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PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION

ON CIA ACTIVITIES

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Langley, Virginia

Wednesday, April 16, 1975

Deposition of WILLIAM C. STURBITTS, called for examination by Counsel for the Commission on CIA Activities, the witness being duly sworn by Thomas C. Hogan, a Notary Public in and for the State of Virginia, in the offices of the Central Intelligence Agency, Langley, Virginia, at 9:50 o'clock a.m., on Wednesday, April 16, 1975, the proceedings being taken down in stenotype by Ruth G. McClenning, and transcribed under her direction.

APPEARANCES:

On behalf of the Commission:

GEORGE MANFREDI, ESQ.,

ROBERT B. OLSEN, ESQ.

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1 P R O C E E D I N G S

2 Thereupon,

3 WILLIAM C. STURBITTS,

4 called as a witness by Counsel for the Commission on CIA

5 Activities, and having been first duly sworn by the Notary

6 Public, was examined and testified as follows:

7 EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE COMMISSION

8 BY MR. MANFREDI:

9 Q Mr. Sturbitts, will you state your full name for the

10 record?

11 A William C. Sturbitts.

12 Q Mr. Sturbitts, do you recall when we spoke some

13 weeks ago you signed a document entitled, "Advice and

14 Waiver"?

15 A Right.

16 Q You understand that document is still in effect?

17 A Sure.

18 Q Mr. Sturbitts, by whom are you currently employed?

19 A You mean the Agency or --

20 Q That is right.

21 A Central Intelligence Agency.

22 Q And what is your current position with the Agency?

23 A I am a Special Assistant, Latin America, for

24 Economic Intelligence Collection and Operations.

25 Q And would you briefly review for me the history of

1 your employment with the Agency?

2 A When I first came in I was in the Intelligence

3 Directorate for approximately ten years and I was put on special

4 detail, special indefinite detail, in the Deputy Director, Plans,

5 which is now the Directorate of Operations.

6 Q What year were you put on that detail?

7 A I guess it was 1964, January, I believe.

8 Q And what did that detail involve?

9 A Cuban operations, economic warfare.

10 Q And how long were you on that detail?

11 A I was in the Cuban operations for nine years.

12 Q Between 1964 and 1973?

13 A (Nods in affirmative.)

14 Q And in 1973 did you assume your current position?

15 A Yes, January.

16 Q Now, while you were on special detail -- to the DOD?

17 A Yes.

18 Q Were you stationed in Washington?

19 A Yes.

20 Q And did you commute with some frequency to Miami?

21 A Yes.

22 Q Were your activities in Miami in any way connected

23 with the operations of the Miami Station?

24 A In some way. My responsibilities were worldwide.

25 I took temporary duty predominantly in Europe, and then Miami.

1 Most of my operations were run out of Europe.

2 Q Run out of --

3 A Europe. Some were run out of Miami but the big ones

4 were run out of Europe.

5 Q Well, in the course of your activities with respect

6 to Cuba did you have occasion to become familiar with the

7 operations of the Miami base?

8 A Yes.

9 Q And the situation in the Cuban community in Miami?

10 A Yes, sir.

11 Q During the nine years you were with DDO's Cuban

12 operations, who was -- who were the chiefs of the Miami

13 Station?

14 A I think in 1963 Ted Shackley was the Chief and he

15 was followed by -- I can't think of his name. I should know

16 it. Well, I will come back to that.

17 Then, the next Chief of Station was Paul Henze.

18 Q What years was he Chief?

19 A I think Paul was there about a year and a half. He

20 left in 1968 when we reduced the size of the Station. Let's

21 say Henze was there from 1966 to 1968. And then Jake Esterline.

22 He was Chief of Station from 1968 to 1973.

23 Q Now, what was the formal title of the group to which

24 you were assigned for the 9-year period?

25 A Well, when I first came in it was known as the

1 Special Activities Staff. It was headed by Desmond Fitzgerald.
2 And then, I believe after that it became the Cuban Operations
3 Group.
4 Q Now, was this a special group within the DDO or was
5 it attached to one of the area divisions?
6 A No. Following the Bay of Pigs, they created a thing
7 called Task Force W which was headed by Bill Harvey. And
8 that -- when Harvey left, he went to Chief of Station, Rome,
9 and Fitzgerald took over, it became Special Activities Staff.
10 It wasn't attached to anything except -- it reported to the
11 Deputy Director, Plans.
12 Q And that was Mr. Karamessines?
13 A Yes. Well, it was Helms at that time back when it
14 was first created. Helms was DDP at that time.
15 Q And Task Force W was created immediately after the
16 Bay of Pigs?
17 A Well, not immediately. I think sometime around --
18 in the Bay of Pigs was in April. I think this was created in
19 September, something like that, 1961.
20 Q And that subsequently became the Special Activities
21 Staff?
22 A Special Activities Staff and consequently became the
23 Cuban Operations Group. As the Cuban Operations Group it went
24 back into the Western Hemisphere Division.
25 Q And what was the date of that reorganization?

1 A Well, let's see. I would say that was probably around
2 1965 because Fitzgerald then became Chief, W.H., and then
3 later DDP.
4 Q Now, Mr.Harvey -- do you recall what position Mr.
5 Harvey held after he left Task Force W?
6 A Yes. He was Chief of Station, Rome.
7 Q And is he still with the Agency?
8 A Oh, no. He retired a long time ago.
9 Q Do you know where he lives at the present time?
10 A Frankly, I don't. I have an idea where he lives.
11 He went to work for a friend of mine who had a law firm.
12 Harvey is a lawyer.
13 Q Indianapolis area?
14 A Yes, some place around there. It is in the midwest,
15 Indiana.
16 Q What was the role that was assigned to Task Force
17 W?
18 A It was the overall Cuban operations.
19 Q Did the Miami -- when was the Miami Station estab-
20 lished?
21 A Well, I think they had a forward operatio-s base down
22 there about 1960 which was small, in Coral Gables.
23 Q This was, then, prior to the Bay of Pigs?
24 A Oh, yes.
25 Q Now, in addition to Task Force W, was the Miami

1 Station running any operations against Cuba?

2 A You mean prior to the Bay of Pigs?

3 Q Yes.

4 A I really don't know. It was a small -- it was a

5 forward base and it was more or less as I recall, a support type

6 thing.

7 Q Well, after the Bay of Pigs when Task Force W was

8 established, did it have sole responsibility for Cuban

9 operations?

10 A Yes.

11 Q Or was that shared with the Miami base, Miami

12 Station?

13 A No. The Miami Station was under Task Force W.

14 Q All right. Would that also be true of the Special

15 Activities Staff, the Cuban Operations Group?

16 A Right, except that at the present time the Station

17 has no Cuban operations.

18 Q I understand that. When were Cuban operations termi-

19 nated?

20 A At the Station? Let's see. Sternfield went down

21 there in 1972. It was during fiscal year '72. I think it was

22 in early 1973. It was a gradual reduction.

23 Q And have those operations been terminated entirely

24 or are they now run out of the Washington area?

25 A All Cuban operations are run out of Washington.

1 There are no more paramilitary operations, that type of thing.

2 Q But there are some Cuban operations being run out of

3 the Washington area?

4 A Right.

5 Q Is that correct?

6 A Right. Worldwide.

7 Q Mr.Sturbitts, in the last couple of weeks you may

8 have seen some allegations in the press about possible assassina-

9 tion attempts that have been mounted or alleged assassination

10 attempts that have been mounted --

11 A Right.

12 Q -- against Fidel Castro. In the course of your

13 activities with respect to Cuba, did you ever learn of any such

14 attempts?

15 A Well, let me answer it this way. I wouldn't say

16 attempts. I know there was discussion. "Attempts" is too

17 strong a word.

18 Q Well, can you place in time your first knowledge of

19 any such discussions?

20 A Well, the first knowledge I had of any discussions,

21 I was on TDY and this was October,November, 1963, with Fitzgerald

22 in Paris. And I knew that he was going to meet -- let me put

23 it another way. I had overheard that discussions were going on

24 with a member of Castro's military but that he wanted, as

25 I recall, he wanted some British -- I mean Belgian rifles and

1 a telescopic sight.

2 Q Who wanted them?

3 A This military guy that was in Fidel's -- I think

4 at one time he was a commandante. Now, I knew that was going

5 on. I didn't participate in it because I was there for another

6 reason. And I know that subsequent to that time that Fitzgerald

7 met with him again and as I recall, as the personal representa-

8 tive of the Attorney General, Bobby Kennedy.

9 I provided all those files. There are 19 volumes that

10 we gave to your people. But I don't know who was reviewing

11 them. I think Belin was going to do it himself.

12 Q Yes. He is. He is doing it himself.

13 You said there were 19 volumes of documents with

14 respect to this.

15 A 19 files, manila.

16 Q All having to do with possible assassination?

17 A All having to do with this whole time period and --

18 can we go off the record for a minute?

19 (Discussion off the record.)

20 BY MR. MANFREDI:

21 Q The first knowledge of such conversations that you

22 had, I take it you obtained on a trip to Europe with Mr.

23 Fitzgerald?

24 A I simply overheard it, that is right.

25 Q And who were the parties to the conversation you over-

1 heard?

2 A A fellow named Nestor Sanchez.

3 Q And Mr. Fitzgerald?

4 A Yes, and I really can't recall some of the other

5 people. We were -- we had just moved the Station at that time,

6 in Paris, out of the Embassy into the old Rothschild Palace

7 and we felt that it was probably bugged, so all conversations

8 took place -- we walked around the garden and tyat type of

9 thing, and, you know, I was walking with somebody, somebody

10 was in front of me, and you just overhear conversations.

11 Q This was in Paris?

12 A Yes.

13 Q I see.

14 Mr. Sanchez -- was he a member of the military?

15 A No. Mr. Sanchez was in the Special Activities Staff.

16 He was stationed in Washington. And he was in contact with

17 Cuban military-type.

18 Q Was it your understanding that the Agency had received

19 instructions with respect to this activity from another

20 component of the Government?

21 A Well, let me put it this way. I don't know whether

22 they received instructions. I have to assume, and I am pretty

23 positive, that this was a result of a Special Group decision.

24 And at this time you have to remember that Bobby Kennedy was

25 overseeing this deal, presumably for his brother, and he was

1 part of that Special Group. He called the meetings, he presided,
2 he did a number of things.
3 Q Were there any other occasions that you can recall
4 in which the possibility or the subject of assassination of
5 Fidel Castro was discussed?
6 A No, not really.
7 Q You referred to this as the first occasion.
8 A This is the first --
9 Q Was there a second?
10 A -- the first time I knew about it or even heard it
11 discussed.
12 Q Well, prior to the investigation that is currently
13 underway -- I am referring now to our Commission's investigation
14 -- were there any other occasions in which this subject came
15 to your attention after this discussion in the garden in
16 Paris?
17 A The only other thing that came to my attention was
18 that the decision was made not to provide him with this sight
19 that he wanted. Whether that is right or wrong, I don't know,
20 but that is what I was told.
21 Q When did you learn that?
22 A Oh, I would assume in -- must have been early 1964,
23 around February, something like that.
24 Q Off the record.
25 (Discussion off the record.)

1 MR. MANFREDI: On the record.

2 BY MR. MANFREDI:

3 Q Mr. Sturbitts, are you familiar with a gentleman by

4 the name of Frank Sturgis?

5 A Indeed.

6 Q Is your familiarity based on what you have read in

7 the press?

8 A No. It is what is contained in the files.

9 Q Have you caused a search to be made of CIA files,

10 particularly the files of the Western Hemisphere Division,

11 in an attempt to determine whether Mr. Sturgis ever had any

12 connection with the Agency?

13 A I have.

14 Q What were the results of that search?

15 A Absolutely no connection, never has been.

16 Q When we talk about connection, are we talking about

17 an employment relationship?

18 A That is what I am speaking of.

19 Q Was Mr.Sturgis ever an independent contractor of

20 the Agency?

21 A No.

22 Q Was he ever a contract employee?

23 A No.

24 Q Was he ever a regular employee of the Agency?

25 A No.

1 Q Was he ever hired to do any piecework for the
2 Agency?
3 A Not to my knowledge.
4 Q Do you know whether or not Mr. Sturgis ever partici-
5 pated in any type of paramilitary or other operation against
6 Cuba?
7 A On his own behalf he did, not on behalf of this
8 Agency.
9 Q How did you learn of those operations?
10 A Through the newspaper. And through FBI reports.
11 Q Now, are these recent FBI reports?
12 A Oh, no. These go back -- I know at one time, the
13 thing that comes to mind, I think he made a leaflet drop
14 over Cuba and this was subsequently reported in the press and
15 by the Bureau office in Miami.
16 Q Do you know who financed his activities?
17 A I have no idea.
18 Q Is it possible that Mr. Sturgis' activities were
19 indirectly financed by the Agency through --
20 A I don't see how. Frank Sturgis is a soldier of
21 fortune; has been. He has constantly tried to associate himself
22 with the Agency. When I went through his file they wanted me
23 to classify the file and the way I classified it was "don't
24 destroy it, he is an intelligence nuisance."
25 Q Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

MR. MANFREDI: On the record.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q Have you caused the Agency records with respect to Mr. Sturgis to be assembled in any one location?

A Yes. Ihave custody of them.

Q And what is the volume of that material?

A As I recall, there are five volumes. Your Committee called for them the other day after the article in the paper, I guess it was last Saturday. They called for them Monday and they returned them Monday afternoon.

Q Do you know who examined those files?

A No, I don't.

Q You indicated a moment ago that Mr. Sturgis contacts the DCD office in Miami with some frequency, is that correct?

A Well, not great frequency but he does with tidbits of so-called information.

Q Is this information limited to narcotics, alleged narcotics traffic?

A Recently it has been.

Q Has Mr. Sturgis been encouraged by the DCD office in Miami?

A Mr. Sturgis has been told by the DCD office in Miami to take his information to the Drug Enforcement Agency or the FBI.

1 Q Do you know whether or not they consider him an
2 established contact?
3 A No manner.
4 Q Do they have any -- do they periodically seek to
5 collect information from Mr. Sturgis?
6 A I can't speak to that but the records that we have
7 don't reflect anything like that. Before they would contact
8 somebody in that context, knowing that there is a 201 file
9 on Sturgis, they would have to coordinate with the Latin
10 American Division before they did anything since we do hold
11 the file.
12 Q Would you briefly explain what a 201 file is?
13 A A 201 file is a personnel file. It consists of any
14 information relating to an individual appearing in the press
15 as a result of other agency reporting and that type of thing.
16 Q Personnel or personality file?
17 A Personality file, I should say. Excuse me.
18 Q Do you know whether or not there is any connection
19 or relationship between Eugenio Martinez and Mr. Sturgis?
20 A Well, I will say this. Obviously, they do know
21 each other. They have to know each other from their days
22 in Cuba.
23 Q Do you know whether or not Mr. Sturgis ever partici-
24 pated with Martinez in raids against Cuba?
25 A No. As I recall, we employed Martinez around 1961,

1 I guess, and he was in our maritime activities. He was a
2 boat captain eventually. And he did participate in infiltrations
3 and exfiltrations and perhaps one or two raids, hit and run,
4 sabotage-type actions against Cuba. Sturgis never engaged in
5 any of these things. He never did it for us nor did he ever
6 do it on any of our boats, planes, or -- anything that belongs
7 to the Agency.

8 Q When Martinez would run such an operation or captain
9 a boat on such an operation, would he be charged with putting
10 together his own crew?

11 A No. He had an assigned crew and every boat had a
12 Case Officer operating either out of the -- probably out of
13 the Miami Station. Sometimes I would assume that we did have
14 some people in the Key West base. But he, Martinez, would receive
15 his instructions and briefings from his Case Officer.

16 Q So it is likely that he could have brought Sturgis
17 along on any of these operations?

18 A Absolutely unlikely. Oh, the guy whose name I was
19 trying to think of, Chief of Station, John Dimmer.

20 Q And that would be for a period of time between
21 Shackley and Henze?

22 A Yes.

23 Q 1964 to 1966?

24 A Something like that.

25 Q Would you describe briefly for me the nature of the

1 activities conducted by the Special Activities Staff during
2 your -- and subsequently the Cuban Operations Group during
3 your 9-year tenure with those groups.
4 A Well, there was -- it was an across-the-board
5 intelligence operation consisting of collection of foreign
6 positive intelligence, counterintelligence, paramilitary
7 activities, covert action, economic activities. That is about
8 the breadth of the thing.
9 Q Now, these were all conducted through the DDO?
10 A Right.
11 Q Now, let's speak for a moment about the paramilitary
12 operations. Were these operations run out of southern
13 Florida?
14 A Right.
15 Q And in particular out of the Miami Station?
16 A Yes.
17 Q Were there any other CIA facilities in that area of
18 the country that participated in these activities?
19 A Not to my knowledge.
20 Q Were there any southern harbors other than Miami
21 that were used in these activities?
22 A Well, we had activities down in the Keys also. As
23 I said, we did have a Key West base.
24 Q Were there any other bases in that area of the
25 country that were utilized in these operations?

1 A Well, not that I would call a base. We did have
2 training facilities for the UDT teams.
3 Q What is a UDT team?
4 A Underwater demolition.
5 Q Where were those bases located?
6 A I frankly don't know. They were down along the Keys,
7 along that long peninsula going down there. There were a
8 number of sites. I really can't recall them.
9 Q Were there any other sites within the United States
10 in which paramilitary training was conducted, for people
11 participating in these activities?
12 A Not to my knowledge.
13 Q Where were these people trained?
14 A What do you mean?
15 Q Well, Cubans who participated in these activities.
16 A We trained them at these places we had in the Keys.
17 Now, there also -- some of them were brought up here and trained
18 at the Domestic Training Station.
19 Q Where is that located?
20 A That is down in Virginia.
21 Q Were any CIA personnel actually involved in these
22 raids?
23 A Occasionally, I would think that -- you have got to
24 understand at this time that we had a great many contract
25 employees, independent contractors and this type of thing.

1 Most of the paramilitary operations and the training was
2 conducted by the Special Operations Group which is another
3 entity of the --
4 Q DDO?
5 A DDO.
6 Q Now, the facilities that we have been talking about,
7 training facilities, were manned, then, by the Special
8 Operations Group, or at least supervised by the Special
9 Operations Group, is that correct?
10 A Well, supervised, yes, and I would think that probably
11 some of the training was given by their people. The Domestic
12 Training Station is under the Office of Training and -- but I
13 would think that in the paramilitary field that the SOG would
14 probably staff the training facility with their people who have
15 the expertise in paramilitary operations.
16 Q Now, were the people that were being trained at
17 these facilities basically Cuban refugees?
18 A Yes.
19 Q And at the outset I take it not many of those people
20 were American citizens?
21 A No.
22 Q Or had become American citizens.
23 A I would assume a great many have.
24 Q By this time.
25 A By this time, yes.

1 Q At the present time, how large is that Cuban community
2 in Miami? Do you have any idea?
3 A Well, it is extremely large. I would think it is
4 probably -- I was trying to think. I would say up towards a
5 military people.
6 Q You spoke about paramilitary operations and covert
7 action. How do you distinguish between those two categories
8 of activities?
9 A Well, actually one can fall into the other. The
10 paramilitary could fall into covert action but in those days
11 we did distinguish somewhat. A lot of the covert action was
12 media placement. We had a number of operations at -- legal-
13 type operations, harassment operations. For instance, Fidel
14 seized a great many art treasures and in particular he had a
15 Napoleonic collection which was supposed to be the finest in
16 the world that he sold to dealers in Europe. He had paintings
17 that were immensely valuable that he tried to have auctioned
18 in London and the London auctioneer would not accept them
19 because he obviously didn't have clear title to them. He was
20 -- they were stolen,in the eyes of the auctioneer. He was
21 forced to auction them in Toronto, Canada.
22 We ran legal operations, got the owners and had them
23 hire attorneys and bring them to court and this type of thing.
24 He seized these race horses. He tried to peddle them
25 in Europe and up in Canada. We ran opposition against that

type of thing.

Q These were what you considered to be covert operations?

A Yes, covert action.

Q Now, this is what you were referring to, legal-type operations?

A Yes.

Q You used legal process to harass Castro.

A Yes.

Q What other types of harassment activities did you run that would fall under this covert action category?

A Well --

Q Would economic warfare be --

A That was sort of something separate unto itself. This was -- the economic warfare aspect of this thing was a decision of the Special Group to enforce an economic blockade.

Q What special group is that?

A It is now called the Forty Committee.

Q Is that 302 Committee?

A Well, it was a 302 at one time, too. First of all, it was called the Special Group, CI, Counterinsurgency. Then it went to the 302 and then it had another name in between there and now it is the Forty Committee.

Q All right. We will return to that a little bit later, but what other types of harassment were you running against Castro --

1 A This is what I was trying to think of.

2 Q -- that would be considered covert action?

3 A Well, as I say, a lot of propaganda, press placement,
4 media placement. It has been so long ago I really don't
5 remember. I know we had a number of things going against him.
6 We used suasion, moral suasion, otherwise. We did some
7 extra-legal things. We tried to get to his sources of supply,
8 particularly when they were countries that we had treaties
9 with, NATO countries, Canada, this type of thing.

10 Q Let's talk about each of those in turn. You said
11 you used moral suasion. What kind of activities are you
12 referring to?

13 A Well, in the moral suasion field we -- actually, we
14 were the catalyst in this whole thing and we had the legal
15 activities, the legal -- well, I don't know how you would
16 phrase it, but we operated under the Cuban access control
17 regulations of the Treasury Department, the Trading with the
18 Enemy Act, and we also used the facilities of the Department of
19 Commerce, the Export Control people.

20 I guess as you are aware, Cuban industry was totally
21 U.S.-oriented. As parts began wearing out and this type of
22 thing, Castro had his little people there running around trying
23 to place orders with subsidiaries of U.S. companies. Where
24 we would find this out through all-source intelligence, we
25 or the Treasury people or the Commerce people would go to the

1 executives of these American companies and ask them to tell
2 their foreign subsidiaries not to provide the spare parts
3 and the other things that Castro might need. We had the
4 Department of Commerce -- we identified 600 of the major U.S.
5 companies that could provide spare parts for Cuban industry.
6 We had the Department of Commerce send letters to those 600
7 manufacturers and ask them to cooperate with them in denying
8 any spare parts to the Cubans. This was a fairly concentrated
9 effort to really isolate them.
10 Q All right. And that is what you were referring to
11 as moral suasion?
12 A Yes.
13 Q Anything else in that category?
14 A Not really. None that I can think of.
15 Q Did you make the same kind of efforts with foreign
16 companies?
17 A At one point we did but it was absolutely useless,
18 the point in case being the Leyland buses. We pulled all stops
19 to stop that sale. The British Government turned us down
20 flat.
21 Q Now, did you attempt to reach any other sources of
22 supply?
23 A Well, we also had what we call a preemptive purchasing
24 program. If there was a single source of supply for a
25 particular item we would go in and buy it to deny the Cubans

1 the market.

2 Q Would that then be re-sold somewhere on the domestic --

3 A Yes.

4 Q -- domestic market?

5 A No. It would be re-sold abroad.

6 Q In all cases?

7 A The cases that I was associated with, it was all

8 sold abroad.

9 Q What kind of purchases were made?

10 A Well, we purchased at one point -- we purchased

11 some Bright Stock in Antwerp.

12 Q What?

13 A Bright Stock.

14 Q What is that?

15 A Heavy, heavy oil, and since Cuba -- 85 percent of

16 her energy comes from oil, this was considered a critical

17 commodity. Bright Stock can be -- oh, it is almost like tar,

18 melted tar, and it can be cut into additives, lubricants, this

19 type of thing, and this was critical to the Cuban economy. So

20 we had an oil firm purchase this Bright Stock from a dealer for

21 which we reimbursed the guy and the Bright Stock was eventually

22 sold in Africa.

23 Q Do you know of any sales of such materials that

24 were made within the United States? Resales, I should say.

25 A No.

1 Q In addition to preemptive buying were there any
2 other actions taken by this group with respect to sources of
3 supply to Cuba?
4 A Well, we did provide through third country agents
5 who got orders for Cuban goods, in collusion with the Commerce
6 Department, and I would assume the Special Group, we had
7 replacement parts manufactured that were substandard.
8 Q And you had them sold through foreign companies?
9 A Well, we had our agents get the Cuban orders all
10 over Europe. Then they would come back and, as a matter of fact,
11 the former Secretary of Commerce, who is on your Committee, Des.
12 and I met him and he gave us the go-ahead to do this.
13 Q Mr. Dillon?
14 A No. He was Secretary of the Treasury.
15 Q But --
16 A But you must remember that these American --
17 Q Mr. Connors?
18 A Yes. But you must remember these American manufacturers,
19 well, their places were nationalized and they were only too
20 happy to work with us. And actually, it was a cash deal, bona
21 fide business. These things were transshipped through two
22 or three countries, finally wound up in Havana.
23 Q You referred to some extra-legal activities.
24 A Yes. That is what I was trying to think of, what
25 we did. I just can't think -- I remember this was on one of

1 our activities but I just can't think -- I remember this was
2 on one of our activities but I just can't remember what the
3 extra-legal was. I just can't remember what it was. I know
4 it was one of the parts of the program.
5 Q This was illegal activities? Is that what you are
6 referring to?
7 A Well, I wouldn't say they were illegal, but they
8 weren't exactly legal, I don't think. Perhaps they were in a
9 gray area some place.
10 Q Well, whose laws are we talking about, international
11 law, the laws of the United States?
12 A I would have to go back and review the thing. I
13 really can't remember this. I would have to go to the files.
14 Q Where could we find that kind of thing in the files?
15 A I would think probably down in the Records Center some
16 place.
17 Q Would it be possible to obtain that material some
18 time during the lunch hour?
19 A No. It is forty miles away.
20 Q Well, is there some place in the building where
21 you could refresh your memory?
22 A Not to my knowledge. All that stuff has been shipped.
23 This is talking 11 years ago, 12 years ago. All that material
24 has been retired.
25 Q What category of activity would we be talking about

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when we refer to extra-legal activities?

A This is what I was trying to think of and I can't think of what it was. I know extra-legal activities was one parts of the program that we were involved in.

I might have a chart in my safe downstairs that might tell me what that is.

Q Well, let's make a note of that and we will have to come back to that.

A All right.

Q Who else would be knowledgeable about extra-legal activities that were run against Castro?

A Well, the people that would be knowledgeable are probably retired and I was running the program. So I ran the economic program.

Q Well, these are activities that were run in connection with the economic program?

A Yes.

Q We talked about media placement during this nine-year period. To what are you referring when you refer to media placement?

A Well, stories or news items that perhaps our propaganda people wrote. We had them placed in newspapers and magazines throughout the world.

Q Would this also include broadcasts over radio stations?

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1 A Oh, yes. Radio is a very big part of it.

2 Q Now, were any of these newspapers or magazines

3 published within the United States?

4 A Not to my knowledge, no.

5 Q These were essentially foreign publications?

6 A Yes.

7 Q Were any of them published in the Cuban community

8 in Miami?

9 A No. The intent was to get world opinion against

10 Castro. You don't do that by publishing in the United States.

11 Q What about the radio broadcasts? How were those

12 handled?

13 A Are you speaking of Radio Swan now?

14 Q Well, I am unfamiliar with how many radio stations

15 were involved. Was there more than one radio station?

16 A No. We only had the one radio station but we did

17 contract time with Florida stations, a station in New York.

18 Q For broadcasts to what areas?

19 A For broadcasts to Havana.

20 Q And the station in New York, was that received also

21 -- was that also broadcasting to various areas of the United

22 States?

23 A I have no idea. I don't know whether they used a

24 particular frequency to get this out or whether they did it

25 on short-wave or what they did.

1 Q But the intention was to reach Cuba.

2 A Reach Cuba.

3 Q You referred to a station in New York, referred to

4 as Swan. Were there others?

5 A There were a couple in Miami that I recall. Not in

6 Miami. I think there was one -- yes, there was one in Miami,

7 I think, and one down in Key West that they used.

8 Q Where was Radio Swan located?

9 A On Swan Island.

10 Q Where is Swan Island?

11 A Swan Island is a little glob around Honduras.

12 Q As far as you can recall, were there any other

13 radio stations in the United States that were utilized to

14 broadcast propaganda materials toward Cuba?

15 A Well, there conceivably could have been, not that

16 I recall right now.

17 Q Do you recall any attempts by the Agency or groups

18 affiliated with the Agency to raise money from the American

19 public to support those propaganda activities?

20 A No. As far as I know, Radio Swan and this type of

21 thing was fully subsidized by the Agency.

22 Q Do you recall the advertising campaigns that were

23 run in connection with Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty?

24 A Oh, yes.

25 Q Was anything of that nature done in connection with

Cuban propaganda?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q And that would include both the publications and the radio?

A Right.

Q Let's talk about economic warfare for a couple of moments. Could you describe for me briefly the type of economic activities that were conducted against Castro?

A Well, first of all, we wanted to denigrate the regime, his credit worthiness, and this type of thing. We worked very closely with the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs in the State Department and, well, for instance, in those days, I guess it was back in 1964, the price of sugar had jumped from about a penny a pound to 13 cents a pound, something like that, and we couldn't understand why. So we kept -- Fidel kept saying that he had such a poor crop and this type of thing and we just couldn't figure out why he had such a poor crop because some of our own island assets told us they were out there cutting this cane like mad and the mills were working 24 hours a day, this type of thing. So subsequently, we found out that he was lying and he was storing the raw cane in the schools, any place. He had no storage facilities and put it any place he could.

So in cooperation with a couple of sugar brokers in New York, we surfaced this fact and the price of sugar took a

1 real tumble and all of a sudden then Cuba started exporting.

2 It was this type of thing that obviously he was

3 trying to build up the world price because he didn't have any

4 money, he was so short on his exchange, and obviously we didn't

5 want him to get the exchange. So it was those types of

6 activities.

7 Q Was the assistance of any U.S. businessmen or U.S.

8 companies enlisted in that effort?

9 A Oh, yes.

10 Q In what manner did you use U.S. companies and

11 businessmen?

12 A Well, we simply used them as the experts. A great

13 many -- the sugar industry in Cuba was controlled by the

14 American community, by American bankers, and obviously they

15 lost everything when they had to pull out. Sugar is the

16 lifeline of Cuba as far as any exchange, foreign exchange, this

17 type of thing, and it was naturally our Number 1 target. So it

18 was only natural that we would go to the American businessmen.

19 Q What kind of assistance did you seek or obtain from

20 these businessmen?

21 A Well, we simply talked with them about why -- you

22 know, the market conditions were, why the price was rising, if

23 we could find out that Fidel has plenty of sugar, what would

24 happen to the market price. This type of thing.

25 Q They were used as consultants, basically.

1 A They were used as consultants, basically, yes.

2 Q We have spoken about the investment American business

3 had in Cuba. Did it ever come to your attention that American

4 organized crime --

5 A No.

6 Q -- had considerable investment in Cuba?

7 A No. Well, everybody knew that the Mafia was in

8 Cuba. I mean, all the casinos and this type of thing.

9 Q The casinos were run --

10 A I knew that long before. When I was in the Air Force

11 during the war, I used to fly into Havana on weekends and this

12 type of thing.

13 Q I understand that. It was fairly well known.

14 A It was a criminal element.

15 Q The Mafia was involved with the casinos in Havana.

16 A Right.

17 Q Do you know of any attempts by the Agency to enlist

18 the support or assistance of any crime figures in any manner

19 whatsoever in the Agency's efforts against the Cuban regime?

20 A No.

21 Q Have you ever heard of Mr.Roselli?

22 A Oh, yes.

23 Q When was the first time you heard of Mr. Roselli?

24 A Well, I guess it was -- it seems to me it was either

25 Drew Pearson or Jack Anderson had an article on him a number

1 of years ago.

2 Q Was that the first time you heard of the man's

3 name?

4 A Yes, as I recall.

5 Q Is that also true of Sam Giancana?

6 A No. I have heard that name but I don't know where.

7 Q In connection with --

8 A Not in connection with the Agency, no.

9 Q In connection with the casinos or --

10 A No.

11 Q -- gambling interests in Cuba?

12 A No.

13 Q You know of no instance in which organized crime

14 figures were used as consultants by the Agency?

15 A Only what I read in the paper. I had no knowledge

16 of that whatsoever.

17 Q Do you know of any offers of assistance from figures

18 of that type --

19 A No.

20 Q -- who were interested in getting back into cuba?

21 A No.

22 Q We were talking about economic warfare. We have

23 talked about attempts to keep the price of sugar low. What other

24 types of economic activities were conducted against Castro's

25 Cuba?

1 A Well, we used all-source information to find out what
2 his commercial dealings were. When we would see -- well, for
3 instance, the Nicaro Nickel Mine which is a source owned
4 by the General Services Administration, finally got back into
5 production and nickel, of course, and still is -- was in short
6 supply. We had a French firm, Societe le Nickel, who was
7 buying almost the entire output of the Nicaro mines. And this
8 French firm ex ported to the United States. So we went to
9 the Treasury Department and to the Foreign Assets Control
10 people and said, isn't there something we can do to stop these
11 le Nickel exports coming into the United States? So they looked
12 into the thing and indeed they did.
13 Q Who owned the mine?
14 A The U.S. Government owned it when Castro took it
15 over.
16 Q I see.
17 A General Services Administration. And it was leased
18 out for operation. But the ownership rested with the
19 Government.
20 So the Treasury simply made the French provide a
21 Certificate of Origin for the nickel that went in -- they
22 export a lot of metal that contains nickel, silverware, knives
23 and forks, this type of thing, and -- you know, stainless
24 steel, and since nickel is used as a hardening agent we simply
25 -- Treasury simply said you can't import any more into this

1 country until we have a Certificate of Origin. As a matter
2 of fact, there was a boat that was pulling into the dock in
3 New York and they wouldn't let it unload. They just turned it
4 around. Eventually, over a period of months, le Nickel
5 found other sources and export privileges to the United States
6 were restored.

7 You know, it is -- you just -- any time you raise
8 or lower a tariff you have economic warfare. It is that
9 simple.

10 Q Were there any other instances that you can recall
11 of economic warfare in which you enlisted the support of
12 American business firms?

13 A I know we were in touch with a great many American
14 business firms. We enlisted everybody's support that we could.

15 MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

16 (Discussion off the record.)

17 BY MR. MANFREDI:

18 Q When we broke for a moment we were discussing other
19 instances where the Agency has enlisted the support of American
20 business in economic warfare against Cuba. Can you think of
21 any other such instances?

22 A Oh, certainly. The Cubans were having an awful time
23 with their Maritime fleet, such as it was. These boats were
24 powered with Nordberg engines. We simply went to the Nordberg
25 people and told them -- asked them to cooperate with us, which

1 they said they would. They notified their manufacturer's
2 representatives around the world if they got any orders from
3 the Cubans they were to be refused. This type of thing.
4 We did the same thing with --
5 Q Let's just stop for a second. Now, was Nordberg
6 compensated in any way for cooperation with the Agency?
7 A No.
8 Q Were they compensated for the loss of business
9 involved in that activity?
10 A No. No.
11 Q I take it, you received similar cooperation from
12 other companies.
13 A Oh, a great many other companies, yes.
14 Q Did any American companies refuse to cooperate in
15 that manner?
16 A No. Not a one.
17 Q Were there any legal sanctions threatened against any
18 companies?
19 A No. No.
20 Q Were there any sanctions that could have been brought
21 to bear upon those companies had they chosen to trade with
22 Cuba?
23 A Well, in the first place, they couldn't trade with
24 Cuba. They couldn't get export licenses from this country
25 anyway. Then, under the Foreign Assets Control Act of the

1 Treasury Department you have the extra-territorialty clause
2 in there where a subsidiary of an American company cannot --
3 foreign subsidiary of an American company cannot trade with
4 the country that is designated and Cuba was a designated country.
5 And all the businessmen were well aware of this. Nobody tried
6 to twist their arm.

7 Q Other than insuring that these companies refused
8 to accept orders from Cuba, which I take it you feel they were
9 legally constrained from doing, what other types of support did
10 you receive from American business?

11 A Well, if American business -- sometimes they would
12 receive correspondence, particularly, say, from -- well, they
13 received it from Cuba asking for publications and this type
14 of thing. They would normally forward all this type of thing
15 to the Commerce Department and the Treasury Department, or in
16 some instances they might call me and I would just give them
17 a Post Office box to send the correspondence to.

18 Q Any other types of support solicited or received by
19 the Agency from American business?

20 A No. Not that I can recall. There just wasn't one
21 firm we approached, and God knows we approached I don't know
22 how many, that wasn't extremely cooperative. As a matter of
23 fact, a lot of them, you know, thought we weren't doing enough,
24 that we ought to do a little more than we were doing, the
25 government wasn't really pushing Cuba the way it should, but

1 outside of that, nothing. There wasn't any problem of coopera-
2 tion. There wasn't any arm-twisting. It was all voluntary.
3 Q Did you identify yourself as CIA --
4 A Yes.
5 Q -- in dealings with these companies?
6 A Indeed, I do and we went to the top level, even
7 the Board Chairman or the president. No problem at all.
8 Q Let's talk about paramilitary operations. We started
9 but didn't really discuss that in any depth.
10 What kind of paramilitary operations were run
11 against Cuba by the CIA?
12 A Maritime operations.
13 Q Is that the extent of it?
14 A That is the extent of it.
15 Q Were there any aerial operations?
16 A Not to my knowledge.
17 Q Leaflet drops?
18 A No.
19 Q Bombing?
20 A No. Of course, you had the over-flights. As far as
21 I am concerned that is the only aerial activity.
22 Q That was run by another directorate, wasn't it?
23 A Yes.
24 Q Aerial photography, and so forth.
25 A Yes. They run a flight when you ask them. It has to

1 be requested and that is about it.

2 Q And those were run out of the United States?

3 A Oh, yes.

4 Q Can you think of anything, any other type of para-

5 military activity other than maritime operations.

6 A No. I really can't, no.

7 Q Am I correct that those operations were manned

8 by CIA contract employees?

9 A Right.

10 Q Which would include Cuban refugees.

11 A Right.

12 Q And some CIA officers?

13 A Right.

14 Q Any other branches of the services, Armed Services,

15 involved? This, of course, is posted Bay of Pigs.

16 A Yes. No, not to my knowledge. You have got to remember

17 that probably down at our Domestic Training Station we

18 probably have people on detail from other -- from the military

19 branches in the Government, but other than that I don't think

20 that -- of course, during the Bay of Pigs operation we also

21 had people detailed into the Agency.

22 Q Now, the training of persons involved in maritime

23 operations, I take it, was conducted in part within the

24 United States and in part outside of the United States. Is

25 that correct?

1 A I would think probably the major portion of it was
2 conducted within the United States.
3 Q The Keys would be considered within the United
4 States.
5 A Oh, yes.
6 Q Or were there any locations where it was conducted
7 outside the United States?
8 A Following the Bay of Pigs,I don't think so. Not
9 to my knowledge. I just don't know, I just don't recall
10 but I don't think that -- I think all the training was done
11 domestically.
12 Q Now, what kinds of operations are included within
13 this category of maritime operations?
14 A Well, the infiltration operations, infiltrating
15 agents into Cuba, exfiltrating agents, hit and run sabotage
16 raids. That is about the extent of it.
17 Q Now, when did these operations commence? Was it
18 shortly after the Bay of Pigs?
19 A I would -- I think these operations were probably
20 at their height during the period about 1963 through, say,
21 1967. The program was terminated in 1968, I think in December
22 1968, something like that.
23 Q Why was the program terminated?
24 A First of all, it was too expensive. It wasn't provid-
25 ing enough intelligence and it simply wasn't -- economically,

1 it wasn't feasible to continue these things. The agents were
2 getting wrapped up. We were -- we just felt that the return
3 wasn't sufficient for what the investment was.
4 Q You say the agents were getting wrapped up.
5 A Yes.
6 Q What do you mean by that?
7 A When we infiltrated an agent, Cubans would identify
8 him and capture him.
9 Q These various types of paramilitary operations that
10 were conducted by the Agency I trust were approved by the
11 Forty Committee?
12 A Every operation received a specific approval from
13 the Forty Committee.
14 Q In advance?
15 A In advance.
16 Q Now, what was the procedure for submitting -- for
17 initiating such an operation?
18 A Well, normally in the case of an infil or an exfil.
19 or perhaps we wanted to lay down the cache.
20 Q You are referring to a cache of arms.
21 A A cache of anything, replay of radio, batteries,
22 whatever they might need. If we decided that we should have
23 one of these operations and the request would go from here
24 over to the, I guess to the White House and then the Forty
25 Committee at its weekly meeting -- they used to meet very

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1 frequently -- they would either approve the operation or say
2 no. These operations had to be planned well in advance because
3 the tides had to be right, the moon had to be in the proper
4 phase for communications and this type of thing. And these
5 things, all these were coordinated with the Joint Chiefs of
6 Staff, the Navy, the Coast Guard, the FBI. If we were
7 exiltrating people, the Immigration and Naturalization Service.
8 Every Government agency or enforcement agency or military
9 agency that had any involvement whatsoever, and the entire
10 thing was coordinated.

11 Q Do you know of any such paramilitary operations
12 that were run unbeknownst to the Forty Committee?

13 A No.

14 Q What kind of volume of operations are we talking
15 about?

16 A You are not talking about a very big volume of
17 operations because of the planning that had to go into these
18 things. I would say that probably at the height of the thing
19 they may be running three or four a month. No more than that.

20 Q You have heard Eugenio Martinez refer to having
21 run 300 operations.

22 A I have seen that.

23 Q Is that inaccurate?

24 A Well, it all depends on what is in his mind. He
25 may have considered some of the training exercises as opera-

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1 tions. Obviously, these guys trained. In order to run one
2 of these operations, you know, you would have to have a mother
3 ship in place and rubber boats and the UDT people to go in to
4 see if there were mines and this type of thing on the shore
5 before you go. So he may have considered that all these train-
6 ing exercises were operations but no way did he ever partici-
7 pate in any three or 400 active operations into Cuba.

8 Q Now, from what specific locations were these
9 operations launched?

10 A They were mostly launched from the Keys.

11 Q Any other locations?

12 A Not to my knowledge.

13 Q Now, would you describe for me the kind of hit and
14 run sabotage operations that were conducted?

15 A Well, we conducted one hit and run sabotage against
16 the Texaco refinery.

17 Q What used to be the Texaco refinery?

18 A What used to be the Texaco refinery.

19 MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

20 (Discussion off the record.)

21 THE WITNESS: These things, a great amount of planning
22 went into these things. We did have a model of the refinery.
23 We agonized over the best approach to the refinery and this
24 type of thing to do the most effective damage. This was run. It
25 was successful, as I recall, not totally successful but it was

1 a successful operation. By that, I mean they didn't do as
2 much damage as they wanted to because they had to get out
3 because the Cuban defense came after them. It was that type
4 of operation that we did.
5 As I recall, another time we took a team in to burn
6 some cane fields. Really, the classical operations that we
7 did in the maritime activities were the infiltrations and
8 exfiltrations.
9 Q Were any CIA operations run out of Guantanamo?
10 A Not to my knowledge.
11 Q Was it impractical to use the base there for --
12 A Well, the base is so surrounded and has been that
13 I think if a guy went through that fence you would carry him
14 back. He wouldn't walk.
15 MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.
16 (Discussion off the record.)
17 MR. MANFREDI: Back on the record.
18 BY MR. MANFREDI:
19 Q Are there any other categories of sabotage run out
20 of the Keys other than what you have just described?
21 A Well, we did lay down a cache, if you will, sabotage
22 kits to be used by our own island agents. They contained
23 sugar to dump into gas tanks and metal fragments to put down
24 crank cases. Things of this nature.
25 One of our main objects was to, of course, sabotage

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1 all the oil. We did that with a big operation. We made our
2 own oil, substandard. Additives, I should say, not oil. We
3 contracted with an American firm for that. And we shipped
4 it in through third countries in Europe. It did hit the target.
5 The thing we wanted to get at was the oil and the
6 automotive machinery on the island. We knew it was breaking
7 down and if we could get a complete breakdown we would have
8 everything at a standstill because in those days the automotive
9 equipment wasn't coming in that rapidly from Europe because
10 Castro didn't hve the money to buy it and they weren't going to
11 extend the credit.
12 The railroad system was in total disaster. The
13 Soviets had such a long logistics line, supply line, plus
14 the fact that the Cubans didn't like the Soviet equipment
15 because they were used to good American equipment. And these
16 were principal targets that we were trying to get to.
17 Q In your experience at the Agency can you think of
18 any other analogus or similar paramilitary operations run
19 from a base in the United States?
20 A No.
21 Q I know there has been some paramilitary training
22 in the United States.
23 A Oh, yes.
24 Q In connection with other operations.
25 A Oh, sure.

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1 Q But do you know of any paramilitary operations that
2 were actually run out of the United States?
3 A No.
4 Q As far as you know, then, this is a totally unique
5 situation.
6 A As far as I am concerned, it is, yes.
7 Q Now, how large a Navy was actually organized in
8 Miami? On a previous occasion you described this to me as
9 the third largest Navy in the Caribbean.
10 A That is right.
11 Q What kind of equipment did these people have?
12 A Well, we had -- honestly, everything from a canoe
13 up to three to 500 foot mother ship. We had Boston whalers,
14 rubber boats. We had a number of craft in, say, the 27 to
15 45 foot length. And they looked like real tubs. They were
16 painted and they looked like they wouldn't even float but
17 they had the fastest engines in them. They could outrun any-
18 thing. They were extremely well armed. We had our under-
19 water demolition teams. We had a pretty good Navy.
20 Q Did these craft operate under non-official cover
21 in the Miami area?
22 A Yes.
23 Q Were there a variety of covers or was there one
24 firm?
25 A No. Variety.

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1 Q Fishing companies?

2 A Well, fishing companies, Geodetic Survey, marine
3 supply. In all, I think during the period that the station
4 and these other entities were under commercial cover, or non-
5 official cover, I think we had 100 so cover companies.

6 Q Did any of these companies actually engage in any
7 legitimate commercial activities?

8 A Not to my knowledge, no.

9 Q None of them -- were any of them in competition with
10 firms in that area?

11 A These are probably what we would call devised
12 facilities. They were probably registered with the State of
13 Florida and they paid taxes and this type of thing, but if one
14 was blown or became known, we just crossed that out of
15 existence and started up a new one.

16 Q What did Eugenio Martinez do when he wasn't running
17 these operations?

18 A Well, he was down -- this is one of the reasons, as
19 I told you before, we brought him back and put him under that
20 contract, that retainer, because of the years that he spent
21 under such strict operational discipline down in the Keys.
22 Obviously, he didn't stay down there all the time. He
23 came back -- he might come back once a month, or something
24 like that, to see his family, perhaps once every two weeks
25 if he got some time off.

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1 Q I see. So some of these boats and personnel were
2 actually stationed full-time in the Keys.
3 A Oh, yes. Oh, sure.
4 Q Were there any operations run out of the United
5 States which involved destruction of crops or poisoning of
6 sugar or anything of that sort?
7 A What did you have in mind specifically? You mean the
8 Puerto Rican thing?
9 A Well, that is one of the things I had in mind.
10 Would you describe that for me?
11 A Well, this is, I guess you could term it a target of
12 opportunity. This was where a vessel was carrying Cuban sugar
13 to the Soviet Union and I forget exactly now what happened to
14 it but I know that it got a hole below the waterline, or
15 something, and had to put into Puerto Rico for repairs.
16 In order to repair it, I guess, and get it in the
17 drydock or wherever it was, they had to remove the sugar and
18 put it in the warehouse and at that time I guess somebody came
19 up with a plan to try to widen the rift between -- there was
20 a rift at that time between the Soviets and Cubans and to
21 put a harmless substance into the sugar that would make it
22 acid, sour tasting, and it wouldn't harm the sugar or the
23 individual, and some of this was done. And then when it
24 leaked, of course, we had to get rid of it and we had a sugar
25 firm buy it back from the Soviets.

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1 Q Bought it back from the Soviets?

2 A Yes.

3 MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

4 (Discussion off the record.)

5 MR.MANFREDI: Back on the record.

6 BY MR. MANFREDI:

7 Q Are there any other operations in which crops were

8 -- were there attempts to destroy crops in Cuba?

9 A No. No.

10 Q Place foreign substances in Cuban products?

11 A In Cuban products?

12 Q Yes.

13 A No. Not that I recall. You see, Cuba really -- in

14 those days the only thing, Cuba was exporting sugar and nickel.

15 The agriculture sector of the economy was in absolutely total

16 chaos. God, they didn't have any citrus, they didn't have

17 anything, and the poor people in Cuba were literally starving.

18 There just wasn't anything to eat. And Fidel was going around

19 with this big plan -- of course, there were a number of

20 experimental cattle ranches in Cuba. King Ranch had one there.

21 I forget -- several other European and American companies that

22 had experimental cattle ranches there and they were experiment-

23 ing with the, you know, cross-breeding and this type of thing.

24 Fidel was preoccupied with this. He went up to

25 Canada and paid $100,000 for a bull and -- so he just put it

1 on an old Cuban Airways airplane. The damn airplane few too
2 high and the bull became sterile by the time he landed in
3 Cuba. No thought given to, you know, pressurizing the cabin
4 and keeping the temperature at a certain point and this type
5 of thing. So he was helping us all along the line and
6 this here again, we generate propaganda, incompetence and this
7 type of thing.

8 But as far as sabotaging any Cuban product, no, we
9 didn't go into that. Our object was to enforce the blockade
10 and cut off his sources of supply.

11 Q When was the Miami Station established?

12 A As a station?

13 Q Yes.

14 A I think in September 1961.

15 Q And that was several years before you became involved
16 in Cuban matters?

17 A Yes.

18 Q Do you know of any other facilities of that nature
19 within the United States, Agency facilities?

20 A You mean, targeted against the opposition?

21 Q Yes.

22 A A station as such?

23 Q Yes.

24 A No. You have some communications facilities that
25 you really call stations because here again, they are not

1 directed towards any domestic activity. They are in support of
2 overseas communications.
3 Q Of course, we have FR bases and DCD offices and
4 Office of Security officers, and so forth.
5 A Right.
6 Q But I am talking about actual stations.
7 A Operating stations, no.
8 Q This is the only such station in the United States
9 as far as you know, is that correct?
10 A Right.
11 Q And was this station established to deal primarily
12 with Cuban activities?
13 A Yes.
14 Q Cuban-related matters?
15 A With Cuba, period.
16 Q Did it have, when it was established, any other
17 responsibilities with respect to Western Hemisphere activities?
18 A Not to my knowledge.
19 Q Entirely limited, then, to Cuban activities?
20 A Yes, and in support of Cuban activity and other
21 countries in the Hemisphere.
22 Q When you joined the group dealing with Cuban
23 activities, what was the size or the number of personnel
24 attached to that Station?
25 A To that Station? Well, the Station had probably a
couple

1 couple hundred staffers there, full-time employees of the
2 Agency, plus I don't know how many contract employees,
3 independent contractors, probably another 200 minimum. It was
4 obviously the largest installation we had. I think at its
5 height it had over 500 people in it.
6 Q Full-time Agency people?
7 A No, no.
8 Q Combination of contract and --
9 A And full-time, yes. A regular employee we call a staff
10 employee.
11 Q Now, would Martinez have been one of those contract
12 people?
13 A Yes.
14 Q Even though he was located down in the Keys?
15 A Oh, yes.
16 Q And what kind of facilities did the Station have in
17 Miami? Physical facilities.
18 A Well, they were located on the south campus of the
19 University of Florida, I mean, the University of Miami, at
20 the old Richmond Naval Air Station. It was a self-contained
21 unit. It was pretty well off the beaten path, in fact, damn
22 well off the beaten path. It was about four miles from the
23 Dixie Highway inland. We had our own guard force.
24 Q Official cover?
25 A No. Non-official.

1 Q Non-official cover. What was the cover?

2 A It was a commercial cover. It was called -- the first

3 one was called Zenith Corporation and it was set up with a

4 President and Vice President, normal corporate setup.

5 Q Engaging in any business?

6 A No.

7 Q Now, in a community of that type, Cuban community,

8 how long could a non-official cover last?

9 A Well, obviously it didn't, but it was research

10 activities. Funded -- it is a giant mechanism when you put

11 one of these things in for the funding and this type of thing,

12 for your ostensible customers, establishing bank accounts.

13 Q Yes, I understand.

14 A So it was a research activity and the only people that

15 ever paid any attention to the place were the newspapers. You

16 know, somebody would make an inquiry, you know, we can't accept

17 any work, we are loaded with Government contracts and this

18 type of thing, and it held up reasonably well. And out of

19 this one thing, of course, then we were running these innumera-

20 ble other covers with different activities. The guard

21 force, of course, were like -- well, they wore uniforms, similar

22 to the Pinkerton people and this type of thing. And I think

23 that there was -- in the later days at that site I think the

24 Department of Agriculture had offices in there and some other

25 Government agencies, in other buildings, of course.

1 Q And this particular Station, then, was under the
2 supervision of the group we have been discussing?
3 A Yes. They were staffed within the Cuban Operations.
4 Q When did the Western Hemisphere Division resume
5 responsibilities for the Miami Station?
6 A Well, when Des. Fitzgerald left as Chief of the
7 Special Activities Staff and became Chief of the Western
8 Hemisphere Division, he brought it back into the Division.
9 Q Is there presently a Miami Station?
10 A Oh, yes.
11 Q And how large is it at the present time?
12 A Well, since we -- I think when we closed down the
13 Cuban Operations, I don't know how large it is at the present
14 time because we are in one of these periods where we are
15 reassigning people, but I think by the end of this fiscal year
16 there are going to be between 11 and 14 people.
17 Q When you joined the group in 1963, what functions
18 were being performed by the Miami Station?
19 A Well, all the classical intelligence functions. I
20 think I have lined them out at one time -- collection of
21 positive intelligence, counterintelligence, paramilitary, this
22 type of thing. Covert action.
23 Q This is the list of things you gave me earlier in
24 the deposition?
25 A Yes.

1 Q Which of these activities, if any of them were
2 actually being conducted within the Cuban community in Miami?
3 A Well, the collection of foreign positive and probably
4 counterintelligence.
5 Q So the Agency was conducting counterintelligence
6 activities in the Miami area?
7 A Yes, sir.
8 Q Can you give me an example of the kinds of counter-
9 intelligence activities that the Agency would be conducting
10 in that area or was conducting in the area at that time?
11 A Well, we had a number of joint operations, as I
12 recall, with the Bureau. We had identified a Castro agent that
13 came in by small boat and when she was -- she came in with a
14 number of other people. When she hit the -- they had a recep-
15 tion center up in Opa Loca that was really a HEW operation.
16 The Domestic Contact Division office had people out there and
17 we did, too. Our people from the DDO were under Immigration
18 and Naturalization Service cover. When the HEW people did the
19 preliminary interrogation of these people they had to fill
20 out forms, where were you born, this type of thing, biographic-
21 type thing. These forms would be passed to our people who would
22 look at the forms and based on previous experience or what
23 they might have been doing, and they felt that perhaps they
24 might have some information of intelligence value, they would
25 reinterrogate them.

It was in this manner that this gal came to our knowledge. We surveilled her for a long time and determined that obviously she was receiving messages and she was sending messages. So along with the Bureau we put a surveillance on her and we obtained a van with DF equipment in it and indeed, she went on the air in the morning at 5:00 o'clock or 4:30 or whatever it was, and the direction finder found it was being beamed toward Cuba, this type of thing, and that was oen of the examples of the CI activities we were involved in.

Q Were there many activities of that type?

A Not really. You have got to remember that the Bureau's Cuban squad was fairly small. I mean, it was a large squad in terms of FBI squads. It had 36 people on it, something like that, but 36 people trying to follow a couple of hundred thousand Cubans around, you know, it is pretty negative. This was one of the reasons that obviously from -- in those days when we had formed these revolutionary fronts which were being run by the Cuban exiles, they were reporting to Case Officers and they would report on things in the community, of people they thought were suspect and this type of thing. These leads in turn were then given to the Bureau and it was to this extent that we got ourselves involved in CI activity.

Q Would it be fair to say that the involvement in CI

1 activities in that area was primarily a function of the over-
2 whelming number of these people and the Bureau's inability
3 to properly staff the thing?

4 A Yes, yes. You have got to remember, too, that a lot
5 of the people on that Cuban squad were in the legal section
6 of the Embassy in Havana. You know, the FBI overseas is
7 known as Legal Attaches, obviously working out of the Embassy
8 the same as our Station was, and a lot of our Station officers
9 from Havana were down in Miami at that time. So there was a
10 relationship there that had gone over a period of years
11 between the Agency and the Bureau.

12 MR.MANFREDI: We will reconvene at 1:00 o'clock.

13 (Whereupon, at 11:45 o'clock a.m., the taking of
14 the deposition was recessed, to reconvene at 1:00 p.m., this
15 same day.)

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AFTERNOON SESSION

Thereupon,

WILLIAM C. STURBITTS,

called as a witness by Counsel for the Commission on CIA Activities, and having been first duly sworn by the Notary Public, was examined and testified as follows:

EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE COMMISSION (Cont'd)

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. When we recessed for lunch you were talking about the Miami Station . Do I understand that the Miami Station was the largest CIA station in the world?

A. The largest CIA station in the world.

Q. At its height?

A. Nothing comes anyplace close to it.

Q. I wonder if you could describe briefly for the record what the AMOTS were.

A. Well, the AMOTS were Cuban a Cuban intelligence organization in exile. We full intended -- this was part of the overall contingency plan that US Government had. Should Castro ever be overthrown, these people would be the nucleus to go into Cuba and form a new Ministry of the Interior.

Q. Now, Ministry of the Interior, is that a euphemism for Security Agency?

A. Well, in most countries of the world the Ministry of Interior, unlike ours, is the security force, internal and

1 Q. And these people were Cuban exiles?
2 A. Cuban exiles.
3 Q. How large an outfit were the AMOTS?
4 A. Well, at one time -- I can give you the exact figures
5 but I know it well exceeded over 100, probably closer to --
6 Q. Go ahead.
7 A. Probably closer to 150, something like that.
8 Q. Now, would that 150 persons be included within the
9 three to 500 who made up the Miami Station?
10 A. No.
11 Q. That was over and above the personnel of the Miami
12 Station?
13 A. Right.
14 Q. These people were fulltime CIA employes, weren't they?
15 A. Right. WEll, let me -- these people really were --
16 they were being subsidized by the Agency. They were employed
17 by two cover companies, the largest of which was called Latin
18 American Social and Economic Research. Then we had another
19 smaller group that did the interrogating and they were under
20 another cover, commercial cover, -- I just don't recall what it
21 was. But these peop.e ostensibly were employees of these wholly
22 owned proprietaries of the Agency. They were duly constituted,
23 incorporated, paid taxes, all this type of thing.
24 Q. The salaries of these people, although paid indirectly,
25 were paid by the CIA?

1 A. That is right.

2 Q. And was training provided them by the Agency?

3 Q. Oh, yes.

4 A. You said the smaller group of the two groups that made

5 up the AMOTS conducted the interrogations, is that correct?

6 A. Right.

7 Q. When you speak of interrogations, are you referring to

8 debriefings?

9 A. I am referring to debriefings of newly arrived exiles

10 or perhaps exiles that had been in the country whom during their

11 time here had acquired new information.

12 Q. How were those -- how and where were those debriefings

13 conducted?

14 A. Well, normally the debriefings were conducted at Opa

15 Loca.

16 Q. That is the Air Base?

17 A. That is the old Air Base there but that is where the

18 reception center was for all the Cuban refugees coming in.

19

20 Sometimes if there was going to be a lengthy debriefing, we had

21 a residence which we rented and the interior was changed into

22 small rooms like this where you could bring people in, sit them

23 down, under controlled conditions, and debrief them without any

24 interference and this type of thing.

25 Q. For how long a period did these debriefings go on?

1 A. You mean in terms of years?

2 Q. Yes.

3 A. Well, I would think that I would probably say from

4 about 1962, and I think the debriefings as such, of course --

5 we relied principally on the airlift for the people coming out

6 and when the airlift was cut off, which Castro did -- cut off

7 about, I guess about 1970 or '71, in that timeframe --

8 Q. I see.

9 A. -- that stopped the flow of the refugees, so we just

10 terminated that part of the activity.

11 Q. Well, in addition to debriefing refugees that came

12 in in the airlift, did the smaller group of AMOTS have any other

13 intelligence gathering functions --

14 A. No.

15 Q. In the community?

16 A. Well, I can't give you a real yes or no to that. I

17 would suppose that there is an outside possibility they could

18 have been used to debrief people within the community, within

19 the Cuban community, but we had in the organization -- all these

20 people were Cuban with the exception of we had what we call an

21 On-Site Case Officer, who was a fulltime staff employee and he

22 had a couple of assistants, including a secretary. These people

23 were directly under his control. Though the organization as it

24 was set up, they had their own chief and this type of thing,

25 but the chief took his instructions from the On-Site Case Officer.

1 Of course, if these people went out and did something on
2 their own, they could do things we were not aware of, obviously.
3 You can't -- you know what they are doing during their eight or
4 ten hours that they are going to work everyday but once they
5 leave, we don't know what they are up to.

6 Q. Did they have CIA credentials?

7 A. No sir, because they were proprietary hires of this
8 commercial cover.

9 Q. Did CIA levy any intelligence requirements upon these
10 people other than in their duties -- in their debriefing
11 capacity, I should say?

12 A. No. When -- there were -- obviously there was a
13 standard debriefing form that covered questions of intelligence
14 interest or a battle, you know, anything -- economic questions,
15 morale, and this type of thing. When these questions -- when
16 these people were cebriefed and the debriefer wrote up the
17 report, it would be sent from the AMOTS over to the Station.
18 If the debriefing report contained something of positive
19 intelligence, of that nature, the Case Officer -- well, not the
20 Case Officer but a staffer in the Station may or may not jot
21 down some additional requirements and ask that that person be
22 recontacted and asked specific questions.

23 Q. Now, in addition to debriefing, what else did this
24 smaller broup of AMOTS do for the Agency in the Miami area?

25 A. This was their prime purpose.

1 Q. How large was that particular group?

2 A. Oh, there were only about, I would say at the outside,
3 I think there were about five debriefers with the support people
4 which would be secretaries, translators, strictly administrative
5 types. I don't think there were more than probably 12 or 15
6 in that group, if there were that many.

7 MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

8 (Off the record discussion)

9 BY MR. MANFREDI: Back on the record.

10 Q. Before we move on to further discussion of the AMOTS
11 could you briefly describe for me what role the CIA plays in
12 resettling Cuban emigres?

13 A. CIA doesn't resettle Cuban emigres.

14 Q. What Agency is charged with that responsibility?

15 A. Health, Education and Welfare.

16 Q. Does CIA play any role in that process?

17 A. We may assist if we are asked but the idea of the whole
18 airlift was having relatives here for somebody to claim you when
19 you came in so you wouldn't become a ward of the State of the
20 Government, and normally when these refugees came in, they were
21 processed through the Center and then they had a place down on
22 Biscayne Boulevard they called Freedom House and this was, of
23 course, all run by HEW, and they -- if need be and they had to
24 stay overnight or stay several days, HEW would put them up and
25 care for them in Freedom House.

1 Then as soon as they could, of course, they would move them
2 to the areas where they wanted to resettle them, where the
3 relatives were, this type of thing, and we had nothing to do
4 with that whatsoever.

5 Q. Turning back to the AMOTS, and to the larger of the
6 two groups, what was the name of that group again?

7 A. SASER, Latin American Social and Economic Research.

8 Q. We can call them LASER for short?

9 A. Really, they are both -- the only reason we separated
10 the two groups was for security because we had one group housed
11 over here and the smaller group was over here. Obviously we
12 couldn't bring these refugees into the larger establishment, so
13 that is why we took the smaller establishment to preserve some
14 cover.

15 Q. Okay. What activities was the larger group engaged
16 in?

17 A. WEll, the larger group was engaged in the collection
18 of intelligence. They compiled dossiers on the principals
19 inside Cuba. They carded -- they kept card files on every
20 refugee that came through the reception center. They provided --
21 they did do economic and social reporting. They put out a
22 monthly newsletter based on the information they collected.

23 The information these people collected as opposed to the
24 information we collected, ther's was all unclassified. That
25 came from -- all the information they had came from human sources

or overt publications. We subscribed -- well, the proprietary subscribed to a number, a great many newspapers, periodicals, Spanish language type things.

Q. Well, they were doing clandestine collections as well, weren't they?

A. I don't know if you could call it clandestine. What did you have in mind?

Q. Well, would they run agents in the community?

A. Well, yes, there were penetrations of the Cuban community, yes.

Q. And that is clandestine collection, isn't it?

A. WEll, I call that human resources.

Q. All right. Where are these files now?

A. They are in the Headquarters here. A great many of them were really destroyed. It got to be rather comic. We went down there several years ago just looking through the files to see what kind of shape they were in and they had such great information for intelligence value in there as a picture of a gal who might be the daughter of a Cuban refugee who just won a swimming meet. It got rather ridiculous. So we purged those files and took out that material, you know, which just didn't have any pertinancy at all.

Q. How are the files organized? You indicated before that there is a card, index card for each Cuban refugee?

A. Right.

Q. Are there soft cover files as well?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. For each Cuban refugee?

3 A. No. Not for each Cuban refugee. I think, as I
4 recall, those card files were up in the milli-ns and I forget,
5 we had I guess the manilla files, probably went into the tens
6 of thousands, I would think.

7 Q. Now, is there any way to determine from those files
8 which of those exiles have become United States citizens?

9 A. No way.

10 Q. Has there been any effort to make such a determina-
11 tion?

12 A. We made an effort at one time but this -- you can
13 become nationalized out in California and your record of
14 nationalization wouldn't be reflected here in Washington for
15 two years. That is how far they are behind.

16 Q. So I take it --

17 A. So there is no central index you can go to. I mean,
18 there is a central index you can go to but it is not current.

19 Q. I take it, then, that there is a possibility that the
20 CIA has some files in Miami or here in Langley on Cubans who
21 are now American citizens?

22 A. Absolutely true.

23 Q. Now, are any of those files likely to contain
24 derogatory information about the individuals involved?

25 A. Well, no. One of the things these people do, of

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1 course, we had targets for recruitment. It could range from
2 anything from a first mate, a captain or chief engineer of a
3 Cuban maritime vessel to Fidel. When we targeted these people
4 as possible recruitments, for possible recruitment,we would ask
5 that all the information on that individual be assembled so that
6 we could do a complete target study -- habits, you know,
7 everything right down the line. In case of some of the more
8 important ones, of course, we had psychological studies prepared
9 where we had enough information. But this is one of the things
10 these people did. If we said we want everything you have on the
11 first mate of the -- one of the Cuban ships, then they would
12 start looking through the papers or anything else to come up
13 with anything they could on what the guy's current activities
14 are, his background, his life habits, this type of thing.

15 Q. Well, the AMOTS were going to be the intelligence
16 service of Cuba?

17 A. Right.

18 Q. And they obviously were going to perform some function
19 in addition to recruitment of agents?

20 A. Right.

21 Q. I take it they were trained in counterintelligence,
22 gathering of positive intelligence, recruitment and all of the
23 traditional skills, is that correct?

24 A. That is about right.

25 Q. So I trust that they had files that were amassed for

1 purposes other than recruitment?
2 A. Well --
3 Q. For example, let me ask you this. Were any of these
4 files on Cubans who were suspected or thought to be a possible
5 internal security problem?
6 A. No. No. They didn't keep those types of files. We
7 would simply task them with through your sources what do you
8 have on so and so. They would not be told the reason why we
9 wanted the information on anybody.
10 Q. Well, I guess with several million fiels or several
11 million cards and tens of thousands of files it is difficult to
12 make generalizations about the kind of information that is in
13 those files?
14 A. Well, that is right.
15 Q. So I guess I won't ask you to do so, but I want to ask
16 you this. I trust that there is the possibility that some of
17 these files do contain what you in the trade refer to as deroga-
18 tory information?
19 A. I would assume so.
20 Q. And that so much of them may -- some of the subjects
21 of those files may now be American citizens?
22 A. Right.
23 Q. And finally I take it that no effort has been made to
24 study that particular situation?
25 A. WEll, we did make an effort to do it at one time.

1 You know, we have a traveler program where when Cubans travel,
2 whether they are on an island or perhaps other places, their
3 names turn up on manifests and this type of thing. Well, these
4 are put into a machine system. What we did when these cards
5 were all transferred back here in Miami, we did go through them
6 at random and pick out cards and then try to match it up with
7 what the machine system had to see if there was updated informa-
8 tion in the machine system that would show that this guy had
9 become a naturalized citizen, and it didn't work out. So --
10 Q. Excuse me, off the record.
11 (Off the record discussion)
12 MR. MANFREDI: Back on the record.
13 BY MR. MANFREDI:
14 Q. I want to straighten out confusion in my own mind
15 where these files presently reside. The cards I take it are
16 presently here in Washington?
17 A. The cards and what is left of the files.
18 Q. That is the soft cover files?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. And --
21 A. I assume they are either here or down at the
22 Records Center.
23 Q. And where is the computer system?
24 A. You mean our machine system? We have --
25 Q. The machine here that you tried to match up with the

1 information on the cards?

2 A. Right down on the third floor.

3 Q. That is not the hydro system?

4 A. Oh, no, no.

5 Q. This is a separate --

6 A. This is a complete -- only the Latin American Division

7 uses this particular system.

8 Q. What kind of records -- strike that.

9 The AMOTS are still in existence, aren't they?

10 A. No.

11 Q. I thought they were going out in June.

12 A. Well, okay. They are on the books until June.

13 Q. I see.

14 A. But they have all been let go. They were let go --

15 they were all given six months termination bonuses and told to

16 go find a job.

17 Q. Do they have any facilities, physical facilities, in

18 Miami at this time?

19 A. no.

20 Q. So there are no records in Miami?

21 A. No. No. We brought all those records back here.

22 Q. Did the AMOTS have law enforcement responsibilities

23 in the Miami community?

24 A. No. No.

25 Q. Any affiliation with law enforcement groups?

1 A. Not to my knowledge.

2 Q. What else did they do, this larger group of AMOTS that

3 was not doing debriefings?

4 A. Well, when they were trained in trade craft we would

5 send them to other countries, in Europe and within the Hemisphere

6 to train some of the local services in those countries. They

7 served as safe housekeepers in other countries. They served in

8 listening posts where we had audio --

9 Q. Foreign listening posts?

10 A. Oh, yes, foreign.

11 Q. Any domestic listening posts?

12 A. No, no.

13 Q. Any domestic surveillances conducted by these people?

14 A. I would assume -- this I cannot answer because I reall

15 don't know. I know that they did a great number of things but

16 to my knowledge there wasn't any domestic surveillance

17 conducted by them.

18 Now, if it was conducted, and if it is a matter of record,

19 I don't know where it could be.

20 Q. What intelligence gathering activities did they

21 conduct in the Cuban community in Miami?

22 A. One of the big problems we had was within that Cuban

23 community, as I said earlier, were some of the militant anti-

24 Castro groups and this just drove the FBI and the Coast Guard

25 and Customs and in general the law enforcement US. Government

1 agencies in Miami plus the State government enforcement agencies
2 up the wall and, of course, I guess it was around -- the
3 Government allowed a lot of this to go on for awhile but I guess
4 about 1965 or 1964 they got a little tired of it and they
5 started to tighten up.
6 I am sure the AMOTS were in part responsible for proposing
7 alerting us and in turn we alerted the enforcement agencies when
8 there was going to be a raid against Cuba by one of these
9 militant groups. A number of times raids were aborted, picked
10 up by the Coast Guard or Florida Coastal Patrol or the Bureau,
11 this type of thing.
12 Q. These people were arrested?
13 A. Oh, yes.
14 Q. Prosecuted?
15 A. Not really.
16 Q. Any of them American citizens?
17 A. Not to my knowledge.
18 Q. This would be Alpha 66 type groups?
19 A. I don't know whether this guy -- well, you know, they
20 are still after this Masferrer and this guy Donestevez. I don't
21 know if they ever did get him in jail but they had him up on
22 so many charges and he was a Cuban exile that made it big here.
23 He was a boat manufacturer, small boats, but whether he ever
24 served any time or not I don't know. I know he was convicted
25 but he was always walking around Miami when I was there. So

1 I truthfully don't know whether any of these people ever went
2 to jaul or not.
3 Q. Other than identifying operations by militant anti-
4 Castro groups, what other intelligence gathering did the AMOTS
5 engage in?
6 A. Well, of course, there was a counterintelligence --
7 I wouldn't call it a project but a counterintelligence interest
8 at that time because we knew that they were infiltrating agents.
9 Q. Cubans were?
10 A. The Cuban Government. They couldn't do it very well
11 on the airlift because, as I said before, the aged, infirm, and
12 young, but they did infiltrate them by small boat. And I don't
13 -- well, we had knowledge that this was on and we did try to
14 identify those people whom we thought would be suspect.
15 Q. Was that done in cooperation with the Bureau?
16 A. With the Bureau, yes.
17 Q. Because of their manpower limitations you folks were
18 in a better position to do it?
19 A. Yes, and language-wise, too. That is always a big
20 factor.
21 Q. And this was conducted through the AMOTS?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. How substantial was the counterintelligence operation
24 in the community?
25 A. WEll, it wasn't that big. They identified not what I

1 would call a great number of suspect infiltrees, but they did
2 come up with a few promising ones and ones it turned over to the
3 Bureau, of course, we have no idea what the hell ever happens
4 to it because, you know, you just -- unless you personally know
5 the guy in the Bureau that is handling the case, you might as
6 well forget it. You have got too many other things to do.
7 Q. What other positive intelligence gathering activities
8 were they engaging in?
9 A. Well, as I told you, one part of them were engaged in
10 electronic intercept.
11 Q. Where was that done?
12 A. Down in Florda, down in Homestead.
13 Q. This is Southeast of Homestead?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. What ere they intercepting?
16 A. Well, originally they were set up to assist with the
17 commo. for the infiltration.
18 As we phased down the maritime activities, they were made
19 available to intercept Cuban communications. NSA tasks them with
20 the frequencies they wanted covered and the Cuban Communications
21 nets they wanted covered, such as the border guards. Another
22 important one was the sugar network. We had the border guards,
23 sugar, transportation, maritime. I think there was an interior
24 network they covered too. But all electronic intercept coverage
25 is dictated by NSA.

1 Now, since they belong to us we could levy ceratin require
2 ments on them if we wanted to, which we did very infrequently
3 because the common interests, -- we have a common interest in
4 what NSA has an interest in and unless there were one particular
5 operation going that they wanted to cover exactly what the Cubans
6 were doing, then we would task our people with that.
7 For instance, we knew a Cuban vessel was taking arms into
8 Africa and our operators saw the thing leave Havana and then
9 there was absolute silence. So nobody knew where the thing was.
10 But we knew arms were being loaded and we finally located the
11 boat in an African port, I mean the intercept operators did, when
12 it came back on the air. And this is the type of thing. As
13 a matter of fact, they were unloading arms in Algiers. And 200
14 Cuban troops.
15 MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.
16 (Off the record discussion)
17 MR. MANFREDI: Let's go back on the record.
18 BY MR. MANFREDI:
19 Q. Were the communications they were intercepting
20 exclusively foreign communications?
21 A. Exclusively foreign communications.
22 Q. Were they intercepting any communications, one terminus
23 of which was the United States?
24 A. No.
25 Q. These were basically Cuban Government communications?

A. Right.

Q. On the Island?

A. Right.

Q. Or between the Island and other locations?

A. Yes.

Q. But not between the Island and the United States?

A. No. Let's go off the record on that.

(Off the record discussion)

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. To your knowledge were the AMOTS engaging in the intercept of any communications, either that facility or elsewhere, in the Miami area or in the southern part of the country?

A. No.

Q. Of other communications?

A. No.

Q. Is that their only intercept facility?

A. (Nods affirmative)

Q. Do you know of your own personal knowledge -- strike that. Do you have any knowledge of any wiretaps, surveillances, breakins or activities of thqt type other than what we have discussed --

A. No sir.

-- that were conducted by the AMOTS?

A. No sir. I want to go off the record a minute.

(Off the record discussion)

1 BY MR. MANFREDI:

2 Q. I understand that a study of the history of the AMOTS

3 has been prepared by one of your members.

4 A. That is right.

5 Q. What is his name?

6 A. I think it is Joaquin -- I can't remember the last

7 name. The poor guy is dead now anyway. Well, I will just have

8 to get that for you.

9 Q. What is the title of the study?

10 A. The title of the study -- it is part of the historical

11 series of the Miami Station and I think it is just entitled "The

12 AMOT Organization."

13 Q. What is the historical series of the Miami Station?

14 A. It was done when Paul Hennessey was down there. What

15 we try to do as we go along, from year to year, is set aside

16 what is considered to be some of the more siginificant things

17 the station might do or that might occur in the station personnel-

18 wise, this type of thing, and then these things are written.

19 Q. I see.

20 A. At intervening periods of time.

21 Q. When was this particular report prepared, the AMOTS?

22 A. I think it was preAared in 1967 or '68.

23 Q. It is a fairly lengthy document, isn't it?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. And purports to be a fairly complete history of the

1 activities of the AMOTS?

2 A. It starts back in 1959 when we first started using

3 this gent..

4 Q. First started using what?

5 A. First started using, I forget what his name was.

6 Q. I see. Is it a chronological study of their activi-

7 ties?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. And you have a copy of that in your custody?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. I would like to see that document. And we will try

12 and obtain it through Hank Knoche's office.

13 A. Okay.

14 Q. Excuse me just for a minute.

15 (Off the record discussion)

16 MR. MANFREDI: On the record.

17 BY MR. MANFREDI: I wonder if you would -- let me ask you

18 this. There have been some allegations in the press that

19 prominent newsmen in the Miami area have in the past been agents

20 of the CIA.

21 Mr. Olsen just came into the office and I asked him to join

22 us because some of your involvement in Cuban activities in the

23 Agency in the Miami area touch peripherally on some of the things

24 had has been charged with investigating, so I am going to turn

25 the examination over to him for whatever time he needs.

MR. OLSEN: Thank you, George.

1 BY MR. OLSEN:

2 Q. Can you begin, since I have not been in on the begin-

3 ning of the interview here, can you start off, Mr. Sturbitts,

4 by giving me about a one or two minute resume of what your

5 contacts were with the Cuban elements in Florida and elsewhere

6 withing this country on behalf of the Agency?

7 A. Well, I was a member of the Special Activities Staff

8 which was in effect the Cuban task force at Headquarters and the

9 Miami Station functioned under the Special Activities Staff in

10 a variety of intelligence collection and operations.

11 Q. Who was the head of the Special Activities Staff?

12 A. Desmond Fitzgerald.

13 Q. And who was his immediate superior?

14 A. Dick Bissell. Excuse me. No. At that time it was

15 Dick Helms. He was the DEP.

16 Q. Deputy Director for Plans?

17 A. Deptuty Director for Plans.

18 Q. What period of time are we talking about now?

19 A. We are talking in the period of 1963 to 1965.

20 MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

21 (Off the record discussion)

22 BY MR. OLSEN:

23 Q. So you were not involved in this Special Activities

24 Group during the 1959 to '61 period?

25 A. No.

Q. Or the period leading up to the Bay of Pigs?

A. No.

Q. And you were not involved in this program at all during the same time that E. Howard Hunt was involved in it?

A. No.

Q. Do you know what the position was Mr. Hunt occupied in connection with the Cuban operations of the Agency during the period of 1959 to '61?

A. To my recollection, Howard Hunt was on the Covert Action Staff dealing in propaganda.

Q. Was this propaganda directed to the Cuban people in this country?

A. No. Cuban people abroad.

Q. And what was his connection with the planning for the Bay of Pigs?

A. I would have to review the record to really answer that. I don't know.

Q. Didn't he spend an awful lot of time in the Miami area?

A. He commuted quite a bit.

Q. Between Washington and --

A. Washington and Miami.

Q. -- and Miami. During the period of 1960 and early '61?

A. Right.

Q. Mr. Hunt has stated in his interviews and in his

1 published materials that he was the person who was in charge of
2 organizing a political unit among Cubans in this country which
3 would constitute the Cuban government in exile. Do you recall
4 where that was?
5 A. That could be quite true.
6 Q. Have you reviewed, Mr. Sturbitts, the Agency's entire
7 files relating in any way to the Cuban operations and particu-
8 larly with reference to whether they reflect any contacts
9 between the Agency and Frank Sturgis?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Or Frank Fiorini?
12 A. There is no relationship.
13 Q. Is it your testimony that the records and files of
14 the Agency reveal no official or unofficial contact of any
15 nature with Frank Sturgis?
16 A. To my knowledge that is true.
17 Q. I take it from that that you are emphatic in your
18 testimony that he was never an employee of the Agency?
19 A. Extremely emphatic.
20 Q. And you are also equally emphatic to the effect that
21 he was never a contract agent of the Agency?
22 A. Exactly.
23 Q. Do you know whether he ever served in the capacity
24 of being an informer or informant to the Agency?
25 A. It is possible that he could have been a source.

1 Q. YOu mean a source of --
2 A. Source of information of another agent. Another
3 agency agent.
4 Q. Do the files of the Agency reflect any matter?
5 A. To my knowledge I don't recall anything like that but
6 it is entirely possible that that could have happened without
7 being a matter of record.
8 Q. Do the files of the Agency reveal any instance what-
9 ever in which Frank Sturgis was ever asked to undertake any
10 kind of an operation or activity on behalf of the Agency?
11 A. To my knowledge, nothing.
12 Q. Do the files of the Agency reveal any evidence
13 whatever that Frank Sturgis was ever paid anything directly or
14 indirectly by the Agency?
15 A. To my knowledge, no.
16 Q. Now, when you say "to my knowledge, no", in answer
17 to some of these questions, do I understand that to mean that
18 you are giving us the full benefit of your knowledge on the
19 basis of a full review of the Agency's records and files?
20 A. On Frank Sturgis, yes.
21 Q. Okay. During the period of time that you were with
22 the Special Activities Group from 1963 to '66, first of all,
23 can you tell us when that began in 1963?
24 A. When the Special Activities Group --
25 Q. No. When your contact with the Special Activities

1 Group began?

2 A. It began -- well, it began around June of '63.

3 Q. Now, with particular reference to the last half of

4 1963, including whatever period in June '63 may not have been

5 involved, were there a great many Cubans in the southern United

6 States who were active in revolutionary fronts that were being

7 sponsored by the Agency?

8 A. Wellm you mean Agency sponsored fronts?

9 Q. Yes.

10 A. The Agency subsidized these fronts in an effort to

11 have unity rather than these split factions, split anti-Castro

12 factions. Obviously the leaders of the fronts knew that the

13 CIA was subsidizing. Supposedly the people that joined these

14 fronts did not know they were being subsidized by the Agency

15 or the U.S. Government.

16 Q. But when you say "supposedly," does the fact appear

17 to be otherwise?

18 A. WEll, based on my experience with the Cubans and this

19 type of thing, and their penchant to talk, I would think that

20 it wouldn't take long for knowledge of any subsidy to surface

21 itself.

22 Q. Was it your opinion and impression at that time, Mr.

23 Sturbitts, that a great many Cubans considered themselves to be

24 involved in the CIA organizations?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. And again with particular reference to the Miami
2 area?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Was there also Cuban activity of this sort elsewhere
5 in the United States? I am asking now particularly with
6 reference to New Orleans.
7 A. There was some Cuban presence in New Orleans. I am
8 really not familiar with what happened in New Orleans that was
9 sort of a sideshow to Miami.
10 Q. But the same is -- it is possible that some of the
11 same Cuban organizations which were being sponsored or funded
12 by the Agency also had activities or operations in New Orleans?
13 A. I don't know if I can answer that, whether they had
14 the same functions. I know that some funding arrangement for
15 subsidizing the organizations in Miami was carried out through
16 New Orleans.
17 Q. Well, can you be more specific about what you mean
18 by that?
19 A. Well, in other words, to fund these organizations we
20 were subsidizing there had to be some ostensible source of
21 income for them to continue what they were doing. A great
22 number -- well, not a great number, but a number of select
23 people were -- well, they were selected and then they were
24 talked to, to pose as trustees, if you would, or directors or
25 whatever you might have of some of these organizations in order

1 to get the funding through to the organizations.

2 These people were normally prominent people and --

3 Q. And did they get funded by the Agency, then, through

4 the mdeium of prominent and well-to-do people?

5 A. These well-to-do people ostensibly would call a friend

6 of theirs that had been made trustee of another type of activity

7 and say, you know, we are trying to assist these Cubans in this

8 type of thing. Could your organization give us any money, and

9 the guy on the other end would say, sure, we can probably lend

10 you $25,000 or something like that, or donate $25,000. This is

11 the way the funding went into the fronts.

12 Q. And was some of that funding arranged through people

13 in New Orleans?

14 A. I would think so. I believe so.

15 Q. Were any of the people in New Orleans through whom

16 that funding operation was effected people who turned out to be

17 involved in the investigations conducted by Jim Garrison?

18 A. Not to my knowledge.

19 Q. How about David Ferrie? Was he ever connected with

20 the Agency in any manner at all in providing funds or assistance

21 to Cubans or Cuban groups?

22 A. I couldn't say. I am just not familiar with -- we had

23 a great many people that did this.

24 Q. How about Clay Shaw? Was Clay Shaw ever used as a

25 funding source?

1 A. This I do not know either.

2 Q. Pardon?

3 A. This I don't know.

4 BY MR. MANFREDI:

5 Q. Where would that information be available?

6 A. Well, we have a guy that used to work with me who was

7 down in New Orleans at that time. He would probably know.

8 Q. Is he in the building?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. What is his name?

11 A. Bill Kent.

12 Q. Bill Kent'

13 A. Yes.

14 BY MR. OLSEN:

15 Q. Who is Bill Kent with now? Which department?

16 A. He is still with the DDO.

17 BY MR. MANFREDI:

18 Q. Western Hemisphere Division?

19 A. No. He is on one of the staffs. He is on the -- I

20 think Career Management Group Staff.

21 Q. Is he officed near you?

22 A. No. He is down in the basement.

23 BY MR. OLSEN:

24 Q. Do the Agency files reveal who the intermediaries were

25 that were used to provide funds to the --

1 A. Oh, yes.

2 Q. -- to the Cuban movements?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Do you know whehter -- do you know the identity of any

5 of them in New Orleans?

6 A. No. No. Totally unfamiliar with anything that took

7 llace in New Orleans.

8 Q. I take it that Frank Sturgis was never an intermediary

9 for providing funds to the Cuban fronts?

10 A. The files that I have don't reflect it.

11 Q. I think we covered this already just a few minutes ago

12 but let me make sure that we have got it on the record.

13 I understood you to say that it was your impression in 1963

14 that large numbers of Cuban exiles, Cuban people in the southern

15 United States, talked about and believed that they were involved

16 in the CIA sponsored activities. Is that true?

17 A. That is right.

18 Q. Was it also your understanding and your impression

19 that there was a good deal of talk among this Cuban element in

20 the southern United States about plans or prospects for the

21 assassination of Fidel Castro?

22 A. I would say no. I don't think there was -- you have

23 got to remember that these people were embittered. They lost

24 their homeland, their possessions, they lost everything and they

25 blamed it all on one man.

Q. That is Fiedl Castro?

A. That is right, and they would probably verbally do anything they could to get rid of him.

Q. Was there a lot of talk about killing Castro among these Cubans?

A. I would say among the Cuban exiles there probably was a lot of talk about that.

Q. Did you participate yourself in the overhearing of such conversations?

A. No.

Q. Was this a matter of something that was reported to you?

A. Well, it was -- I really don't remember what the source of it was but I know in my discussions with people at the Station and from my visits down there and that type of thing that this subject always came up. What were they going to do with Fidel? How are they going to get rid of him and this type of thing. I don't mean the Agency people. This is what the Cuban exile community was discussing.

Q. Yes. Do you know what Howard Hunt was doing for the Agency in 1963?

A. Well, it seems to me he was here at Headquarters in '63 and I think he was assigned to the European Division of the DDP.

Q. This is your best recollection --

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. -- at the moment. Is it possible that he was with

3 Domestic Operations Division in the field of proprietaries

4 engaged --

5 A. I guess you are right, yes. I believe he was there.

6 Q. Did you personally know Howard Hunt?

7 A. No.

8 Q. Never met him?

9 A. I met him. That is all. I can't say I know him.

10 Q. You would not have known anything about his where-

11 abouts on any particular day, then. Is that true?

12 A. Can we go off the record?

13 (Off the record discussion.)

14 THE WITNESS: Let's go back on the record.

15 BY MR. OLSEN:

16 Q. I would like to have it on the record.

17 A. Do you have a particular day?

18 Q. No. I am just asking you if your acquanitance with

19 Hunt was such that you would have known of his whereabouts on

20 any particular day.

21 A. No.

22 Q. Was it very infrequently that you ever saw him?

23 A. Oh, I would see him in the halls, this type of thing,

24 but -- bump into him perhaps downtown on the street.

25 Q. But you would have no occasion for knowing from one

1 day to the next where he was?

2 A. No.

3 Q. Have you ever conducted any kind of inquiry on behalf

4 of the Agency as to where he was on November 22, 1963?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. And when did you conduct that inquiry?

7 A. I have done it twice that I recall and the most recent

8 one was I guess -- I am just trying to think. Well, it wasn't

9 too long ago because we did have an inquiry and we obtained the

10 time and the attendance records from the Office of Finance which

11 showed that Howard Hunt was on sick leave on that day.

12 Q. Was this just fairly recently?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. I understood from what files I have seen, Mr.

15 Sturbitts, that the only records that were available from the

16 Office of Finance showed that he had had nine hours of sick leave

17 during the two-week pay period ending the 23rd of November but

18 that the records were not available as to how much sick leave

19 or annual leave had been taken on any particular day.

20 A. Well --

21 Q. Am I mistaken?

22 A. As I recall, he was in a duty status one day and a

23 sick leave status the next day and back to duty the next day.

24 I would have to check that with my Budget and Fiscal Officer.

25 He is the chap that got that for me.

1 Q. Can you check that for us?

2 A. Sure.

3 Q. And give us the results of that?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Because this is much more detailed information than

6 I have been previouly aware is available in the files of the

7 Agency.

8 A. All right. I will do that.

9 BY MR. MANFREDI:

10 Q. Do you want to make a note of that?

11 A. Let me have a piece of paper.

12 Q. YOu might also want Mr. Sturbitts' phone number which

13 is 351-5106.

14 THE WITNESS: That was 22 November, right?

15 BY MR. MANFREDI:

16 Q. That is the day.

17 A. 1963.

18 Q. In response to whose inquiry was that investigation

19 made?

20 A. I don't know. I would have to look that up, too. I

21 don't recall exactly who asked for it. I don't know whether --

22 I will just have to check that. I don't know who it was.

23 Q. And the date? Do you have any idea when you made the

24 inquiry?

25 A. No. But Ican find out from the B and F guy, hopefully.

1 Q. You said there was a previous inquiry?

2 A. Yes. The previous inquiry came from Archie Roosevelt

3 who is now retired and was at that particular time the Chief of

4 European Division.

5 Q. When was that inquiry received?

6 A. That was about a year ago, I guess.

7 BY MR. OLSEN:

8 Q. About the first time these photographs began to be

9 circulated?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. About the bums in Dallas?

12 A. Yes, and actually I think this -- Archie's inquiry

13 came from some magazine or newspaper man in Europe. Archie was

14 Chief of Station, London, for a long time and he apparently

15 made a lot of acquaintances over there among the media.

16 Q. This is something you are relating to Der Sterm

17 Magazine?

18 A. That is right.

19 Q. And did I understand you to say thqt in checking with

20 the Office of Finance that it was positively ascertained that

21 Hunt was on sick leave on November 22nd?

22 A. Well, I will have to check that. That is the way

23 I understood it but I did get this through our Budget people who

24 have the contact with the Office of Finance.

25 Q. And that he was on annual leave the day before?

1 A. No. He was on a duty status the day before, on sick
2 leave, and then on duty status the following day.
3 BY MR. MANFREDI:
4 Q. Was there any effort to determine what Mr. Hunt's
5 previous pattern with respect to sick days had been?
6 A. (Nods in negative)
7 BY MR. OLSEN:
8 Q. November 22, 1963, was a Friday. When you say that
9 records reveal that he was on a duty status the next day --
10 A. It was a Friday. Then I was mistaken.
11 Q. Does that mean he was on duty the following Monday
12 or on the next day, Saturday?
13 A. No. On the following Monday. I didn't realize the
14 22nd was a Friday.
15 Q. Will you check that thing for us and give us a brief
16 memo together with whatever supporting -- copies of supporting
17 documents you can find?
18 A. Okay.
19 Q. As promptly as possible on this question.
20 I think that covers the subject matter.
21 MR. MANFREDI: I can give you another moment if you want.
22 Can you think of anything else?
23 MR. OLSEN: I think that is all.
24 MR. MANFREDI: Okay. Off the record.
25 (Off the record discussion)

1 BY MR. MANFREDI:

2 Q I am sorry for the interruption but over the long

3 I think probably I saved you some time.

4 We are talking about newspaper editors when we were inte

5 rupted -- or when I invited the interruption. I guess I ough

6 to be fair.

7 Is it not a fact that the Agency had some relationship w

8 some prominent newspaper officials in the Miami area?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q And what was the nature of that relationship?

11 A. Traditionally the Chief of Station maintained the

12 relationship with officials of the Miami Herald, particularly t

13 Latin American editor, as well as relationships with staff

14 members of it, I think it is the Miami News and stringers for

15 the other newspapers and periodicals stationed in Miami.

16 Q What was the purpose of those relationships?

17 A. I really couldn't say what the prupose of the relation

18 ship was. I mean, the same reason that we establish a relation-

19 ship with the press in this town. There were certain things tha

20 might come to the attention of the press involving true names

21 and incidents that we felt should perhaps not be surfaced at any

22 particular time.

23 Q Do you have any knowledge of use of the press in Miami

24 for propaganda purposes?

25 A. No. No.

SECRET

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1 Q Would you know if that were the case?

2 A No. I really wouldn't know, but the relationship was
3 a two-way street. It wasn't simply that we assisted these
4 people as well as they were assigint us.

5 Q What assistance would you render for members of
6 the press in Miami?

7 A Well, in the case of the Latin American editor
8 we would put him in contact with the Chiefs of Stations of
9 areas he periodically visited and the Chiefs of Stations
10 would give him background briefings and this type of thing
11 on the developments within a given country.

12 Q Was that done evenhandedly for various newspapers?

13 A Predominantly, I would say probably the Miami
14 Herald received probably a little more attention than the
15 other papers, principally because it was a large paper and
16 their Latin American editor traveled a great deal throughout
17 the Hemisphere.

18 Q Was he also used as a source?

19 A No.

20 Q Do newspapermen in Washington, D.C., receive
21 similar briefings?

22 A Yes.

23 Q We talked with Mr.Olsen for a short period of time
24 about fronts, revolutionary fronts. How large were these
25 organizations?

SECRET

1 A Well, the membership varied. As I said, we were
2 principally interested in the leadership of the organizations.
3 Once the organization was established and the leadership took
4 over, then they would take care of enlisting the, I guess,
5 getting membership from the Cuban exile community to join.
6 Q What were their functions, the fronts?
7 A Well, it was to bring some unity out of this chaotic
8 thing of the splinter groups and get -- as I said, it was a
9 political organization in exile.
10 Q Did they conduct any operations?
11 A No, not that I know of.
12 Q Just like a political party?
13 A Like a political party.
14 Q How many of these fronts were there?
15 A There were several of them. I really don't remember
16 the names of them. The FRD was one. The Revolutionary
17 Democratic Front. I guess that was probably the biggest one.
18 And there were some others.
19 Q The RDF?
20 A FRD.
21 Q I see.
22 A Front Revolutionary Democratic. It is the
23 Democratic Revolutionary Front.
24 Q All right. Are these groups still in existence?
25 A I would think not. I really don't know.

mbh 3

1 Q Is there a CIA station in Puerto Rico?

2 A No. There was but there isn't any more. There

3 hasn't been one there for years.

4 Q When was it disbanded?

5 A I think the station was established around 1958

6 and -- perhaps it was established before that. I think it

7 went out of existence in 1958.

8 Q Do you know why it went out of existence?

9 A No, I don't. I don't have any idea.

10 Q Do you know what function it was performing?

11 A (Nods in negative.)

12 Q You mentioned earlier that Bernard Barker worked

13 in the Cuban community for the CIA?

14 A He worked with these fronts, too.

15 Q Was he performing any intelligence function in the

16 community?

17 A Intelligence functions. Well --

18 Q Was he collecting information?

19 A Sure. If he got information that he thought was

20 worthwhile he would pass it on.

21 Q Now, would he have been considered one of the three

22 or 500 persons employed or assigned to the Miami Station?

23 A Yes. He was a contract employee.

24 Q And were intelligence requirements levied on such

25 contract employees?

1 A Normally, the requirements are pretty standard,
2 or they were at that time. But here again, you always have
3 ad hoc type things that pop up from time to time, and have to
4 be surfaced.
5 Q Some of these contract employees were, then, in
6 the business of collecting intelligence information in the
7 Cuban communities in Miami.
8 A Right.
9 Q Now, I think we finished with the AMOTS but can
10 you think of any other functions performed by the AMOTS that
11 we have not discussed in the course of the afternoon?
12 A No, not really. No.
13 Q I think you previously described them for me as the
14 eyes and ears into the Cuban community.
15 A Right.
16 Q And they actually had a physical facility in Miami
17 which was their headquarters, did they not?
18 A Exactly.
19 Q And there was a CIA Case Officer who managed to super-
20 vise that facility.
21 A Yes.
22 Q Now, what has happened to the AMOTS?
23 A The AMOTS were gradually phased down and will go
24 out of existence -- the AMOTS are out of existence, aren't
25 they? Isn't it the AMDUKES or -- these are the radio people.

1 Q And the AMDUKES are the AMOTS?

2 A The AMDUKES are AMOTS but they are radio people.

3 Q They are the ones that conducted the intercept

4 for NSA?

5 A Yes. The only reason we use two different names

6 is that in each of these things in those days we had to have

7 a project which had to be renewed every year to get the

8 funding.

9 Q So AMDUKE and AMOT --

10 A Synonymous.

11 Q -- are cryptonyms?

12 A Yes.

13 Q Do the initials stand for anything other than --

14 A No. Just pick them out. If you want to encrypt

15 somebody you just call downstairs and they give you a

16 crypt. You don't have anything to do with it. The AM happened

17 at that particular time to be the Cuban diograph.

18 Q Now, turning to the Miami Station's involvement for

19 assistance to the Secret Service in connection with the

20 political conventions in 1968 and 1972, would you briefly

21 describe for me the nature of the assistance provided by

22 the Agency to the Secret Service?

23 A At the request of the Secret Service we conducted

24 name traces on individuals whom the Secret Service wanted

25 traced. These includedthe employees of all hotels in Miami

1 Beach where any convention activities were to take place,
2 employees of catering services, limosine service, employees
3 in -- what do they call it, the Civic Center in Miami. It
4 is a big auditorium down there. I forget what they call it.
5 Foreign news people and media, television, radio people.
6 Q Were these people on whom name traces were requested
7 all foreign nationals?
8 A All foreign nationals.
9 Q Was there any check made to determine whether
10 any of them were American citizens?
11 A We levied on the Secret Service as a requirement
12 that they have identified these people by nationality before
13 we would run a name trace. Inadvertently, at one time
14 they did submit a list, a rather long list of American citizens
15 which we promptly sent back to them and told them we could
16 not trace.
17 Q And this practice was followed both in 1968 and
18 1972?
19 A That is right.
20 Q And where were these names traced?
21 A They were traced back here and also in Miami. The
22 Miami Station did their name check and we did our name check
23 here. In the case of Cubans, probably the Miami Station had
24 more information on the Cubans than we would have back here.
25 Q But the names were traced through Agency files?

1 A Through Agency files.

2 Q Was Secret Service receiving cooperation from FBI

3 on this as well?

4 A Oh, yes.

5 Q And in effect, they were getting an all-Agency name

6 check --

7 A Right.

8 Q -- on people who might pose a security threat --

9 A Yes.

10 Q -- to a candidate?

11 A Well, they were just trying to determine who might

12 be a security threat.

13 Q That is right. Potential threat.

14 A Yes.

15 Q For what political parties -- strike that.

16 In 1968 was this service provided for both political

17 conventions?

18 A Both political conventions.

19 Q Were they both held in Miami that year?

20 A No. I guess it was in 1972 they were both held

21 there. I think it was just the Democratic in 1968.

22 Q These requests did come from the Secret Service

23 rather than --

24 A From the Secret Service and it was -- the Director

25 of the Secret Service came to the DCI and asked him for

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

1 support.

2 Q Do you still maintain the records with respect to

3 that tracing activity?

4 A I have all the names that have been traced.

5 Q And they are on little cards down in your files?

6 A Yes.

7 Q Why have those records been maintained? Is there

8 any reason those records have been maintained?

9 A Well, because we were told to maintain them when

10 the Watergate thing broke.

11 Q I see.

12 A And since then nobody will destroy anything.

13 Q OK. Are you aware of any picketing at various

14 places in the country that has been conducted by Cuban

15 groups?

16 A I was not aware of it until I was told of it.

17 I still don't know whether this was a spontaneous action on

18 the part of these people or whether they were instructed to

19 do it. I tried to run that down and I have been unable to.

20 Q At what locations has it been reported that pickets

21 were located?

22 A Airline offices in New York, Miami. I think another

23 place. I forget where it was.

24 Q Have you in fact been able to verify that these

25 persons were Cubans?

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1 A Well, it is a matter of record in the AMOT history
2 that this indeed did take place. Now, what I have been trying
3 to determine is whether the On-Site Case Officer authorized
4 this,which I fully doubt.
5 Q Who was the On-Site Case Officer?
6 A At that time it was a fellow by the name of Tony
7 Sforza.
8 Q Is he still alive?
9 A Yes, he is down in Miami. But I just do not know
10 whether this was a unilateral action on the part of the
11 AMOTS against the countries that were then trading with
12 Cuba, notably Spain and Great Britain and France.
13 Q Other than this incident which we -- strike that.
14 What kind of an investigation have you conducted?
15 A I have talked to people, which is really all you
16 can do. There is no other way you can do it.
17 Q You have been unable to determine who, if anyone,
18 authorized this activity? Have you been able to identify
19 any of the persons who participated in the picketing?
20 A No.
21 Q With what frequency did this activity occur?
22 A I don't have any idea. I only know of one instance.
23 Q This was in New York City?
24 A New York City and Miami.
25 Q Do you know of any organized political activity that

bh 10

1 the AMOTS engaged in?

2 A To my knowledge, they didn't engage in any.

3 Q Any political activity.

4 Do you know of any other activities that they have

5 conducted within this country, they or any of their members

6 have conducted within this country that we have not already

7 discussed this afternoon?

8 A No.

9 Q Any political activities? Any operations?

10 A No. Not really. Of course, we have used certain

11 select individuals to what we call hand-hold defectors, Cuban

12 defectors. In other words, live with them until they are

13 resettled and this type of thing. And this is another activity

14 they engaged in. But other than that, I can't think of any-

15 thing else.

16 Q Do you know of any criminal activities that have

17 been attribited to --

18 A I have heard of some allegations which have never

19 been proven.

20 Q What are the allegations?

21 A The allegations concern break-ins and surveillances

22 and this type of thing.

23 Q Have those allegations been made with any fre-

24 quency?

25 A Well, I forget who it was. It was during the

1 Watergate trial. Some of these allegations that came out
2 and I think they were carried in the Anderson column but we
3 made file checks and this type of thing. One particular
4 activity was supposed to have been carried out in Rockefeller
5 Center in New York and it turns out it was taken out of
6 context. It was a training mission and -- training exercise.
7 These guys were being trained in surveillance in New York
8 and they were simply asked to go into a branch of the Manhattan
9 -- Chase Manhattan and to come back out and then they were
10 supposed to diagram the layout of the bank. And this to some
11 of them meant casing the bank when in fact it was just a
12 memory exercise.

13 Q With what frequency were those kinds of training
14 exercises conducted?

15 A Well, whenever there was an -- whenever it was felt
16 that these people, selected individuals, were to be trained
17 in trade craft.

18 Q And did their trade craft training include such
19 things as surveillance?

20 A Sure.

21 Q And break-ins?

22 A No. Not break-ins. Nor surreptitious entry. As I
23 said, in the case of this particular thing, it was misinter-
24 preted as casing the bank. These exercises were given -- they
25 could have walked into your office, your outer office and

1 said -- the instructor could have said two hours later tell
2 me what is in that outer office? What is the layout of it?
3 This is just for observation.
4 Q You stated earlier none of those allegations have
5 been proven. Have any of them been proved to your
6 satisfaction?
7 A No. Ithink we disproved them to my satisfaction.
8 Q I take it you do not believe they took place other
9 than the training exercise?
10 A Oh, no. No. I don't believe they did.
11 Q Do you know of any instances where members of that
12 group have broken in, made any other type of illegal entry
13 in this country?
14 A No.
15 Q Have you ever been present at any discussions of
16 the legality or illegality of maintaining stations like the
17 Miami Station within this country?
18 A Legality? No.
19 Q How about the propriety?
20 A Well, to my knowledge, that really never came up.
21 No one to my knowledge, has ever questioned the legality or
22 the propriety of having the Station.
23 Q There have been some allegations in the press and
24 elsewhere about possible misuse of Cuban exiles, members of
25 that community, by the CIA. Are you aware of those?

bh 13

A No.

Q We received some correspondence and I have seen some articles that suggest that the Cuban community is sort of a resource that is occasionally tapped by the CIA for various operations in this country.

A You mean this country?

Q Yes. Picketing was one example. There were also some other examples of unusual activities. Do you have any knowledge of use by the CIA of Cuban nationals or exiles for any type of operation within this country?

A No.

Q Do you know whether or not the Agency has provided any financial support for Cuban businessmen in this country?

A No. Not to my knowledge.

Q Other than the maintenance of cover?

A No.

Q Establishment of businesses?

A No.

Q No?

A No.

Q In the course of our discussions today we discussed the AMOTS, the AMDUKES, various political front groups, revolutionary front groups. Are there any other emigre, Cuban emigre groups in the Miami area which have been supported by the Agency, either financially or otherwise?

1 A Not to my knowledge.

2 Q Are you familiar with the appendix that was attached

3 to Mr. Colby?s statement?

4 A Yes.

5 Q Did you have some role in drafting that?

6 A You mean the Miami Station thing?

7 Q Appendix J, entitled, "The Miami Station".

8 A Yes.

9 Q You wrote it?

10 A Yes.

11 Q It has a familiar ring about it. There are references

12 to indigenous organizations, emigre organizations. Are

13 there any others other than the ones we have been discussing?

14 A Not to my knowledge. There are, you know, if you

15 want to call it an organization, we did, you know, subsidize

16 the bellwout of Juanita Castro.

17 Q Yes, I am familiar with that.

18 A You are familiar with all that and that is by the

19 board now, too.

20 Q She was doing --

21 A Propaganda.

22 Q -- propaganda broadcasts.

23 A Yes.

24 Q Do you have any personal knowledge of what kind of

25 intelligence-gathering activities are conducted in the Miami

1 area now by the Miami Station?

2 A There are no domestic activities at all in the

3 Miami Station. All Cuban activities have been moved back

4 here to Headquarters. The Miami Station now is completely

5 and solely involved in the intelligence in the Caribbean.

6 Q Does the Miami Station -- I beg your pardon --

7 does the Headquarters component that now handles the Cuban

8 situation in Miami run any agents in the Cuban community?

9 A No. Well, let me explain that to you. We do have

10 a career agent who has been with us for a good many years

11 in Miami and we do use him to contact relatives of Cubans

12 who are still in Cuba. I mean, relatives who are in the U.S.

13 who have relatives in Cuba.

14 Now, this is done principally with the idea of a

15 recruitment target, determine weaknesses or strengths, this

16 type of thing. He does contact these people all over the

17 United States. If we come across an individual that looks like

18 he might be recruitable, or perhaps we could even double him,

19 we will, after we make our preliminary assessment, and we

20 find out where relatives and these types of people are, we

21 will ask this career agent or instruct him to go contact

22 these people, be it New York, New Jersey, Chicago, or what-

23 ever.

24 Q So you use Cuban, now citizens or aliens in this

25 country, as access agents.

bh 16

1 A Right.

2 Q Just like foreign associates would do.

3 A Exactly.

4 Q Are there any more people like Bernard Barker who

5 are contract employees of the Agency who still work in the

6 Miami-Cuban community?

7 A No. None.

8 Q That entire apparatus has been --

9 A Has been dismantled.

10 Q -- dismantled. What is the current size of the

11 Miami Station?

12 A I really don't know but it runs between 11 and 14,

13 as far as I know. I think it will be 11 by the next fiscal

14 year.

15 MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

16 (Discussion off the record.)

17 MR.MANFREDI: Let's go back on the record.

18 BY MR. MANFREDI:

19 Q There are presently no Cuban Ops being conducted out

20 of Miami?

21 A No. All Cuban Ops. are being conducted out of

22 Headquarters.

23 Q And even from the Headquarters location there are

24 no paramilitary operations?

25 A No.

1 Q No covert -- well, there is some propaganda activity
2 being conducted still?
3 A On a very small scale, and the covert action facility
4 that we had, the radio, taped program, is being terminated
5 by 30 June. So for all practical purposes, it is terminated
6 now.
7 Q The Miami Station is under official cover.
8 A Yes.
9 Q And it has been decreased to how many people?
10 A Between 11 and 14.
11 Q And it has absolutely no responsibilities with
12 respect to Cuba?
13 A Absolutely none.
14 Q And its responsibilities are entirely directed to
15 other Latin American countries?
16 A To Caribbean countries.
17 Q Caribbean countries. And I trust that there are
18 other Agency stations in the Caribbean?
19 A Yes.
20 Q Well, I have no further questions, Mr. Sturbitts.
21 If you have anything you would like to add you are welcome
22 to do so.
23 A No, I have nothing.
24 Q I want to thank you on behalf of myself and the
25 Commission for your cooperation.

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

1 A Sure.

2 Q I am sorry we had to take so much of your time.

3 A That is all right.

4 Q Thank you again.

5 (Whereupon, at 3:35 o'clock p.m., the taking of the

6 deposition was concluded.)

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JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 8/27/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : ROCKCOM
RECORD NUMBER : 178-10003-10001

RECORD SERIES : ASSASSINATION FILE

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ASSASSINATION MATERIALS--MISC. ROCK/CIA (9)

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE : MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD, SPECIAL GROUP MEETING 20 SEPTEMBER 1962

DATE : 09/20/1962
PAGES : 1

SUBJECTS :
ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES
CIA
CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS

DOCUMENT TYPE : MEMORANDUM
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1C
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/15/1993

OPENING CRITERIA :

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD OF SPECIAL GROUP MEETING OF

20 SEPTEMBER 1962

There was discussion of FIRE FLY. Its use over Kamchatka was disapproved. General Carter raised the possibility of using it against Cuba, and State appeared enthusiastic. (General Carter does not feel that any operations which DD/R has been considering have been prejudiced by this discussion.)

There was some discussion of the balloon operation over Cuba, but action was deferred until next week. In the meantime, State is most anxious that it be arranged for the exiles to do this and that they not come running back to Miami immediately. The question was also raised as to whether the exiles could still obtain helium.

The next ambassadorial counter-insurgency team will go to Africa. The chairman will be Carl Hummelsine. We are to drum up a candidate.

In presenting the North Vietnam plan next week, CIA is to include the requirement for an overflight to gather radar information. In connection with the whole North Vietnam operation, State seems determined to have no overflights over Laos and no involvement of Chinese Nationalist aircraft or personnel except possibly Chinese pilots in sterile aircraft with South Vietnam credentials. State plans to balance very carefully the risks versus the potential gains. DD/I is to prepare the same sort of assessment on the North Vietnam operation as on Tibet.

The Air Libya item was approved as presented.

The support to the Apra Party in Peru approved as presented.

On Tibet, to be acted on next week, Secretary Rusk is absolutely firm on getting the Indians cranked in.

SECRET

General Carter briefed the meeting on the provision of the security advice to the President of Colombia.

General Carter read the CIA memo on CINCARIB communications problems. The meeting expressed delighted surprise at our capability. We are now a full-fledged member of the State-Defense group which is considering this problem.

On Nicaragua, a memo is to be prepared for the Acting DCI describing the degree of Cuban involvement, particularly in the shipment of arms to Nicaragua by way of Honduras. This memo will also cover Communist infiltration of student and labor and a discription of CIA activities in these same fields.

There was a long discussion of the role of USIB in recommending countries to be placed on the counter-insurgency list. Full account to be gotten from Tom Parrott.

There was discussion of the Southeast Asia status report, concentrating on strategic hamlets, the Montagnards, and the bad press situation in Saigon.

General Carter called attention to the memoranda on the North Vietnam presence in Laos. The question came up as to whether there was an SNIE in the works on this. This subject is to be kept current, especially in view of the 6 October deadline.

State and Defense announced that they had now sent the counter-insurgency doctrine papers to everyone in the field.

There was a suggestion that it was time for a progress report on the South Vietnam intelligence capability.

SECRET

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Date: 8/27/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : ROCKCOM
RECORD NUMBER : 178-10004-10053

RECORD SERIES : ASSASSINATION FILE

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : MISC. ROCKEFELLER COM. AND CIA FILES (3)

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE : DCI PRESENTATION TO THE PFIAB, 7 DECEMBER 1962

DATE : 12/10/1962
PAGES : 3

SUBJECTS :
ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES
PFIAB
OPERATION MONGOOSE
MC CONE, JOHN
CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS

DOCUMENT TYPE : MEMORANDUM
CLASSIFICATION : Top Secret
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10 December 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD.

SUBJECT: DCI Presentation to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, 7 December 1962

1. After concluding the discussion on Cuba, the Director told the Board that he wanted to report on the status of OXCART. He noted that we were on schedule with the aircraft, and that five would be completed by the end of December. He said that one had reached MACH 2.16 at 60,000 feet. There had been some trouble with the J-58 engines, but all problems were soluble. He said the progress on the aircraft was running ahead of that on the engines, and noted that we had had 75 hours in the air with 18 hours on the J-58 engine. He said he had been in direct contact with Mr. Horner to insure that the project was receiving top priority. Dr. Killian asked if Pratt and Whitney had their first team in and the DCI said yes, but one of the problems was that Hamilton Standard didn't have access to everything in Pratt and Whitney unless Horner paved the way.

2. Dr. Baker asked if there had been a solution to the fuel pump problem and the DCI commented that he believed a solution was being reached. Dr. Killian noted that Bendix was working on an alternative fuel pump. The DCI concluded by saying that while the radar cross section was not as small as we had hoped for, it was being worked on.

3. Mr. McCone then turned to the budget and noted that some difficulties had arisen in this connection and in the over all field of coordination. He reminded the Board that they had wanted him to review the budgets of the whole intelligence community, and noted that the military intelligence budget was 90% of the over all effort. He said that he had discussed this with Secretary McNamara. Dr. Killian reiterated that he thought the DCI should review the whole intelligence budget. The DCI noted that intelligence in Defense was going through a transitional period with the development of DIA and other changes. General Doolittle expressed surprise that CIA was only 10% of the intelligence budget. The DCI pointed out that Defense was spending $3,844,000,000 on intelligence and CIA only $363,000,000. This was an increase from $2,250,000,000 in the past, but Defense had put all reconnaissance of the Navy and Air Force into its intelligence budget. He said he did not believe this was correct, and thought it should be deleted.

4. Turning to the CIA budget, the Director said he had instructed the Agency to keep at the level of last year--this was about $50,000,000 less than what had been asked for by the various departments. He said he thought the Agency had worked hard to keep the budget down, and noted that there had to be additional funds for operations against Cuba. There was an increase in NPIC, and as a result the budget was $425,000,000 versus $405,000,000. The Bureau of the Budget had cut this to $381,000,000 and taken $20,000,000 for Cuban operations to charge to the Reserve. The DCI said he found this unacceptable, and thought the contingency should be pure. At this point

Mr. Clifford said he had run across the phrase, MONGOOSE, on several occasions, and asked what this involved. The DCI then explained briefly the MONGOOSE project and how it was set up. He said that after his discussion with the President and Attorney General last fall, it had been decided to utilize all resources to unseat Castro. He went on to mention some of the activities of the project. Mr. McCone then said he did not favor continuing sabotage and guerilla operations. He noted that he was very disturbed about the future and felt that there might be a confrontation within the next few days, and that the Russians might light up the SAM's. He said he had no way of explaining why the SAM sites were being left there. Dr. Langer asked if it might not be for fear of an invasion; the Director said he did not think so because our military forces could eliminate the SAM sites without much trouble.

5. Mr. McCone then said he wanted to discuss the NRO agreement. He said that it had not worked, and the Director of NRO feels that he must have fiscal control over CIA projects and review programs progressively week by week and month by month. The DCI said this was wrong because the appropriation was to CIA and was approved by a different committee of Congress to whom we were responsible. He noted that CIA could handle the project more clandestinely. He had discussed this matter with the Secretary of Defense but had reached no agreement. Defense is withholding $140,000,000 and asking CIA to fill out certain forms before they will advance the money. The Director said that such a decision cannot be made retro-

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/17/201

Agency Information

AGENCY: ROCKCOM
RECORD NUMBER: 178-10004-10054

RECORD SERIES: ASSASSINATION FILES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER: MISC. ROCKEFELLER COM. AND CIA FILES (3)

Document Information

ORIGINATOR: PFIAB
FROM: KIRKPATRICK, LYMAN
TO: RECORD

TITLE: MEETING OF THE DCI WITH PBIAB, FRIDAY, DECEMBER 28, 0930 A.M.

DATE: 12/28/1962
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SUBJECTS:
ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES
CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS
PFIAB
MC CONE, JOHN
OPERATION MONGOOSE
CUBAN EXILES

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Dec 27-28

CONFIDENTIAL

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

AGENDA FOR MEETINGS OF DECEMBER 27 - 28, 1962

ITEM	TIME	SUBJECT
		December 27th
1.	9:00 - 9:30	The Chairman's Time
2.	9:30 - 10:00	Review of Board's Draft Interim Report to the President
3.	10:00 - 12:45	Review of Draft Report on Intelligence Community Activities Relating to the Cuban Arms Buildup (Received from DCI on December 26, 1962)
4.	12:45	Depart for Lunch
5.	1:00 - 2:30	Lunch - The Hay-Adams Hotel (Guests of Dr. Langer)
6.	2:30 - 3:30	Review of the World Situation Mr. Ray Cline, Deputy Director/Intelligence, CIA [illegible]
7.	3:30 - End of Day	Resume Review of Report on Cuban Arms Buildup
8.	7:30 p.m.	Dinner at Residence of Mr. John McCone (3025 Whitehaven Street, Northwest, D. C.) (attended by all Bd. members except [illegible], Baker, Coyne)
		December 28th
9.	9:00 - 9:30	The Chairman's Time
10.	9:30 - 1:00	Discussion of Report on the Cuban Arms Buildup with the Following Key Intelligence Community Officials: a. 9:30-10:30 Mr. John McCone b. 10:30-11:00 Lt. General M. Carter, Deputy Director, CIA c. ~~11:00-11:30~~ 11:15-12:00 Lt. General G. Blake, Director, NSA d. ~~11:30-12:00~~ 12:00-12:35 Mr. Thomas Hughes, Deputy Director, Intelligence and Research, Department of Stat[e] e. ~~12:00-1:00~~ 12:35-1:30 Lt. General Joseph Carroll, Director, DIA

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(December 28th - Continued)

ITEM	TIME	SUBJECT
11.	1:00 - 2:30	Lunch - Room 21, Executive Office Building
12.	2:30 - 3:30	Status of Implementation of Prior Board Recommendations ~~Mr. Russell Ash~~
13.	3:30 - END	Resume Discussion of Report on the Cuban Arms Buildup and Complete Preparation of Report to the President.

TOP SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

This document contains information [illegible] IDEALIST, CORONA OXCART

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Board Meeting of December 27 - 28, 1962

The Board convened at 9:00 a.m. on December 27.* Those present were Dr. Killian, Chairman, Board members Langer, Murphy, Gray, Doolittle, Pace and Clifford and Messrs. Coyne and Ash.

Dr. Killian suggested that Board members read the draft report which had been furnished to the Board on the preceding day by Mr. McCone, the Director of Central Intelligence, setting forth the results of the all-source review which the Board had requested concerning U. S. intelligence community activities with respect to the Soviet military buildup in Cuba during the 6-months preceding October 22, 1962. The Chairman asked that Board members make note of any comments and questions they might wish to raise for discussion during this two-day meeting. Dr. Killian said that he was not sure the DCI's report had the approval of the intelligence community at this point, for he understood that Mr. McCone was at that moment reviewing the draft report in Seattle, and it was possible that some of the conclusions and factual details might not have yet received final approval by the agencies which contributed to the preparation of the report (CIA, DIA, State and NSA). Accordingly, the Chairman noted the importance of the discussions which the Board would have on the following day with heads of the intelligence agencies. The Chairman also thought that the Board should aim for the preparation of a Board report to the President at the close of this 2-day meeting.

Dr. Killian said that he had very recently talked to Mr. McGeorge Bundy who hopes that the Board will take the time it needs to produce a solid report on the handling given by U. S. intelligence agencies to the Soviet military buildup in Cuba. Mr. Bundy assured that the President will understand that the Board is going into the subject deeply and objectively. About 10 days ago, the Chairman related, he had received a telephone call from Mr. Bundy who said that he had seen an early draft of the DCI's report (from a confidential source) and was concerned because the report did not get to the basic issues, and Mr. Bundy expressed an intention to talk to Mr. McCone about this. Dr. Killian stated that he had an appointment to see Mr. Bundy later in the morning at which time he would ask Mr. Bundy to meet with the Board during the course of this meeting.

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* Board members Baker and Land were unable to attend.

TOP SECRET

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24-day stay in Cuba, and our Government is equally in the dark about Soviet and Cuban plans for further activities involving other countries in this Hemisphere. Also we are lacking intelligence on Cuba/Communist China discussions. Mr. Murphy reiterated his concern that our lack of information on such matters as these indicates the absence of an adequate intelligence capability to keep our Government informed about developments in Cuba at the present time and in the future.

Dr. Killian at this point reported to the Board on the conversation which he had just had with Mr. Bundy. According to Mr. Bundy, the President is fully aware that the Board is conducting its review of the Cuba situation. The President wants an objective report from a group of citizens who have no axe to grind, and he is placing great store on this effort of the Board. The Chairman said that Mr. Bundy was obviously concerned about the prospect that the Congress will make inquiries into the Cuba matter. However, Mr. Bundy feels there is a bare possibility that Congressional investigators will be more hesitant to raise hypothetical questions if they learn of the existence of a study having been made by a group such as the Board. It is Mr. Bundy's hope that the Board will carefully consider the preparation of a sanitized version of the report, but if the Board and the President feel that this cannot be done then the Board should try to prepare a report which could be used in executive session of a Committee of the Congress.

Dr. Killian went on to report other matters which had been covered in his discussion with Mr. Bundy. He said that Mr. Bundy had expressed concern over the failure of the DCI to accept the suggestion that there be submitted a more adequate report than the one which the DCI forwarded to the Board on December 26. Mr. Bundy noted in this connection that the DCI's report assigns to policy makers prime responsibility for any failures with respect to intelligence handling.

On the question of availability of Special Group records for purposes of the Board's study, Mr. Bundy informed the Chairman that certainly the Board should examine such records and that they could be obtained from Mr. Parrott (Mr. Bundy commented that the Board is the only group which can have this kind of access).

As to the Board's study, Mr. Bundy told Dr. Killian that the Board should include in its review discussions with the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff -- Mr. Bundy indicating that the Secretary of Defense has particular reservations about the DCI's report.

Another matter mentioned by Mr. Bundy was his belief that the morale of the intelligence community as a whole stands to suffer in the absence of a carefully done review and report which is being expected from the Board.

With regard to the interim report which the Board has under way, Mr. Bundy informed the Chairman that the report could be delivered to him or it could be presented to the President directly, and Mr. Bundy thought it important that the Board present it to the President in person. One other matter discussed was the Board's concern about any intelligence let-down in the wake of the Cuba crisis, it being Mr. Bundy's belief that no such let-down is in prospect if present directives and discussions on the subject have any effect in Government.

(At the conclusion of the Chairman's account of his discussion with Mr. Bundy, the Board recessed for lunch.)

At 2:30 p.m., the Board was briefed on the world situation by Mr. Thomas Lawlor, senior intelligence officer in CIA's Office of Current Intelligence (Mr. Ray Cline, Deputy DCI/Intelligence was on vacation leave and not available to be present at this Board meeting). Mr. Lawlor explained that his own responsibilities included the handling of current intelligence matters, the selection and write-up of current intelligence items (e.g., in the CIB and in memoranda for the White House), and the preparation of internal intelligence notes for use at the CIA working level. Mr. Lawlor pointed out that his duties were in the areas of analysis and production, not the collection, of intelligence. His briefing of the Board included the following subject matters:

<u>USSR/Chicom relations</u>: Recriminations between the USSR and Communist China are the greatest in the history of their dispute, and an open break in party relations is most likely near.

<u>USSR/Cuba</u>: The USSR is presently reappraising its foreign policy positions in the light of the Cuba crisis aftermath.

<u>USSR/Berlin</u>: The USSR is at a diplomatic standstill in Berlin, and this is traceable to the USSR/Chicom rift.

The Chairman asked the DCI whether the MONGOOSE activity presented any particular intelligence problem in the Cuba situation. Mr. McCone said that it had not. He said that in the MONGOOSE activity the Special Group and the Attorney General had given a great deal of consideration to the need for intelligence collection with respect to Cuba, but the intelligence needed was primarily for covert action rather than other purposes. Nevertheless, the MONGOOSE activity contributed to the over-all intelligence collection effort on Cuba. Mr. McCone recalled that there was a hiatus in the collection of intelligence on Cuba after the Bay of Pigs invasion, and when he took office in November 1961 Mr. McCone was surprised to learn that no interrogation of Cuban refugees was aking place. Thereafter, following discussions with the President and the Attorney General they got the refugee interrogations under way.

Mr. Murphy wondered why there had been a let-down in intelligence gathering after the Bay of Pigs incident. Mr. McCone said that this took place before his time, but he assumed that the reasons had to do with discouragement and other psychological factors. In response to Dr. Killian's question as to whether another intelligence let-down was in store in the wake of the Cuba crisis, Mr. McCone said that there was in fact a great danger of such a development following what some officials consider was an "intelligence victory" for the United States. Mr. McCone, noting that the Soviet SA-2's remain in Cuba, said he had brought this up forcefully a week ago at an NSC Executive Committee meeting, and the President had agreed to get word to the USSR that any interference with our aerial reconnaissance of Cuba would be considered as being most grave -- and Messrs. McCloy and Stevenson have passed this word to Kuznetsov. Mr. McCone added that while low-level reconnaissance flights have been suspended, should any ominous development occur it will be necessary to obtain Presidential approval of the resumption of low-level flights.

Mr. Pace inquired as to whether there were any prohibitions on the conduct of intelligence operations with regard to Cuba. Mr. McCone said yes, it is desired to follow a more aggressive pattern of agent infiltration into Cuba. He would like to see a 3 or 4 month effort directed toward the obtaining of straight intelligence on Cuba (in lieu of political warfare, for example) to determine the trend of Soviet plans in Cuba. The DCI noted that the Soviets may quietly get out of Cuba, or they may in

fact take one step back and two steps forward, and hold on to the Cuba real estate as a propaganda and insurgency base, as a means of keeping Castro under control, or in order to retain a capability for quick restoration of a Soviet offensive capability. The kind of concerted intelligence action which the DCI had in mind would include (1) penetration of the Castro government regime, (2) the placement of additional agent teams in Cuba, (3) the continuation of efforts to obtain the assistance of British, French and German representatives in Cuba, (4) the possible obtaining of useful intelligence from the attorney, Donovan, who is negotiating prisoner releases, and (5) possibly the obtaining of useful information from the captain of the "African Pilot" who had a 3-hour talk with Castro and who yesterday asked to see a U. S. intelligence officer.

Mr. Pace asked whether Mr. McCone would favor the use of Guantanamo Naval Base as a base for launching intelligence and related operations against Cuba. Mr. McCone said that he would not be in favor of this because if we were caught using Guantanamo for intelligence operations Castro would obtain UN and other support for Cuba's demands for U. S. evacuation of the Naval Base.

Answering General Doolittle's question, the DCI stated that U-2 overflights of Cuba were going at the rate of two a day, resulting in coverage of all targets once a week and in coverage of some important targets (e.g., harbors) more often. Mr. McCone said that COMOR and USIB list the targets and that he then establishes flight schedules. [illegible]

Going back to the subject of Guantanamo, Mr. Pace asked whether the DCI had made a study of the expected intelligence return that would be obtained if intelligence operations were conducted from the Base -- Mr. Pace adding that he thought such a study should be made before a final policy decision was reached. Mr. McCone said that he had not made such a study. He added that in August the "operators" in CIA had proposed to the MONGOOSE Group that Guantanamo Base be so used, but this was opposed at the policy level. Mr. McCone said that he would not be opposed to a restudy of the proposal at this time. In answer to Dr. Killian's inquiry, Mr. McCone confirmed that we are conducting SIGINT operations at Guantanamo, and Mr. Kirkpatrick noted that NSA had only recently added two more positions there

Mr. Murphy asked the DCI to state the meaning of "MONGOOSE B PLUS". Mr. McCone explained that in the MONGOOSE Group it was originally conceived that Phase I would be one of gathering intelligence on the possibilities for the organization and supply of resistance groups within Cuba, but this effort was "only fairly successful" because Castro has some 100,000 informers in place in Cuba and exercises internal security controls through a system of ration cards, and therefore, CIA did not get as many teams into Cuba as had been hoped. On August 10, Phase II was reached with MONGOOSE planning for (a) violent actions (b) a relatively high level of actions, or "B PLUS", and lesser actions, or "B MINUS". Mr. McCone said that he had not been prepared to endorse proposed "B PLUS" actions in the absence of plans for military backing, because of his own speculation that the U.S. would be faced with MRBMs in Cuba. In any case, the MONGOOSE effort became diverted by considerations of Soviet activities in Cuba, Mr. McCone stated.

In answer to a question from Mr. Murphy as to who chairs the MONGOOSE Group at this time, Mr. McCone said that he did not know whether Mr. Bundy or the Attorney General was now serving as Chairman.

With reference to the absence of photographic evidence of Soviet offensive missile deployment prior to October 14 photography, Mr. McCone said that if one looks at photography of Cuba obtained on September 5 it is possible to spot evidence of activity at the San Cristobal MRBM site, but this activity could have been that of agricultural workers and the evidence did not then point to missile activity. Dr. Killian noted the Board's concern that Soviet camouflage operations may be deceiving us. Mr. McCone expressed his own great concern that the Soviets are deceiving us by camouflage methods. Acknowledging that our intelligence estimates leave a certain margin for error, Mr. McCone noted that it is nevertheless impossible for us to say that we know all that is going on in the USSR with respect to missile activity. In response to Dr. Killian's comment that public discussions seem to indicate that U. S. missile capabilities are superior to those of the USSR, the DCI considered that any such conclusion is erroneous and dangerous and could lead to a complacency which might well result in curtailment of the U. S. missile program by an economy-minded Congress. Mr. McCone added that in his presentations to select Committees of the Congress he always expresses reservations concerning U. S. missile superiority.

Dr. Killian wondered whether the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Congress understand the danger of conclusions that "nothing is there because it can't be seen". Mr. McCone said that undoubtedly there is a tendency toward heavy dependence upon photographic intelligence.

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[With Danny get exact documented visits + phonecalls:] Edwin J Lopez prepared by Dan Hardway

SCENARIO

CHRONOLOGY OF OSWALD'S VISITS TO THE SOVIET AND CUBAN EMBASSIES.

September 26, 1963 Thursday	A man claiming to be Oswald vists the Cuban (1) Embassy between 10:00 A.M. and 2:00 P.M. The visit probably occurs around one o'clock. "Oswald" is discribed as 5'6" tall, blond hair, sunken cheeks, very thin, aquiline nose, very straight eyebrows, approximately 35 years old and wearing a light blue Prince of Wales suit. He was said to look very cold with a hard face and a penetrating cunning way of looking at you. "Oswald" was seeking an intransit visa to Cuba on his way to Russia. He displayed documents that showed his membership in the Fair Play for Cuba Committee and the American Communist Party. He was told that he would have to first obtain a visa to Russia before he could be issued an intransit visa. He is also told that he should return to the Cuban Embassy with his passport and a copy of a photograph in order to fill out the visa application. (Azcue)
September 27, 1963 Friday	
Circa 10:30 A.M. (Teltap)	a "Oswald" calls the Soviet Military Attache (SMA) with whom he speaks in Spanish. He tells the SMA that he is looking for a visa to Odessa. The SMA tells him to call the Consulate. "Oswald" asks for directions to the Embassy and recieves them.
10:37 A.M. (Teltap)	b "Oswald" calls the Soviet Consulate and asks to speak to the Consul in Spanish. He is told that the Consul is not in. He is told that he can call back at 11:30. "Oswald" says that he is looking for a visa to Odessa.
circa 11:30 A.M. (Tel tap at 4:26)	(2) "Oswald" goes to the Russian Embassy where he once again exhibits the documents he has already shown the Cubans as well as other documents such as his and Marina's marriage license. "Oswald" discusses his situation with someone at the Embassy and comes away with the understanding that everything would be expeditiously handled.
circa 12:15 P.M. (Stop here Azque)	Someone from the Soviet Embassy calls Azcue whom he is aware of because of what "Oswald" has told him, and tells him that they have to get authorization from Moscow to grant him a visa and that it will probably take four months.
circa 12:45 A.M.	(3) "Oswald" returns to the Cuban Embassy with the

9/27/63 12:45 (cont'd)	photo and completes the visa application, stating that he would like to leave in three days. He asks Azcue about how long it will take to get the visa. Azcue explains his misconception to him, an argument results and Azcue throws Oswald out. Duran feels sympathetic to Oswald, gives him ~~her address~~ and promises to help in any ~~way she can.~~ She feels that Oswald should have been granted the visa with no problems and that Azcue's actions are wrong.
1:25 P.M.	Oswald calls the Soviet Consulate in an attempt to find out what has gone wrong with the arraingment he thought he had. In Spanish, he asks for the Consul. He is told that the Consul is out and that he can be contacted between four and five on Mondays and Fridays. This call may have been from Duran's phone. If it was he then told her that he could get hold of the Soviet he had his deal with and would she be kind enough to talk to him. She said that she would and to come back at four o'clock. If the call was not made then Oswald got this message to Silvia and the same arraingments for Silvia's four o'clock call were made.
4:05 P.M.	Silvia Duran calls the Soviet Embassy. She tells them the American citizen, the one who wants a visa to Cuba in transit to Russia, is there. She asks who he talked to at the Soviet Embassy when she sent him there to get a Soviet visa so he could get an intransit visa to Cuba. She tells the official she is speaking with that the man seeking the visa wants to know with whom he spoke because he had been assured that there would be no problem. The man at the Soviet Embassy puts another man on the phone and Silvia goes through it again. He tells her that her call will be returned.
4:26 P.M.	A Soviet Official returns Silvia's call. The situation is explained to Silvia. She realizes that she cannot give him a visa because of the delay on the Soviet end and the fact that he does not know anyone in Cuba. What does Silvia tell Oswald who is still setting there waiting? In light of subsequent events it was probably something that would keep his hopes up.
Night	Oswald goes to a party at Rubin Duran's with Silvia and two American friends. This may have been, more likely was, the night of the 26th. He is seen by Elena Garro de Paz. He spends the night with Silvia.

Date / Time	Event
September 28, 1963 Saturday	
circa 11:00 A.M.	Oswald is back at the Soviet Embassy bugging them to expedite his visa. They send him back to the Cuban Embassy to get an address.
11:51	Duran calls the Soviet Consulate and puts Oswald on the phone. He tells them that he is returning to the Soviet Embassy with the address.
circa 12:00	Oswald returns to the Soviet Embassy and is assured that a telegram will be sent and that it will be handled as quickly as possible.
afternoon	Oswald decides that he needs more help and tracks down a revolutionary, pro-Castro Cuban group on the campus of the University of Mexico. Maybe he hopes that he can find someone who will say they know him in Cuba. In any case, he seeks some sort of assistance from these Pro-Castroites. He spends the night with them.
September 29, 1963 Sunday Morning	Oswald spends the day with the Pro-Castro group.
Sunday Afternoon/ evening and night	?
September 30, 1963 Monday	? Note: the association with the Cuban group could have been anytime between the afternoon of 9/28 and the afternoon of 9/30. Contreras said that he met Oswald in the afternoon and spent the rest of the day, that night and part of the next day with him.
October 1, 1963 10:31 A.M. Tuesday	Oswald calls the Soviet Military Attache inquiring about a telegram. He is refered to the Consulate.
10:45 A.M.	Oswald calls the consulate with the same inquiry and learns that the telegram has been sent but no reply has been received. He is discouraged. Obyedkov hangs up on him.
later or earlier	Oswald calls the man with whom he had made his "arraingement" and discusses the assistance that was promised him. He is dangled and the man eventually hangs up on him.
later or on the 2nd. Wednesday	Oswald leaves Mexico.

On or about	this may have happened
9/30/63 Monday	MCS recieves a transcript in which Silvia Duran discusses an American and his problem with a Soviet Counsel. Win Scott writes "Can we identify?" on transcript. Goodpasture notifies Flick that an American is apparently trying to get a visa and that the COS would like to ID. The Cuban and Soviet monitors are asked to notify Flick of any conversation involving an american, or in English. ETC, HOWEVER.
10/1/63	Flick is notified by a monitor that there is an English conversation on the Soviet tap. Flick listens and hears the man ID himself as Oswald. He pulls the tape and marks it "urgent" and notifies Goodpasture that they have an ID on an American. The tape is delivered to Tarasoff for immediate transcription. It is recieved late this day or early on the second by Goodpasture. Disposition of tape unknown, could "urgent" tapes have been routinely retained for longer period? Goodpasture now has ID but does not know for sure that it is the one that Scott has asked about. The guy in the 9/27 conversation sounds real interesting but there is nothing in this conversation, OR 9/28 that clearly connects. She discusses reporting it with Manell. There is some disagreement over whose responsiblity it is to report. Either decision is made, or conflict continues until photos is checked.
Goodpasture ties in 9/28 Soviet conversation re: address.	
10/7/63	Photos from 10/1, 10/2, 10/3, 10/4 (?) are recieved in base from Soviet Embassy.
10/8/63	B. Manell drafts report cable. Goodpasture adds paragraph 2.
10/10/63	(in interim: Goodpasture tries to ID MMM photo? how?) HQ response recieved. Descriptions don't match. Controversy in station on whether Oswald's same. 9/27 + 9/28 conversation tied DEFINATELY in to LHO during this week. by similarity of subtantive content of cable and conversation and voice comparison.
10/16/63	Oswald "P" file opened.
10/18/63	by this time photo of MMM recieved at Station. Goodpasture picks up on it. This MMM photo one from Cubemb on 10/15.

10/21/63

10/15 MMM shown to penetration agents by this time. What response? MCS cables HQ asking for a photo of LHO. For what purpose? Was it just to compare to surveillance photos? Were they planning on showing to penatration agents? why? note: quite a few people say interest level was high--so what actions were taken?

24 August 1978

HSCA Interview of David Atlee Phillips at HSCA offices, 8/23/78, 1:20 to 4:35 P.M., by Dan Hardway, Charles Berk, and Gaeton Fonzi.

Mr. Phillips was reminded that the CIA omnibus release letter still applied to our discussions and that he should feel free to answer our questions in spite of any secrecy oath that he may have executed during his employment with the CIA. He was asked if he remembered and understood the letter and if he wanted to review the letter again. Mr. Phillips stated that he remembered the letter and did not think it necessary to see the letter again.

Mr. Phillips was asked about his activities in Mexico that related to his job as Chief of Covert Action in the Mexico City Station from 1961 to 1963. Mr. Phillips was asked how many persons were in his propoganda shop in Mexico City. He said that it was manned only by himself, a case officer under his direction and a secretary. He later added that there was also one other case officer under his direction who worked under deep cover outside of the Embassy. Mr. Phillips stated that from 1961 to 1963 he ran only about 6 or 7 operations or projects. He added that there would have also been many "ad hoc" actions. Under questioning, he stated that it is possible that he was responsible for as many as 14 to 17 ongoing operations and 3 to 6 developmental stage operations. Most of these operations were directed at the Cuban target and "the great percentage of them had an anti-Cuban or anti-Soviet bias."

Mr. Phillips was asked about the handling of agents. He stated that he himself handled "very very few" agents. "Usually I met with someone who was working deep cover and they in turn would handle several agents." Mr. Phillips did recall handling one agent personally, a radio-TV broadcaster. He also said that he would often meet with other agents even

though he was not handling them on a day to day basis. He stated that at all times he had at least one deep cover officer working outside of the Embassy and that, sometimes, he had two such officers.

Mr. Phillips stated that he did have access, and did use in some of his propoganda activities, agents who were located outside of Mexico. Mr. Phillips also stated that he did use a few assets that he had developed prior to his transfer to Mexico City; he specifically recalled a man named SAYAS who had been a newspaperman in Cuba and went to work in Mexico City. He said that while he had been a propoganda officer for the JMARC operation he had used assets that he had developed during his prior tour of duty in Havana. Mr. Phillips said that such assets were usually handled by him personally during the Bay of Pigs.

Mr. Phillips stated that during the Bay of Pigs operation he travelled to Miami "fairly frequently; every 6 weeks, 3 weeks, 5 weeks." He stated that responsibility for propoganda operations were divided between him and his subordinate in Miami, William Kent. When asked to explain that division Mr. Phillips stated:

> Kent reported to my shop in Washington. He had day to day contact with the groups we were supporting down there, the student group and the doctors or whatever, and the people involved in Radio Swan.

Phillips stated that Radio Swan was run out of Miami, through the mechanism of the Gibralter Steamship Company. He did say that he was in contact with the agent who ran Radio Swan. He said that he felt uncomfortable naming than agent and suggested we ask the Agency for his identity.

Mr. Phillips stated that when he traveled to Miami he often went to see the people he knew from Havana, including those he was running as agents himself. He would also, on occassion, meet with agents whom

Bill Kent was running "if Bill Kent got to the point where he felt he would like a little weight." Sometimes he went down to Miami on a "trouble shooting" mission, as when problems developed with a commercial radio station the Agency was funding.

Mr. Phillips stated that he had had no recent contact with Mr. Kent relating to anything being done by this Committee. He did state that, approximately a month ago when Mr. Kent retired from the CIA, he received a call from Mr. Kent. He said that Mr. Kent said that he was setting up an executive employment agency and had asked for Mr. Phillips help in finding jobs for former employees of the agency as well as referring people for specific skilled jobs. They did not discuss the HSCA at all, according to Phillips.

Mr. Phillips stated that it would be accurate to state that there were two "sets" of propoganda activities during the Bay of Pigs; one that was run out of the Miami offices coordinated by Bill Kent and a second set that he personally ran without coordinating with Mr. Kent. Most of Mr. Phillips prior established assets were in the second set of propoganda operations.

Mr. Phillips said that even after he became Chief of Cuban Operations in Mexico City he still worked very closely with the propoganda shop, and his successor as head of that shop, James Flannery, in propoganda operations.

Mr. Phillips said that his "Cuban shop" covered the activities of the Cuban Embassy and that a special group covered the airport. He said that a good deal of time was

spent looking for opportunities to recruit Cubans who came to Mexico City. The shop also ran a debriefing center for Cubans who left Cuba by way of Mexico. He also said that one of the primary activities of the Cuban shop would have been to identify the DGI officers in the Cuban Embassy and their functions, duties and assignments whenever possible. Mr. Phillips said that he was still involved in propaganda activities at this time specifically recalling a Mexican broadcaster whose radio station could be heard in Cuba. Mr. Phillips pointed out that he had been a close friend of Mr. Flannery's and that Mr. Flannery was made Chief of Covert Action in Mexico on his, Phillip's, recommendation.

Mr. Phillips' said that he had "quite good" relations with Win Scott and that he reported directly to him as opposed to reporting through the Deputy Chief of Station which would have been the routine manner. Mr. Phillips stated that he thought that Robert Shaw had been in charge of the Cuban photographic surveillance operations and that they had two penetration agents in the Cuban Embassy. He stated that he could not remember the names of the penetration agents and was not sure of the cryptonyms.

Mr. Phillips was asked why his name came up so infrequently in a review of Agency documents of this period from Mexico City. He said that his name should appear on any "formal project" he had going, but that he "did like to delegate work." He said that his name must be on many papers.

Mr. Phillips said that there was a CI responsibility in the Cuban shop. "You always watch out for it, but there was no formal program." He said, however, that "I never really understood what CI was." Phillips said that there were some CIA officers who made counter-intelligence their primary concern during their entire careers but that he was not one of them. He described the CI effectiveness of the Mexico City Station as "average" and its Cuban section as "less than average."

Mr. Phillips stated that he was aware of the existence of the Special Affairs Staff in Washington that dealt with Cuban matters. He was also aware that the SAS had its own counter-intelligence section. He recalled meeting the Chief of that section, Hal SWENSON, on a trip to Washington. He also said that it would have been normal routine for Mr. Swenson to have traveled to Mexico City on "routine trips" or special cases. He said that he had probably seen Swenson in Mexico but that he did not recall any specific meetings.

Mr. Phillips recalled that the Legat office of the U.S. Embassy in Mexico was large; that it had 11 to 20 officers assigned to it. He said that there was a close relationship between the Agency station and the Legat office. He said that the Legat got "drop copies" - what? of most reports. He said that it would have been routine to advise the Legat of "interesting cases" and that an American reporting to a foreign embassy would have been such a case. He said that a local dissemination would have definately been routine and that this liaison

relationship would have been at least partially responsible for reporting such a visit to Headquarters.

Mr. Phillips was queried about whether, in such a case, it would have been routine for the Agency station to take any action other than just reporting the information that had come to its attention. Mr. Phillips said that it could have happened in certain circumstances, such as if the contact looked as if he had recruitment potential or was a serious security case. In those instances it was possible that other actions would be taken. Mr. Phillips remembers one such instance specifically and pointed out that it is related in his book, Nightwatch, on pp. 126-128. This is a story of an American military officer who offered to spy for the Cubans and an operation mounted against him by the Agency in Mexico. In response to a direct question Mr. Phillips acknowledged that the Station could, and often did, take actions other than just reporting in regard to Americans in Mexico that were in contact with Soviet or Bloc Embassies without a specific request from another interested agency; i.e., they often took investigative and operational action on their own initiative. Mr. Phillips said that the reason that the Station could do this was Mr. Scott's ranking (informal) in the agency. Mr. Phillips illustrated this point by saying that when Mr. Scott returned to Washington to report he did not go to the Chief of Western Hemisphere Division but directly to either the DCI or DDP. He pointed out that Scott had been a division chief himself prior to his assignment as Chief of Station in Mexico.

Mr. Phillips was asked if the CIA shared assets and informants with the FBI in Mexico. He said that he did not know of any such cases but there was coordination and liaison with the Bureau on the surveillance operations.

Mr. Phillips acknowledged that one additional area in which the Station and the FBI shared an interest was the colony of American expatriates in Mexico. He said that he was not sure of who had the responsibility for that area in the Station but that it may ~~of~~ have been Ms. Ann Goodpasture. Mr. Phillips stated that he was not aware of any Agency liaison in Mexico City with either Army or Navy regarding counter-intelligence or counter-espionage cases. He said that he had never heard of any arguments that may have occured concerning whose responsibility it was to report Oswald's initial contact with the Soviet Embassy or about the extensiveness of the Station's reporting after the assassination.

Mr. Phillips does remember Viola June COBB. "Blonde, flew an airplane, track record for hitting a lot of beds in Cuba, had a twin sister involved in aviation. That's what comes to mind." He vaguely remembers messages or reports from or about her coming out of his Cuban shop but he believes that she was run out of Washington or Miami as an asset and that someone from one of those two places would have regularly come to Mexico to run her.

Mr. Phillips stated that he did not recall an officer with a hair lip or who spoke with a lisp.

Phillips stated that he did not know if Ms. Cobb was also an informant for the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Phillips stated that he recalls three or four members of the Warren Commission staff coming to Mexico. He said that he may have chatted with them informally but he had no formal dealings with them. He said that they spent most of their time with Mr. Scott.

Mr. Phillips said that he first heard the name of Silvia Duran about the time he arrived in Mexico, as soon as he started reading the telephone tap transcripts. "Her name appeared time and time again." He added: "We had no interest in her. She wasn't friendly with anyone." Mr. Phillips had previously mentioned, in his discussion of the Cuban shop's interest in recruiting agents, the name of Ambassador Lechuga and their interest in pitching him. Mr. Phillips was shown Slawson's memo concerning his trip to Mexico where Scott told him that the CIA had a substantial prior interest in Duran because of her affair with Lechuga. Phillips seemed surprised and said "No one let me in on this operation." Mr. Phillips said that it is possible that the Agency pitched Duran. "At one time we pitched almost everyone at the Cuban Embassy. She must have been considered." Mr. Phillips said that it was possible that she was not pitched because the station could not identify any of her weaknesses. At this point Mr. Phillips was told about the LITAMEL/9 reports on Duran that said that all that

~~all that~~ would have to be done to recruit her was get a blonde, blue eyed American in bed with the little "puta." Mr. Phillips admitted that it sounded like she had at least been targeted and that the station's interest was substantial and that the weakness and means had been identified. He pointed out, however, that targeting does not necessarily mean that she had been pitched, or, even if she was pitched, that she had accepted the pitch. Mr. Phillips said that he was not aware that a pitch had been made.

Phillips stated that Ms. Duran's 201 file should be "very thick". He stated that a thin 201 file prior to the assassination "would be very surprising". He said that a name trace should come up with at least a lot of 3x5 cards that predate the assassination.

Mr. Phillips stated that he saw Lachuga only three times after he left Cuba: once on an airplane from Miami--"we just nodded"--; once at the inauguration of Mexican President Diaz Ordaz; and once when he was having lunch at a fancy resturant near the American Embassy in Mexico. On the last encounter Phillips said that he knew Lachuga was going to be there and that he had specifically gone there to talk to him. He said that Lachuga turned off all the advances he made.

Phillips was asked why the Agency had sent a cable to Mexico after Ms. Duran's arrest saying "don't allow any Americans to have contact with her." (paraphrase). He said: "Don't know. I can't tell you why they did that. I can't guess why." He said that he was not aware that the

Warren Commission staffers who were in Mexico wanted to talk to Duran. He said that he knew Clarence BOONSTRA well, that the last he heard he was in North Florida, but that he had never discussed the assassination or Oswald with him.

Mr. Phillips said that he vaguely remembered that Win Scott did have a safe in his office. He guessed that Scott and his secretary would have been the only people who had access to that saff. He said that Scott had had several secretaries over a period and that he only remembers the first name of one of them: Dottie. He said that he had no idea of what Scott kept in his safe. He said that when he (personally) was chief of station in the Dominican Republic, Brazil and Venezuela, he kept ~~really~~ "very sensitive" material in his safe in his office. He assumes that the same would have been true of Mr. Scott. Phillips offered the example that someone would call and say that someone at the Embassy was a prostitute, he would note that for the record and keep it in the private safe. He guessed that the material in the safe would have been material Scott generated himself. He said that memos of meetings with the Mexican president in which sensitive topics were discussed would have been a likely candidate for retention in Scott's safe. He said that he does not know what happened to Scott's safe after he died but that he has heard a vague story that someone went out and found a lot of documents that Scott had kept.

Mr. Phillips stated that he thought that the Chief of

the DGI in Mexico was a man named "LUNA."

Mr. Phillips was asked about the story in his book concerning the DGI officer with the penchant for antique jewelry that appears at page 133. He said that he does not remember the name of that person, but says he took some literary license because he doesn't specifically recall if the person was, in fact, a DGI officer. "Thank God my next book is fiction," he said.

Phillips was asked about the following DGI officers:
Orestes Guillermo Ruiz Perez--"vaguely familiar";
Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez--"Yes, familiar.";
Manual Vega--could have been Chief of DGI;
Luisa Calderon--"familiar";
Teresa Proenza--"definitely familiar";
Alfredo Mirabal--"familiar";
Eusebio Azcue--the consul, "to my knowledge he was not Cuban intelligence."

Mr. Phillips was asked if Proenza was a CIA asset. He said "The name is familiar but I don't recall the context." He also could not remember if Luisa Calderon had been an asset. He said: "I don't really remember the true names of the agents. I never saw them or dealt with them." He stated that he could not remember whether the Agency had ever pitched Ruiz but that "there were several attempts to pitch intelligence types."

Mr. Phillips was shown Carlos Blanco's report of 28 June 1963. He stated that he had probably seen it previously but does not remember it specifically. He said that the name

Carlos Blanco had probably been made up for the purposes of this one report. He said that he recalled the name of Luisa Calderon a bit better after reading the document. He said that she may have been the asset who worked in the Embassy for the Agency but he still could not be certain because he could not recall the true names. He said that he did not know if there would have been a "further report" and that, if there was, it would not have necessarily been sent to Headquarters unless it had been of special interest.

Mr. Phillips was then shown the dispatch concerning Luisa's sister. (CIA # 3715.) He said that he does not know whether she was ever identified, contacted or used. He said that he had never heard of a "domestic exploitation section" and pointed out that the words were not capitalized.

Mr. Phillips stated that he did know Mr. Barney Hidalgo. He does not recall him ever being in Mexico but said that it was possible that Mr. Hidalgo could have been there and that he would not have known about it. He said that he had on occassion worked with Mr. Hidalgo. He said that Hidalgo did not have any executive talents, but he was involved in a lot of operations. He said that Hidalgo had some problems: "I don't want to say he was crazy, but I was always uncomfortable around him." Mr. Phillips also recognized the cryptonym AMMUG/1.

Mr. Phillips was shown CIA #'s 3665 and 3662 which are reports from AMMUG that the Cubans believed that Calderon had been recruited by the CIA and had, therefore, called her back

to Cuba. Mr. Phillips said that that did not help him recall that much about Calderon other than to make him think that she was not a CIA agent "because she went back to Cuba."

Mr. Phillips stated that he was not aware that after the assassination that Thomas Mann expressed a great deal of interest in the Mexico City investigation. He also said that he did not know why Mann would have been pressing for the arrest and questioning of Luisa Calderon. He said that, in fact, he had never known or heard that such was the case.

Mr. Phillips was shown the transcript of the Calderon call. (CIA 3717.) He said "I've seen this document before... when we were reviewing things after the assassination." He was asked what the Mexico Station had done to follow up on that conversation. He said that he could not recall that anything was done other than forwarding the conversation to Headquarters. He said that he did not know what Headquarters had done with it. He said that he could not remember being tasked or his shop being tasked, with anything concerning this lead. He said that he did not know if this conversation was given to the WC by HQ but acknowledged that it was not shown to the staff members who visited Mexico. He does not recall any specific follow up regarding Calderon. He does not know why Calderon was not arrested.

The section of Carlos Blanco's report concerning Teresa Proenza was pointed out to Phillips. He said that he thought the report may have been written by a person used by the station that thought that everyone was a communist. He said this may

have been LIHUFF/1. He said that the document did not help his memory that much and that "I don't know of any reason why she would be termed dangerous."

Phillips was shown the LITAMEL/9 contact report regarding the firing of Teresa Proenza (CIA # 3714.). Mr. Phillips stated that he dos not know why Teresa Proenza was fired. He said that he did recognize the cryptonym AMROD. He said that it was a disinformation operation and that it may have been aimed, in part, at Teresa Proenza. He said that the person in his book that he refers to as a cultural attaache with a penchant for antique jewelry was not Teresa Proenza. He said that he remembers that the person he refers to in that story was definately a man. Phillips stuck adamantly to this contention.

Phillips stated that he does not recall that the Mexico City Station ever developed any information that Oswald was in contact with anyone else at the Cuban Embassy other than Azcue and Duran. Mr. Phillips was shown the FBI report of an interview with Ms. Proenza's brother. Mr. Phillips stated that it did not ring any bells and he could not recall ever having heard of such a thing. Mr. Phillips was also informed of the FBI report from a CIA source that indicated that Oswald had had contact with Proenza. He said that he had never heard of it. Mr. Phillips then stated that some things were coming back to him. He asked if Proenza was a lesbian but he didn't recall if that was a fact or part of the disinformation campaign aimed at her.

The timing of the departures of Calderon and Proenza was pointed out to Mr. Phillips as well as the indications that they had met Oswald, had prior knowledge of the assassination, the nominal reason regarding Proenza over the Raul Roa note. He was asked if he knew if their recalls were connected and if they were connected with the assassination. He said that he did not know, maybe Calderon and Proenza had been lovers, but that may have been part of the disinformation, he just could not remember which, fact or fiction.

Mr. Phillips stated that it was very possible that HQ or JMWAVE could have recruited and run Cuban agents in Mexico without the knowledge of the Mexico Station. Phillips said: "I suppose it would have been possible for an agent in Mexico City to be run out of JMWAVE station in Miami without my knowledge, but I would have been furious if I found out about it:. He said that this may have even been "probable" in the case of a "sensitive operation," but he pointed out that anyone doing that took the risk of crossing Win Scott who was close to both the DCI and DDP. This lead Mr. Phillips to say that if that was the case then the DDP, at least, would probably have approved the WAVE use of an agent in Mexico. We took Mr. Phillips through the documents on Ms. Calderon again and asked him if this could have been an instance such as that we were talking about. He said that it very well could have been but that he had no knowledge that would indicate that that was the case. He said that this was the kind of thing "they might have asked Barney Hidalgo to do." Phillips agreed that

CIA #3665 indicates that a pitch to Calderon was to be made by someone outside of Mexico. "If it was someone from the CIA there would be something in her 201 files... but possibly it could have been run out of a soft file." He said that her file should be substantial. He said he could not explain why the Calderon conversation would not have been in her 201 while it was in Oswald's.

Mr. Phillips was informed of the testing of the impulse camera beginning on September 27, 1963. He stated that he had "no recollection" of the disposition of the photographs obtained during that testing.

Mr. Phillips stated that if another cable (a third) was sent to HQ regarding Oswald prior to the assassination that he did not know about it.

Mr. Phillips was asked if there was a way for HQ and a Station to communicate without the commo becoming part of the permanent record. He stated that there was at least one way that he knew of in addition to telephone and personal courier. He said that it was technically possible to set up a "telcom" system by persuading the cable operators to set it up on a "back channel". He stated that such a system would work on a question and answer sheme. He said "It has been done on occassion but I don't recall it ever having been done in Mexico." Mr. Phillips also stated that he did not believe that there had been any telephone communications concerning the assassination. Refuting documents were not shown.

COMMITTEE SENSITIVE

Mr. Phillips acknowledged that the FBI would manipulate their files on employees of the CIA at the Agency's behest. He also said that he would not be surprised if other catagories of files could be manipulated, including internal CIA files. Mr. Phillips was asked what factors would make him suspicious of a file. He said that missing references, pages that had half of them torn off, things like that would arouse his suspicion. He also listed a missing report from a sequentially numbered series of reports as one thing that would arouse his suspicion. In response to a direct question, Mr. Phillips said that, if what we had told him about Ms. Duran's file was true, then we could be fairly certain that her file had been "manipulated."

Mr. Phillips was asked about James Angleton. He said: "He didn't tell me anything about his operations. He kept promising to tell me, but he never did." He said that Angleton held his operation very tightly to his vest. Phillips said it is possible that J.C. King mignt have had some operations outside of the JMARC structure but that they could not have been funded without someone knowing about them. A division chief does have access to operational and developmental funds but, Phillips said, he has never heard of a discretionary fund available to Division Chiefs. He said that the developmental fund usually had a lot of money in it but that it eventually had to be accounted for. "I can't remember having such a fund that I didn't account for through the DDP."

Mr. Phillips said that he did not participate, nor was he aware of, in any campaign after the assassination to spread misinformation about the death of Kennedy. He could not explain why the misinformation that came from the Cuban groups and individuals that tended to point to Castro involvement were predominantly from assets that he had handled personally as opposed to ones that had been ran out of the Miami station. He said that he agreed that it was strange that the one peice of evidence that tended to show at least DGI foreknowledge was not pursued by his shop while disinformation from his former assets occupied the attentions of investigators in that area. Mr. Phillips stated that he did not know of any hard evidence that existed in 1963 that pointed to Castro's involvement.

Mr. Phillips was asked about his operations in Havana, specifically the names of the operations he was involved in, when he worked there as a covert operative from 1958 to 1961. He said he went to Cuba in the summer of 1958 after he had retired from the Agency. He said the Agency heard he was setting up his own public relations business there and asked him to continue working for them, not on a staff status but on a contract basis. Most of his work, he said, involved propaganda operations for Latin American coundtries and not Cuba. He did do what he termed "ad hoc" stuff as it came along and he did develop propaganda news stories and editorial material that was sent out to the provincial newspapers. He also specifically recalled attending a meeting of a group of businessmen who

began talking about developing anti-Castro activity, but that group never got off the ground because there was an informant in the group and most of the participants were shortly afterwards arrested.

When asked about his relationsip with Julio Lobo, he became a bit upset and said he thought he had covered that adequately in his deposition. He said as far as he could recall he met Lobo only one time, perhaps it was even in Madrid and not Havana, he doesn't recall, and he had no substantial dealings with him. He wanted to know if Veciana's story about Bishop is still being considered and if any decision about his being Bishop had been conclusively arrived at. He said he doesn't like living under the fear and tension of possibly being called before the television cameras and having Veciana suddenly stand up and point his finger at him and say that he is Bishop and that he saw him with Oswald. Phillips was told by the interviewers that they had no authority to disclose anything of substance about our investigation to him. He asked that the interviewers seek permission to let him know what was going on. He was told that his request would be brought to high-level attention but that a response of any kind at all could not be assured.

Phillips stated that he did not know Paul Bethel very well. but it was not Bethel who introduced him to Lopez-Fresquet. He said that that introduction was made by Bethel's boss, Dick Cushing.

Phillips said that he had no additional recollections on Jack Cogswell other than he remembered that he was an

American businessman in Havana.

Mr. Phillips stated that he "probably" did have some contacts with someone or some persons associated with the Moa Bay Mining Company, but he did not recall any specific names. He also "must have" had some contact with Freeport Sulpher people. "I was fairly socially active at the time and the name of the company is familiar to me."

Mr. Phillips said that he did not have many public relations clients during that time. He could recall only the man who owned Ambar Motors and the El Mundo newspaper. He also traded for free French lessons at the Berlitz School although he can not recall exactly what kind of public relations work he did in return.

Phillips did not recall the name Darnell.

He said that he did know Wayne Smith, political attache at the American Embassy, very well. He remembered him as a big guy because they were in a little theatre group together and in one play Phillips had to throw Smith out of a window.

Phillips said that he did not know Roberto Vale.

Phillips was asked about the procedure of traveling out of the country on covert operations. He said he always traveled out under his true name and with his legitimate passport. He would have other documentation on him for use with his alias when he arrived in the country. He said that's the way it was always done by every agent as far as he knew unless it was a "very sensitive operation." He knew of no specific sensitive operation in which a phoney passport was issued by the agency.

"I don't know how that mechanism worked," he said. He added that he had never had a phoney passport.

Mr. Phillips said that he had met McClendon (Gordon) once whent they were in college. He said that he had not seen him again until September of 1976 when he attended a Retired Intelligence Officers meeting. Later McClendon had called him and reminded him of an incident mentioned in Nightwatch involving a shool day's episode and MecClendon told him that he was the kid who picked him up in his car. As far as Phillips can recall, he never had any contact with McClendon during the intervening years. He never met McClendon at any time during 1963 in Dallas.

Phillips stated that he has no familiarity with the Catherwood Foundation or Cummins Caterwood or E. Wharton Shober. He was not specifically familiar with the Foundation's Cuban Aid Relief operation in Miami.

Phillips said that the debriefing centers in Miami were under the aegis of the CIA but the Agency only got the product from them, they were actually run by another agency. He said that they may have been ran by military intelligence. He said that he had never met any of the supervisory personnel who ran those centers.

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11 JFK F-2	10	
12 JFK F-3	11	
13 JFK F-4	18	
14 JFK F-5	24	
15 JFK F-6	32	
16 JFK F-7	49	

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EXECUTIVE SESSION

- - -

Tuesday, June 20, 1978

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U.S. House of Representatives,

Select Committee on Assassinations,

Subcommittee on the Assassination of John F. Kennedy

Washington, D. C.

The Committee met, pursuant to recess, at 6:20 o'clock p.m., in Room 1-D, Headquarters, Central Intelligence Agency, Langley, Virginia, the Honorable Louis Stokes (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Stokes, Preyer, Burke, Fithian, Devine and Sawyer.

Also present: G. R. Blakey, G. Cornwell, M. Goldsmith, R. Morrison, E. Berning, M. Jackson, J. Smith, K. Klein and S. Brady.

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The Chairman. The Committee will come to order.

At this time the Committee will resume its sitting. We are still in executive session by virtue of the resolution adopted by the Committee this past evening.

At this time the Chair will recognize Mr. Blakey.

Mr. Blakey. Off the record.

1 (Discussion off the record.)

2 The Chairman. Anything further?

3 Bring the witness in.

4 Let the record reflect that the Committee has resumed its

5 sitting and at this time the witness, Yuri Nosenko, is back

6 before the Committee once again.

7 Mr. Nosenko, I admonish you that you are still under the

8 oath that you took last night.

9 TESTIMONY OF YURI IVANOVICH NOSENKO -- Resumed

10 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

11 The Chairman. And at this time, then, the Committee will

12 recognize the counsel for the Committee, Mr. Klein.

13 Mr. Klein. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

14 Good evening.

15 Mr. Nosenko. Good evening, sir.

16 Mr. Klein. You told us that after the assassination

17 you had an opportunity to be present when Oswald's file was

18 brought from Minsk, is that right?

19 Mr. Nosenko. Absolutely right.

20 Mr. Klein. Did you have an opportunity to read the entire

21 file at that time?

22 Mr. Nosenko. No, sir.

23 Mr. Klein. How much of the file did you read?

24 Mr. Nosenko. It was simply looking, page by page, first

25 part of the first volume.

1 Mr. Klein. You went through the first part of the first
2 volume, page by page?
3 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.
4 Mr. Klein. Did you go through any of the other volumes?
5 Mr. Nosenko. No, sir.
6 Mr. Klein. You told us that an officer named Matveev
7 took the file away to prepare a summary?
8 Mr. Nosenko. Right.
9 Mr. Klein. Do you know who wrote that summary?
10 Mr. Nosenko. The summary was written by the First
11 Department of the Second Chief Directorate.
12 Mr. Klein. Do you know who, in particular?
13 Mr. Nosenko. No, sir, I do not know.
14 Mr. Klein. And did you ever have an opportunity to read
15 the summary that the First Department prepared?
16 Mr. Nosenko. No, sir; I didn't see it.
17 Mr. Klein. The Russian word "spravka", does that mean --
18 Mr. Nosenko. Is summary, right.
19 Mr. Klein. And why were you not able to read the summary
20 that they wrote?
21 Mr. Nosenko. Well, the file was taken in the First
22 Department. I was working in the Seventh Department.
23 Mr. Klein. Did you make any attempt to read it?
24 Mr. Nosenko. No.
25 Mr. Klein. Was it at all unusual that with all your

involvement in the case you did not have an opportunity to read that file?

Mr. Nosenko. It was the decision of the Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, given big importance to this question, that a resume will be prepared by the most prestigious department, American Department, and that is why we couldn't even ask.

Mr. Klein. You didn't even ask to see it?

Mr. Nosenko. No.

Mr. Klein. So it was not unusual that you were not allowed to see it?

Mr. Nosenko. No, it was not unusual.

Mr. Klein. You have testified before this Committee that the KGB did not allow Lee Harvey Oswald to defect because he was uninteresting. You have testified the KGB did not even speak to Lee Harvey Oswald because he was uninteresting; and that you ~~decided~~ he was not interesting without speaking to him.

Do you know what year Lee Harvey Oswald came to the Soviet Union?

Mr. Nosenko. 1959.

Mr. Klein. In 1959, approximately how many Americans wanted to defect to the Soviet Union or requested permission to defect?

Mr. Nosenko. There was a defectionist, I remember, one of the employees, one of the workers, who was helping to organize the American Exhibition in Moscow, Mr. Webster.

1 Mr. Klein. Without giving particular names, how many
2 Americans would you say asked permission to defect in 1959?
3 What would the number be?
4 Mr. Nosenko. These two were known to me -- Oswald and
5 Webster.
6 Mr. Klein. From 1955 to 1960, what would be your best
7 estimate as to how many Americans asked permission to defect
8 to the Soviet Union?
9 Mr. Nosenko. As far as I heard, there I think was one
10 only.
11 Mr. Klein. One other, meaning three altogether.
12 Mr. Nosenko. One besides Oswald and Webster, what I
13 know.
14 Mr. Klein. Three?
15 Mr. Nosenko. T hree.
16 Mr. Klein. Of the three, was Oswald the only one turned
17 down because he was uninteresting?
18 Mr. Nosenko. Right.
19 Mr. Klein. Do you know any other defector who was ever
20 turned down because he was uninteresting?
21 Mr. Nosenko. No.
22 Allow me to tell, as you have seen, and you told yourselves,
23 how many Americans are defected. It is a very rare occasion and
24 KGB prefers defection when they are planning, they want, these
25 types of defectors, they like and invite those people who can

1 give them certain information which is valuable.

2 Mr. Klein. Do you recall telling this Committee yesterday

3 that up until 1960 the Seventh Department was recruiting

4 left and right?

5 Mr. Nosenko. Absolutely right.

6 Mr. Klein. And that you recruited a woman in Utah who was --

7 Mr. Nosenko. I simply had given example of this recruit-

8 ment which took place up to 1960. When Seventh Department was

9 recruitng and giving files to the Intelligence Service, First

10 Chief Directorate, not asking them before, is it person will

11 be for them valuable or not.

12 Mr. Klein. And that KGB officers were getting bonus

13 and promotions when they induced people to recruit?

14 Mr.Nosenko. Right.

15 Mr. Klein. And despite that, Lee Harvey Oswald, when

16 he asked to defect, you turned him down without even speaking to

17 him, to find out if he had any information; is that right?

18 Mr. Nosenko. Sir, we had quite a few recruitments in '59,

19 a very big amount of them in '59 very interesting, much,

20 much more interesting -- professors and teachers -- and

21 even was a co-op from CIA we had quite a few recruitments,

22 and Oswald was nothing on this base, on this foundation.

23 Mr. Klein. Would the KGB have any interest in an

24 American student?

25 Mr. Nosenko. As I told you yesterday, KGB interested in

1 students, but particularly those students who are studying
the Russian language, Russian history, Russian economy.

2 Mr. Klein. And would they have any interest in an
3 American who had strong anti-American views and who was a
4 professed Marxist? Would they have any interest in that
5 kind of person?

6 Mr. Nosenko. Here were are coming to a very interesting
7 and sensitive question. From mid-1950, by the order of
8 Central Committee Communist Party, Soviet Union, KGB was
9 prohibited to make any approachment and recruitment of
10 members of the Communist Party of the West.

11 Mr. Klein. I am not asking about a member of the
12 Communist Party.

13 Mr. Nosenko. Your question is, and if he is some type
14 of Marxist here, the question maybe he is possibly a member
15 of Communist Party, and to check it for KGB very difficult
16 if he is a member of Communist Party or not of his country.

17 Mr. Klein. Would they ask him if he is a member of
18 the Communist Party?

19 Would they check it?

20 Mr. Nosenko. No, they would not ask him.

21 Mr. Klein. They wouldn't ask him?

22 Mr. Nosenko. No.

23 Mr. Klein. Would the Soviet Union be interested in
24 someone who was in the military and worked with radar equipment?

1 Mr. Nosenko. It depends. If he was corporal, private,
2 is no big interest. If he was officer, maybe they would be
3 interested.
4 Mr. Klein. The fact that he worked with the equipment
5 wouldn't be enough; they would want to know what his rank was?
6 Mr. Nosenko. No, sir; it is not enough because they
7 had sources.
8 Mr. Klein. And in 1959 would the Soviet Union have been
9 interested in someone who served as a radar operator on an air
10 base where U-2s took off and landed?
11 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir; it would be very interested.
12 Mr. Klein. It is your testimony that Lee Harvey Oswald,
13 who was a student, who was a professed Marxist, who had --
14 Mr. Nosenio. Students? I never heard that he was a
15 student.
16 Mr. Klein. -- who had been a radar operator and had
17 worked on a base from which U-2 airplanes took off and
18 landed, that he wasn't even interesting enough for the KGB
19 to speak to him, to find out if he knew any of this information?
20 Mr. Nosenko. Mr. Klein, I understand your position,
21 but we didn't know that he had any connection with U-2
22 flights. That is one thing.
23 And if you, Mr. Klein, are basing on what was written by
24 Mr. Epstein in the book, it is a little bit from the air
25 taken ideas. Mr. Epstein even telling that how important

for KGB to know about such base -- that base. We knew it in '50's when I worked in GRU at the Navy, in 1950, '51, '52. We knew every base and in Japan, at this Atsugi Base, and we knew what kind of airplanes had been. We didn't know about U-2, no. Sure, it is very interesting, but when Oswald applied, requested to stay in the Soviet Union, we didn't know a word about his knowledge, anything concerning U-2 flights.

Mr. Klein. And you didn't ask him if he had any kind of information about that when he wanted to defect, is that correct?

Mr. Nosenko. No.

Mr. Klein. And you told us that one reason that no one was working on Oswald was because all of your people were concentrating on the American Exhibition in 1959, is that correct?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir. Not only American Exhibition, there were other tourists and among them were interesting targets, very interesting targets.

Mr. Klein. You told us yesterday that things didn't --

Mr. Nosenko. I can explain you why, because an American Exhibition in Moscow was by the information which KGB had, I don't know how much it's right, how much it's wrong, but it was suspected quite a number of people from American intelligence community who were working on American Exhibition in Moscow, and when the work is going on against such targets,

1 it is not one officer, it is a big amount of people involved
2 on each case, because it is very serious target.
3 Mr. Klein. Do you know what date Lee Harvey Oswald
4 came to the Soviet Union?
5 Mr. Nosenko. No, sir, I do not.
6 Mr.Klein. Mr. Chairman, I would ask that this
7 document be marked for identification and shown to the witness.
8 The Chairman. Without objection.
9 (The document referred to was
10 marked as JFK Exhibit No. F-2
11 for identification.)
12 Mr. Klein. Looking at this document --
13 Mr. Nosenko. Right.
14 The Chairman. Did counsel want to identify for the
15 record how the document has been marked?
16 The Clerk. JFK-F-2.
17 Mr. Klein. Looking at this document, does it say on the
18 top "Visa and Registration Office, Interior Department,
19 Executive Committee of the Moscow City Council"?
20 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.
21 Mr. Klein. Do you recognize that type of document?
22 Mr. Nosenko. Yes. It is from Department of giving Visas
23 and Registrations, which is working under auspices of Directorate
24 of Internal Affairs of Moswcow City.
25 Mr. Klein. And does this appear to be an authentic

1 document, an authentic copy of the document?

2 Mr. Nosenko. Sure.

3 Mr. Klein. Looking at Number 8, does it say what

4 date Lee Harvey Oswald came to the Soviet Union for the first

5 time?

6 Mr. Nosenko. October, 1959.

7 Mr. Klein. October what?

8 Mr. Nosenko. October 16, 1959.

9 Mr. Klein. I would ask that this document be marked for

10 identification, Mr. Chairman.

11 The Chairman. Without objection.

12 Would the clerk indicate for the record?

13 The Clerk. JFK-F-3, Mr. Chairman.

14 (The document referred to was

15 marked as JFK Exhibit No. F-3

16 for identification.)

17 Mr. Klein. Looking at the newspaper article clipping, on

18 the right hand side, with the heading "U.S. Fair in Soviet

19 Jammed at Close," do you see that?

20 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

21 Mr. Klein. And what is the date of that story?

22 Mr. Nosenko. The date is September 4.

23 Mr. Klein. Are you aware of the fact that the American

24 Exhibition ended on September 4, more than a month before

25 Oswald came to the Soviet Union?

1 Mr. Nosenko. Mr. Klein, I would like you to ask when
2 Americans who were working for this Exhibition left Moscow.
3 Mr. Klein. I will ask you another question.
4 Yesterday, when I asked you if things got back to
5 normal once the fair ended, did you say yes?
6 Mr. Nosenko. No, till they were leave the Soviet
7 Union. No. They are the same targets. Okay, you are right,
8 it is closed September 4th, but does it change the importance
9 of these people against whom KGB was working? They were
10 still in Moscow.
11 Mr. Klein. Do you recall yesterday my asking you, did
12 things in your department get back to normal once the fair
13 ended, and do you recall saying yes?
14 Mr. Nosenko. Well, I meaning fair ended when left all
15 the people involved in work on American Exhibition, Americans
16 when they left, and they were staying quite a long time
17 after it was closed. It was closed for visits for Soviet
18 citizens, but it took quite a time for them to leave.
19 Mr. Klein. You also testified yesterday that Lee Harvey
20 Oswald was allowed to stay in the Soviet Union after he said
21 that he was going to kill himself if they sent him home.
22 You told us that he slashed his wrists and two psychiatrists
23 examined him and both found him mentally unstable.
24 Mr. Nosenko. Right.
25 Mr. Klein. What was the point of having the two

psychiatrists examine him?

Mr. Nosenko. I think simply to be assured that it was right found decision, concerning this person. Two independent.

Mr. Klein. After they examined him, the decision was made to let him stay; is that correct?

Mr. Nosenko. It is not because of the examination he was allowed to stay, Mr. Klein. You are a little bit mixing things. He was allowed to stay because KGB and Soviet Government had come to the conclusion if this person will kill himself it will bereaction in newspapers, which can in any way hurt the starting, the warming of Soviet-American relations.

Mr. Klein. The Soviets were worried he would kill himself in the Soviet Union?

Mr. Nosenko. Right, if they would not allow him to stay.

Mr. Klein. Could the KGB have taken him and put him on the next plane out of Russia and thereby ended their whole problem with Lee Harvey Oswald?

Mr. Nosenko. It is a very sensitive question. He can jump out of car. If he decided, if he is mentally unstable, you don't know what he will do.

Mr. Klein. Do you think the KGB didn't do that because they were worried he might jump out of the car or do something like that?

Mr. Nosenko. Simply a mentally unstable person, they

didn't want to go it on any such action.

Mr. Klein. They would rather keep him in the Soviet Union?

Mr. Nosenko. No, they would rather prefer they washed their hands, Mr. Klein; they are not making decision, KGB. In Soviet Union decisions are made by the Central Committee of the Communist Party, and General Secretary and Politburo, not by KGB. KGB a servant of the Politburo and Central Committee Communist Party.

Mr. Klein. Going by the facts as you have told them to this Committee --

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Klein. -- why wasn't he put on a plane and sent back to America?

Mr. Nosenko. KGB washed their hands. Then from Intourist it was given information Ministry of Foreign Trade; Ministry of Foreign Trade reported to the Soviet Government. As I said, I assumed the Chairman was surely asked; he told his opinion of the KGB, and up to the Soviet Government how they would decide.

Mr. Klein. Could he have been brought to the U.S. Embassy and told them he is an American, "You take care of him; we don't want him"?

Mr. Nosenko. It can be done, sure. It can be done, but it wasn't done.

1 Mr. Klein. Instead they elected to allow him to stay
2 indefinitely in the Soviet Union and they have to worry about
3 him every single day, what an unstable American would do, is
4 that correct?
5 Mr. Nosenko. They didn't allow, KGB didn't allow. Soviet
6 government allowed.
7 Mr. Klein. The facts as you have testified to them are
8 that the KGB allowed this mentally unstable person to stay
9 in Russia, and they sent him to Minsk to live and work in a
10 radio factory. Then the KGB allowed this mentally unstable
11 individual to marry a Soviet woman, and then this mentally
12 unstable individual was allowed to join a hunting club where
13 he had access to a gun.
14 Can you think of any other cases in all the time you
15 worked in the KGB where a mentally unstable person was
16 treated in thiskind of manner?
17 Mr. Nosenko. I told you I do not know any other cases
18 of mentally unstable, excluding one code clerk, American, was
19 also mentally ill; he was delivered in Soviet Union. I heard
20 it. I never have worked with him, I never have seen him.
21 And the thing is, I am sorry, but you are putting and stressing
22 a number of questioning, and it sounds so peculiar. What does
23 it mean, KGB allow him to marry?
24 Mr. Klein, in the Soviet Union there is by degree of
25 Presidium of Supreme Soviet U.S.S.R. a law allowing marriage of

1 Soviet citizens with foreign. A foreigner can marry a Soviet
2 citizen, by the law. There is not a thing that KGB can in any
3 way try not to give, not to make it possible, but this is in
4 cases when the person who is marrying a foreigner worked in
5 some sensitive place, let's say, in missiles, rocket
6 industry production, was in process of any place of his work-
7 ing seeing classified material. In these cases, KGB will try
8 to put different type of fences. But it is unlawful. In
9 accordance with Soviet law, marriage is allowed; he doesn't
10 need to ask permission of Soviet Government or anyone. And his
11 wife, Marina, wasn't working in any place which was sensitive
12 from the point of view of Soviet security.
13 Mentally unstable it doesn't mean that he is raving
14 mad; it is mentally unstable.
15 Mr. Klein. You testified that not only was Oswald not
16 spoken to when he first said he wanted to defect but even after
17 the decision was made to allow him to remain in the Soviet
18 Union, still nobody from the KGB spoke to him, is that correct?
19 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.
20 Mr. Klein. You also tetified to the extensive resources
21 that were devoted to put physical and technical surveillance
22 on Oswald. You told us the men involved, the time involved,
23 the facilities involved?
24 Mr. Nosenko. Right.
25 Mr. Klein. Do you find great contradiction --

1 Mr. Nosenko. No, sir.

2 Mr. Klein. -- in the fact that, on the one hand, you

3 put all these resources into following Oswald around, trying to

4 see who he talked to and what he does and, on the other hand,

5 you don't even have a person go and talk to him and ask him,

6 "Tell us your background; tell us about yourself."

7 Is there any contradiction?

8 Mr. Nosenko. Even in the United States, yes, sure, for

9 you, for me just now American citizens, yes, sure, but there,

10 no.

11 Mr. Klein. They don't talk to people there?

12 Mr. Nosenko. They can talk and cannot to talk, but I

13 don't see contradiction there. Anyone, any foreigner who will

14 be staying, even if this defector not on his own, but, let's

15 say, KGB pushed him to stay, to defect, he still will be watched

16 and on him will be put this same type of work that was

17 put on Oswald, not less.

18 Mr. Klein. You talk about their society is different than

19 ours. Is it unusual that they allow an American to defect

20 and live there without ever questioning him, to ask him if he

21 is an intelligence agent?

22 Mr. Nosenko. On the contrary, no doubt, let's say he

23 was intelligence agent, what he will tell them that he was

24 sent with mission as intelligence agent? Why to scare him?

25 Let him live how he wants. We will be watching him. He

1 will show by his behavior, by his action.

2 Mr. Klein. They purposely don't speak to him; is that

3 your testimony?

4 Mr. Nosenko. In this case they didn't speak with him

5 because he didn't present interest for the KGB and because

6 he was mentally unstable.

7 Mr. Klein. You testified that you read the reports of

8 two psychiatrists who examined Lee Harvey Oswald at the

9 hospital after he cut his wrist, is that correct?

10 Mr. Nosenko. Right.

11 Mr. Klein. You said both found him mentally unstable?

12 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

13 Mr. Klein. You told us in great detail how this

14 decision was made to have these psychiatrists examine him.

15 I would ask that this document be marked for

16 identification.

17 The Chairman. The clerk will identify for the record

18 the number appearing on the document.

19 The Clerk. It will be JFK-F-4.

20 (The document referred to was

21 marked as JFK Exhibit No. F-4

22 for identification.)

23 Mr. Klein. Have you ever seen that document before?

24 Mr. Nosenko. No, sir. I haven't seen it.

25 Mr. Klein. Were you aware that the Soviet Government

1 provided certain documents to the Warren Commission in 1964?

2 Mr. Nosenko. No, sir. I wasn't aware of this.

3 Mr. Klein. Looking at that document in front of you --

4 Mr. Nosenko. Right.

5 Mr. Klein. -- is that a hospital record?

6 Mr. Nosenko. Oh, yes, sure. It is a hospital record.

7 Mr. Klein. And whose hospital record? Does it have a

8 name on it?

9 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir. It is from Botkin Hospital.

10 Mr. Klein. Whose name is it?

11 Mr. Nosenko. Lee Harvey Oswald.

12 Mr. Klein. Does it say what date he was admitted?

13 Mr. Nosenko. Discharged, admitted 23rd, discharged

14 28th.

15 Mr. Klein. What year is that?

16 Mr. Nosenko. October of 1959.

17 Mr. Klein. And does it have on the bottom the diagnosis,

18 why he was in the hospital?

19 Mr. Nosenko. Incised wound of one-third of the left

20 forearm.

21 Mr. Klein. And that date, October of 1959, is that when

22 Oswald first came to the Soviet Union and cut his wrist?

23 Mr. Nosenko. I cannot tell you dates, sir. I do not

24 remember.

25 Mr. Klein. You have in front of you the other document

1 which told -- Number 8 -- what date he came to the Soviet Union.
2 Is that still there?
3 Mr. Nosenko. No, sir. This is admittance to the hos-
4 pital and dischargement.
5 Mr. Klein. Number 8?
6 Mr. Nosenko. Arrival, October 16.
7 Mr. Klein. And the date on the hospital admittance is
8 what date?
9 Mr. Nosenko. Twenty-third of October.
10 Mr. Klein. And would you turn to the hospital admittance
11 form, the one I just gave you, to the third page, please?
12 Mr. Nosenko. Yes.
13 Mr. Klein. And do you see where it says "History of
14 Present Illness"?
15 Mr. Nosenko. No, I don't see.
16 Mr. Klein. On the third page?
17 Mr. Nosenko. I have the third page.
18 Mr. Klein. It has Number 6 on the top of the page, but
19 it's the third page on the document.
20 Mr. Nosenko. Oh, Number 6, History of Present Illness.
21 Yes. Just a second.
22 Mr. Klein. Would you glance through that and would you
23 tell us if this is the hospital report from when Lee Harvey
24 Oswald cut his wrist and was taken to Botkin Hospital?
25 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Klein. Now, would you turn to the next to the last page. It has a 13 on the right hand side.

Do you see that page?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr.Klein. The next to the last page.

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Klein. And do you see where it says, two-thirds of the way to the bottom, "Psychiatric Department" underlined?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Klein. Would you read what is said under that?

Mr. Nosenko. "His mind is clear; perception is correct; no hallucination or deliriums. He answers the questions legible and logically; he has a firm desire to remain in the Soviet Union; no psychiatric symptoms were noted; the patient is not dangerous for other people; his condition permits him to stay in Psychiatric Department by an order of the Assistant to the Chief PHysicians, Dr. Kornika. The patient is transferred to the Seventh Ward."

Mr. Klein. Is there anything in there to indicate he is mentally unstable?

Mr. Nosenko. Here I do not see.

Mr. Klein. Does that report indicate that he was normal?

Mr. Nosenko. Here I do not see what I have seen. But this you receive from the Soviet Government, and if you think you received the true things, what was in file, you are wrong,

1 Mr. Klein.

2 Mr. Klein. And that document, according to you, is that

3 not an authentic copy?

4 Mr. Nosenko. KGB can prepare you any document. Take

5 the material, or ask the doctors who are cooperating with KGB

6 and they will prepare you any document.

7 Mr. Klein. I -am not asking you what they can do. Are

8 you testifying that this document is not authentic, it is not

9 the document?

10 Mr. Nosenko. This document never was in the file of the

11 KGB.

12 Mr. Klein. So --

13 Mr. Nosenko. This I testify.

14 Mr. Klein. -- it is your tetimony that the KGB sent us

15 a phony document?

16 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

17 Mr. Klein. You testified before this Committee that there

18 was periodic physical surveillance of Lee Harvey Oswald which

19 was ordered by Moscow, to be carried out in Minsk?

20 Mr. Nosenko. Right.

21 Mr. Klein. And you testified in detail about that,

22 and you told us how the physical surveillance consisted of

23 following Oswald for a month or month and a half at a time,

24 and there were a number of people that would be involved, is

25 that correct?

1 Mr. Nosenko. Right.

2 Mr. Klein. It was a big operation?

3 Mr. Nosenko. Big operation? No, it's not a big
4 operation.

5 Mr. Klein. There were a number of people involved, weren't
6 there?

7 Mr. Nosenko. It is not a big operation. It is routine.
8 In KGB it is a routine, nothing serious. It's not an
9 operation even. It's surveillance, it's not an operation.

10 Mr. Klein. And have you ever stated that the only cover-
11 age of Oswald during his stay in Minsk consisted of periodic
12 checks at his place of employment, inquiry of neighbors and
13 associates and review of his mail? Have you ever stated
14 that was the only coverage of Oswald in Minsk?

15 Mr. Nosenko. I stated before, and I stated it to you
16 yesterday, and I state now, that the order was given, and I
17 have seen it -- to cover him by surveillance periodical, to
18 cover him by an agent watching in places of his living, places
19 he is working, control over his correspondence and control of
20 his telephone conversations.

21 Mr. Klein. My question is, have you ever stated that the
22 only coverage was checking at his places of employment and
23 his neighbors and associates, and not say anything about
24 periodic, physical surveillance?

25 Mr. Nosenko. Sir, I cannot tell you what I stated. I was

1 for quite a big period of time, quite a few years, interrogated,
2 by hours, and in different types of conditions, including
3 hostile conditions.

4 Mr. Klein. That was by the CIA?

5 Mr. Nosenko. Where they asked questions in such form
6 which later my answer will be interpreted in any way, however
7 they want to interrogate us.

8 Mr. Klein. That was by CIA?

9 Mr. Nosenko. And I cannot tell you what I did say. I
10 cannot remember dates. You must understand, it's hundreds of
11 interrogations, hundreds.

12 Mr. Klein. This period that you are telling us about,
13 you were questioned by the CIA during that period, is that
14 correct?

15 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sure.

16 Mr. Klein. Were you questioned during that period by
17 FBI?

18 Mr. Nosenko. I questioned by FBI in February, yes.

19 Mr. Klein. At this time I would ask that this document
20 be marked for identification and shown to the witness.

21 The Chairman. The clerk will indicate for the record
22 the number appearing on the document.

23 The Clerk. Exhibit JFK-F-5.

24 (The document referred to was marked
25 as JFK Exhibit No. F-5 for

1 identification.)

2 Mr. Klein. These hostile interrogations you just alluded
3 to, did they lead you to state other than the truth to these
4 interrogators?

5 Mr. Nosenko. I was answering questions which were put
6 to me.

7 Mr. Klein. Did you ever not tell the truth?

8 Mr. Nosenko. No, I was telling the truth.

9 Mr. Klein. I would direct your attention --

10 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

11 Mr. Klein. Just a moment. Before you you have a
12 Federal Bureau of Investigation report, is that correct?

13 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

14 Mr. Klein. Iwould direct your attention to page 29 of
15 that report.

16 Mr. Nosenko. Right.

17 Mr. Klein. The last paragraph, beginning with, "Nosenko
18 stated" -- it's underlined. Would you please read that
19 paragraph to us?

20 Mr. NOsenko. "Nosenko stated that in view of instruction
21 from the KGB Moscow, no active interest could be taken in
22 Oswald in Minsk without obtaining prior approval from KGB
23 in Moscow. According to Nosenko, no such approval was ever
24 requested or granted, and based on his experience, he opined
25 that the only coverage of Oswald during this stay in Minsk

1 consisted of periodic checks of his places of employment,
2 inquiries of neighbors and associates, and review of his mail."
3 Mr. Klein. Did you make that statement?
4 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir. What do you find here wrong?
5 Mr. Klein. Does that statement say anything about
6 physical surveillance?
7 Mr. Nosenko. No, it didn't.
8 Mr. Klein. Did you forget to tell them about the physical
9 surveillance?
10 Mr. Nosenko. Maybe I forget; maybe they didn't put;
11 I do not know.
12 Mr. Klein. Do you recall speaking to agents Poptanich
13 and Gheesling on March 3rd and 4th, 1964?
14 Mr. Nosenko. I cannot tell you. I do remember the date,
15 no. I remember I was speaking with agents from FBI.
16 Mr. Klein. When you spoke to them, did you recall that
17 they spoke to you at that time, March 3rd and 4th, about
18 Lee Harvey Oswald?
19 Mr. Nosenko. I told you, they were speaking with me
20 about Oswald, but I cannot tell you the date whem.
21 Mr. Klein. Was it in March 1964?
22 Mr. Nosenko. They were speaking with me -- February
23 and the beginning of March of 1964.
24 Mr. Klein. And did they tape the conversations?
25 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, they were taping all conversations.

1 Mr. Klein. Did the agents make notes when you were
2 talking?
3 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.
4 Mr. Klein. Did they ever show you those notes?
5 Mr. Nosenko. No.
6 Mr. Klein. Were you aware that the statements you were
7 making to them were going to be written down in to a report?
8 Mr. Nosenko. Sure.
9 Mr. Klein. Did you ever have an opportunity to see the
10 report?
11 Mr. Nosenko. No. The only one which was sent to the
12 Warren Commission, this I have seen.
13 Mr. Klein. Were you aware that the report would be put
14 in your file?
15 Mr. Nosenko. Must be.
16 Mr. Klein. Were you aware that report would be shown to
17 a committee such as this investigating the assassination?
18 Mr. Nosenko. I didn't know that it would be created, the
19 Committee, because it was 1964.
20 Mr. Klein. You didn't know that?
21 Mr. Nosenko. No. Did you know that this Committee --
22 in 1964 -- will be existing in '78, '77?
23 Mr. Klein. And were you telling them the truth when you
24 told them that the only coverage of Oswald, and listing these things and
25

not telling them about the physical surveillance, was that the truth you told them?

Mr. Nosenko. Well, I told them that there was done the work against Oswald; it was ordered, passive type of work , it's called passive. Whenever it's ordered not to make an approachment, not to make a contact, not to make a recruitment, this is passive.

Anything when enters besides whatever is done, contact, approachments, recruitment, attempt to recruit, it is immediately called active.

Mr. Klein. Looking at that report, did you tell them about the physical surveillance which you told this Committee about yesterday?

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, I do not see here, but I have no doubts. I do not know. Maybe I didn't mention that this date you said, maybe. I didn't mention but I was telling them about surveillance.

Mr. Klein. Didn't you tell us that you always told the truth and told everything you knew when you spoke to the FBI and the CIA?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Klein. If they would have asked you, "Was there physical surveillance?" --

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, I will answer yes, it was.

Mr. Klein. -- you would have answered yes?

1 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

2 Mr. Klein. You also testified before this Committee that
3 in accord with the orders from Moscow that there was technical
4 surveillance, and you told us in detail about how they tapped
5 his phone and they would record it and make copies of it
6 and gave it to a certain person.

7 Again, drawing your attention to page 29 of that same
8 paragraph, does that say anything about the technical sur-
9 veillance that you told us about?

10 Mr. Nosenko. No, sir.

11 Mr. Klein. Did you forget?

12 Mr. Nosenko. But, if you ask, even an agent of FBI,
13 I doubt it, no. In KGB control of correspondence, control of
14 telephone, it's not big deal. It's giving order to control a
15 telephone can be given by Chief of Section, not speaking of
16 Chief of Department, not speaking of Chief of Directorate,
17 and not speaking to receive a warrant from the judge. Control
18 of correspondence can be signed, permission to put control
19 over correspondence can be done by the Deputy Chief of
20 Section even.

21 Do you understnd what I want to tell you, it is absolutely
22 considered, KGB, nothing important.

23 Mr. Klein. Is it a big deal to check periodically at
24 someone's place of employment and talk to their neighbors? Is
25 that a big deal?

1 Mr. Nosenko. No.

2 Mr. Klein. But you told them about that, didn't you?

3 Mr. Nosenko. I tried simply to describe them what

4 kind of, not to take active -- what does it mean, passive type

5 of coverage of the target?

6 Mr. Klein. If they would have asked you was there any

7 technical surveillance, then would you have told them?

8 Mr. Nosenko. I would have said they were told, even

9 word for word, in this document said not the technical surveil-

10 lance. They have a certain terminology. Let's say surveil-

11 lance, it's called to lead, the measurement N/N, and to

12 control telephone to lead the measurement M.

13 Mr. Klein. If they would have said, "Was there any

14 technical surveillance of Oswald?" would you have said

15 "yes"?

16 Mr. Nosenko. Sure.

17 Mr. Klein. You also testified to this Committee that

18 the KGB would have had to have known about Marina Oswald,

19 you said, by the end of the month they would have a batch

20 of papers?

21 Mr. Nosenko. You told me, if she had seen him, you

22 something metnioned, 15, 13.

23 Mr. Klein. Because surveillance was on Oswald, they would

24 have had to pick her up?

25 Mr. Nosenko. I cannot tell you it was in the moment when

1 he was seeing her or not. You said assume that he met her
2 16 and 13, and it became known to KGB through surveillance. I
3 said by the end of month that at least something will have on
4 her, who is she, where she is working, where she studied, where
5 she work.

6 Mr. Klein. They would know that through the surveillance
7 on Oswald?

8 Mr. Nosenko. The fact will be known through surveillance;
9 then through other outfits of KGB they will find whatever
10 possible on her.

11 Mr. Klein. Were you ever asked the following question
12 and did you give the following answer:

13 "Question: Why wouldn't she -- referring to Marina -- have
14 been investigated when she first met Oswald?

15 "Answer: They did not know she was a friend of Oswald
16 until they applied for marraige. There was no surveillance
17 on Oswald to show that he knew her."

18 Were you ever asked that question and did you give that
19 answer?

20 Mr. Nosenko. Sir, I do not remember my questions, and
21 answers.

22 Mr. Klein. I would ask that this document be marked for
23 identification, please, and shown to the witness.

24 The Chairman. The clerk will identify for the record
25 the number appearing on the document.

1 The Clerk. JFK-F-6.

2 (The document referred to was

3 marked as JFK Exhibit No. F-6 for

4 identification.)

5 Mr. Klein. Looking at that document, have you ever seen

6 it before?

7 Mr. Nosenko. No, sir.

8 Mr. Klein. You have never seen that before?

9 Mr. Nosenko. I never have seen it before.

10 Mr. Klein. And is that a report that says on the cover,

11 "Memorandum for the Record; Subject: Followup Report on the

12 Oswald Case; Source: AEDONOR." Was AEDONOR your code name

13 at one time?

14 Mr. Nosenko. I do not know.

15 Mr. Klein. "Date of Interview: 3 July 1964." Does it

16 say that on the cover?

17 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

18 Mr. Klein. And turning to the very last page, page 18.--

19 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

20 Mr. Klein. Does it say, "Thomas A. Ryan"?

21 Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

22 Mr. Klein. "SR/CI/KGB"?

23 Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

24 Mr. Klein. Did you ever hear of a man named Thomas A.

25 Ryan?

Mr. Nosenko. No, I do not know a man Thomas A. Ryan.

Mr. Klein. Do you recall speaking to a man named Thomas Ryan?

Mr. Nosenko. No, sir.

Mr. Klein. Would you turn in this document to page 9. On page 9, the last question and answer, would you read the question for us, and read the answer?

Mr. Nosenko. "Why wouldn't she have been investigated when she first met Oswald?"

"They didn't know she was a friend of Oswald until they applied for marriage. There was no surveillance on Oswald to show that he knew her."

Mr. Klein. Were you ever asked that question and did you ever --

Mr. Nosenko. I do not remember, sir. But if it is, it must be asked and I this answered.

Mr. Klein. Was that the truth?

Mr. Nosenko. As far as I remember, those conditions in which I was asked, better ask where I was in this period of time, what conditions I was kept, and what type of interrogations were going on.

Mr. Klein. Did you tell us yesterday that you always told the truth?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

Mr. Klein. -- when you spoke about Oswald?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

Mr. Klein. Was this question relating to Oswald?

Mr. Nosenko. I was answering what I could.

1 Mr. Klein. Is that the truth, that they didn't --

2 Mr. Nosenko. It's how it is put, how it is put. You see,

3 again, why wouldn't she have been investigated. Here must be

4 question was in this form. The investigation, not the checkup

5 of her, but, let's say, invitation for conversation, something

6 of this kind, it's some kind of here misunderstanding on both

7 parts, that would be mine and interrogator.

8 Mr. Klein. It is an inaccurate transcript?

9 Mr. Nosenko. I consider many, many things are

10 inaccurate.

11 Mr. Klein. Is that transcribed accurately?

12 Mr. Nosenko. I do not know, sir.

13 Mr. Klein. That answer, do you think it is transcribed

14 accurately, that that's your answer?

15 Mr. Nosenko. Well, I can only explain only one thing.

16 Let's say there was KGB found out that he had an acquaintance,

17 Marina Prusakova. They were not married. They didn't know --

18 they didn't apply for marriage. What kind of first will be

19 investigation? Checkup in archives of KGB of Byelorussia, and

20 on the basis whatever kind of material on her will be found.

21 Let's say, if she was ever on trial by militia, under arrest.

22 If militia had any material, they can expand further. They

23 can also send checkup in the place of her -- one, it's in one

24 order, to give us the picture of the character of the target,

25 check on him in place of his work and check in place of his living,

1 in one order.

2 But more, farther investigation, the true investigation --

3 this is called checkup -- will be studied and they will start

4 when they see something, let's say, suspicious in behavior of

5 Oswald and this his connection.

6 In case of Marina, when they found out that they are going

7 to marry, sure, they will be more, farther investigation,

8 thorough invetigation; but before it will only be checkup.

9 From thispoint of view I was answering this question.

10 Mr. Klein. Let me make it simple.

11 Mr. Nosenko. Right.

12 Mr. Klein. If the question was asked exactly as it appears

13 here, "Why wouldn't she have been investigated when she first

14 met Oswald?" would this be your answer? Is that a correct

15 answer as it appears here?

16 Mr. Nosenko. Well, it appears here, but I do not remember.

17 Sure, I answered and this was question, but, gentlemen --

18 Mr. Klein. Was this true? This says "There was no

19 surveillance on Oswald to show that he knew her" -- is that

20 right or wrong?

21 Mr. Nosenko. This is what I answered, yes. It is right.

22 It is written here.

23 Mr. Klein. You remember answering that?

24 Mr. Nosenko. No.

25 Mr. Klein. How do you know you answered that?

1 Mr. Nosenko. You are giving me official document.

2 Mr. Klein. You have no recollection of answering this?

3 Mr. Nosenko. Sir, I do not have any recollection of

4 interrogations.

5 Mr. Klein. If you answered that, were you telling the

6 truth?

7 Mr. Nosenko. I don't know. I answered. Must be. This

8 is how I answered question.

9 Mr. Klein. You testified to this Committee that the KGB

10 decided to have Lee Harvey Oswald examined by two psychiatrists.

11 You told us about how it was decided, who decided it, where

12 it was decided. Then they found Lee Harvey Oswald to be mentally

13 unstable?

14 Mr. Nosenko. Right.

15 Mr. Klein. Have you ever been asked the following

16 questions and given the following answers:

17 "Question: Did the KGB make a psychological assessment

18 of Oswald?

19 "Answer: No, nothing, but at the hospital it was also said

20 he was not quite normal. The hospital didn't write that he was

21 mad, just that he is not normal.

22 "Question: Did the hospital authorities conduct any

23 psychological testing?

24 "Answer: I don't think so. There was no report like this."

25 Mr. Nosenko. No, I told that there was opinion of

1 psychiatrists that hewas mentally unstable.

2 Mr. Klein. Is what I read to you correct?

3 Mr. Nosenko. Sir, I do not know whether it is correct or

4 wrong. I am answering you what I know.

5 Mr. Klein. Did you ever make a statement like that?

6 Mr. Nosenko. I do not remember statements for five years,

7 interrogation.

8 Mr. Klein. I would direct your attention to the Ryan

9 Report.

10 Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

11 Mr. Klein. Page 7.

12 Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

13 Mr. Klein. Would you read for us the first and second

14 questions and answers, please.

15 Mr. Nosenko. "Did the KGB make psychological assessment

16 of Oswald?"

17 "No, nothing. But at the hospital it was also said he

18 was not quite normal. The hospital didn't write that he was

19 mad, just that he was not normal, mentally unstable."

20 Mr. Klein. Please keep reading.

21 Mr. Nosenko. "Did the hospital authorities conduct any

22 psychological testing?"

23 "I don't think so. There was no report like this.

24 "What was the Soviets' opinion of Oswald's personality,

25 what kind of man did they think he was?"

1 "KGB throught he was of no interest for the country or
2 for the KGB, that he is not normal, that he should leave
3 the country."

4 Mr. Klein. Did you say anything in there about two
5 psychiatrists examining Oswald and about reading their reports
6 which said he was mentally unstable? Did you say anything
7 about that there?

8 Mr. Nosenko. Sir, I do not remember what I said to them;
9 but I would like you to find out the conditions in which interr-
10 gations were done, how it was done, by what procedures, when
11 two interrogators are seated. I never knew any names -- they
12 never announced me names -- one playing part of bad guy and other
13 good guy, and it starting slapping then, not physically but I
14 mean, psychologically and in conversation, turning question up-
15 side down, however they would like, then this leave, another one
16 will start in softer way.

17 Mr. Klein. When did this --

18 Mr. Nosenko. And I would not trust any of their documents
19 in those periods of time. Up to 1967 when we started from the
20 beginning, to work, Mr. Bruce Solie. That is the one thing.
21 Second, my knowledge of language was very poor in '64. I didn't
22 understand many questions, and none of them, excluding Mr.
23 Deryabin, knew Russian language and Mr. Deryabin was asking
24 me only questions concerning my biography and this type of ques-
25 tion, but nonoperative questions.

Mr. Klein. Do you have any recollection of being asked these questions and giving the answers that you just read to us?

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, I told you, and I will tell, I do not remember their questions, and I do not remember my answers; but I tried to be truthful with them. Then was period of time when I have seen that they were simply was laughing at me; I rejected to answer questions, and whenever they were asking, I would answer, "I do not remember, I do not know, I do not remember."

Mr. Klein. These answers, do they say "I do not know, I do not remember" or do these give responsive answers?

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, I do not trust this document prepared by people in those years.

Mr. Klein. Is it your testimony that these might not be accurate questions and answers?

Mr. Nosenko. My opinion -- I cannot tell you exactly, I say might be.

Mr. Klein. You testified --

Mr. Nosenko. One more thing: If we are going into this, a number of interrogations, I was under drugs, and on me was used a number of drugs, and I know that, and hallucinations and talking during night and sodium and everything, even many others, and a number of things were absolutely incoherent.

Mr. Klein. This hostile interrogation that you have been referring to, when did it begin?

Mr. Nosenko. Arrested me 4th of April, 1964, started

1 interrogate me in two days. They interrupted -- I don't know
2 interrogate a month, two, made break; then again, then again
3 period of no interrogation; then again interrogations, up to
4 24 hours, not giving me possibility to sleep.
5 Mr. Klein. And this was all after April 4, 1964?
6 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.
7 That is why I will not take as a document anything what
8 concerns interrogations in hostile, absolutely hostile,
9 situation.
10 Mr. Klein. You testified in detail yesterday about the
11 cable which you saw which was sent from Mexico City to the First
12 Chief Directorate in Moscow, and you testified that you actually
13 read that cable and that it told that Oswald was in Mexico City
14 and he wanted permission for visa to come to the Soviet Union.
15 Do you remember reading that cable and describing it for
16 us in detail, how long it was?
17 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.
18 Mr. Klein. Did you ever say to anyone that after Oswald
19 went to Minsk, the next time you heard of him was in connection
20 with Oswald's application to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City
21 for a Soviet reentry visa, and you did not know how Mexico City
22 advised Moscow of the subject's application; your knowledge
23 resulted from an oral inquiry of your department by M.I. Turalin.
24 Did you ever say that, that you did not know how Mexico
25 City advised Moscow of Oswald's application?

1 Mr. Nosenko. I do not remember. I am telling you what
2 I have seen, cable, what was told through Lieutenant Colonel
3 Alekseev to tell to Turalin the opinion of Second Chief Directorate
4 Seventh Department.
5 Mr. Klein. I draw your attention to page 30 of the FBI
6 report in front of you.
7 Mr. Nosenko. I do not have it.
8 (Pause)
9 Yes, sir.
10 Mr. Klein. On the top of page 30, read for us the under-
11 lined section on the top, beginning "The next time" --
12 Mr. Nosenko. "The next time Nosenko heard of Oswald was
13 in connection with Oswald's application to Soviet Embassy in
14 Mexico City for a Soviet reentry visa. Nosenko did not know how
15 Mexico City advised Moscow of subject's application. His
16 knowledge resulted from an oral inquiry of Nosenko's department
17 by Turalin, Service No. 2, Counterintelligence in Foreign
18 Countries, First Chief Directorate. Nosenko recalled that Turalin
19 had orally contacted Vladimir Alexseev, Chief of Sixth Section
20 of Nosenko's Tourist Department, with respect to Oswald.
21 Nosenko's department had no interest in Oswald and they
22 recommended that Oswald's request for reentry visa be denied.
23 Nosenko couldn't recall when Oswald visited Mexico City in
24 connection with visa application."
25 Mr. Klein. Did you ever say this to an FBI agent?

1 Mr. Nosenko. Must be I said it, it's here in document.

2 Mr. Klein. It says in here that Nosenko did not know how

3 Mexico City advised Moscow of subject's application. Did you

4 say that?

5 Mr. Nosenko. Must be; I said this in this way.

6 Mr. Klein. And did you tell us that not only did you know

7 how they advised them by cable but that you read the cable?

8 Mr. Nosenko. This is what I recollection.

9 Mr. Klein. Did you tell them the truth?

10 Mr. Nosenko. I was trying to tell what I remembered.

11 Mr. Klein. And this FBI report which you just read from,

12 would you look back on the first page and would you tell us the

13 date of thatreport?

14 Mr. Nosenko. Fifth of March, 1964.

15 Mr. Klein. March 5, 1964. Is that before April 4,

16 1964?

17 Mr. Nosenko. Yes,sir.

18 Mr. Klein. That was before any hostile interrogations

19 began, is that correct?

20 Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

21 Mr. Klein. And at that time you said that you did not know

22 anything about the cable, is that right?

23 Mr. Nosenko. This is what I answered them, how I remembered.

24 Mr. Klein, I have a question. Do you understand from what

25 psychological turmoil a person passing who defected, do

you understand that it is necessary time, time to settle psychologically, he doesn't know how he will be living, what he will be doing, and at the same time a person feels attitude on the part of those who helped him to come CIA? I felt something going on.

Mr. Klein. You testified to us today that you didn't know how wrote the summary of Oswald's file in the First Department because you never had an opportunity to read it. Did you ever tell anyone that Fedroseve and Matveev, F-e-d-r-o-s-e-v-e and M-a-t-v-e-e-v of the First Department, Second Chief Directorate, took the file and wrote a second "spravka", which you told us was a summary?

Mr. Nosenko. Summary.

Mr. Klein. Did you ever tell anybody that?

Mr. Nosenko. Must be I told, it is again right, because you see, not Fedroseve -- Fedroseve was Chief of First Department, American Department, and I will repeat what I told you yesterday. Matveev has come to take file, but surely Fedroseve who is Chief of American Department, he had given call to Chief of Seventh Department. He was involved in this; that is why I mentioned him. He was Chief of First American Department. His deputy, Colonel Matveev, has come, and not alone; with him was a couple of officers, has come and told that Gribanov ordered and Fedroseve giving call to Department, we must take it, and took. Who of them wrote, I do not know, no doubts that Fedroseve and Matveev were participated in the preparation of documents.

1 They are responsible for First American Department.

2 Mr. Klein. So you have an idea of who would have written,

3 is that correct?

4 Mr. Nosenko. American Department, no doubts that this

5 two will be participating or correcting.

6 Mr. Klein. But you didn't read that summary, is that right?

7 Mr. Nosenko. I do not remember reading the summary.

8 Mr. Klein. Did you read it? Do you have any recollection

9 of reading it?

10 Mr. Nosenko. No, I haven't seen summary.

11 Mr. Klein. Are you positive that you didn't see that

12 summary?

13 Mr. Nosenko. I have seen summaries in the file of Oswald.

14 Mr. Klein. Are you positive you didn't see the summary

15 written by the First Department after they took the file away?

16 Mr. Nosenko. I do not remember seeing. As I told you,

17 I haven't seen it.

18 Mr. Klein. You testified that Oswald was considered normal

19 prior to the time he cut his wrist, and even told us that you

20 were surprised, you had no indication he would do something

21 like that.

22 Were you ever asked the following question, and did you

23 give the following answer:

24 "In what way was the Oswald case handled differently from

25 cases of other American defectors?"

1 "Answer: The main difference is that he was not to be
2 allowed to stay. He was considered to be not normal."
3 Mr. Nosenko. This is what cases I know, who were staying.
4 Mr. Klein. Did you ever say that he was considered not
5 normal, referring to the period before he tried to commit suicide?
6 Mr. Nosenko. I do not remember; but if I said it, it's
7 not right becuase we didn't know that he was normal or not
8 normal. Up until the moment of he cut his wrist we started to
9 suspect.
10 Mr. Klein. Did you ever say that he was considered not
11 normal?
12 Mr. Nosenko. Sir, I do not remember.
13 Mr. Klein. Well, if you would have said it, would it have
14 been correct?
15 Mr. Nosenko. No, it would not be correct, because he cannot
16 be considered abnormal. We didn't know anything up till he
17 cut the wrist.
18 Mr. Klein. You testified to this Committee that you were
19 present at a meeting with the Chief of the Seventh Department
20 Chief of your section, Major Rastrusin, at that meeting, it was
21 decided that Oswald should not be given permission to defect.
22 You told us where the meeting took place, told us who
23 was there.
24 Mr. Nosenko. Right.
25 Mr. Klein. You told us that Krupnov was not even in the

1 Seventh Department at that time?

2 Mr. Nosenko. Krupnov appeared a little later.

3 Mr. Klein. Did you ever tell anyone that on the basis of

4 your evaluation of Oswald, you instructed Krupnov to advise Oswald

5 through Intourist interpreter that Oswald would not be permitted

6 to remain in the U.S.S.R. permanently and that he would have

7 to depart at the expiration of his visa?

8 Did you ever tell anybody that?

9 Mr. Nosenko. Sir, I do not remember. If I said it, it

10 was wrong, not right, because Krupnov started participation only

11 in this case when Oswald was allowed to stay. In the moment

12 when Oswald arrived in Soviet Union, when he went in hospital,

13 Krupnov was still not in Seventh Department. He very soon

14 appeared later. Then it was wrong. If I stated it, it was

15 wrong.

16 Mr. Klein. Directing your attention to the FBI report in

17 front of you, I would like to draw your attention to page 28.

18 Mr. Nosenko. Right.

19 Mr. Klein. Beginning with the underlined section beginning

20 with the first "On the basis" in the second paragraph, would

21 you read this?

22 Mr. Nosenko. "Nosenko and Krupnov on the basis of this

23 information, concluded that Oswald was of no interest to the

24 KGB and both agreed that Oswald appeared somewhat abnormal."

25 Mr. Klein. Not that, the second paragraph, "On the basis

of" --

1 Mr. Nosenko. "On the basis of Nosenko's evaluation of
2 Oswald, he instructed Krupnov to advise Oswald through the
3 Intourist interpreter Oswald would not be permitted to remain in
4 the U.S.S.R. permanently and that he would have to depart at
5 the expiration of his visa, and thereafter seek reentry as a
6 permanent resident through routine channels at the Soviet
7 Embassy in the United States."

8 Mr. Klein. Did you ever say that?

9 Mr. Nosenko. I do not remember saying this. It can be
10 that simply misunderstanding, and, you see, this is not
11 transcription from the tape. It is, I will say a summary, and
12 I do not remember. But, if I said this, it is not right because
13 Krupnov didn't participate it in the beginning.

14 Mr. Klein. Also it says --

15 Mr. Nosenko. It was participation of Rastrusin.

16 Mr. Klein. Also is it correct when it says in there that
17 you made the decision and --

18 Mr. Nosenko. No, I couldn't make decision, being Deputy
19 Chief of Section.

20 Mr. Klein. Does it say anything there --

21 Mr. Nosenko. I could say my opinion, yes.

22 Mr. Klein. Does it say anything there about a meeting
23 to determine what to do, or does it say that on basis of your
24 evaluation, you told Krupnov to do it?

25 Mr. Nosenko. It's not right. I said only that Krupnov

1 appeared later. This period, what we are discussing here, was
2 Rastrusin involved, decision cannot be done on my own, being
3 Deputy Chief of Section, decision cannot be done even being
4 Deputy Chief of Section, Chief of Section, at least it
5 must be on the level of Chief of Department.
6 Mr. Klein. So it is incorrect, is that what you are saying?
7 Mr. Nosenko. It is incorrect, and Krupnov -- I do not
8 remember.
9 Mr. Klein. You told us, when I questioned you about the
10 fact that you didn't tell the FBI that there was physical
11 surveillance, the last question I asked you, if they would have
12 asked you if he was physically surveilled, would you have told
13 them, and you said yes?
14 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sure. I will say.
15 Mr. Klein. Were you ever asked the following question
16 and did you give the following answer:
17 "Was he physically surveilled" and that is referring to
18 Minsk, and you answered "No, there was none"?
19 Mr. Nosenko. It was not right, because it was order given
20 and he was under periodical surveillance.
21 Mr. Klein. I draw your attention to page 9 of the CIA
22 document in front of you, Memorandum for the Record.
23 Mr. Nosenko. I do not have it.
24 Mr. Klein. The Ryan Report. I draw your attention to page
25 9.

1 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

2 Mr. Klein. Would you read the first question and the first

3 answer?

4 Mr. Nosenko. "Was he physically surveilled?"

5 "No, there was none."

6 Mr. Klein. Did you ever give that answer to that question?

7 Mr. Nosenko. I do not remember; it's not right, the

8 answer.

9 Mr. Klein. I would ask that this tape, which is marked

10 3 July '64, Reel No. 66, be deemed marked for identification.

11 The Chairman. Indicate for the record the marking.

12 The Clerk. JFK-F-7.

13 (The item referred to was marked

14 as JFK Exhibit No. F-7 for

15 identification.)

16 The Chairman. We will recess for about five minutes.

17 (A brief recess was taken.)

18 The Chairman. The Committee is back in session.

19 During the recess the witness made a request of the

20 Chair that he be permitted to make a brief statement prior to

21 counsel for the Committee resuming interrogation.

22 The Chair is going to grant that request and recognize

23 the witness at this time for such statement as he would like

24 to make.

25 Mr. Nosenko. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

1 Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, I arrived in the
2 United States in 1964, 12th of February. I felt something was
3 going wrong because the attitude on the part of the officers
4 from CIA who was dealing with me, I felt was going wrong, by
5 a number of remarks, their behavior. Besides, I was in a
6 psychological process. It's a very big thing, when you are com-
7 ing to live in a new country. I left the country where I was
8 born, never mind, my defection was strictly on ideological
9 basis, but still psychologically is very big thing and very
10 serious thing.

11 A very short period of time, April 4, I was invited on check-
12 up for the doctor, and this checkup turned to be arrest.
13 Arrested was in very rude form, nobody beat my physically ,
14 no, but in rude form, trying to put dignity of the person, of
15 human being, down, kept in very hard conditions. I was
16 smoking from 14 years old, never quitted. Iwas rejected to
17 smoke. I didn't see books. I didn't read anything. I was
18 sitting in four walls, metal bed in the center of the room and
19 that is all.

20 I was hungry, and this was the most difficult for me because
21 how I tried not to think about food. I was thinking about food
22 because all the time I want to eat. I was receiving very small
23 amount, and very poor food. I was sitting some kind of attic;
24 it was hot, no air conditioning, cannot breathe; windows -- no
25 windows, closed over. I was permitted to shave once a week,

1 to take showers once a week.

2 From me were taken toothpaste, toothbrush. The conditions
3 were really inhuman, conditions in this place; and later
4 transferred in another place, which is now I know where it
5 was, the second place, Camp Perry, where certain house and the
6 same very, very Spartan conditions; three and a half years.
7 Besides that, on me were used different types of drugs and
8 sleeping drugs, hallucination drugs, and whatever I do not know,
9 and don't want to know.

10 What I want to tell you, the arrest was done illegally,
11 without due process of law, without -- in violation of
12 Constitution, which was found by Rockefeller Commission. It
13 wasn't mentioned, my name, but simply nameless defector, who
14 was over three years in extremely Spartan conditions.

15 Interrogations were done sometimes 24 hours, not giving me
16 an hour to sleep. Interrogations were in very hostile manner.
17 Simply, what I would say were rejected. How long I will be, why
18 it is without due process, no warrants; "You will be eternally,
19 25 years." How long we would want you to keep. That is why
20 I consider all interrogations, all materials, which concerns
21 this period of time are illegal, and I am not recognizing them
22 and don't want to see them. And I am asking you not to ask
23 questions based on this interrogations, including trying to
24 play the tape during this interrogations. For me it's difficult
25 to return back. I passed through hell. I started new life in

1 '69 only because I was true defector. I never raised this
2 question with correspondents. I never went in press, because
3 I am loyal to the country which accepted me, and I didn't wanted
4 to hurt the country.
5 I didn't hurt, even to hurt, the intelligence, the CIA.
6 I didn't consider the whole CIA was responslbe. Were responsible
7 several people, for this. Thank God they are not working there
8 anymore. They are out. If I will go in press, if I would
9 be telling about these inhumane conditions, I will hurt not only
10 the agencies, the intelligence service of the U.S., I will hurt
11 the interests of the U.S. Who would like to defect, reading
12 in what conditions and what treatment defectors is receiving.
13 Sir, I prefer that you be using materials when it was started
14 humane relations with me, which was started at the end of '67.
15 I still was under arrest but I was transferred from the extremely
16 Spartan conditions, and with me started to work Mr. Bruce
17 Solie, who passed through the whole life, through all cases,
18 through everything. People who were talking with me before
19 were coming with what they were told, how to approach to me,
20 how to treat me. They have come with made opinion, before
21 whatever I will say yes or no. That is why I consider it
22 is all unlawful documents in the period of interrogations done
23 by anyone in CIA up until the end of '67.
24 The Chairman. Is there anything further, Mr. Nosenko?
25 Mr. Nosenko. No, sir.

(Pages 53 thru 78, being Committee business only, are excerpted.)

1 Mr. Blakey. Shall I inform the witness?

2 The Chairman. In light of the time situation and our
3 original intention of trying to wind up by 10:00 p.m., the Chair
4 thinks perhaps we ought to try and invoke a five minute rule
5 so that everybody gets a fair opportunity rather than to proceed
6 informally and extend this matter over a long period of time.

7 Anyone have any objection?

8 All right, bring the witness in.

9 (Whereupon, at 8:43 o'clock p.m., the witness returned
10 to the hearing room.)

11 The Chairman. Let the record reflect the fact the witness
12 has again returned to the witness table and, Mr. Nosenko,
13 at this time counsel for the Committee has concluded his questions
14 to you and at thispoint in time the members of the Committee
15 would like to be able to pose questions to you with reference
16 to your testimony here yesterday and this evening. Is that
17 agreeable to you, sir?

18 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

19 The Chairman. Thank you.

20 The Chair at this point would invoke the five minute
21 rule. The Chair will begin the questions.

22 Mr. Nosenko, you are now a citizen of the United States,
23 you are now an employee of the CIA, I understand as a consultant,
24 is that correct?

25 Mr. Nosenko. On private contract. I am not an employee

1 of the CIA. I am on a private contract, used as a consultant
2 on counterintelligence of the Soviet KGB.
3 The Chairman. And in that capacity, sir, are you paid an
4 annual salary?
5 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir, I am paid an annual salary.
6 The Chairman. And what is that salary?
7 Mr. Nosenko. $35,000.
8 The Chairman. And --
9 Mr. Nosenko. It is the last year, because it was cost of
10 living.
11 The Chairman. I see. In that capacity, do you contract
12 out also to other persons or other organizations?
13 Mr. Nosenko. No.
14 The Chairman. This is your sole income?
15 Mr. Nosenko. Only one sole income.
16 The Chairman. Has the CIA given you anything else of
17 value other than a salary, that is, a home, anything of that
18 sort?
19 Mr. Nosenko. No, sir. And in the book published, written
20 by Epstein was mentioned CIA bought me home. No, sir, I bought
21 home on my money, nobody bought me a home, no.
22 The Chairman. You also now are remarried and you have --
23 Mr.Nosenko. Yes, sir, I am married. I am American citizen,
24 I have five stepchildren and six grandchildren.
25 The Chairman. You now have a passport? Do you have a

passport as a --

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, I have a passport, which I once used being sent by the Agency in 1975, in England, for week where I was talking with British Intelligence and Counterintelligence Services, concerning my knowledge of the Second Chief Directorate, KGB in general.

The Chairman. Is that the only country to which you have traveled since your defection?

Mr. Nosenko. No. I have traveled on behalf of the Central Intelligence Agency also for the last four years. I was in eleven countries. And I never received or demanded or asking any special fees for consultations with all friendly intelligence services, never.

The Chairman. Have you ever returned to Soviet Russia?

Mr. Nosenko. Never once in Soviet Union from 1964 and hope will never see it again.

The Chairman. And how long have you now been a consultant for CIA?

Mr. Nosenko. I was from 1969, from April 1969, when I was released from detention arrest.

The Chairman. Now, will you clarify for us when you first were placed under arrest?

Mr. Nosenko. Fourth of April, 1964.

The Chairman. And on what date had you defected?

Mr. Nosenko. I defected 4th of February of 1964 in Geneva,

Switzerland.

The Chairman. And when you were placed under arrest, where were you placed in detention?

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, I do not know, it was somewhere around Washington, close to Washington, where I was '64 and beginning '65, approximately. I don't hear any radio, I didn't see any newspaper, I do not know, didn't know anything what happen in the world for many years.

I know that it was by car from Virginia where I was staying from 12 of February '64, I was taken by car for visit to doctor, and it was 30, 40 minute drive, it was in this area, but then in approximately after a year and maybe 13 months, a year and one month, roughly, I was transferred in very peculiar conditions, was put under shackles and handcuffs, blindfolded, put in the car, and don't know where I was going, only I heard, passing through city, I couldn't understand, I couldn't see anything, then I heard airplanes, I understood that I was somewhere in airport, and once I was scared to death, I think I was thinking they were returning me to the Russians. Well, they put me in airplane --

The Chairman. Mr. Nosenko, my time has expired. I want to recognize --

Mr. Nosenko. I do not know the place, sir. I know I only now found out reading the book of Daniel Schorr that I was in Camp Perry up to the end of '67. That is what I found out from

1 the book.

2 The Chairman. Thank you.

3 Mr. Preyer.

4 Mr. Preyer. Mr. Nosenko, one thing that comes through very
5 strongly in your testimony is that it is a hard life to be a
6 defector. I think to the average mentality we think it would
7 be good for a country to welcome a defector, but to the
8 intelligence mentality apparently a defector is immediately sus-
9 pect, and you have recounted your treatment here, and apparently
10 Lee Harvey Oswald, from your testimony, was greeted somewhat
11 like this in the U.S.S.R. His treatment was much different
12 from yours.

13 One thing he was not an intelligence agent, of course.
14 But you have indicated that he was kept at arms' length by the
15 KGB. The impression I get was the mere fact of being a defector
16 caused the KGB to be less interested in him than if it was
17 someone they had recruited?

18 Mr. Nosenko . Right.

19 Mr. Preyer. Although he was kept at arms' length by the
20 KGB, in the sense that he was not contacted, it does appear
21 that he lived very well there, relatively speaking. He cer-
22 tainly lived much better than you lived in your early years.
23 That he was given a job in Minsk, he was given a pension,
24 which is something that seems extraordinary in this country,
25 from the Red Cross, and apparently pretty good housing conditions

1 in Minsk.

2 Is that typical way that a defector would be treated in

3 Russia, is at arm's length?

4 Mr. Nosenko. Every defector will be watched but, sir,

5 when you mentioned what he received being in Russia, it is very

6 little. I can give you only one example. When defectors

7 Martin and Mitchell, employees of NSA, who cooperated with KGB

8 abroad, and then they defected to Soviet Union, they received

9 extraordinary help. It is not like Oswald. Oswald is nothing.

10 Mr. Preyer. The amount of money?

11 Mr. Nosenko. The amount of money and other things,

12 extroardinary.

13 Mr. Preyer. For Oswald were not extraordinary?

14 Mr. Nosenko. No.

15 Mr. Preyer. You mentioned the other three defectors that

16 you had known of. What sort of treatment did they receive?

17 Mr. Nosenko. I will tell you what Martin and Mitchell --

18 Mr. Preyer. Were they two of the other three?

19 Mr. Nosenko. These two, for example. I can mention others,

20 what I heard, I never work with them, what I heard. Martin

21 and Mitchell, by decision of Soviet Government was given them,

22 to each one, $100,000 on their account, was given apartment,

23 not like Oswald received, but real good apartment, so-called

24 classless society, living high class. Each one was given car,

25 each one received life pension a month of 5000 Soviet rubles

up to death. And each one was helped with work. Both were assigned with some type of research work where they had given position, let's say Martin was given position of researcher. But amount of pay of his was analogical to the amount of pay of the Director of this Institute, besides what he is receiving of pension. This is the treatment of those defectors whom they want, who had given them valuable information.

In case of -- excuse me -- was Annabella Bücar defected something early '50s. She was working in American Embassy in Press Department. She also received, in spite of the fact was making very good money in the Soviet Union, she was working for Moscow Radio, she was receiving life pension of big amount, amount approximately what in Soviet Union is received by Deputy of Minister, of Ministry, of this or that industry.

Mr. Preyer. But the defector who was not giving information?

Mr. Nosenko. Now, he will be given a little bit something, pension like was Oswald, to Oswald given pension. I don't know what was given to Webster, a worker, who was defected in '59 and by the way, in very short period of time he decided he doesn't like the life in the so-called Soviet paradise. He wanted to return back home, but if he received it will be analogical to what Oswald received, not more.

The Chairman. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. Devine.

1 Mr. Devine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

2 Were you solicited to be a defector?

3 Mr. Nosenko. No, sir. No, sir.

4 Mr. Devine. Why did you defect?

5 Mr. Nosenko. I defected because I for years of my life
6 has come to number of conclusions that the whole society, the
7 whole system, is dictatorial system, nondemocratic system,
8 the true police state system, and especially working the
9 KGB opened eyes for me. My defection was strictly on ideologi-
10 cal basis.

11 Mr. Devine. Had you been out of the Soviet Union prior
12 to your defection?

13 Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

14 Mr. Devine. Other than to Geneva?

15 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, I was in England twice, then I was
16 passing through a number of countries, staying day, two,
17 France, Belgium, HOlland. I was in 1960 in Cuba.

18 Mr. Devine. You were a married man in Russia?

19 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

20 Mr. Devine. Had a child?

21 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, two daughters.

22 Mr. Devine. Were you having some domestic difficulties?

23 Mr. Nosenko. No. I tried in 1960-'61, I tried to arrange
24 to go to work abroad with my family, and in the last moment
25 it fell down, and I understood I cannot go abroad with family,

1 and that is why when I contacted CIA in '62, I -- psychologically
2 I was ready, ideologically was ready and psychologically ready
3 to defect, but the question of family was bothering me.

4 Mr. Devine. But not enough to keep you there?

5 Mr. Nosenko. Not enough to keep me there. And in '64
6 I has come knowing that I will never return.

7 Mr. Devine. You were willing to abandon your family?

8 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir, because I didn't see possibility
9 to take family out. I was living the last four or five years
10 as a man with two souls, splitted personality, one I must show
11 and was showing, as good KGB officer, as a good Communist, as
12 a patriot of the Soviet system, the Soviet Union, and the other
13 part of me, the true part I am not believing in what I am
14 telling, I am not believing in the system, I do not like it,
15 I do not want it, and I consider what phony things are going
16 on because I was working in KGB, I knew it. I simply couldn't
17 more tolerate to be with this double splitted personality.

18 Mr. Devine. How did you dispose of your children and your
19 wife in Russia?

20 Mr. Nosenko. The thing was psychologically, my had, had
21 in my mind. help me. My mother was rather rich, after death of
22 father, she was very rich woman and she had a lot that will be
23 enough not only for my children but their children and grand-
24 children. From the point of view of material they will never
25 suffer.

Mr. Devine. Yes,but as a defector would there not be reprisals taken by the Soviet Union against your family?

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, before the death of Stalin it could be taken drastic measures against the family, but after the death of Stalin, from middle 1950s, quite a little changes took place in the Soviet Union, and the family will not suffer.

Another thing, oh sure, will be certain things which they cannot achieve. Let's say my brother who studied later in the same Institute what I finish, Institute of International Relations, he will never have possibility to go abroad, but he will never be put in jail, can never be exiled from Moscow, the same, nothing happened with family.

Mr. Devine. The fact that you were a KGB man didn't your defection cause some irritation among those in power over there?

Mr. Nosenko. Sure.

Mr. Devine. Did they want to get you back, didn't they want to get even with you?

Mr. Nosenko. Oh, yes, and they are looking for me.

Mr. Devine. But they took no reprisals against your family.

Mr. Nosenko. No.

Mr. Devine. How do you know that?

Mr. Nosenko. Well, I do not know exactly, but you see, there were some defections before. The family didn't suffer like it was, let's say, in '40s and maybe up to death of Stalin.

Mr. Devine. Were those KGB defections?

Mr. Nosenko. Even from KGB.

1 The Chairman. The time of the gentleman has expired.

2 Mrs. Burke?

3 Mrs. Burke. Well, I would like to go back a little bit

4 after you decided to defect. I think you had a number of

5 conversations with the American Embassy, was it, or was it

6 CIA, during those ten days that you were in touch, where you

7 negotiated whether or not you would in fact defect?

8 Mr. Nosenko. No, I contacted CIA in 1962 and --

9 Mrs. Burke. In '64?

10 Mr. Nosenko. In '64, when I arrived in Geneva, on second

11 day I mailed a cable, and I knew -- a prearranged addressed,

12 and I knew that in two days somebody in appropriate place and

13 appropriate time will meet me from CIA.

14 Mrs. Burke. And they met you --

15 Mr. Nosenko. They met me and I was meeting them every

16 day, visiting, and when I had free time, visited secret address

17 in Geneva.

18 Mrs. Burke. All right, during those times you were meeti

19 them, did you negotiate in terms of what your situation would

20 be here in the United States if you defected, or where you wo

21 go?

22 Mr. Nosenko. Well, I put a question that what amount o

23 salary I want, that will find for me job. This I negotiate

24 Mrs. Burke. Did you discuss whether or not you wou

25 be imprisoned?

1 Mr. Nosenko. No, it never come to my mind that they would
2 imprison me.
3 Mrs. Burke. Did you tell them that -- I think you told
4 us you had some information you would well to them for a
5 certain amount of money.
6 Mr. Nosenko. It's in '62.
7 Mrs. Burke. In '62 you said that. In '64 you didn't
8 discuss any sale of any information?
9 Mr. Nosenko. No, no, on the contrary, for the period of
10 '62 -'64, I tried to get as much as possible information, not
11 only to come what I knew where I participated in the depart-
12 ment where I worked but to find out as much as possible what can
13 be valuable to the American intelligence and I had come with
14 some luggage.
15 Mrs. Burke. All right, well, during the time that you were
16 talking to them about what your salary would be, the circum-
17 stances of your defection, and I assume you told them what your
18 rank was, some of the things you worked on --
19 Mr. Nosenko. Yes.
20 Mrs. Burke. -- did you tell them you worked on the
21 Oswald file?
22 Mr. Nosenko. I do not remember, I can mention. I do not
23 remember, honestly.
24 Mrs. Burke. Did you discuss Oswald at all with them during
25 that period?

1 Mr. Nosenko. I must, sure, mentioned this fact because,
2 no, it happened such a thing. I must mention. But I do not
3 remember. I cannot tell you what questions were, what my
4 answers were.

5 Mrs. Burke. Did you tell them that the Soviet Union thought
6 that Oswald may have been a United States agent?

7 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, I certainly -- it would be -- anyone
8 treated. Oswald, or anyone from the United States who
9 come to live on his own decided to defect, or they contacted
10 him before, they will still will be suspected in a possibility
11 that he is an agent of American intelligence, and also this fact.

12 Mrs. Burke. And is this the reason that you gave him why
13 he was not allowed to remain in the Soviet Union?

14 Mr. Nosenko. The reason was that they didn't want him to
15 stay because, KGB, because they didn't consider him an interest-
16 ing target, an interesting person who has valuable information.

17 Mrs. Burke. I know that. In fact, I remember you
18 saying something about a person would only be interesting under
19 certain circumstances, one of which would be if they came in as
20 a tourist and they applied a very short time before they arrived.

21 Mr. Nosenko. Oh no.

22 Mrs. Burke. And they were an add on to, for instance,
23 the tour.

24 Mr. Nosenko. Right. Right.

25 Mrs. Burke. Now, from what that report shows, it shows that

1 Oswald received his visa in two days to come to the Soviet
2 Union. So he would be automatically suspect, and he would be
3 automatically what you would call an interesting person.
4 Mr. Nosenko. No, no, no. In this case, you see, Oswald
5 even didn't receive a visa in United States; he received it
6 passing through Europe.
7 Mrs. Burke. Through Helsinki?
8 Mr. Nosenko. Right, in Finland, where it's process was
9 easier than it will be in the United States. He simply bought
10 a tour and he received, managed to receive visa.
11 Mrs. Burke. Let me just ask one other thing.
12 Did you tell them any of your, aside from the ideological,
13 why you wanted to defect? For instance, did you tell them
14 anything about this promotion you thought you had when you went
15 to, was it, Gorki?
16 Mr. Nosenko. Yes.
17 Mrs. Burke. But then you --
18 Mr. Nosenko. No, I didn't tell them. I simply said that
19 my position, because with me, it was documented, I lied. I
20 said my position was Lieutenant Colonel. It wasn't true. It
21 was false statement. The same false statement was concerning
22 recall telegram when I wanted to push the defection process.
23 Mrs. Burke. My time is up. May I just ask one
24 question? Were you upset when you didn't get your promotion
25 after they had --

1 Mr. Nosenko. No, no ma'am. I still didn't receive it.
2 It was sent on signature. You see, they are signing, not
3 immediately when they are received. Personnel Directorate
4 gather in from all over the Soviet Union, from all KGBs and
5 comment on signature to the Chairman, twice, three times a
6 year. They were simply gathering in and didn't get enough
7 materials. I do not know. Maybe it was signed in January. But
8 up to my leaving, nobody informed me that it was signed. I
9 didn't -- wasn't rejected.
10 The Chairman. The time of the gentlewoman has expired.
11 Mr. Dodd?
12 Mr. Dodd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
13 I wonder if you might let me ask you -- let me start back
14 here, very quickly. One of the very first questions you were
15 asked last night by Mr. Klein, was the way Mr. Klein worded
16 the question, and I will ask you to expound on it if it is a
17 correct recall on my part.
18 Mr. Klein asked you or stated that you arranged for your
19 transfer to the American section of the KGB. He used the words
20 you arranged for your transfer to that section. Is that an
21 accurate statement? Did you want to be in that section? Did you
22 specifically ask to be in that section?
23 Mr. Nosenko. No, it wasn't accurate, it wasn't right.
24 Arrangement was done in work form. I was working after finishing
25 Institute in GRU, Navy Intelligence, and being in 1952 New Year,

1 in Moscow on New Year on a short leave, I was in company where
2 it was one of my friends with whom I studied at the Institute.
3 He worked in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. But his father-
4 in-law was high ranked General of MGB, in those years was
5 called KGB, and he asked me what I am doing, this General.
6 I said that I am working for the Navy Intelligence, GRU.
7 Do you like this work?
8 I said no, because I am not using what I received
9 education.
10 Would you like to work in MGB?
11 I said, if it will be with the use of my disciplines
12 which I studied at the Institute, why not? That is all. And
13 in March after death of Stalin this general was appointed the
14 First Deputy Minister of MGB of Beria. He remembered this
15 conversation and several days after death of Stalin I was recalled
16 to MGB which was called MVD in this period of time, in March of
17 '53, and was assigned to Second Chief Directorate. This is what
18 true statement.
19 Mr. Dodd. When you sent to the safe house or whatever it
20 was in Geneva, in 1964, by your own admission you lied to the
21 agent there in that you stated you had received a telegram
22 issuing your recall back to the Soviet Union.
23 Mr. Nosenko. Right.
24 Mr. Dodd. Therefore, it was that important that they
25 accept you immediately.

TOP SECRET

1 Did you show anyone a telegram?

2 Mr. Nosenko. No, sir, no, sir. There wasn't any telegram.

3 Mr. Dodd. Did they ask for a telegram?

4 Mr. Nosenko. No, but, sir, what happened, I started to

5 meet them in January, had passed three, four, five, six, seven

6 days. I am afraid of that any moment my Chief of the Second

7 Chief Directorate will be returning from France.

8 Mr. Dodd. I didn't ask you that, Mr. Nosenko. My question

9 to you is, were you asked whether or not you had a copy of

10 the telegram that you had received from the Soviet Union?

11 Mr. Nosenko. And I -- if I was even asked I couldn't

12 give them because I cannot take it. It would be secret

13 cable.

14 Mr. Dodd. You have answered my question.

15 You stated last night that -- and this might have been a

16 supposition on your part, but I am curious about it -- you stated

17 that it was your feeling that the intelligence community in

18 this country considered you a dispatched agent in 1962. Is

19 that something that you felt in 1962?

20 Mr. Nosenko. No. It's --

21 Mr. Dodd. A reflection back?

22 Mr. Nosenko. A reflection back. No, no, sir.

23 Mr. Dodd. You, by your own statement, again have received

24 some very rough treatment, inhuman treatment, to use your words,

25 living under spartan conditions, and I am sort of brushing over

1 this very quickly, between 1964 and 1969. Certainly you
2 couldn't have been very pleased with the way you were being
3 treated by a country that you had defected to and offered to
4 give information to. So for a period of that '64, to '69,
5 five years, you went through a rather rough period in your life?
6 Mr. Nosenko. Yes.
7 Mr. Dodd. Why did you go to work for somebody who treated
8 you like that?
9 Mr. Nosenko. Sir, I, even was five year there, I didn't
10 consider that it was decision of the whole CIA. I didn't
11 consider that -- I didn't blame the whole CIA because it
12 wasn't the question decided by the whole Agency. It was
13 decided question by several persons who were I consider simply
14 in this period of time sick, mentally sick, not ill, but
15 were simply in fear, in scare, in mania as if KGB penetrated
16 everything.
17 Mr. Dodd. Is it your statement to me that for five
18 years, while you were incarcerated in almost solitary confine-
19 ment, that you thought that this was the individual acts of a
20 couple of employees of this Agency?
21 Mr. Nosenko. Not employees.
22 Mr. Dod. Without the approval of the very highest
23 authority in this Agency?
24 Mr. Nosenko. Sir, I have seen Chief of Soviet Russia
25 Division, Mr. David Murphy. He was a high ranking man. It was

1 his decision, decision of Mr. Angleton, decision of Mr.
2 Murphy, and when they are coming to Director, and I know, from
3 my life, they can report in the way how they will report it, and
4 the Director will accept because they are responsible people,
5 they are sitting in this place. He is not going into details,
6 he is not going and studying, he is not going himself visiting.
7 The Chairman. The time of the gentleman has expired.
8 Mr. Sawyer?
9 Mr. Sawyer. First, have you received any compensation
10 for the period during which you were held in jail?
11 Mr. Nosenko. I received in several years later, I put
12 the question, I want to be paid for every year which I was
13 unlawfully arrest, the amount of money which we have agreed,
14 with taken taxes and whatever American citizens are paying.
15 Mr. Sawyer. Did you get that?
16 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, and on this sum of money I bought
17 the house.
18 Mr. Sawyer. I see.
19 I will tell you what bothers me about your testimony, very
20 frankly. You stated that they would be very interested in a
21 member of the American intelligence community that they could
22 even compel to defect. Here you had a willing defector, a guy
23 who said that undoubtedly that he didn't like America, and
24 that he did like Russia, and he wants to defect, and nobody
25 even interrogates him, according to you, as to what exposure or

1 experience he had. He might have worked in the missile silos,
2 he might have done anything, but nobody asked him, and that he
3 lives there for a period of, a long period of time. Here is a
4 guy that is totally willing to talk. It is not like approaching
5 somebody who doesn't want to talk to you or that might not want
6 to talk to you. And here is a fellow who was a radar operator,
7 experienced to some degree, and I don't know to what degree,
8 but apparently the Russians don't know to what degree either,
9 because nobody asked him, in a highly secret air base in Japan,
10 but they didn't ask him even about that, and it is very rare
11 to have one come.

12 I have listened to Radio Free Cuba, where they air all
13 kinds of propaganda, and this guy would have been certainly
14 good for propaganda when he loved Russia and hated the United
15 States. And I just, with those circumstances, I very frankly
16 find it almost impossible to believe that they did not
17 thoroughly interrogate him at least.

18 Mr. Nosenko. They never considered him an interesting
19 target. It was known that he served in Marine Corps.

20 Mr. Sawyer. What I am getting at, how did they know
21 whether he was an interesting target when they never even asked.

22 Mr. Nosenko. They judging by what they know about him
23 what in questionnaire he filled and plus what they found out
24 from interpreter on him. He said to interpreter, he served
25 in Marine Corps, he finished his years of service.

1 Mr. Sawyer. But he might have been a cryptographer in the
2 Marine Corps. He might have been as an enlisted man, he
3 might have been a cryptographer and know all our codes and
4 code methodology that might help break codes and that sort of
5 thing, but nobody ever asked him. That is what I don't under-
6 stand. And I can't believe it, very frankly.
7 Mr. Nosenko. I understand, sir, but I am telling you he
8 wasn't considered interesting target, and --
9 Mr. Sawyer. But they didn't have any facts to know
10 whether he was interesting, and here is a guy that wants to
11 talk to them.
12 Mr. Nosenko. But the judgment made on each person to work
13 actively against him on the basis of his questionnaire. If
14 in questionnaire will be said he is, let's say, professor,
15 teacher, let's say he is working for the government, any
16 department, but for the Federal Government, or he is an officer,
17 sure, on him will be paid attention.
18 Mr. Sawyer. Well, all right, we can drop that for a
19 minute.
20 But now, he got a visa in two days in Finland. I happen
21 to have been in Finland four years ago and wanted to get a
22 visa, a sort of a last minute decision, to go to Leningrad, and
23 I was told there is a minimum of 30 days before you can get a
24 visa. Now, to issue him a visa in two days for Russia, that
25 is very unusual, apparently, so they must have had some

interest in getting him there.

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, what I know, there wasn't any interest to get him. He managed to get this visa.

Mr. Sawyer. All right.

The other thing I am curious about is when they interrogated you so carefully here, why someone like Oswald, a known defector and who could well have been now a Russian intelligence agent, comes back to the country, apparently CIA or FBI, or nobody paid a bit of attention to him, and let him wander around the country with a Russian wife at will.

I have used up my time.

The Chairman. Okay. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. Fithian.

Mr. Fithian. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Nosenko, as I piece it together, there are four possibilities for this Committee to believe. Let me sketch out what those possibilities are.

One, that you told the truth in 1964, but you are now misleading this Committee.

Two, that you told an untruth in 1964, basically your statements in 1964 were not true, but you are telling the truth now.

Three, that in fact you were dispatched here by the KGB, or the Soviet Government, because of apparent but unreal

1 connections between the Soviets and Oswald and the assassination
2 of President Kennedy. Obviously the USSR would need this for
3 obvious reasons. They would badly need this for all sorts of
4 international reasons.

5 And finally, the fourth option is that you were dispatched
6 here by the Soviet Government and the KGB because there was an
7 actual connection between the KGB and the assassination of
8 President Kennedy.

9 These are the items which I have picked up in the last
10 two days that would tend to lead some people to believe the
11 last of the four, or at least the third to the last of the four,
12 either that the KGB dispatched you here because they needed it
13 for political reasons, though they were not involved, or they
14 dispatched you here because in fact they did collaborate with
15 Oswald.

16 First, Oswald goes to Russia. You say he is rejected, but
17 they grant him a pension, however small.

18 Second, they grant him the pleasures of a hunting club,
19 even though you said earlier he was mentally unbalanced, and
20 you are allowing him to use a gun.

21 Three, they allowed him to marry in Russia.

22 Four, they gave him a job.

23 Now, in -- not talking about the time when you were
24 under stress and incarcerated, but just talking about the two
25 months prior to that -- the FBI questioning, and the prearrest

story makes no sense.

The rejection of Oswald's offer to defect makes absolutely no sense to me.

Mr. Sawyer has just pursued that momentarily. I think that can be rejected by us, by reasonable people, prima facie. I see no reason to accept that part of your story whatsoever.

The exposition, taking you off to worry about the exposition, and so forth, was demonstrated a fraud.

No reprisals against your family. Nobody was working against Oswald, you said, yet later on you said you had seven to eight large files, you only read the first portion of one file. You said no KGB ever talked to Oswald regarding letting him defect. The reason you gave us for that was that he slashed his wrists and you concluded he was unstable. Yet prior to that discovery of his instability, you granted him a visa in two days and he asked to be permitted to defect prior to slashing his wrists, and therefore you had to make the decision prior to slashing his writs, prior to knowing that he slashed his wrist, that you were going to reject him. That doesn't hold water either.

Finally, you said in your testimony American defection was very rare. All the more reason, if it only happens once every year or a couple of times a year, or three times between '56 and '59, it is totally incredible to me that he would not have been interrogated. No reasonable person can believe that story.

1 You said he was not interesting, you were not interested
2 in him, the KGB rejected him. Despite that, you were "recruiting
3 right and left all kinds of people to assist in the espionage
4 operation."
5 Now, all of these things, Mr. Nosenko, leads me to be
6 very, very disturbed by your story because it simply just on the
7 face of what you told us last night and tonight, can't possibly
8 be true.
9 In the first place, you remember too much now. You remember
10 too much in the way of details after 15 years. Therefore, I
11 have great difficulty accepting any of your story.
12 We as a Committee of the United States Congress are charged
13 with trying to assess what actually happened in the assassination
14 of President Kennedy. That is the central story. You have not
15 helped us very much. You have confused the issue. In fact,
16 by your testimony you have led at least this member to wonder
17 whether or not you are still working with the KGB.
18 The Chairman. The time of the gentleman has expired.
19 I will permit the witness to answer.
20 Mr. Nosenko. Mr. Congressman said his opinion. Do you
21 ask me any question?
22 Mr. Fithian. I would just like to have you tell me why I
23 shouldn't believe that you were dispatched here by the KGB,
24 in the light of just the points I am making, in the light of
25 the enormous differences, not in the CIA interrogation under

1 duress, but in the earlier period when you were not under that
2 kind of duress. It doesn't wash with me.
3 The Chairman. The time of the gentleman has expired.
4 Mr. Nosenko. Sir, if you want me to defend myself, I can
5 say only one thing. I never done from the first day in the
6 United States anything directed against this country. I tried
7 before I has come, when I contacted '62 the CIA, and has come
8 in '64, I tried to get as much as possible information. I
9 am the source who told concerning existence of microphones in
10 American embassy in Moscow. I am the man who have given, I
11 don't know , 300 cases --
12 Mr. Fithian. We are only concerned --
13 The Chairman. The time of the gentleman has expired.
14 Mr. Edgar.
15 Mr. Edgar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
16 It is very hard to follow Mr. Fithian's comments because
17 I would like to shift gears a little bit. BUt you indicated
18 to our Chairman that you now act as a consultant to the CIA.
19 Is that your only job?
20 Mr. Nosenko. It is the only job.
21 Mr. Edgar. In the course of acting as consultant to the
22 CIA, do you have access to talking with CIA employees from time
23 to time who contact you and who assist you and protect you and
24 give you some of the direction for your consulting?
25 Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

1 Mr. Edgar. Have you ever been in a conversation with any
2 of the agents of the CIA about who might have been responsible
3 for having you detained on April 4th, --

4 Mr. Nosenko. No.

5 Mr. Edgar. -- 1964.

6 Mr. Nosenko. No.

7 Mr. Edgar. You indicated earlier you thought it was a man
8 by the name of Murphy.

9 Mr. Nosenko. Murphy, Chief of Soviet, former Chief of
10 Suviet Russian Division, and Chief of Counterintelligence,
11 former Chief of Counterintelligence of the CIA Mr. Angleton
12 because it cannot without him be decided.

13 Mr. Edgar. Do you know of any other KGB agents or other
14 defectors who were held in those very same conditions?

15 Mr. Nosenko. No, I do not know.

16 Mr. Edgar. Were there any other prisoners held nearby
17 that you could hear or --

18 Mr. Nosenko. No, sir, I was in solitary absolutely
19 confinement, no prisoner, nobody I could see.

20 Mr. Edgar. Yet you are still willing to be a consultant
21 to the CIA?

22 Mr. Nosenko. I am -- no. Sir, I am consultant only on
23 the base, on my knowledge what I know about counterintelligence
24 work of the KGB.

25 Mr. Edgar. Well, you have suggested to the Committee that
your statements given to the CIA in 1964 cannot be considered

1 reliable because the statements were given under duress, and
2 prior to our recess a few moments ago you indicated that you
3 felt that the tapes and the FBI and the CIA interrogations of
4 '64, '65, and '66 should not be considered as reliable
5 statements.
6 Is that not correct?
7 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, because I considered the whole arrest
8 was unlawful, without due process of law, illegal arrest,
9 what was the finding as unlawful by Rockefeller Commission.
10 Mr. Edgar. Thank you.
11 You were held under those spartan conditions and you
12 indicated that those statements would have to be unreliable.
13 Now, I have three specific questions, then, to ask you.
14 Have you ever told the CIA that these statements could
15 not be considered reliable?
16 Mr. Nosenko. Sure, when we started, they change the
17 situation, they moved me from spartan conditions, started to
18 talk with me as a human being, to treat me as a human being.
19 Mr. Edgar. Did you go on a point by point correction of
20 any of those statements you previously made?
21 Mr. Nosenko. It wasn't in the form of simply returning
22 to document, it was case by case, whatever concerns me, my
23 biography, my work, whatever cases I knew, whatever cases I
24 was involved, all questions were raised by 20, 30 times each
25 case, when it was reevaluation of all information given by me.

1 Mr. Edgar. And it is your testimony that after 1967, '68,
2 when those interrogations took place, you gave accurate,
3 truthful statements?

4 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir, whatever and how good I recollect,
5 at the best.

6 Mr. Edgar. And those statements of '67-'68 should be
7 considered by this Committee as the absolute truth?

8 Mr. Nosenko. Right.

9 Mr. Edgar. And nothing but the truth.

10 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, yes, sir.

11 Mr. Edgar. And it is clear to you that all the questions
12 that were raised about Oswald were also raised in 1967 and '68?

13 Mr. Nosenko. Everything was raised in this period.

14 Mr. Edgar. If, then, this Committee discovers inconsis-
15 tencies in your statements that you made in 1967 and '68,
16 after your incarceration and the illegal period that you
17 talk about, if we find inconsistencies between that statement
18 and the statements you gave us last night and tonight, which
19 should we believe?

20 Mr. Nosenko. Sir, if -- you must believe -- not you must --
21 it is up to you what you believe. But, sir, let's say was read
22 to me by Mr. Klein a question, that I said when I said concerning
23 Oswald, I did not mention physical surveillance. It is a big
24 operation. It is nothing big in the KGB to put under surveil-
25 lance Soviet or foreigner, or to control telephone conversations

or correspondence. I could maybe something miss, you see, when I mentioning. I do not have such a brilliant, brilliant mind that immediately like photographic memory, immediately return word and word. I simply was describing that it wasn't active work, that there wasn't planned recruitment, there wasn't planned approachment, contact. There was type of passive work which is called in KGB to watch him and what is it, agents, control of correspondence, and explaining this, I simply, I could miss that he was under surveillance.

You can return to this and tell me, uh-huh, you told in '67 you didn't mention that he was under surveillance. It is not a contradiction.

The Chairman. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. Nosenko, in reply to Mr. Sawyer's question, you indicated you were paid for the period of time that you were under arrest, that it was a lump sum payment I suppose?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. What amount of money was that?

Mr. Nosenko. Something about, oh, about $80,000.

The Chairman. About $80,000?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

The Chairman. Any other sum in addition to that were you paid?

Mr. Nosenko. I think I received about $15,000 or $20,000 when I started on my own to live, to buy furniture. I received,

1 yes, in the beginning, in '69, in April. But this lump I
2 received in '70, '71. '71.
3 The Chairman. So that the record is clear, you received
4 $80,000 for the period of time you were under arrest.
5 Mr. Nosenko. Right.
6 The Chairman. In order to get started again, you were
7 given an additional $15,000, and that was in 1969.
8 Mr. Nosenko. Right.
9 The Chairman. Since 1969, to the present time, you have
10 received $35,000 --
11 Mr. Nosenko. No, no, no, sir.
12 The Chairman. Would you --
13 Mr. Nosenko. They started, when they released me they
14 started to pay me in the beginning $16,000. Then they raised
15 each year, $2000, two and a half thousand were raises. I only
16 received $35,000 this year, '78, from October of '77, approxi-
17 mately.
18 The Chairman. From October '77 to the present time you
19 received $35,000.
20 Mr. Nosenko. Right.
21 The Chairman. Can you give us some indication of how many
22 days you have worked during 1978?
23 Mr. Nosenko. Well, I am working at home besides coming
24 here when they needme, at least twice a month, and spending
25 a week, approximately, besides traveling when they are

1 sending me the last few years abroad to talk with friendly
2 intelligence services. I am also working at home on my own.
3 I am studying Soviet periodicals, Soviet magazines, Soviet
4 newspapers. I am making certain researches, I am trying not to
5 lose what is going on, what changes taking place in policy.
6 The Chairman. Would it be fair to say that you sort of
7 set your time and that no one else sets your time?
8 Mr. Nosenko. When I am out of this area, yes, at home,
9 I am myself setting time.
10 The Chairman. And during the last year, how many weeks
11 would you say you have spent here at the Agency?
12 Mr. Nosenko. Not at the Agency. They are meeting me in
13 other places. I am very rare visiting this place, only if they
14 invite me for a lecture or about KGB counterintelligence. But
15 I am meeting them when I am in this area, under certain
16 conditions, in certain places where they need me.
17 Well, one month, twice I am coming. Let's say I am
18 spending about 12, 13 days a month here, it can be in some
19 cases seven, eight days a month, but in main the last period
20 of time I am coming, the last years, I am coming almost
21 twice a month.
22 The Chairman. For how long?
23 Mr. Nosenko. For a week, five, six days.
24 The Chairamn. My time has expired.
25 Mr. Preyer?

1 Mr. Preyer. Mr. Nosenko, your testimony has been considered
2 a major piece of evidence, and was so considered by the Warren
3 Commission as rebutting any Russian connection with the assassi-
4 nation of Lee Harvey Oswald, and I think the key part of your
5 testimony that we are concerned with, not so much the question
6 about any inconsistencies in it, but are you right on the big
7 question, namely, was Lee Harvey Oswald a KGB agent?
8 I want to mention, I have been a little surprised by your
9 testimony, bythe gaps in your knowledge of Oswald, and really
10 how little you knew about him. For example, when he went to
11 Minsk, he was tranferred out of your oversight, I take it, and
12 as I understood you, you did not know he was married until
13 later on, and did not know he had gone back to the United
14 States.
15 Mr. Nosenko. Mr. Congressman, if I was staying and
16 working '60 and '61 period in the same Seventh Department which
17 sent file on Oswald in Minsk, I would know, but I was working
18 in First American Department.
19 Mr. Preyer. Right. Now, I am not questioning you about
20 that. The question I wonder, that that brings to my mind is,
21 if Oswald had been a KGB agent, are you certain you would have
22 known it? In other words, if you didn't even know he was
23 married, didn't even know he had gone to the United States,
24 couldn't he have been a KGB agent in that period without your
25 knowledge, or are you certain --

1 Mr. Nosenko. No, I couldn't, you are absolutely right, I
2 couldn't know. But in '63 when happened assassination of
3 the President, when it was mentioned that Oswald shot the
4 President, when it start, demanded the file back from Minsk,
5 when started conversation with Minsk, started in KGB investi-
6 gation, detailed approach. This is what --
7 Mr. Preyer. So you convinced that seeing the first section--
8 Mr. Nosenko. Seeing the first section in which the most
9 important material in the whole file will be this in first
10 section of the first volume.
11 Mr. Preyer. Were the rest of the sections of that file,
12 incidentally, wire -- telephone taps?
13 Mr. Nosenko. It will be information from agents in
14 second part. In third part will be from telephone conversa-
15 tions, from surveillance. In fourth part, photocopies of letters,
16 different mail, when they checking Soviet connections, Soviet
17 friends of Oswald.
18 Mr. Preyer. Well, on this question of your knowledge
19 of Oswald and being in position to know about him, you knew about
20 the cablegram from Mexico yet you did not know he had gone back
21 to the United States. Is that because you had moved to--
22 Mr. Nosenko. Again, I returned in Seventh Department
23 and I was working '62, '63, up to '64 in Seventh Department
24 and the cablegram has come in Seventh Department. Seventh
25 Department was started against Oswald in '59.

1 Mr. Preyer. Have you read a lot about the Oswald case
2 in recent years?
3 Mr. Nosenko. Well, I read several books, what appeared.
4 I only didn't read the last book which was written about Marina
5 Oswald by Mrs. Priscilla Johnson. Why? Because I knew
6 that I would appear here, that the staff of your -- your
7 staff will be talking with me. I didn't wanted something to
8 get -- I can, you know, mix what I knew and something to use
9 what I got from the book.
10 Mr. Preyer. I just wondered if you had read about the
11 Mexican cable, and perhaps through the years may have been --
12 Mr. Nosenko. No, I never have seen that it was mentioned
13 Mexican cable. I have seen that he visited Mexico, in Mexico
14 visited Soviet and Cuban embassies. This I have seen in books,
15 this fact.
16 Mr. Preyer. If I have got one more moment, Mr. Chairman,
17 to change the subject, one of the things that struck me is
18 that when you defected, as Mrs. Burke mentioned, in Geneva,
19 in 1964, very shortly after the Kennedy Assassination, I get
20 the impression that the CIA or American forces to whom you
21 defected, did not have much to say about the assassination or
22 was not --
23 Mr. Nosenko. They are -- I mentioned must be Oswald, the
24 asked. But they were asking different, whatever cases I can
25 immediately give them, names, when recruited, his position,

1 from what country, this they were interested, as much as possible
2 to take this type of information. They asked me about Oswald.
3 I told them what I knew.

4 The Chairman The ;time of the gentleman has expired.

5 Mr. Devine.

6 Mr. Devine. I don't want to know where you live, but
7 do you reside in the general area of the nation's capital?

8 Mr. Nosenko. I was living in this area up to 19 -- middle
9 of 1973, but FBI gentlemen -- I didn't mention , I also meeting
10 FBI people when I am here, not only CIA, but they are not paying
11 me anything. FBI people inform me that they have information
12 that KGB trying to locate me. Then it happened in the area
13 where I was living in Maryland up to 1973, I was in a
14 shopping center, and on me was coming a Soviet from KGB. I knew
15 his face, and this whole -- I immediately reported this and
16 we decided that for me better to move from the area where
17 Soviet diplomats, KGB officer working under cover of diplomats
18 are freely traveling and can spot me.

19 Mr. Devine. That person didn't recognize you?

20 Mr. Nosenko. I immediately turned and went, turned my back
21 and went in another direction.

22 Mr. Devine. Have you been contacted or in touch with
23 anyone from the Soviet Embassy here in Washington?

24 Mr. Nosenko. Only in 1964, the Soviet Embassy in
25 Washington demanded to see me after defection.

1 Mr. Devine. Did you see them?

2 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, in the State Department, in presence
3 of American diplomats, I have seen for five, say seven
4 minutes, Consul from Soviet Embassy and interpreter, another
5 diplomat.

6 Mr. Devine. What did they want with you?

7 Mr. Nosenko. They ask me how could I do it, and do I
8 understand the importance of this thing, that I defected from
9 the country, and I said, gentlemen, nobody pushed me on this
10 question, it is absolutely my own decision, and decision of free
11 will, which I made long ago, and without any return. Then they
12 told me now we know how to treat you, and what do you think
13 about your Soviet citizenship.

14 I said, it's automatically, I am rejecting it. I do
15 not need. And on this I finished conversation.

16 Mr. Devine. They made no threats of reprisals against
17 your family back there?

18 Mr. Nosenko. No, no. They later only, Mr. Congressman,
19 they later sent two letters, one from wife and another from
20 my mother. These letters were delivered by them. They visited
21 American embassy in Moscow and had left these two letters.
22 These letters were sent by American embassy in Moscow to
23 State Department, State Department had given to CIA, CIA had
24 given me these letters. I answered one short note that my
25 decision is final, decision ideological and in spite of all

1 my love to the family, and in spite of my respect to the
2 memory of the father, I can repeat that if he was alive I would
3 also would do the same, that is all.
4 Mr. Devine. Getting back to one of Mr. Stoke's questions
5 about the amount of money paid to you for your years of
6 incarceration, the fact that they gave you $15,000 or $20,000
7 which you used for furniture and so forth, were there any
8 strings tied to either of those funds, the $80,000 or the subse-
9 quent amount?
10 Mr. Nosenko. No, sir, no.
11 Mr. Devine. That you would not contact the press or
12 anybody else about this?
13 Mr. Nosenko. No, it never was mentioned, never.
14 Mr. Devine. No strings attached?
15 Mr. Nosenko. No.
16 Mr. Devine. Finally, do you have any knowledge of any
17 connection with Oswald and the assassination of President
18 Kennedy?
19 Mr. Nosenko. No, sir.
20 Mr. Devine. From your connections in the KGB at that time?
21 Mr. Nosenko. Whatever I said, nothing more. I do not
22 know anything.
23 The Chairman. The time of the gentleman has expired.
24 Mrs. Burke.
25 Mrs. Burke. I have just a few random questions. You

1 mentioned Priscilla Johnson's book. Did you by any chance
2 while you were working in the American tourist area, did you
3 have any occasion to investigate her coming to Russia or did
4 she come during any of that time as a student?

5 Mr. Nosenko. Priscilla Johnson?

6 Mrs. Burke. Yes.

7 Mr. Nosenko. Why, yes, her name, she was a correspondent
8 in Moscow working, and KGB didn't like her dispatches and they
9 made very, very rude operations against her. They --

10 Mrs. Burke. What did they do.

11 Mr. Nosenko. Huh?

12 Mrs. Burke. What did they do to her?

13 Mr. Nosenko. Well, they wanted to get rid of her from the
14 Soviet Union. They didn't see possibility to recruit her. They
15 didn't see any possibility to find or to create compromising
16 situation. They didn't like her dispatches which they were
17 anti-Soviet. Then they decided to get rid of her, and they
18 made such an operation in restaurant where she had dinner in
19 evening. They put drugs in her liquor, which she was drinking,
20 wine or vodka or whatever it would be, and she was absolutely
21 drunk. And she was delivered in local regional, one of the
22 regional little -- it's not clinic, it is where they deliver
23 drunks to spend night. And they put her there and made photo
24 pictures of her being drunk and other women drunk laying there
25 and published an article and put even a picture. And surely

1 she was immediately recalled by her agency or her newspapers for
2 which she was working.
3 Mrs. Burke. Do you think that is the wrong Priscilla
4 Johnson?
5 Mr. Edgar. If the gentlewoman would yield, are you sure
6 that you are talking about the same person?
7 Mr. Nosenko. Priscilla Johnson, yes, this correspondent,
8 yes.
9 Mrs.Burke. Let me ask you one other question.
10 When she was there, did she interview Oswald?
11 Mr. Nosenko. I know it is now reading here the books. I
12 didn't know that she interviewed. I only found out it with
13 living in the United States, with reading books.
14 Mrs. Burke. That she interviewed him. That didn't show
15 in your file?
16 Mr. Nosenko. I didn't read her book -- this is what in
17 some other books mentioned that she had interviewed him.
18 Mrs. Burke. Let me ask again about Oswald in Minsk, and
19 first of all, can American tourists go to Minsk easily?
20 Mr. Nosenko. Minsk is open city, yes.
21 Mrs. Burke. It is an open city now. Was it an open
22 city then?
23 Mr. Nosenko. Yes.
24 Mrs. Burke. And when he was there, of course, I realize
25 that you don't know and you did not keep up with what he was

1 doing there, but in reading that file, in the first few
2 pages or anything, did you notice anything in terms of his
3 contacts with Americans, or did you notice anything at all
4 that was extrardoinary about him?

5 Mr. Nosenko. No, there wasn't. For the whole his period
6 of time there wasn't found any indication on suspicion,
7 suspicious meetings or anything suspicion concerning his contacts
8 with Americans.

9 Mrs. Burke. Let me -- As I understand it, it was fairly
10 routine that everyone's phone would be tapped, so that that
11 was not --

12 Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

13 Mrs. Burke. -- your information that that would be
14 nothing unusual.

15 You know, there is one thing that is bothering me, and
16 that is the inconsistency and the greater detail that is present
17 today than in your earlier statements.

18 Could you give us an explanation of why there is more de-
19 tail today?

20 For instance, in your earlier statements I noticed you
21 refer to the interpreter as a tourist, the tourist guide, as
22 just a tourist guide or an interpreter? Today you referred
23 by name to that person. And again, the two psychiatrists --

24 Mr. Nosenko. I don't know even now name of this inter-
25 preter. I do not remember name.

1 Mrs. Burke. I see. I thought --

2 Mr. Nosenko. Interpreter, I never mentioned.

3 Mrs. Burke. You never mentioned the interpreter?

4 Mr. Nosenko. No. I do not remember her name.

5 Mrs. Burke. It was just this officer Rastrusin?

6 Mr. Nosenko. Officer, yes.

7 Mrs. Burke. He was -- but he was the one that found --

8 wasn't he the one that found Oswald?

9 Mr. Nosenko. No, this is the officer who reported about

10 him.

11 Mrs. Burke. He reported it, b ut he didn't find him?

12 Mr. Nosenko. No, no, interpreter found him with

13 administration of the hotel where Oswald was staying.

14 Mrs. Burke. Oh, I see.

15 Mr. Nosenko. You see, interpreter has come in the

16 morning to take him or has come to take him to city, to show

17 him, as interpreter on a guide, on a tour. And she was waiting

18 about 20, 25, 30 minutes and was concerned.

19 The Chairman. Time is up. One more.

20 Mrs. Burke. All right, just one more question.

21 When Oswald arrived, then, he didn't speak very much

22 Russian, is that right?

23 Mr. Nosenko. No. Ididn't hear that he spoke in Russian.

24 Mrs. Burke. I see. Were there any notations at all in the

25 file -- what is your understanding of his fluency in Russian

1 during the time of his stay?
2 Mr. Nosenko. Well, during time of his stay surely he
3 started a little bit to talk, but it wasn't very, it wasn't
4 good Russian. It wasn't even --
5 The Chairman. The time of the gentlewoman has expired.
6 Mrs. Burke. Thank you.
7 The Chairman. Mr. Dodd.
8 Mr. Dodd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
9 I would like to just pick up on that line of questioning,
10 if I could, with you, Mr. Nosenko.
11 Correct me if I am wrong, but as I understand it, Oswald,
12 you were aware of Oswald's desire to defect. There was a
13 decision, and in fact he was informed through his Intourist
14 guide that his request had been rejected.
15 Is that correct so far?
16 Mr. Nosenko. Is in general, but it wasn't in this ways
17 told to him. It was in so-called, you know, soft manner. It
18 was explained to him by through Intourist --
19 Mr. Dodd. That he would have to go through his embassy?
20 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, that Intourist not dealing with this
21 question. He must go through this, this, this procedures.
22 Mr. Dodd. Okay.
23 Now, you, at the time of this, of Oswald's request, you
24 were working in the Seventh Department of the Second Directorate
25 which was involved with tourism?

1 Mr. Nosenko. Right.

2 Mr. Dodd. Okay. Could you tell me what would be the
3 normal operating procedures within the Soviet Union if a
4 tourist were involved, say, in a car accident with an Intourist
5 guide. Say a Frenchman was involved in a car accident. Assuming
6 it was not his fault, someone hit him, what happens? Do
7 they notify immediately the French Embassy, what steps do they
8 take in order to deal with that individual?

9 Mr. Nosenko. I would assume, sir, that he will be,
10 sure, he immediately will be taken in polyclinic, will be informed
11 his embassy.

12 Mr. Dodd. Those kind of steps.

13 Mr. Nosenko. Right.

14 Mr. Dodd. If you had made a decision that Oswald should
15 not be accepted in the Soviet Union, and if you find him in
16 his room with his wrist slit, why don't you then contact the
17 American Embassy and notify them that you have an American on
18 your hands who just tried to kill himself?

19 Mr. Nosenko. Sir, he wasn't an employee of American
20 embassy.

21 Mr. Dodd. He was a tourist, though.

22 Mr. Nosenko. A tourist.

23 Mr. Dodd. And I just asked you about a Frenchman who might
24 be a tourist and get in a car accident, and you said you would
25 take him to the hospital, you would notify the embassy. Why

1 don't you take Mr. Oswald to the hospital and notify the
2 American embassy?
3 Mr. Nosenko. Nobody knew that he would cut wrist.
4 Mr. Dodd. No, but you found him with his wrist cut.
5 Mr. Nosenko. Right. He was delivered in hospital .
6 Mr. Dodd. Why didn't you notify the American embassy?
7 Mr. Nosenko. He wasn't dying, he wasn't serious, they
8 made transfusion and put stitches. It is -- I am telling what
9 I think why it was.
10 Mr. Dodd. You understand my problem here. You have got
11 someone who you don't want to accept him. You have already
12 made a decision that he shouldn't be allowed to defect. You
13 walk into his room and find him with his wrist slit, it would
14 seem to me that this guy has already indicated just by that act
15 alone that he is not playing with a full deck of cards, and
16 you decide then that you are going to accept him because you
17 are worried that it might cause some embarrassment after Camp
18 David.
19 Mr. Nosenko. No. But the question to inform the Embassy,
20 it must be passing through such stage. Intourist itself cannot
21 contact the American Embassy.
22 Mr. Dodd. No, obviously.
23 Mr. Nosenko. No. They must contact their Minister of
24 Foreign Trade which in its turn putting question to Ministry of
25 Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet

1 Union can contact the embassy.

2 Mr. Dodd. LEt me jump onto something else quickly in the

3 time we've got.

4 You knew that Lee Harvey Oswald was a Marine?

5 Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

6 Mr. Dodd. You knew by your answer to Mrs. Burke's question

7 a minute ago that Oswald had a student's knowledge of Russian?

8 Mr. Nosenko. When he was living in Minsk, not before,

9 before he has come. No.

10 Mr. Dodd. You didn't know that?

11 Mr. Nosenko. No, when he was living in Minsk, when he

12 was in daily contact with Soviets working at the plant and

13 having friends.

14 Mr. Dodd. Did you know that he had been a student of

15 Marxism?

16 Mr. Nosenko. No.

17 Mr. Dodd. Did you know that he had given the U.S.

18 embassy his notice to defect?

19 Mr. Nosenko. No. I know that he visited embassy and

20 after was, he was told that he will be allowed to stay, after

21 this.

22 Mr. Dodd. You were not aware at that time that he con-

23 tacted through Intourist and eventually your office and made

24 it known that he intended to defect or wanted to defect, you

25 were not aware or your department was not aware that he had

1 already notified the American embassy that he intended to
2 defect?
3 Mr. Nosenko. No, no, no, sir.
4 Mr. Dodd. You were not aware of that.
5 Mr. Nosenko. No. He wasn't under surveillance. We
6 didn't know. When he was going alone without interpter, we
7 didn't know.
8 Mr. Dodd. I didn't ask you how you know. I just asked
9 you whether or not -- he didn't tell you that?
10 Mr. Nosenko. No. Nobody from KGB talked with him.
11 The Chairman. The time of the gentleman has expired.
12 Mr. Sawyer?
13 Mr. Sawyer. When Congressman Devine asked you how you
14 knew your family was okay or that they hadn't invoked any
15 reprisals, I didn't get the answer.
16 Mr. Nosenko. Sir, I asked Mr. Solie in '69, '70, once
17 I asked, anything about my family?
18 Mr. Sawyer. Mr. who?
19 Mr. Nosenko. Mr. Bruce Solie, CIA officer who was in
20 contact with me, '69, '70. He answered me that they are all
21 right, everything okay. But he didn't went in any detail
22 and I never returned more to this question. But there is another
23 point, sir. Besides the father's position, after he died, she
24 was receiving, she received pension, and besides that, for
25 the years --

1 Mr. Sawyer. How did you know she died?

2 Mr. Nosenko. Father died, I said. Father died in 1956.

3 After father's death she received a pension.

4 Mr. Sawyer. I understand. You went through that before.

5 I noticed here though, when he slashed his wrist, the

6 psychiatric examination report here by the doctor says the

7 patient apparently understands the questions asked in Russian,

8 so he must have spoken Russian, you know, to whatever degree,

9 when he went there. I thought you said you were always

10 interested in someone who can speak Russian or has studied

11 anything Russian.

12 Mr. Nosenko. Who specializes in any field of Russia,

13 who will be working for the United States government.

14 Mr. Sawyer. But here is a guy at that time, when he first

15 came there, within a matter of days after, the doctor says the

16 patient apparently understands the questions asked in Russian.

17 Mr. Nosenko. Sir --

18 Mr. Sawyer. That would have keyed interest right there,

19 wouldn't it?

20 Mr. Nosenko. Sir, if we knew that he studied in Columbia

21 University, in Yale University --

22 Mr. Sawyer. Well, it says right --

23 Mr. Nosenko. In Russian Institute.

24 Mr. Sawyer. It says on the report, this was on the 21st

25 or the 23rd or 25th of October, a week after he arrived, it

1 says the patient apparently understands the questions asked
2 in Russian. So you knew he spoke Russian at that time. And yet
3 that was one of your criteria.

4 Mr. Nosenko. Well, sir --

5 Mr. Sawyer. Something else I am a little curious about.
6 Apparently, coming here, wanting to defect, wanting to leave
7 America, wanting Russia, here is a guy that if he didn't
8 know anything would be apparently capable of going back to the
9 United States at the behest of KGB in areas of the country that
10 Russian diplomats and so forth, KGB people weren't allowed to go
11 and dig up information for them and come back. Here is a guy
12 you didn't have to threaten, he volunteers. And it seems strange
13 you wouldn't talk to him or be interested in him just from that
14 point of view.

15 And how -- and another thing that greatly bothers me,
16 how did you know that he, being in the Marines, you knew that,
17 but how did you know he wasn't a cryptographer or how did
18 you know he wasn't stationed in the Office of the Joint Chiefs
19 of Staff as a guard or as a messenger or a clerk, or that he
20 worked with U-2s, which apparently he did. Why would the KGB
21 not at least find these things out, with a guy that wants to
22 go to Russia, wants to be a Russian?

23 Mr. Nosenko. Sir, I only can repeat you, when on him was
24 received the first information about his arrival, checkup was
25 made on him. There wasn't any existing material in KGB, any

1 knowledge about him. He never was before in the Soviet Union.
2 In judging by the question --
3 Mr. Sawyer. Why weren't they asking, why wouldn't they
4 ask, that's the question. Why wouldn't they ask?
5 Mr. Nosenko. They are not --
6 Mr. Sawyer. Apparently they knew he could speak Russian.
7 Mr. Nosenko. -- asking Americans approaching.
8 Judging by the questionnaire, they decided, the KGB decided,
9 Seventh Department, he is not an interesting target.
10 Mr. Sawyer. Well, why would a person like this not even
11 be interesting for something like the Tokyo Rose, on some kind
12 of propaganda program where he could say how bad things were
13 in the United States, and why he didn't want to stay there
14 anymore and how great they were in Russia, like these
15 propagandists do?
16 Mr. Nosenko. Sir, I am telling you why it was decided,
17 and how KGB was thinking about him.
18 Mr. Sawyer. I yield back the balance of my time.
19 The Chairman. The time of the gentleman has expired.
20 Mr. Fithian.
21 Mr. Fithian. Mr. Chairman, I just now got this report.
22 I wonder if I could let Mr. Edgar go ahead of me?
23 The Chairman. The Chair will recognize Mr. Edgar.
24 Mr. Edgar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
25 I have a series of questions which I hope most of which

1 will be yes and no kinds of questions.

2 Did you conduct in the KGB a program to compromise and
3 recruit journalists?

4 Mr. Nosenko. I was working, when I started to work in the
5 KGB in 1953, the first year I was working against American
6 correspondents.

7 Mr. Edgar. But the KGB, not you personally, but the KGB
8 did have a policy of going against journalists and trying to
9 compromise them, yes or no?

10 Mr. Nosenko. Trying to recruit or compromise them.

11 Mr. Edgar. Did they censor all the journalists' notes
12 that they could gather from the journalists? Did they censor
13 the notes before they allowed the story to go out?

14 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

15 Mr. Edgar. Priscilla Johnson interviewed Oswald on the
16 15th of November, 1959. Would the KGB have looked at her
17 notes from that interview?

18 Mr. Nosenko. Sir, they are censored not by the KGB, but
19 there is special -- it is government organization was censoring
20 this. Some materials are coming to the KGB, some are not
21 coming.

22 Mr. Edgar. Well, she reveals in her article that he was a
23 Marxist, that Oswald was a Marxist and a Marine Corps radar
24 man. It would seem to me the KGB would have discovered that
25 in November of 1959.

1 Mr. Nosenko. Sir, I didn't know this in those days.

2 Mr. Edgar. Do you know a correspondent by the name of

3 Arlene Mosby?

4 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, I heard such a name, Mosby, a woman

5 who was a correspondent.

6 Mr. Edgar. In the earlier questioning of Congresswoman

7 Burke, you were not confusing Arlene Mosby with the treatment

8 of Priscilla Johnson?

9 Mr. Nosenko. I think it was Priscilla Johnson, the case

10 which I described, I think so. I think so, it was Priscilla

11 Johnson.

12 Mr. Edgar. How do you know?

13 Mr. Nosenko. What I heard from colleagues who were in

14 KGB, who were working against correspondents.

15 Mr. Edgar. But you are not absolutely clear?

16 Mr. Nosenko. And then there was an article in --

17 Mr. Edgar. You are not absolutely --

18 Mr. Nosenko. In literary newspaper, I think it was, not

19 in Pravad, Izvestia, but in Literary Gazette.

20 Mr. Edgar. But you are not absolutely certain?

21 Mr. Nosenko. No. I think it was Priscilla JOhnson, as

22 I said.

23 Mr. Edgar. But it could have been someone else.

24 Mr. Nosenko. An American correspondent, woman.

25 Mr. Edgar. Are you certain that after 1967 you sat down

with the CIA and corrected your earlier statements about Oswald, yes or no?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Edgar. We have only a few pages of written testimony, some three pages that you gave, and in fact, in the beginning part of that testimony, you indicate that you don't want to go through it again because your earlier testimony will stand for itself. I am paraphrasing what you said.

Were the notes and the recordsings of those corrections made and kept by the CIA?

Mr. NOsenko. Sir, Mr. Bruce Solie talking with me every day for a period from the end of '67, the whole '68, 1968, '69, every conversation he was recording. But he never has come and showed his notes, transcriptions or anything. He was returning to every case, to every aspect by 20, 25, 30 times.

Mr. Edgar. But specifically on the Oswald case, would it be correct in our assuming that it was more than three pages of notes on specifically Lee Harvey Oswald after 1967?

Mr. Nosenko. If he was raising questions concerning also Lee Harvey Oswald.

MR. Edgar. We have some information that Bruce Solie --

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, Mr. Solie.

Mr. Edgar. Stated in a deposition that there is nothing on Oswald other than the three pages.

Mr. Nosenko. I cannot say how many pages. I know

1 that he was passing through all cases, all questions, with me
2 for the period almost two years.
3 Mr. Edgar. Who other than Bruce Solie did you talk to about
4 correcting your earlier statements?
5 Mr. Nosenko. I wasn't correcting them. They were correcting;
6 they were talking returning back to every case.
7 Mr. Edgar. One final question.
8 Mr. Nosenko. And also besides Mr. Solie, were people coming
9 from FBI with cases in which were interested for them.
10 Mr. Edgar. One final question. You stopped our hearing
11 about an hour ago and were concerned about our playing the tape
12 and bringing up old memories, and I respect the fact that you are
13 very patriotic in coming before this Committee and helping us.
14 Would you be willing to sit down with our staff and go
15 through a series of written questions which outline specifically
16 for you the contradictions of your 1964, '65, '66 and early '67
17 timeframe, with the statements that you made in '67, '68 and
18 '78, and indicate in a yes-no manner which statement, laid side
19 by side, is true and which statement is false?
20 Mr. Nosenko. If it is the wish of the Committee, sure.
21 Mr. Edgar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
22 The Chairman. The time of the gentleman has expired.
23 Mr. Fithian?
24 Mr. Fithian. Mr. Nosenko, do you remember when it was that the
25 FBI first interviewed you concerning Oswald?

1 Mr. Nosenko. Sir, I do not remember dates, but --

2 Mr. Fithian. It was between February and April?

3 Mr. Nosenko. Right, right.

4 Mr. Fithian. The information we have is that it was early

5 March, the first week in March. Is that about right?

6 Now, have you talked to the FBI about that testimony at any

7 time since then?

8 Mr. Nosenko. Gentlemen, on many, many times I have seen

9 FBI, many, many questions raised. I cannot -- about this testi-

10 mony, no, no.

11 Mr. Fithian. About the Oswald testimony?

12 Mr. Nosenko. About Oswald were asked questions, but not about

13 this testimony . I do not remember about this testimony.

14 Mr. Fithian. My question is, there is a written transcript

15 summary of your testimony to the FBI taken on March 5th, 1964.

16 Mr. Nosenko. Right.

17 Mr. Fithian. My question is, have you at any time since

18 then visisted with the FBI about this testimony?

19 Mr. Nosenko. No, sir, no, sir.

20 Mr. Fithian. Now, next, when -- what is your understanding

21 as to when Oswald first offered to defect, when you first knew,

22 when the KGB first knew he was interested in defecting?

23 Mr. Nosenko. I cannot give you a date.

24 Mr. Fithian. All right.

25 Well, he filled out an application --

1 Mr. Nosenko. No, no, no application, in oral form. He
2 told the interpreter in oral form.
3 Mr. Fithian. This was the Intourist?
4 Mr. Nosenko. Interpreter of the Intourist.
5 Mr. Fithian. And then the Intourist came to the KGB?
6 Mr. Nosenko. Right, and it immediately was informed to KGB
7 that this American applies, wants to stay, said to interpreter.
8 Mr. Fithian. And then you reviewed the file?
9 Mr. Nosenko. It was several pieces of pages what we had on
10 him. It wasn't even file.
11 Mr. Fithian. But you reviewed whatever applications --
12 Mr. Nosenko. Right. No it wasn't application to stay. He in
13 oral form told the interpreter that he wants to stay Soviet
14 Union.
15 Mr. Fithian. You reviewed the pages that he had filled out
16 for the visa and any other sheets that you had?
17 Mr. Nosenko. He didn't -- yes, these documents, yes, for
18 the visa, questionnaire and --
19 Mr. Fithian. Yes. What I am trying to get at is what did
20 you have in front of you physically, knowledgeably about Oswald?
21 Mr. NOsenko. What I remember, it was it was several pages
22 only, was questionnaire, was form of document from Intourist
23 received how long his tour and how many days. There was checks
24 of Oswald in archives of KGB to forms. There was information from
25 Intourist who work with Oswald and --

Mr. Fithian. All right. Let me just stop you here.

Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

Mr. Fithian. The forms in there by the KGB were filled out based on what information?

Mr. Nosenko. On his name, what he supplied, who he is, when he was asking visa.

Mr. Fithian. But they conducted no check, no search?

Mr. Nosenko. It is in the archives of KGB, if he ever was in Soviet Union, on him there will be something. If he wasn't in Soviet Union but he was known to intelligence service --

Mr. Fithian. But you didn't have any record on that.

Mr. Nosenko. Nothing.

Mr. Fithian. And so the final question is that the only thing that you had to judge -that he was an uninteresting subject was what he had told the Intourist guide?

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Fithian. That is the only substantive thing?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir, and his questionnaire for who he is, his name, whatever he filled about himself. That's all.

The Chairman. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The Chair has one additional request from one member, for one additional question.

Mr. Sawyer?

Mr. Sawyer. I just have one additional question, and that is the $80,000 you got for compensation and the $15,000 or $20,000

1 you got later, that was net money after whatever taxes or whatever
2 it was --
3 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, after all taxes were taken.
4 Mr. Sawyer. Thank you.
5 Mr. Dodd. Mr. Chairman?
6 The Chairman. Mr. Dodd?
7 Mr. Dodd. I just wondered for the record, I wondered if,
8 Mr. Nosenko, you could tell us when you arrived in this country on
9 February 12th, 1964, between February 12th, 1964 and April 4th,
10 1964, where were you in this country?
11 Mr. Nosenko. February 12 of 1964 and April 4th, I was staying
12 in house in Virginia. I do not know address.
13 Mr. Dodd. Did you go -- did you travel at all?
14 Mr. Nosenko. No, sir.
15 Mr. Dodd. No vacation?
16 Mr. Nosenko. Oh, I went in March on week to Hawaii I was.
17 Mr. Dodd. Were you on your own?
18 Mr. Nosenko. No, no, no, with guards.
19 Mr. Dodd. It was a relaxed period for you and just a chance
20 to rest?
21 Mr. Nosenko. Chance to get a little bit rest.
22 Mr. Dodd. Is it your knowledge that this is the normal way
23 that defectors are treated when they come to this country?
24 Mr. Nosenko. I do not know.
25 Mr. Dodd. Just one last point, Mr. Chairman, and that is

1 with regard to the American exhibit, as a result of a statement by
2 Mr. Klein which I understand you did not disagree with, the American
3 exhibit ended on Sepgember 4th, 1959? That's when the termination
4 of the exhibit was?

5 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, he showed me an article.

6 Mr. Dodd. Is it your knowledge that employees thatworked
7 during the exhibit stayed on for a period of time after that?

8 Mr. Nosenko. Sure, to it will be disassembled, this is the
9 whole process is going on. It is closed for visitors to visit,
10 to look.

11 Mr. Dodd. How long a period would that have been, a week?

12 Mr. Nosenko. No, more.

13 Mr. Dodd. More?

14 Mr. Nosenko. More, sure.

15 Mr. Dodd. Thank you, Mr.Chairman.

16 The Chairman. Mr. Nosenko, with reference to your earlier
17 comments this evening regarding what transpired during your
18 period of isolation, which you described as extreme spartan
19 conditions, I would like to make this request of you. I think the
20 record ought to in a very graphic way portray those conditions
21 under which you were subjected during that period of time, and
22 while you are complying with Mr. Edgar's request and working with
23 the staff in terms of the contradictory data, would you also agree
24 to work with the staff in terms of seeing that the record has a
25 complete and accurate description --

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. --of all the conditions which you underwent during that period?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Thank you.

Did you have some?

Mr. Cornwell. Following up on the question that Congressman Dodd just asked you, the staff, in an attempt to determine how long it took to disassemble the exhibition, checked with a knowledgeable employee who was involved in that process in the State Department and were informed by that person that the exhibition was disassembled and the persons who were operating it had left by October the 4th, approximately 30 days after the exhibition was terminated.

Would you disagree with that information?

Mr. Nosenko. No, sir, I cannot disagree. I do not remember. I do not know, even, when they left, no, sir.

Mr. Cornwell. That is all I have.

The Chairman. Anything further from the Committee?

Now, Mr. Devine, do you have anything?

Mr. Devine. No. He is under continuing subpoena.

The Chairman. Under the rules of the Committee, Mr. Nosenko, any witness appearing before our Committee is entitled at the conclusion of his testimony to address the Committee for a period of five minutes for the purpose of clarifying anything

for the record or making any statement he so desires, and I want to at this time afford you that five minute period to make such a statement, if you so desire.

Mr. Nosenko. Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, I consider my appearance, invitation to appear at Committee, as I told also the same applies before, my meetings with the staff of the Committee, I consider it honor, great honor for me. I will try to answer whatever I remember, whatever I know as only truth, and but the truth. And you would like to see me appear at any time, I am at your disposal and I will try to give you the only things what I know.

The Chairman. Thank you.

That is the completion of your statement, sir?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Mr. Nosenko, on behalf of the Committee and the United States Congress, I want to express our appreciation to you for having appeared here and having given this Committee the benefit of your testimony. At this time I would remind you of the terms of your agreement to work with our staff and provide further information to the Committee, that you will continue under the oath administered to you by this Committee.

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Thank you very much for your appearance here.

Mr. Nosenko. Thank you, sir.

1 The Chairman. You are excused.

2 At this time, there being no further business to come

3 before the Committee, the meeting is adjourned subject to the

4 call of the Chair.

5 (Whereupon, at 10:17 o'clock p.m., the Committee was

6 adjourned subject to the call of the Chair.)

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TOP SECRET

SECRET

0002450

meticulous files.

memo to Legat at same time as cable.

SECRET

10143-10100

Goldsmith
3/21/[illegible] Notes re Hardway summary of M.C. tapes, transcripts, + cables. - Preassassination

SECRET

2 1. transcriptions generally are summaries rather than verbatim.

2. "previously transcribed" materials are not in the materials that Hardway examined.

0002451

3. marginal notations are common

4. Spanish transcripts are of poor quality. - Why would there even be any Spanish transcripts.

5. transcripts for 9/15 + 9/16/63 are missing. Holmes' explanation is that [intercept] activity ~~was~~ may have been shut down on weekends.

translated from Spanish transcription { 6. 9/27/63
1. M.O. seeking visa to Odessa
2. same person calls back at 10:37 a.m.
3. another call 1:25

LHO 4:05 pm 4. Duran to Soviet emb. - conversation in Spanish re LHO, who was then at Cuban emb. - apparent that LHO had been at emb earlier

LHO 4:26 pm 5. Sov. emb → Duran re LHO; (LHO still at emb)

Win Scott sought to id ~~person~~ LHO; [illegible] underlined in red; (1) also applies to 9/28

7. 9/28/63

LHO 1. Duran → Sov. emb; LHO talks to S.O. (LHO to go to Sov. emb)

8. 10/1/63 Apparent that LHO had been at Sov emb earlier

? 1. 10:31 a.m. - possibly LHO calling ^person Mil attache for info re teleg. from Wash.

LHO 2. 10:45 - LHO to guard in reference to teleg. - LHO identifies himself

[1+2 previously transcribed]

SECRET

0002452

9. 10/3/63
- call to Sov emb re visa
[previously transcribed]

10. 10/1/63 #6344 re Phillips
10/8/63 6384 - missing - Obtain
DIR 72527 - re Phillips

11. Correct dates of photos 10/1 + 10/4 or 10/2 + 10/4.

12. 10/8/63 cable 6453 MCS → HQ
reports LHO visit.
absence of routing slip on cable
10/10/63 DIR 74830 → MCS re background on LHO + instructed MCS - re LHO + passing info to 3d agencies locally.
10/10/63 DIR dissemination - cable contained erroneous description.

Accuracy of description of LHO

13. ~~What was [Tarasoff's] predecessor or cuppt?~~

14. Scott's suggestion of a P file on LHO.

15. ~~18.~~ 10/10/63 - HQ dissemination re LHO to other agencies
#74673

16. 10/15/63 MCS 6534 requesting pouched photo of LHO
- No response to this cable.

17. 10/16/63 Scott memo to ~~Earl~~ Mann re LHO; no mention of visa aspect. Obtain

~~18. Oswald P~~ P file - all data re LHO

Obtain Soviet contacts file - MCS file
Absence of routing slips on some cables

0002453

15th 16th PARAPHRASE? — MARGINAL NOTES + P.T.

[LIAISON] routing - transcrip, etc/time

[unilateral] operation

[PENETRATION] AGENTS.

first trans. + action (consult?)

Post ASS'N:
NATURE of checks. - DIR 84886

Mexi 7023 ERASURE/date CORREC.
"not recorded this date"

7024 - All info reported (prior to 27th calls etc) by [H.M.]

(Hunt Bishop P.T. Importance)

7025 - report of 9/28 + 10/1 conv. by A.G.

7028 - ~~cal~~ [Mexican] pick-up of 9/28

when first realized photos ≠ LHO

7033 reports all calls.

7034 recheck of all photos.

I General.
  A. duties
  B. typical day. ←
II People.
  list
III the surveillance ops. (arrow to I.B)

2/14/78

DDO Briefing on 201's.

Bill Donley - former op off.
Mike Levy
[Lee Coyle]
Virginia Jones.

basis for opening
1. operational interest -
 a. recruitment (access) (trace)
 b. Tracking
 c. CIS (threat)

generally - amassed material in indexes brought together into 201. - actual process of opening only takes an hour or so.

* When MC report came in in 10/9 there was a response - is there a document re this trace?

opened by:
A. case officer.

Mick scenario - judgement call by officer - there may not be a 201 opened even though a reliable source suggest counter-intelligence threat type problem.

most 201's are on people who are being considered for recruitment.

MH: ≠ necessarily open 201 but would go into an index. Info would be disseminated.

—

There are criteria for opening: high level commies. } HANDBOOK
recruitees.
usually opened by operations (desk) officer.

—

research
↓ 20 days?
desk (decision)

—

There are ops run from HQ in which case the CO is the desk officer.

—

the 201 is indigenous to DDO.

—

PRQ part I → automatic 201. – Required for clearance.
Part II – extended @ assessments, detail bkgnd analysis, operational projections.
OS has no need for Part II. which is kept in 201.

—

Agee essentially correct. Rule on bifurcated files. – central card reference between them. Index check should lead to both.

MAINLY IN FIELD.

201 – true name – PRQ I + reference to second.
seperate file PRQ II

201 mainly bio - try hard not to run operations out of 201's.

reason for opening - necessarily in it. would be a reference to a cable or document.

201 assigned chronologically as the name comes in.

would have his picture if ~~he~~ one could be gotten - not required. - would go right in.

there should be a table of contents list on a 201 - computerized.

green list - info on subject compiled as a result of signal/communications intelligence.

[State cover can go from "fig leaf" to fully integrated.]

project files - Policy Coordination Staff - coord. w other agencies - may also be a project file on desk if serious agency involvement

graphics file. - do obtain a great deal of photos of things like ships. - DDI if positive

intelligence value + may be disseminated.
might be photos of individuals of prominence.
graphics file not in DDO
biographics registry in DDI
OCR - Office of Central Reference

P&L - part of compartmentation system refers to cable traffic opened by one of top 3 officers in DDO.

---

crypt can't be assigned a 201.

---

if got into a debriefing of handling a defector to us then that is automatic criteria for opening.
a report of fact of defection alone wouldn't be enough.

547A form /1896 form.

(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA—controlled documents.)

INTERVIEW OF THOMAS CASASIN
AUGUST 17, 1978
AMERICAN EMBASSY/ PARIS, FRANCE

By Surell Brady

Casasin stated that he retired from the Central Intelligence Agency in 1973. At the time of the assassination of President Kennedy in November, 1963 he was stationed in Paris; he was working in the area of Soviet operations, but had no official cover. He arrived in Paris in September, 1962.

He stated that in September, 1960 he was assigned [defense cover] 24 as Branch 6 Chief. He worked for two years in Section 6.

Casasin said that during his assignment in Paris he had not infrequent contact with the CIA station in Paris. He estimated that the contact occurred every two and a half weeks. The contact was made on the outside by telephoning a person with official cover. He said he never made written contact with the station.

Casasin explained that the function of Section 6 was operations in support of the Soviet Russia Division of the CIA. He said the work consisted of amassing information in support of the SR Division; he characterized that work as classical espoinage work against the USSR. He said it involved penetration for the purpose of espionage and included cartography, demography, sociology, and experts in the fields of science and political science. He stated that the section was in a "down" phase when he entered and that it consisted of only 20-25 persons.

Casasin worked in Japan from February 1955 to June 1960. He served as Chief of the Soviet Base of the North Asia Command. He said his unit was attached to the Far Eastern Command of the Armed Forces. He explained that his unit was one of four bases: Soviet, Japan, North Korea and Red China. Each of those geographical areas was a target. The Soviet base in which he worked was therefore targeted against the Soviet Union. He was assigned head of that base in 1955.

He said the operations out of the Soviet base included espionage. The covert operations consisted of psychological warfare and radio transmission to internal Soviet audiences. He said the espionage also included spying against Soviet naval and industrial targets in Soviet ports, using mainly Japanese operatives who had access to the ports.

Casasin said that his base had extremely limited work with the

military. He said it consisted primarily of briefing the military on items of mutual interest. He said the CIA had tried to work with clandestine units of the military, including the Army (he said the Navy had no clandestine units), but it was the opinion of the CIA that the military had too low a degree of professionalism for the successful operation of clandestine projects. Casasin stated that during this time the military said it was actually running operations, but it was never confirmed by the CIA and they found no evidence of such military operations.

Casasin identified two military intelligence personnel in the area when he was stationed in Japan: Captain Perez, OSI, and John B. Stanley, Army head.

Casasin said, however, that the Navy did provide some operational support for his base. It consisted of providing [cover] for persons running operations against the Soviets.

Casasin said he cannot recall any specific information that the military was using American military personnel in any of its operations. He said, however, that there ~~was~~ were occasional rumors that an American serviceman was trafficking with suspected foreign subversives. He said the individual intelligence agencies would have handled any such cases. He stated that he never heard any concrete information of American contact with the Soviets.

Casasin could not recall the name of the Chief of the North Asia Command in 1955; he believed the man was a retired vice admiral and that his last name began with the letter "O." Harry Little succeeded that person in 1957.

Casasin said that most of his communications during that time from Japan went back to headquarters. He explained that the North Asia Command at that time was tied up with the situation of Korea and Japan.

Casasin said that he does not know who had the oversight responsibility or authority for the U-2 program. He cited that as an example of how well compartmentalized their work was. He said he never learned who was in charge of the U-2 program out of Japan. He said that he assumed it was some type of paramilitary operation. He said the North Asia base ran no paramilitary operations and that most such smaller units usually did not.

Casasin said he does not recall any discussions concerning the possible use of American defectors to penetrate the Soviets. He said one reason for no interest in such use was probably that the First

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(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA—controlled documents.)

Chief Directorate of the KGB would suspect any such American from the beginning as being CIA connected. He said the CIA at that point knew a lot about the KGB and its thinking because they had had experience with displaced persons from the communist bloc.

Casasin explained further that American intelligence interests were much more short range than the type of slow, long-range project of working an American defector into some sensitive or intelligence-productive position within the Soviet Union. He said that was simply not the American way of conducting intelligence and that that thinking precluded such programs.

Casasin said lessening of tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union from such things as the Spirit of Camp David did allow some shallow penetration. This consisted primarily of using short-term tourists and foreigners on legitimate business within the Soviet Union. But he said these projects had no direct or obvious effects on our intelligence gathering against the Soviet Union.

I referred Casasin to CIA Document 435-173-A, which is a memo dated 25 November 1963 from Thomas B. Casasin to Walter P. Haltigan on Mr. Lee Harvey Oswald. Casasin says he does remember the memo. I asked him to explain the cover memo dated 12 December 1963 by Robert G. Lamprell to Chiefs of SR and WH re: GPFLOOR-Lee Harvey Oswald.

3 Casasin explained that Lamprell (whose real name was [William Robert Sinclair] he died of cancer a few years ago) was one of Casasin's contacts in Paris. He said that Lamprell was the Senior Officer in the Soviet Office in the Paris Station, and served as the second in 3 command. Casasin said that Walter Haltigan (whose real name was [James Flint] was his normal contact in Paris. He surmised that his memo was sent out by Lamprell because Haltigan might not have been available. He does not know the reason for the delay between the date of his memo, 25 November, and the transmission by Lamprell, 12 December.

Casasin said he recalls that he wrote the memo spontaneously when he heard a news cast about Oswald after the assassination. He recognized Oswald when he heard the news information that Oswald had lived in Minsk in the Soviet Union and had married a foreigner. He remembered those details from State Department information he had seen.

Casasin explained the cryptonym REDWOOD as clandestine operations; the Chief of the SR Division was responsible for that project. He explained that was separate from the REDCAP program, which was operations against Soviets outside of the USSR.

Casasin explained the relationship of the Counterintelligence

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2/mc

staff to other divisions. He said Counterintelligence had primary responsibility for staff review, but supposedly no command voice. However, they did have their own closely held operations. Counterintelligence gave approval on every operation. Casasin said that it was possible or even probable that Counterintelligence ran operations in his geographical target.

Casasin said research was one of the functions of the 6 Branch. But he cannot recall research's exact mandate within the 6 Branch. He listed the branches besides 6 Branch: (1) Scandinavia; (2) Western Europe; (3) Middle East and Latin America; (4) ? ; (5) Far East; and the Inter-Branch.

Casasin said the the research unit of Branch 6 would get information from defectors about Soviet realities and details about Soviet life which could be used to assist persons working inside the Soviet Union. He said such defectors were normally pumped about personal life in the USSR. However, Casasin said he does not personally know of any defectors being used as a source in his brief time in the SR Division. He said the agency also benefitted from FBI debriefings of such defectors. In part this was due to the CIA's limited charter domestically in the United States. But the Contacts Division (OO) did have a domestic mandate within the U.S. Casasin said he thought the American defector to Czechoslovakia, Fields, had been debriefed by the agency. Casasin said he believed the agency also got information on Americans in the Soviet Union from State Department information about visas or from the press.

Casasin said he cannot remember who served as Chief of the Section 6 research branch while he was there. He said the deputy chief was an older woman near the age of retirement. He said that Rudolf Balaban worked with him and is still at the agency; he could probably remember the names of the others in the section.

I asked when Casasin recalled the discussion took place which he refers to in his memo. He said it was the last days of his work with the section; he assumes it was the third or fourth week of July, 1962 when he left the section, so he believes the conversation about Oswald took place the first week of July, 1962.

Casasin said at the time he assumed Oswald had been sent out of the Soviet Union by the KGB, so he exercsied caution and did not attempt to debrief Oswald.

Casasin gave the following dates in an effort to pin down when the conversation took place. He said he left Japan on June 25, 1960 and

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(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA—controlled documents.)

travelled through Europe on leave with his family until Spetember, 1960. He said therefore the conversation could not have taken place in the summer of 1960 as the memo states. He said he used the wrong year in the memo.

Casasin identified KUJUMP as the Operations Division. He said it had a contacts division for debriefing persons. He said the "suitable channels" for debriefing referred to in the memo were the Immi gration and Naturalization Service and the FBI. He said he believed he had received maybe one State Department dispatch on the returning American. He said the dispatch probably originated if Oswald had given up his passport at the Embassy in Moscow and had had to reapply to the embassy to be able to return to the United States. Casasin said he believes Oswald's contacts with the Embassy in Moscow were initiated by Oswald. Casasin said he only knew whatever appeared in the State Department dispatches about Oswald.

He said his statement in the memo that Oswald looked "odd" was the CIA's evaluation of Oswald. This was based on the fact that he was allowed to live in the Soviet Union and permitted to marry a Soviet citizen. Casasin said he believed some type of controlled intelligence station should approach Oswald; they would be able to contact and talk to him in a perfunctory manner for debriefing purposes.

Casasin said that during the period 1945-60 no more than 10 American defectors came to their attention from the State Department and the military.

Casasin identified the REDSKIN cryptonym as the legal travellers program. It involved using persons to give information about the Soviet Union who had a "very legitimate" presence in the Soviet Union, such as scientists, etc.

Casasin said the agency which conducted the debriefing of these people and defectors would write the information and pass it on. He believes therefore that if Oswald had been debriefed he would have seen the information in that form.

Casasin said he believes it is inconceivable that Oswald would have been any type of operative of the CIA. However, he also gave his opinion that the nature of KGB operations made it conceivable that Oswald could have been a "lay-low" Soviet operative.

I asked about the CIA interest in Minsk which is reflected in Casasin's memo. Casasin said it was known that there were some type of special design plants in Minsk which were of interest to the CIA.

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Classified by derivation: __________

Casasin said that type of special design plant dealt with aviation, nuclear energy, bacteriological warfare, etc. He said that he cannot remember specifically which type of plants were located in Minsk, but the city was of interest for that reason. Additionally, anyone in the area of those plants was of interest to the agency. Casasin said he is confident that Oswald was not working in any type of security facility. He said even with the presence of the design plants, Minsk was not identified as a security or military priority area. Casasin said also that he believes they had some type of encyclopedic information at the agency on the radio factory in Minsk where Oswald worked. He said that kind of information was maintained in the Office of Research and Reporting. Casasin said he was not aware of a KGB facility in Minsk.

Casasin said the Legal Travellers Program was headed at the time of his memo by Alexander Sokaloff (phonetic) of the Soviet Russia Division. He said the program began pre-1960 with the lessening of tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. He said Sokaloff had come out of the Soviet Union with his parents as a child. He explained that defectors such as Sokaloff were kept at arms length for security reasons by the agency.

The Legal Travellers Program operated in such a way that the agency contact was in touch with the traveller well before the proposed trip and would be informed as to which areas would be visited, what he would be doing in the country, etc. The agency contact would then be able to give the traveller the agency's "requirements" for information while he was abroad. Casasin said he was not involved in the program. He said he was opposed to it because it was too short-term to justify the investment of resources and the risk involved. He said he believes the travellers were told that their contacts were CIA, but he doesn't know for sure. He said cover may have been used by the contact.

I asked Casasin what the reference to the "Harvey Story" in the last line of his memo referred to. He said at first that it must have been some kind of cryptonym he was using at the time. He pondered a while. Then he said he would need some kind of prompting of his memory. He said he doubts that it would have been someone's true name.

Casasin said he has never been contacted by anybody, including the Warren Commission, about the memo.

He said that his interest in Oswald as expressed in the memo was just a lead. He said the fact of no follow-up on that lead was not unusual. He said Oswald's going to the Soviet Union was unusual, but that left him open to the possibility of KGB contact. He therefore

(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA—controlled documents.)

ultimately was of only marginal interest to the agency.

Casasin said it was normal to not make a check for a 201 file on a person like Oswald, meaning that it was not unusual that he did not check for Oswald's 201. He said this was epsecially not unusual since they had made the decision not to use Oswald. It's possible that a colleague of Casasin's might have checked, but Casasin said he doesn't recall any such check.

Casasin said his subordinates in the Branch 6 were, Balaban, a man named Richard, last name possibly [Wink], and [Charles Cox,] who was the liaison with the Technical Supports Division (i.e., concealment devices). He said deputies in the branch were David Chachavadze (in 1960 for three or four months), A.T. Stewart (possibly Averill); Stewart stayed on in the branch and Casasin believe he could be of more help in remebering details about the branch; also, Becky Balaban, who is married to Rudolf Balaban.

Casasin said that the purpose of a 201 is to indicate that a request had been made for provisional operational approval. He said the file would indicate operational interest and would then refer one to the specific office with the interest in the individual. He said he doesn't know that actual criteria for opening 201's. He said also that after initial interest was shown in an individual by the opening of a 201, the number might remain with the individual without the persen actually being developed as an asset.

Casasin mentioned that agency people were assigned to the military base at Atsugi.

Casasin referred agin to the "Harvey Story" reference in his memo. He sated that "Whatever I meant by Harvey had nothing to do with him (Oswald)."


I showed Casasin the Personality (201) File Request form from Oswald's 201 file. He said he had never seen it before and did not know there actually existed a 201 file on Oswald. Referring to the source of the form, CI/SIG, Casasin said Ci stood for Counterintelligence. He said he thought SIG stood for Signal Intelligence, but he was not sure. He said that notation would mean that NSA or the military had picked up Oswald's name in some type of transmission. He asked if Oswald had access to any type of radio transmissions. He said he thought the 201 section of the Registry Office could answer questions about the notations on the form.

Referring to the "AG" notation in the Other Identification

block on the form, Casasin said he does not know what it stood for. I asked him if he understood why some of the notations were crossed out and new notations had been made; he said he could not explain that. He said he thought the Permanent Charge notation meant that the file would stay in the Office of Registry and that the file therefore had no operational significance. In this file he said he thought it would be routine to open a file on defectors such as Oswald, so it may have had some other office charge because of that. He said Branch 6 did not have an interest in the Oswald file.

I asked how he would have come across the State Department communications on Oswald. He said the normal distribution of such State Department information would mean that the dispatches would be circulated for information and then routed back to registry where they would be kept on file as Third Agency documents. He said he believes from the dispatches he saw on Oswald that they were in a consecutive series as received from the State Department. He believes from the memo that he must have seen several such dispatches with information about Oswald.

Casasin explained the operational interest various divisions within the agency might have in this way:



He said he believes the 201 Personality form in Oswald's file is passive and not operational and sees nothing to indicate operational interest. He said the above scheme means that only the line divisions would carry the operations, and he does not see any indication of such an interest on the form. The fact that only Counterintelligence is indicated on the form seems to preclude any operations.

Casasin talked further about suspicions about Oswald. He expressed the feeling the Oswald and Marina got their visas to leave the Soviet Union too easily. He expalined the "unusual behavior" of Oswald as being his defection: his reasons were unknown, he seemed disoriented, he married a Russian. Casasin said that while he does not believe Oswald was sent back to the United States by the Soviets, he cannot preclude that possibility.

I asked if the Americans were able to follow Oswald's activities

Classification: SECRET

(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA—controlled documents.)

while he was living in the Soviet Union. Casasin said he doesn't believe we were able to monitor him inside the USSR. He said it would have been too risky to run the chance of exposing any operatives inside the country.

I asked if Oswald's threat at the Embassy in Moscow to reveal milit ary secrets to the Soviets wouldn't have made Oswald of more intelligence interest. Casasin said if he had revealed secrets he would have been of interest for security.

I asked Casasin if a memo would have existed from the time of the conversation referred to in his 1963 memo about interest in Oswald. He said he doesn't think so; he said it was not customary to write memos about such leads which were discussed and not followed-up. He does not remember preparing any such memo.

2060377

Classification:

Classified by derivation:

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10012-10030
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : AC643360W - PAGES 15-16

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : CIA
TO :
TITLE : CIA INFORMATION REPORT
DATE : 01/04/63
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS : PFUNTNER, JORDAN J.

UNDIMINISHED PRESTIGE OF FIDEL CASTRO IN LATIN AMERICA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 1C
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/22/97
OPENING CRITERIA : COMPLETION OF REVIEW BY CIA.
COMMENTS : COORDINATION WITH CIA HAS BEEN COMPLETED AND DETERMINED TO BE RELEASABLE, PER LTR DTD 23 SEP 97.

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

[redacted] / [redacted]
(When Filled In)

COUNTRY	CUBA/LATIN AMERICA	REPORT NO.	TDCS -3/532,860
SUBJECT	UNDIMINISHED PRESTIGE OF FIDEL CASTRO IN LATIN AMERICA	DATE DISTR.	4 JANUARY 1963
		PRECEDENCE	ROUTINE
DATE OF INFO.	DECEMBER 1962	REFERENCES	RD-W-2107 IN 44195
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	ENGLAND, LONDON (3 JANUARY 1963)		
APPRAISAL	3	FIELD REPORT NO.	OEL-34,413

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE AN OFFICIAL BRITISH SERVICE FROM "A REGULAR SOURCE, QUOTING A YUGOSLAV JOURNALIST WHO RECENTLY TOURED LATIN AMERICA."

1. FIDEL CASTRO HAS LOST LITTLE PRESTIGE AMONG HIS SUPPORTERS IN LATIN AMERICA AS RESULT RECENT CRISIS. IN EYES OF HIS DISCIPLES, THE UNITED STATES FAILED TO EXPLOIT AN OPPORTUNITY TO UNSEAT HIM, AND CASTRO REMAINED IN POWER.

2. LATIN AMERICAN COMMUNIST PARTIES HAVE BECOME INCREASINGLY DIVIDED BETWEEN VIOLENT AND NON-VIOLENT FACTIONS. THIS CONTROVERSY IS LIKELY TO RESULT IN INDIVIDUAL COMMUNIST PARTIES ADOPTING MORE INDEPENDENT AND FELXIBLE POLICIES. THERE IS A GENERAL TREND AGAINST POLICIES "DICTATED FROM OUTSIDE ."

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

[redacted] / [redacted]

GROUP 1

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	XX	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OBI	OO	INS
STATE/DIR													FBI		EXO		

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

DA IN 4722

15

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FORM 5-62 1K OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (15-20)

USAOSD/8354

CLASSIFICATION—DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

TDCS -3/532,860

IN 44195

PAGE 2

3. BRITISH COMMENTS.

A. THE IMPRESSION DESCRIBED IN PARA 1 DOES NOT AGREE ENTIRELY WITH INFORMATION FROM OTHER SOURCES BUT IT IS AN INTERESTING POINT OF VIEW. To WHOM?! British

B. SOURCE SAYS THAT CUBAN EXILES IN VENEZUELA ARE "DISILLUSIONED" OVER THE OUTCOME OF THE CUBAN CRISIS BUT THAT THE DIRECTORIO REVOLUCIONARIO ESTUDIANTIL (DRE, REVOLUTIONARY STUDENT DIRECTORATE) AND ALPHA 66 INTEND TO CONTINUE PROMOTING SMALL-SCALE ATTACKS ON CUBA.

4. FIELD DISSEM: STATE, CINCLANT, CINCARIB.

END OF MESSAGE

ACTION: ACSI, NAVY, AF, JCS, OSD
INFO: DCSOP
DA IN 4722

16

CLASSIFICATION—DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

0000

Date : 05/20/97
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : USA
RECORD NUMBER : 197-10002-10190
RECORDS SERIES : HEADQUARTERS FILES, PENTAGON TELECOMMUNICATIONS CENTER
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : CIA TDCS-3/566,305
DATE : 00/00/63
PAGES : 3
SUBJECTS : WEST GERMANY: SOVIET MILITARY ALERT FOLLOWING KENNEDY ASSASSINATION

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : / /
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY USSR/EAST GERMANY/EASTERN EUROPE

REPORT NO. TDCS -3/566,305

SUBJECT HIGHLIGHTS OF MILITARY WEEKLY SUMMARY NO. 48

DATE DISTR.

PRECEDENCE

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. 20-26 NOVEMBER 1963

PLACE & DATE ACQ. GERMANY, MUNICH /29 NOVEMBER 1963/ IN TEXT.

APPRAISAL 3, EXCEPT WHERE OTHERWISE INDICATED/

FIELD REPORT NO. EGK-27396

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE OFFICIAL WEST GERMAN SERVICE FROM INFORMANTS OF VARYING RELIABILITY.

FOLLOWING ARE HIGHLIGHTS FROM THE GERMAN SERVICE MILITARY WEEKLY SUMMARY NO 48/63, COVERING THE PERIOD OF 20-26 NOVEMBER 63.

1. DURING THE WEEK UNDER REVIEW, THERE WERE NO INDICATIONS OF PREPARATION FOR ATTACK BY SOVIET BLOC FORCES.

2 PART A. GENERAL.

LAST WEEK'S EXERCISE AND TRAINING ACTIVITIES IN THE SOVIET BLOC ARMED FORCES WERE NORMAL AND WERE THUS IN KEEPING WITH THE GENERAL PACE OF TRAINING AT THIS TIME OF YEAR.

SOVIET AND SATELLITE FORCES REACTED TO THE ASSASSINATION OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, NOV 22ND, WITH PRE- CAUTIONARY MEASURES OF A GENERAL NATURE WHICH MAY BE

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	XXXXXX	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	XXXXXX	DDI
STATE/DIR															

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

DA IN 157472

SECRET

INTERPRETED AS A REACTION TO CORRESPONDING STAND-BY MEASURES OF THE U.S. FORCES.

IT IS EXPECTED THAT IN THE PRESENT SITUATION SOVIET TACTICS IN THE FIELD OF MILITARY POLICY WILL BE MARKED BY CAUTION.

3. PART B. ARMED FORCES.

A. USSR/EAST GERMAN.

1/ ON THE NIGHT OF 22/23 NOVEMBER, SPECIAL ALERT MEASURES WERE ORDERED IN THE ORANIENBURG GARRISON FOR NVA UNITS AND POSSIBLY ALSO FOR SOVIET ARMY UNITS /SEVERAL B/F-3/. GERMAN COMMENT- THE MEASURE WAS PRESUMABLY TAKEN IN CONNECTION WITH THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY. IT APPARENTLY WAS CONFINED TO THE BERLIN AREA.

B. EAST GERMAN.

1/ SINCE MID-OCTOBER 1963, CONTROL POSTS /SO-CALLED HINTERLANDPOSTEN/ HAVE BEEN STAGGERED IN DEPTHS OF UP TO 1 KILOMETER FROM THE INTERZONAL BORDER DURING WEEKEND NIGHTS. /SEVERAL F-3/.

4. PART C. GROUND FORCES.

A. SOVIET.

1/ SUMMARY GERMAN COMMENT ON TRAINING /GSFG/.

TRAINING AT LOCAL TRAINING GROUNDS AND NUMEROUS DRIVING SCHOOLS IS INDICATIVE OF RECRUIT TRAINING. FROM 14 TO 18 NOVEMBER ELEMENTS OF THE FIRST GUARDS TANK ARMY CONDUCTED

EXERCISES, PRESUMABLY AT REGIMENTAL LEVEL, AT THE LETZLINGER HEIDE AND ALTENGRABOW TROOP TRAINING GROUNDS.

SINCE 26 NOVEMBER, THERE HAVE BEEN TENTATIVE INDICATIONS OF ACTIVITY OUTSIDE GARRISONS OF ELEMENTS OF THE 34TH ARTILLERY DIV. NO OBSERVATIONS HAVE BEEN MADE AS YET INDICATIVE OF EXERCISES WITH FULL UNITS PARTICIPATING.

5. PART D. AIR FORCES. NO HIGHLIGHTS PROVIDED.

6. PART E. NAVY.

A. SOVIET.

1/ ON 25 NOVEMBER 1963, ONE F-CLASS SUBMARINE, WITHOUT PT-NUMBER, PASSED NORTHWARD THROUGH THE GREAT BELT. /B-2/

7. PART F. LOGISTICS, AND PART G. PSYCHOLOGICAL - NO HIGHLIGHTS PROVIDED.

FIELD DISTRIBUTION: ARMY, AIR, NAVY, USEUCOM

END OF MESSAGE

ACTION: ACSI, NAVY, AF, JCS, OSD
INFO: DCSOP
DA IN 157472

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 6/24/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : ARMY
RECORD NUMBER : 198-10004-10076

RECORD SERIES : CALIFANO PAPERS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : ARMY
FROM : JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR.
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 00/00/1963
PAGES : 123

SUBJECTS :
EXAMINATION OF PRINCIPAL SOURCES OF POLICY AND CONTINGENCY PLANNING ON CUBA
NATIONAL SECURITY ACTIONS ON CUBA
U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE CUBAN BRIGADE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B; 1C
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/24/1997

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : Califano Papers, Box 6, Folder 6. Indexed collection of CIA, DOD, DOS, and NSC reports.

NO.	SUBJECT	DATE
1	CIA Report No. CS DB-3/652, 924 (SECRET-NOFORN)	17 Jan 63
2	Memo fr McGeorge Bundy to NSC Exec Comm(C) w/6 Incls: 1(S); 2(TS);3(S); 4(S); 5(S) and 6(S)	22 Jan 63
3	Drft Memo for NSC Exec Comm, subj: US Policy Towards Cuba(TOP SECRET) (in dupe)	23 Jan 63
4	Memo for NSC Exec Comm, subj as above(TOP SECRET)	23 Jan 63
5	Memo for NSC Exec Comm, subj as above, from DoD Rep on ICCC (TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE)	23 Jan 63
6	DepSecDef ltr to Mr Vance, subj: US Policy Towards Cuba, Cy 2 of 6, Control #559 (TOP SECRET) w/1 Incl, Coord of Cuban Affairs Memo for NSC Exec Comm, Subj: US Policy Toward Cuba(TOP SECRET)	23 Jan 63
7	Dept of State Memo for Mr Bundy, subj: Papers for NSC Exec Comm Mtg, 25 Jan 63 (TOP SECRET)	24 Jan 63
8	National Security Actions on Cuba (Pending and Closed) (TOP SECRET)	Undtd
9	Memo to Mr Cottrell from Mr. Ford, subj: Examination of Principal Sources of Policy and Contingency Planning on Cuba (TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE)	4 Feb 63

3

SECRET - SENSITIVE

February 4, 1963

TO : ARA - Mr. Cottrell

FROM : S/P - John W. Ford

Subject: Examination of Principal Sources of Policy and Contingency Planning on Cuba

In accordance with your instructions, over the week-end I have reviewed the main sources of policy on Cuba. The problem as I define it as follows:

The Problem:

Prior to the establishment of the Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs, much work had been done on Cuba, both in the policy and contingency fields. The purpose of the current exercise is to review and identify the main sources of such policy and contingency planning in an effort to determine if any of the work previously done will be of value to the officers of your committee as we go forward with implementation of the newly stated Cuban policy and objectives.

Sources of Policy and Contingency Planning:

The principal sources of policy and contingency planning which may or may not be of value to the work of your committee are as follows:

1. The National Security Action Memoranda emanating from the White House.

2. The Actions of the National Security Council.

3. The Basic National Security Policy of the U.S. (now awaiting final stages of formal clearance before presentation to National Security Council).

4. The Records

SECRET - SENSITIVE

4. The Records of Action of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council as they pertain to Cuba.

5. The Reports of the Sub-Committees of EXCOM - during the Cuban Crisis.

6. The Resolutions of the Organization of American States and the Punta del Este Conference.

7. Public Statements of Government Officials, in Particular Press Conference of President Kennedy of September 13, 1962.

8. Meeting of Secretary Rusk with Foreign Ministers of Latin America during Cuban Crisis.

9. Recently Approved New Policy Statement and Objectives as Drawn Up by the Interdepartmental Committee of Cuban Affairs.

10. Cuban Guidelines Paper.
(A guidelines paper as such does not exist on Cuba as is the case in a majority of other countries.)

CONCLUSIONS:

There are well over eight volumes of material concerned with Cuba, particularly that generated during the recent October crisis. This review is nearing completion, and I am segregating particular reports which may be of value to the members of your committee as we go forward with implementation of the new policy and objectives. In the attached documentation, I have segregated those National Security Council decisions and National Security Action Memoranda which are carried as pending or closed in the files of the Department of State. Where action on a particular NSC decision or NASAM has been transferred to EXCOM, action responsibility on these decisions would appear now to be within the purview of your Coordinating Committee. From my review

to date,

to date, it appears that all of these decisions call for actions which have already been considered by your Committee. You will note that in some instances action responsibility on an NSC decision or NASAM has been transferred to the Special Group (Mr. Alexis Johnson).

Attachment:
List of Pending and Closed
NSC and NASAM decisions
concerning Cuba.

8

SECRET

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTIONS ON CUBA
(PENDING AND CLOSED)

TOP SECRET

NSC Action No.	Substance	Status
483 NSC 2422a 5/5/61	Agreed that US policy toward Cuba should aim at the downfall of Castro regime.	(Pending) According to files, out of this NSC directive grew a policy paper, to be handled differently from regular guidelines papers on each country. As of 9/4/62, White House was informed that action on this NSC directive would be reported in compliance with NSAM 181 which transferred certain NSC & NASAM actions to special group (Alexis Johnson).
483 NSC 2422d 5/5/61	Importance President attaches to obtaining adequate intelligence on Cuban military capabilities.	(Pending) Action to be reported in compliance with NASAM 181 (Johnson channel)
483 NSC 2422e 5/5/61	Importance President attaches to publication in free world press of terrorist actions of Castro regime, etc. and to possible political action to end current terror.	(Pending) Action transferred to EXCOM
483 NSC 2422g 5/5/61	Relations with Cuban Revolutionary Council should be improved.	(Pending) Action transferred to EXCOM
483 NSC 2422i 5/5/61	Cuban refugees to be given refugee status; refugees in Miami to be relocated; refugees to be eligible to apply for travel privileges.	(Pending) Action transferred to EXCOM
483 NSC 2422k 5/5/61	Initiation of negotiations to enlarge willingness of other American states to join in action against Castro.	(Pending) Action transferred to EXCOM

NSC Action No.	Substance	Status
483 NSC 2422m 5/5/61	USIA will expand L.A. program, but not initiate electronic warfare against Castro; means of propaganda should be madeavailable to non-US groups.	(Pending) Action transferred to Johnson channel Per NASAM #181.
483 NSC 2422n 5/5/61	US military officers under general guidance to be prepared by Dept of State, would discuss Castro threat to all L.A. with L.A. officers.	(Closed) completed action as of 11/28/61.
483 NSC 2422o 5/5/61	Dept of State should prepare a report on a possible new juridical basis for effective anti-communist action.	(Closed) S/P paper "possible new Basis for Anti-Communist Action" 7/24/61
483 NSC 2422p 5/5/61	Robert Woodward's assumption of responsibility of Task Force on Cuba on announcement of appointment.	Closed.
483 NSC 2422b 5/5/61	No US military intervention now. Do nothing which would foreclose possibility military intervention in future.	Closed.
483 NSC 2422c 5/5/61	No naval blockade or airwar against Cuba.	Closed.
483 NSC 2422f 5/5/61	Detailed study to be made by CIA with other Departments of possible weaknesses and vulnerabilities in elements which control Cuba.	Closed. Bissell memo to Achilles 11/21/61 re: "Situation and Prospects in Cuba"by Sherman Kent 11/3/61.

SECRET

SECRET

NSC Action No.	Substance	Status
483 NSC 2422h 5/5/61	No separate Cuban military forces should be organized in U.S. Cuban nationals would be encouraged enlist in US Armed Forces.	Closed. DEF recommended to Pres. draft program be terminated 6/30/62 due to modest results.
483 NSC 2422j 5/5/61	No immediate trade embargo on Cuba.	Closed, with President's action of 2/3/62 declaring total embargo on trade with Cuba with exception medicine and food on humanitarian grounds.
483 NSC 2422l 5/5/61	Alliance for Progress to be strengthened.	Closed. Weekly report now from AID to White House.
NASAM 194 10/2/62	Policy Toward non-bloc ships in Cuban trade (Action US Government proposes to take with regard to shipping to Cuba.)	Pending. Action transferred to EXCOM.
NASAM 100 10/5/61	Contingency Planning for Cuba.	Pending Action transferred to Johnson channel.
CUBA NASAM #31 3/11/61	US Government must have ready a White Paper on Cuba and be ready to give assistance to Cuban Patriots in similar effort.	Closed. Paper prepared and translated: "The Castro Regime in Cuba" 9/61
CUBA NASAM #181 8/24/62	Eyes only - Limited Distribution. Reporting to be through another channel and handled personally by Deputy USecy Johnson (understand this authorized response on certain pending NSC Actions, 2 NASAMs thru Johnson channel)	Closed.

TOP SECRET

NSC Action No.	Substance	Status
CUBA NASAM 196 10/22/62	Establishment of NSC Executive Committee	Closed.
CUBA NASAM 208 12/6/62 EYES ONLY	Cuba Overflights. (This Presidential directive approved an attached Guidelines for the Planning of Cuban Overflights, and requested CIA to come up with an estimate of the adequacy of such a system of intelligence collection to meet the criteria set forth, on assumptiân it is supplemented by energetic collection of information by all other available means.)	Report Submitted.
CUBA NASAM 213 1/8/63	Interdepartmental Organization of Cuban Affairs - with responsibility vested in a Coordinator of Cuban affairs in Department of State.	Closed.

TOP SECRET

34

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

January 24, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Papers for NSC Executive Committee Meeting, January 25 at 4:00 p.m.

Attached are two revised papers "Summary of Coordinator's Recommendations" and "United States Policy Toward Cuba" which are being transmitted to members of the NSC Executive Committee for consideration at the meeting of the Committee on Friday, January 25 at 4:00 p.m. Also attached is a new page 8 for the paper entitled "United States Policy Toward the Cuban Brigade." The other two papers transmitted on January 22 remain unchanged and will also be considered at the Friday meeting. They are "United States Policy in Cuba in the Organization of American States" and "Current Problems Concerning Cuba."

William H. Brubeck
Executive Secretariat

Attachments:

As stated.
Copy No.____.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

(Prepared for the Meeting of Friday, January 25, 1963, 4 p.m.)

FROM : Coordinator of Cuban Affairs

SUBJECT: United States Policy Toward Cuba

United States Policy

On November 20, the President set forth the broad guidelines of United States policy with respect to Cuba in the following words:

> "As for our part, if all offensive weapons systems are removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in the future, under adequate verification and safeguards, and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive communist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean. And, as I said in September, 'we shall neither initiate nor permit aggression in this hemisphere.'
>
> "We will not, of course, abandon the political, economic and other efforts of this hemisphere to halt subversion from Cuba, nor our purpose and hope that the Cuban people shall some day be truly free. But these policies are very different from any intent to launch a military invasion of the island."

Objectives

Accordingly, the objectives of United States policy with respect to Cuba are:

1. Protecting the security of the United States and the other states of the Organization of American States (OAS) by assuring that offensive weapons are not reintroduced into Cuba;

2. Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba;

3. Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive military action against other Caribbean states;

4. Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime to direct and support subversion and insurrection within the other Hemisphere states;

5. Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of divorcing the Cuban Government from its support of Sino-Soviet Communist purposes;

6. Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of replacing the Cuban Government with a regime that would break with the Sino-Soviet Bloc, it being understood that our ultimate objective is replacement of the regime by one fully compatible with the goals of the United States;

7. Maximizing the cost to the Soviet Union of supporting the Castro regime;

8. Maximizing the political isolation of the Castro regime from other free world states, and especially from states of the OAS. Whenever possible, U. S. actions against Cuba should be multilateral, preferably based upon the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) or on resolutions adopted by the Organization of American States. The newly-won hemispheric solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be jeopardized by seeking OAS actions of marginal value and which might split the hemisphere;

9. Being prepared to meet, with the employment of appropriate U. S. combat elements and/or logistical support, the wide variety of military contingencies that may arise from pursuit of the foregoing objectives; and

10. Producing comprehensive intelligence related to the above objectives.

Supporting Actions

A. To achieve the foregoing objectives, the U. S. Government will be prepared to increase the political economic, psychological and military pressures, as appropriate opportunities present themselves or can be created. The actions listed below are those requiring immediate approval and would be initiated in the sequence set forth below. Recommendations for further

actions based upon the re-examination of existing programs and upon the development of new programs related to the foregoing objectives will be forthcoming.

1. In addition to current covert program, such as intelligence collection, recruitment of Cuban officials as agents, radio broadcasts, support of the Cuban Revolutionary Council(CRC) and other exile group activities and infiltration of propaganda materials:

   a. Intensify covert collection of intelligence within Cuba, especially within the regime;

   b. Support the efforts of certain Cuban exiles, who are associated with the original aims of the 26 of July Movement and who believe that the Castro regime can be overthrown from within in order that they may: 1) cause a split in the leadership of the regime at the national or provincial levels; and 2) create a political base of popular opposition to the regime; and, 3) secure intelligence;

   c. Assist Cuban exiles in developing a capability to launch balloons carrying leaflets and other propaganda materials from international waters into Cuba. Launch propaganda balloons after an operational capability has been established.

2. With respect to the actions listed below, the results of Mr. Donovan's imminent negotiations with Fidel Castro for freeing the 20-odd American prisoners should first be ascertained. If these actions were taken before the conclusion of the negotiations they could jeopardize the release of the Americans.

3. If these negotiations fail, or when the prisoners are recovered, proceed on the following timetable:

4. Inform NATO and OAS twelve hours in advance of the proclamation of the four point shipping orders. (The proclamation calls for the orders to go into effect in five days). These orders:

   a. Close United States ports to all vessels of a country whose vessels engage in carrying arms to Cuba;

   b. Close United States ports to any ship which has carried goods in the Bloc-Cuba trade within 120 days of the time it seeks to enter a United States port;

   c. Prohibit all United States flag ships and all ships owned by United States nationals or residents from entering any ports of Cuba and from carrying any goods bound to or from Cuba; and

d. Prohibit any cargo sponsored by any department of the United States from being shipped on vessels owned or controlled by persons who own or control vessels engaged in the trade between Cuba and the Soviet Bloc.

5. At the termination of the U. S. Chiefs of Mission Conference - January 20-30, or at a later date dependent on the Donovan mission, Assistant Secretary Martin, or another representative of the President will visit the Presidents of Chile, Mexico and Brazil to convey to them the importance President Kennedy attaches to maintaining hemispheric solidarity by their supporting the following resolutions:

a. An OAS resolution condemning Cuba for its actions which continue to endanger the peace, deploring refusal to allow inspection, condemning the presence of Soviet troops, recommending continued surveillance and continued vigilance against subversive activities, and terminating the invocation of the Rio Treaty on the missile crisis, together with

b. An OAS resolution which would recommend 1) extension of arms embargo to all items of trade except food and medicine (fall back position: extension of arms embargo to all strategic items);

2) prohibition of ships of OAS member states from transportating embargoed items and deny use of ports to ships in Bloc-Cuba trade; 3) denial of Soviet over-flights and transit rights for flights to Cuba; and 4) a call on other states to take similar action.

6. After obtaining the maximum possible support of the key countries of Mexico, Chile and Brazil, the other OAS members will be approached in Washington and in their respective capitals, simultaneously. It should be possible for this consultation and OAS action on the resolutions to be completed within ten days. Prior to formal COAS approval of the resolutions, we will inform our NATO allies of the impending OAS action.

7. At the first NATO meeting after formal OAS action on the resolutions, we will request that NATO include Cuba on the list of countries to which shipment of COCOM list (strategic) items prohibited.

8. After NATO decision on our COCOM request, we will seek to get agreement from Free World industrial nations to prevent shipping of critical spare parts and equipment to Cuba, not on the COCOM list.

9. In addition to the four point shipping resolutions, and action under Section 107 of the Foreign Assistance Act, continue to press Free World nations to keep their shipping out of Bloc-Cuba trade.

B. Contigency Planning

New opportunities for accomplishing our objectives may arise either as a result of Bloc action in other parts of the world; as a result of aggressive moves (or isolated hostile actions) by the Castro-Communist regime itself; or as a result of uprisings or internal conflict within Cuba.

Our contingency planning, which will be undertaken immediately, should include preparations for increased multilateral and/or bilateral political and economic measures, large scale use of Cubans who are now inside Cuba; more extensive air activity including both high and low level flights primarily directed toward surveillance and collection of intelligence, and which may also have the effect of embarrassing the Castro government and keeping the Castro forces on continual alert; retaliatory measures, as appropriate, including the imposition of a POL blockade; harrassment of Cuban officials in other countries; severance of communications to Cuba; major acts of sabotage on shipping destined for Cuba and on key installations to Cuba; intensive naval patrols; and, ultimately, the use of U. S. military force. To the extent feasible, U. S. military forces employed against Cuba should be accompanied by U. S. militarily-trained free Cubans and by the armed forces of those Latin American nations desirous of participating in the U. S. effort.

Our programs should be designed to encourage the Brigade members to melt back into the exile community and engage in constructive pursuits pending the liberation of Cuba. We should offer them some special assistance but not to the extent that they become a perpetual privileged class within the community. Presidential action on their behalf would single them out unnecessarily.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

(Prepared for the Meeting of Friday, January 25, 1963, 10 a.m.)

FROM : Coordinator of Cuban Affairs

SUBJECT: Summary of Coordinator's Recommendations

1. U. S. Policy Objectives

The following are the objectives of the U. S. with respect to Cuba:

a. Protecting the security of the United States and the other states of the Organization of American States by assuring that offensive weapons are not reintroduced into Cuba;

b. Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba;

c. Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive military action against other Caribbean states;

d. Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime to direct and support subversion and insurrection within the other OAS states;

e. Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of divorcing the Cuban Government from its support of Sino-Soviet Communist purposes;

f. Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of replacing the Cuban Government with a regime that would break with the Sino-Soviet Bloc, it

being understood that our ultimate objective is replacement of the regime by one fully compatible with the goals of the United States;

g. Maximizing the cost to the Soviet Union of supporting the Castro regime;

h. Maximizing the political isolation of the Castro regime from other Free World states, and especially from states of the OAS. Whenever possible, U. S. actions against Cuba should be multilateral, preferably based upon the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) or on resolutions adopted by the Organization of American States. The newly-won hemispheric solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be jeopardized by seeking OAS actions of marginal value and which might split the hemisphere;

i. Being prepared to meet, with the employment of appropriate U. S. combat elements and/or logistical support, the wide variety of military contingencies that may arise from pursuit of the foregoing objectives; and

j. Producing comprehensive intelligence related to the above objectives.

2. Supporting Actions

Actions in support of these objectives and their time sequence are set forth in the attached paper entitled "U. S. Policy Toward Cuba." They include the four point shipping regulations, OAS sanctions, NATO

action to include Cuba on the COCOM list, and approaches to Free World industrial nations to eliminate sale and shipment of critical items from their Cuban trade. Existing programs will be reviewed and further recommendations made as necessary. Planning for the variety of contingencies related to Cuba will be undertaken at once.

In addition to current covert programs such as intelligence collection, recruitment of Cuban officials, support of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) and other exile activities, infiltration of propaganda materials, and radio broadcasts, the following are recommended for approval and immediate initiation:

a. intensified covert collection of intelligence within Cuba, especially within the regime;

b. support of Cuban exiles who are seeking to return the 26 of July Movement to its original aims.

NOTE: It should be noted that approval of the foregoing actions may impair our ability to accomplish objective b. (Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba) because taking these actions could provide the U.S.S.R. with rationale for maintaining its forces in Cuba. Nevertheless, approval of the foregoing actions is recommended.

3. Cuban Brigade

Brigade leaders should be induced to accept a specially tailored civilian and military program for Brigade members.

The Brigade should be disbanded as a military unit and individual members urged to accept civilian training or to enlist in the existing U. S. military program for Cubans and join a Brigade reserve unit thereafter. Our moral obligation would be discharged to the Brigade members and creation of a privileged class in the exile community would be avoided.

TOP SECRET

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

January 23, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. VANCE

SUBJECT: United States Policy Toward Cuba

Attached is a revision of paper #2 submitted by the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs for the meeting of the NSC Executive Committee on the above subject, that has now been rescheduled for Friday at 4:00 p.m. The revision consists essentially of what is now denominated as "ALTERNATIVE I" in the proposed statement of policy and related courses of action with respect to Cuba, supplemented by the insertion of the paragraphs marked in red at the top of page 3 and on page 7 of the revision. This supplemental material is derived from portions of the text of "ALTERNATIVE II" in the original paper.

At luncheon today with Alexis Johnson, I handed him the attached revision and told him Mr. McNamara's and my reasons for suggesting the expansion of State's paper to include the supplemental material referred to above. He, in turn, will discuss the revision with Mr. Cottrell who will thereafter be in touch with you. If possible, will you let me know by noon tomorrow where you and he stand with regard to the revised paper.

Enclosure

SIGNED
ROSWELL L. GILPATRIC

cc: Mr. McNamara
General Taylor
Mr. Yarmolinsky

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DRAFT/23 Jan 63

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

FROM : Coordinator of Cuban Affairs

SUBJECT: United States Policy Toward Cuba

United States Policy

On November 20, the President set forth the broad guidelines of United States policy with respect to Cuba in the following words:

> "As for our part, if all offensive weapons systems are removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in the future, under adequate verification and safeguards, and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive communist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean. And, as I said in September, 'we shall neither initiate nor permit aggression in this hemisphere'.
>
> "We will not, of course, abandon the political, economic and other efforts of this hemisphere to halt subversion from Cuba, nor our purpose and hope that the Cuban people shall some day be truly free. But these policies are very different from any intent to launch a military invasion of the island."

Objectives

Accordingly, the objectives of U.S. policy with respect to Cuba are:

1. Protecting the security of the United States and the other states of the Organization of American States (OAS) by assuring that offensive weapons are not reintroduced into Cuba;

2. Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba;

3. Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive military action against other Caribbean states;

4. Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime to direct and support subversion and insurrection within the other OAS states;

5. Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of divorcing the Cuban Government from its support of Sino-Soviet Communist purposes or replacing the Government with a regime which would accomplish this purpose;

6. Maximizing the cost to the Soviet Union of supporting the Castro regime;

7. Maximizing the political isolation of the Castro regime from other free world states, and especially from states of the OAS. Whenever possible, U.S. actions against Cuba should be multilateral, preferably based upon the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) or on resolutions adopted by the Organization of American States. The newly-won hemispheric solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be jeopardized by seeking OAS actions of marginal value and which might split the hemisphere.

8. Being prepared to meet, with the employment of appropriate U.S. combat elements and/or logistical support, the wide variety of military contingencies that may arise from pursuit of the foregoing objectives; and;

9. Producing comprehensive intelligence related to the above objectives.

Our ultimate objective with respect to Cuba remains the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime and its replacement by one compatible with the objectives of the U.S. and, where possible, sharing the aims of the Free World. To achieve this objective, the U.S. Government will be prepared to apply increasing degrees of political, economic, psychological and military pressures, as appropriate opportunities present themselves or can be created, until the Castro/Communist regime is overthrown.

Isolating, undermining and discrediting the Castro/Communist regime through the exercise of all feasible diplomatic, economic, psychological and covert actions may achieve the immediate objectives and could create propitious conditions in Cuba for further advance toward our ultimate objective.

Supporting Actions

The following actions should be initiated in the sequence set forth below:

1. Await results of Mr. Donovan's imminent negotiation with Fidel Castro for freeing the 20-odd American prisoners. Prior aggressive U. S. action could jeopardize their release.

2. If these negotiations fail, or when the prisoners are recovered, proceed on the following timetable:

3. Inform NATO and OAS twelve hours in advance of the proclamation of the four point shipping orders. (The proclamation calls for the orders to go into effect in five days). These orders:

   a. close United States ports to all vessels of a country whose vessels engage in carrying arms to Cuba;

   b. close United States ports to any ship which has carried goods in the bloc-Cuba trade within 120 days of the time it seeks to enter a United States port;

   c. prohibit all United States flag ships and all ships owned by United States nationals or residents from entering any ports of Cuba and from carrying any goods bound to or from Cuba; and

d. prohibit any cargo sponsored by any department or agency of the United States from being shipped on vessels owned or controlled by persons who own or control vessels engaged in the trade between Cuba and the Soviet bloc.

4. At the termination of the U. S. Chiefs of Mission Conference in El Salvador on January 28-30 Assistant Secretary Martin will visit the Presidents of Chile, Mexico and Brazil to convey to them the importance President Kennedy attaches to maintaining hemispheric solidarity by supporting the following resolutions:

a. An OAS resolution condemning Cuba for its actions which continue to endanger the peace, deploring refusal to allow inspection, condemning the presence of Soviet troops, recommending continued surveillance and continued vigilance against subversive activities, and terminating the invocation of the Rio Treaty on the missile crisis, together with

b. An OAS resolution which would recommend 1) extension of arms embargo to all items of trade except food and medicine (fall back position: extension of arms embargo to all strategic items); 2) prohibition of AR ships from transporting embargoed items and deny use of ports to ships in Bloc-Cuba trade; 3) denial of Soviet over-flights and transit rights for flights to Cuba; and 4) a call on other states to take similar action.

5. After obtaining the maximum possible support of the key countries of Mexico, Chile and Brazil, the other OAS members will be approached in Washington

and in their respective capitals, simultaneously. It should be possible for this consultation and OAS action on the resolutions to be completed within ten days. Prior to formal COAS approval of the resolutions, we will inform our NATO allies of the impending OAS action.

6. At the first NATO meeting after formal OAS action on the resolutions, we will request that NATO include Cuba on the list of countries to which shipment of COCOM list (strategic) items is prohibited.

7. After NATO decision on our COCOM request, we will seek to get agreement from Free World industrial nations to prevent shipping of critical spare parts and equipment to Cuba, not on the COCOM list.

8. In addition to four point shipping resolutions, and action under Section 107 of the Foreign Assistance Act, continue to press Free World nations to keep their shipping out of Bloc-Cuba trade.

9. In addition to current covert programs such as intelligence collection, radio broadcasts, recruitment of Cuban officials as agents, support of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) activities, and infiltration of propaganda materials, the following are recommended for approval and immediate initiation:

   a. Intensify to maximum degree possible intelligence and counterintelligence coverage of Cuba;

   b. Support the efforts of certain Cuban exiles, who are associated with the original aims of the 26 July Movement and who believe that the Castro regime can be overthrown from within in order that they may: 1) cause

a split in the leadership of the regime at the national or provincial levels; and, 2) create a political base of popular opposition to the regime; and, 3) secure intelligence;

c. Assist Cuban exiles in developing a capability to launch balloons carrying leaflets and other propaganda materials from international waters into Cuba. Launch propaganda balloons after an operational capability has been established.

In addition to these immediate actions, we should make preparations now so that we are able to seize opportunities for more positive action towards our ultimate objective of the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime. These opportunities may arise either as a result of Bloc action in other parts of the world, as a result of aggressive moves (or isolated hostile acts) by the Castro/Communist regime itself; or as a result of uprisings or internal conflict within Cuba. We should prepare contingency plans to deal with these situations.

Our contingency planning should include preparations for large-scale use of Cubans inside Cuba; more extensive air activity including both high and low level flights primarily directed toward surveillance and collection of intelligence, and which may also have the effect of embarrassing the Castro government and keeping the Castro forces on continual alert; retaliatory measures, as appropriate, including the imposition of a POL blockade; harrassment of Cuban officials in other countries; severance of communications to Cuba; major acts of sabotage on shipping destined for Cuba and on key installations in Cuba; intensive naval patrols; and, ultimately, the use of U.S. military forces.

We should be in a position to respond with open military support (to include such items as materiel, advisors, training, and Special Forces support and, if necessary, up to the full range of military forces), to a request for assistance from any anti-Castro/Communist group or groups in Cuba which demonstrate an ability to survive, which threaten the present regime, and whose aims are compatible with those of the U.S.

To the extent feasible, U.S. military forces employed against Cuba should be accompanied by U.S. militarily-trained free Cubans and by the armed forces of those Latin American nations desirous of participating in the U.S. effort.

23 JAN 63

MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

(Prepared for the Meeting of Thursday, January 24, 1963, 10 a.m.)

FROM : Department of Defense Representative on the Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee on Cuba

SUBJECT: United States Policy Toward Cuba

Policy

Our ultimate objective with respect to Cuba remains the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime and its replacement by one compatible with the objectives of the U. S. and, where possible, sharing the aims of the Free World. To achieve this objective, the U. S. Government will apply increasing degrees of political, economic, psychological and military pressures, as appropriate opportunities present themselves or can be created, until the Castro/Communist regime is overthrown. Our immediate objectives are to isolate the Castro/Communist regime from the Free World and from the Bloc; weaken it economically; promote internal dissension, erode its domestic political support; frustrate its subversive activities; negate its influence in the hemisphere; increase the cost to the Bloc of sustaining the regime; and obtain the withdrawal of Russian troops from Cuba.

Isolating, undermining and discrediting the Castro/Communist regime through the exercise of all feasible diplomatic, economic, psychological and covert actions may achieve the immediate objectives and could create propitious conditions in Cuba for further advance toward our ultimate objective.

We should be in a position to respond with open military support (to include such items as material, advisors, training, and Special Forces support and, if necessary, up to the full range of military forces), to a request for assistance from any anti-Castro/Communist group or groups in Cuba which demonstrate an ability to survive, which threaten the present regime, and whose aims are compatible with those of the U. S.

Invasion of Cuba by U. S. military forces, as distinguished from military support upon request of indigenous forces, should not be undertaken in the absence of aggression or other Castro/Communist and/or Soviet actions that threaten the peace or security of the hemisphere. This does not preclude appropriate U. S. retaliation for isolated hostile acts by the Castro/Communist or Soviet forces.

To the extent feasible, U. S. military forces employed against Cuba should be accompanied by U. S. militarily-trained free Cubans and by the armed forces of those Latin American nations desirous of participating in the U. S. effort.

Intensive, comprehensive and continuing intelligence gathering in depth on Cuba should be identified as a primary objective of the national intelligence effort.

Whenever possible, U. S. actions against Cuba should be multilateral, preferably based upon the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) or on resolutions adopted by the Organization of American States. The newly-won hemispheric solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be jeopardized by seeking OAS actions of marginal value and which might split the hemisphere.

Overt and covert annexes of specific actions in support of this policy will be prepared.

Discussion

The active pursuit of our ultimate objective involves a phased and controlled series of political, economic, psychological

and military actions. Such actions might include leaflet dropping; propaganda urging sabotage, strikes, and opposition to the regime; psychological operations urging defections; large scale training of Cubans in the U. S. and the use of such Cubans inside Cuba; extensive air activity including both high and low level flights primarily directed toward surveillance and collection of intelligence, and which may also have the effect of embarrassing the Castro government and keeping the Castro forces on continual alert; retaliatory measures, as appropriate, including the imposition of a POL blockade; harrassment of Cuban officials in other countries; severance of communications to Cuba; major acts of sabotage on shipping destined for Cuba and on key installations in Cuba; intensive naval patrols; and, ultimately, the use of U. S. military forces.

In addition, this course of action would involve a broad gamut of carefully timed political, economic, psychological and covert actions, such as OAS sanctions, Caribbean security arrangements, intensified surveillance of and publicity concerning Castro/Communist subversive activities in Latin America, application of Four Point shipping restrictions and other economic sanctions, and a series of actions designed to obtain, to the greatest extent possible, multilateral approval of and participation in the campaign to unseat the Castro/Communist regime.

This course of action has the advantage of attaining the objective more rapidly and under more controlled conditions than the alternative stated by the Coordinator. Indeed, this may be the only course of action that will accomplish the ultimate objective. It involves greater risks; and, in the short run, a greater expenditure of money and material and far greater numbers of personnel.

From the standpoint of international politics, the U. S. will probably be subjected to criticism for aggression from the uncommitted nations. It is difficult to predict the reaction of the Latin American governments. They may attack the U. S. for "intervening" or they may react favorably (as they did during the missile crisis). To a large extent, the reaction of the nations throughout the world, and particularly the Latin American nations, will depend upon how adroitly these actions are handled. For example, there may even be advantages to the fact that our active policy and the courses of action under it may eventually become impossible to conceal. If properly handled, the overt aspects of this policy may serve not only to mitigate any unfavorable reactions from other countries, but also to gain, particularly in Latin America, increasing appreciation of the threat of Castro/Communist Cuba.

The active pursuit of our objective will make it clear that the U. S. will not permit the maintenance of a communist base in the hemisphere. From the standpoint of military posture, the more active approach may be subjected to counteractions from the Sino-Soviet Bloc elsewhere. As we increase the pressures on Castro/Communist Cuba and the extent of our commitment to overthrow the regime, U. S. prestige becomes more deeply involved. The further we progress along this route, the more significant will be the loss of U. S. prestige if we alter or abandon it.

The successful execution of this policy will require careful timing and coordination of our actions and the development of detailed plans. While such plans would be designed to bring about the overthrow of the Castro regime within a given time frame for planning purposes, they would have to be sufficiently flexible to accommodate changes to the international situation.

In any case, at crucial points along the way, it will be necessary for the highest levels of our Government to review the actions already taken and those contemplated and to assess the advantages of continued and escalated activity against the disadvantages and dangers of such activity.

Commitment to this course of action does not exclude the possibility of actively pursuing the isolation of the Castro regime from the Bloc.

Coordinator's Recommendation

I do not concur in the policy recommended by the Coordinator. The objectives stated in the Coordinator's paper do not sufficiently commit the U. S. to the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime. The Coordinator's paper depends too much upon events outside the control of the U. S. Government and does not sufficiently contemplate the creation of opportunities to effect the downfall of the Castro/ Communist regime. The specific actions recommended in the Coordinator's paper are consistent with the policy recommended in this paper and, in many cases, would be among the initial steps that would be taken in executing that policy.

Recommendation

I recommend that the policy stated above be adopted as the United States policy toward Cuba.

DRAFT/23 Jan 63

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

FROM : Coordinator of Cuban Affairs

SUBJECT: United States Policy Toward Cuba

United States Policy

On November 20, the President set forth the broad guidelines of United States policy with respect to Cuba in the following words:

> "As for our part, if all offensive weapons systems are removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in the future, under adequate verification and safeguards, and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive communist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean. And, as I said in September, 'we shall neither initiate nor permit aggression in this hemisphere'.
>
> "We will not, of course, abandon the political, economic and other efforts of this hemisphere to halt subversion from Cuba, nor our purpose and hope that the Cuban people shall some day be truly free. But these policies are very different from any intent to launch a military invasion of the island."

Objectives

Accordingly, the objectives of U.S. policy with respect to Cuba are:

1. Protecting the security of the United States and the other states of the Organization of American States (OAS) by assuring that offensive weapons are not reintroduced into Cuba;

2. Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba;

3. Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive military action against other Caribbean states;

4. Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime to direct and support subversion and insurrection within the other OAS states;

5. Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of divorcing the Cuban Government from its support of Sino-Soviet Communist purposes or replacing the Government with a regime which would accomplish this purpose;

6. Maximizing the cost to the Soviet Union of supporting the Castro regime;

7. Maximizing the political isolation of the Castro regime from other free world states, and especially from states of the OAS. Whenever possible, U.S. actions against Cuba should be multilateral, preferably based upon the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) or on resolutions adopted by the Organization of American States. The newly-won hemispheric solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be jeopardized by seeking OAS actions of marginal value and which might split the hemisphere.

8. Being prepared to meet, with the employment of appropriate U.S. combat elements and/or logistical support, the wide variety of military contingencies that may arise from pursuit of the foregoing objectives; and;

9. Producing comprehensive intelligence related to the above objectives.

Our ultimate objective with respect to Cuba remains the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime and its replacement by one compatible with the objectives of the U.S. and, where possible, sharing the aims of the Free World. To achieve this objective, the U.S. Government will be prepared to apply increasing degrees of political, economic, psychological and military pressures, as appropriate opportunities present themselves or can be created, until the Castro/Communist regime is overthrown.

Isolating, undermining and discrediting the Castro/Communist regime through the exercise of all feasible diplomatic, economic, psychological and covert actions may achieve the immediate objectives and could create propitious conditions in Cuba for further advance toward our ultimate objective.

<u>Supporting Actions</u>

The following actions should be initiated in the sequence set forth below:

1. Await results of Mr. Donovan's imminent negotiation with Fidel Castro for freeing the 20-odd American prisoners. Prior aggressive U. S. action could jeopardize their release.

2. If these negotiations fail, or when the prisoners are recovered, proceed on the following timetable:

3. Inform NATO and OAS twelve hours in advance of the proclamation of the four point shipping orders. (The proclamation calls for the orders to go into effect in five days). These orders:

   a. close United States ports to all vessels of a country whose vessels engage in carrying arms to Cuba;

   b. close United States ports to any ship which has carried goods in the bloc-Cuba trade within 120 days of the time it seeks to enter a United States port;

   c. prohibit all United States flag ships and all ships owned by United States nationals or residents from entering any ports of Cuba and from carrying any goods bound to or from Cuba; and

d. prohibit any cargo sponsored by any department or agency of the United States from being shipped on vessels owned or controlled by persons who own or control vessels engaged in the trade between Cuba and the Soviet bloc.

4. At the termination of the U. S. Chiefs of Mission Conference in El Salvador on January 28-30 Assistant Secretary Martin will visit the Presidents of Chile, Mexico and Brazil to convey to them the importance President Kennedy attaches to maintaining hemispheric solidarity by supporting the following resolutions:

a. An OAS resolution condemning Cuba for its actions which continue to endanger the peace, deploring refusal to allow inspection, condemning the presence of Soviet troops, recommending continued surveillance and continued vigilance against subversive activities, and terminating the invocation of the Rio Treaty on the missile crisis, together with

b. An OAS resolution which would recommend 1) extension of arms embargo to all items of trade except food and medicine (fall back position: extension of arms embargo to all strategic items); 2) prohibition of AR ships from transporting embargoed items and deny use of ports to ships in Bloc-Cuba trade; 3) denial of Soviet over-flights and transit rights for flights to Cuba; and 4) a call on other states to take similar action.

5. After obtaining the maximum possible support of the key countries of Mexico, Chile and Brazil, the other OAS members will be approached in Washington

and in their respective capitals, simultaneously. It should be possible for this consultation and OAS action on the resolutions to be completed within ten days. Prior to formal COAS approval of the resolutions, we will inform our NATO allies of the impending OAS action.

6. At the first NATO meeting after formal OAS action on the resolutions, we will request that NATO include Cuba on the list of countries to which shipment of COCOM list (strategic) items is prohibited.

7. After NATO decision on our COCOM request, we will seek to get agreement from Free World industrial nations to prevent shipping of critical spare parts and equipment to Cuba, not on the COCOM list.

8. In addition to four point shipping resolutions, and action under Section 107 of the Foreign Assistance Act, continue to press Free World nations to keep their shipping out of Bloc-Cuba trade.

9. In addition to current covert programs such as intelligence collection, radio broadcasts, recruitment of Cuban officials as agents, support of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) activities, and infiltration of propaganda materials, the following are recommended for approval and immediate initiation:

   a. Intensify to maximum degree possible intelligence and counterintelligence coverage of Cuba;

   b. Support the efforts of certain Cuban exiles, who are associated with the original aims of the 26 July Movement and who believe that the Castro regime can be overthrown from within in order that they may: 1) cause

a split in the leadership of the regime at the national or provincial levels; and, 2) create a political base of popular opposition to the regime; and, 3) secure intelligence;

c. Assist Cuban exiles in developing a capability to launch balloons carrying leaflets and other propaganda materials from international waters into Cuba. Launch propaganda balloons after an operational capability has been established.

In addition to these immediate actions, we should make preparations now so that we are able to seize opportunities for more positive action towards our ultimate objective of the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime. These opportunities may arise either as a result of Bloc action in other parts of the world, as a result of aggressive moves (or isolated hostile acts) by the Castro/Communist regime itself; or as a result of uprisings or internal conflict within Cuba. We should prepare contingency plans to deal with these situations.

Our contingency planning should include preparations for large-scale use of Cubans inside Cuba; more extensive air activity including both high and low level flights primarily directed toward surveillance and collection of intelligence, and which may also have the effect of embarrassing the Castro government and keeping the Castro forces on continual alert; retaliatory measures, as appropriate, including the imposition of a POL blockade; harrassment of Cuban officials in other countries; severance of communications to Cuba; major acts of sabotage on shipping destined for Cuba and on key installations in Cuba; intensive naval patrols; and, ultimately, the use of U.S. military forces.

We should be in a position to respond with open military support (to include such items as materiel, advisors, training, and Special Forces support and, if necessary, up to the full range of military forces), to a request for assistance from any anti-Castro/Communist group or groups in Cuba which demonstrate an ability to survive, which threaten the present regime, and whose aims are compatible with those of the U.S.

To the extent feasible, U.S. military forces employed against Cuba should be accompanied by U.S. militarily-trained free Cubans and by the armed forces of those Latin American nations desirous of participating in the U.S. effort.

ALTERNATIVE II

United States Policy

1. Our ultimate objective with respect to Cuba is the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime and its replacement by one compatible with the objectives of the U.S. and, where possible, sharing the aims of the Free World. To achieve this objective, the U.S. Government will apply increasing degrees of political, economic, psychological and military pressures, as appropriate opportunities present themselves or can be created, until the Castro/Communist regime is overthrown.

2. Our immediate objectives are to isolate the Castro/Communist regime from the Free World and from the Bloc; weaken it economically; promote internal dissension, erode its domestic political support; frustrate its subversive activities; negate its influence in the hemisphere; increase the cost to the Bloc of sustaining the regime; and obtain the withdrawal of Russian troops from Cuba.

3. Isolating, undermining and discrediting the Castro/Communist regime through the exercise of all feasible diplomatic, economic, psychological and covert actions may achieve the immediate objectives and could create propitious conditions in Cuba for further advance toward our ultimate objective.

4. We should be in a position to respond with open military support (to include such items as materiel, advisors, training, and Special Forces support and, if necessary, up to the full range of military forces), to a request for assistance from any anti-Castro/Communist group or groups in Cuba which demonstrate an ability to survive, which threaten the present regime, and whose aims are compatible with those of the U.S.

5. Invasion of Cuba by U.S. military forces, as distinguished from military support upon request of indigenous forces, should not be undertaken in the absence of aggression or other Castro/Communist and/or

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Soviet actions that threaten the peace or security of the hemisphere. This does not preclude appropriate U.S. retaliation for isolated hostile acts by the Castro/ Communist or Soviet forces.

6. To the extent feasible, U.S. military forces employed against Cuba should be accompanied by U.S. militarily-trained free Cubans and by the armed forces of those Latin American nations desirous of participating in the U.S. effort.

7. Intensive, comprehensive and continuing intelligence gathering in depth on Cuba should be identified as a primary objective of the national intelligence effort.

8. Whenever possible, U.S. actions against Cuba should be multilateral, preferably based upon theTTreaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) or on resolutions adopted by the Organization of American States. The newly-won hemispheric solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be jeopardized by seeking OAS actions of marginal value and which might split the hemisphere.

Overt and covert annexes of specific actions in support of this policy will be prepared.

Discussion

The active pursuit of our ultimate objective involves a phased and controlled series of political, economic, psychological and military actions. Such actions might include leaflet dropping; propaganda urging sabotage, strikes, and opposition to the regime; psychological operations urging defections; large scale training of Cubans in the U.S. and the use of such Cubans inside Cuba; extensive air activity including both high and low level flights primarily directed toward surveillance and collection of intelligence, and which may also have the

effect

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effect of embarrassing the Castro government and keeping the Castro forces on continual alert; retaliatory measures, as appropriate, including the imposition of a POL blockade; harrassment of Cuban officials in other countries; severance of communications to Cuba; major acts of sabotage on shipping destined for Cuba and on key installations in Cuba; intensive naval patrols; and, ultimately, the use of U. S. military forces.

In addition, this course of action would involve a broad gamut of carefully timed political, economic, psychological and covert actions, such as OAS sanctions, Caribbean security arrangements, intensified surveillance of and publicity concerning Castro/Communist subversive activities in Latin America, application of Four Point shipping restrictions and other economic sanctions, and a series of actions designed to obtain, to the greatest extent possible, multilateral approval of an participation in the campaign to unseat the Castro/Communist regime.

This course of action has the advantage of attaining the objective more rapidly and under more controlled conditions than the alternative stated by the Coordinator. Indeed, this may be the only course of action that will accomplish the ultimate objective. It involves greater risks; and, in the short run, a greater expenditure of money and material and far greater numbers of personnel.

From the standpoint of international politics, the U. S. will probably be subjected to criticism for aggression from the uncommitted nations. It is difficult to predict the reaction of the Latin American governments. They may attack the U. S. for "intervening" or they may react favorably (as they did during the missile crisis). To a large extent, the reaction of the nations throughout the world, and particularly the Latin American nations, will depend upon how adroitly theee actions are handled. For example, there may even be advantages to the fact that our active policy and the courses of action under it may

eventually become impossible to conceal. If properly handled, the overt aspects of this policy may serve not only to mitigate any unfavorable reactions from other countries, but also to gain, particularly in Latin America, increasing appreciation of the threat of Castro/Communist Cuba.

The active pursuit of our objective will make it clear that the U. S. will not permit the maintenance of a communist base in the hemisphere. From the standpoint of military posture, the more active approach may be subjected to counteractions from the Sino-Soviet Bloc elsewhere. As we increase the pressures on Castro/Communist Cuba and the extent of our commitment to overthrow the regime, U. S. prestige becomes more deeply involved. The further we progress along this route, the more significant will be the loss of U. S. prestige if we alter or abandon it.

The successful execution of this policy will require careful timing and coordination of our actions and the development of detailed plans. While such plans would be designed to bring about the overthrow of the Castro regime within a given time frame for planning purposes, they would have to be sufficiently flexible to accommodate changes to the international situation.

In any case, at crucial points along the way, it will be necessary for the highest levels of our Government to review the actions already taken and those contemplated and to assess the advantages of continued and escalated activity against the disadvantages and dangers of such activity.

Commitment to this course of action does not exclude the possibility of actively pursuing the isolation of the Castro regime from the Bloc.

COORDINATOR'S RECOMMENDATION

I recommend approval of Alternative I.

STATEMENT OF DOD REPRESENTATIVE

I do not concur in the policy recommended by the Coordinator. Alternative I does not make the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime an objective of the U. S. In addition, Alternative I does not sufficiently contemplate the creation of opportunities to effect the downfall of that regime. The specific actions recommended in Alternative I are consistent with the policy recommended in Alternative II and, in many cases, would be among the initial steps that would be taken in executing that policy. I recommend adoption of Alternative II.

23 JAN 63

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

(Prepared for the Meeting of Thursday, January 24, 1963, 10 a.m.)

FROM : Coordinator of Cuban Affairs

SUBJECT: United States Policy Toward Cuba

There are submitted for your consideration two alternative statements of policy and related courses of action with respect to Cuba. Alternative I was prepared by the Department of State. The Alternative II was prepared by the Department of Defense. The Coordinator's Recommendation that Alternative I be approved, and the Department of Defense non-concurrence, appear at the end of this paper.

ALTERNATIVE I

United States Policy

On November 20, the President set forth the broad guidelines of United States policy with respect to Cuba in the following words:

> "As for our part, if all offensive weapons systems are removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in the future, under adequate verification and safeguards, and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive communist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean. And, as I said in September, 'we shall neither initiate nor permit aggression in this hemisphere'.
>
> "We will not, of course, abandon the political, economic and other efforts of this hemisphere to halt subversion from Cuba, nor our purpose and

and hope that the Cuban people shall some day be truly free. But these policies are very different from any intent to launch a military invasion of the island."

Objectives

Accordingly, the objectives of U. S. policy with respect to Cuba are:

1. Protecting the security of the United States and the other states of the Organization of American States (OAS) by assuring that offensive weapons are not reintroduced into Cuba;

2. Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba;

3. Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive military action against other Caribbean states;

4. Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime to direct and support subversion and insurrection within the other OAS states;

5. Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of divorcing the Cuban Government from its support of Sino-Soviet Communist purposes or replacing the Government with a regime which would accomplish this purpose.

6. Maximizing the cost to the Soviet Union of supporting the Castro regime;

7. Maximizing the political isolation of the Castro regime from other free world states, and especially from states of the OAS;

8. Being prepared to meet, with the employment of appropriate U. S. combat elements and/or logistical support, the wide variety of contingencies that may arise from pursuit of the foregoing objectives; and;

9. Producing comprehensive intelligence related to the above objectives.

Supporting Actions

The following actions should be initiated in the sequence set forth below:

1. Await results of Mr. Donovan's imminent negotiation with Fidel Castro for freeing the 20-odd American prisoners. Prior aggressive U. S. action could jeopardize their release.

2. If these negotiations fail, or when the prisoners are recovered, proceed on the following time-table:

3. Inform NATO and OAS twelve hours in advance of the proclamation of the four point shipping orders. (The proclamation calls for the orders to go into effect in five days). These orders:

   a. close United States ports to all vessels of a country whose vessels engage in carrying arms to Cuba;
   b. close United States ports to any ship which has carried goods in the bloc-Cuba trade within 120 days of the time it seeks to enter a United States port;

   c. prohibit all United States flag ships and all ships owned by United States nationals or residents from entering any ports of Cuba and from carrying any goods bound to or from Cuba; and

d. prohibit any cargo sponsored by any department or agency of the United States from being shipped on vessels owned or controlled by persons who own or control vessels engaged in the trade between Cuba and the Soviet bloc.

4. At the termination of the U. S. Chiefs of Mission Conference in El Salvador on January 28-30 Assistant Secretary Martin will visit the Presidents of Chile, Mexico and Brazil to convey to them the importance President Kennedy attaches to maintaining hemispheric solidarity by supporting the following resolutions:

a. An OAS resolution condemning Cuba for its actions which continue to endanger the peace, deploring refusal to allow inspection, condemning the presence of Soviet troops, recommending continued surveillance and continued vigilance against subversive activities, and terminating the invocation of the Rio Treaty on the missile crisis, together with

b. An OAS resolution which would recommend 1) extension of arms embargo to all items of trade except food and medicine (fall back position: extension of arms embargo to all strategic items); 2) prohibition of AR ships from transporting embargoed items and deny use of ports to ships in Bloc-Cuba trade; 3) denial of Soviet over-flights and transit rights for flights to Cuba; and 4) a call on other states to take similar action.

5. After obtaining the maximum possible support of the key countries of Mexico, Chile and Brazil, the other OAS members will be approached in Washington

and in their respective capitals, simultaneously. It should be possible for this consultation and OAS action on the resolutions to be completed within ten days. Prior to formal COAS approval of the resolutions, we will inform our NATO allies of the impending OAS action.

6. At the first NATO meeting after formal OAS action on the resolutions, we will request that NATO include Cuba on the list of countries to which shipment of COCOM list (strategic) items is prohibited.

7. After NATO decision on our COCOM request, we will seek to get agreement from Free World industrial nations to prevent shipping of critical spare parts and equipment to Cuba, not on the COCOM list.

8. ←In addition to four point shipping resolutions, and action under Section 107 of the Foreign Assistance Act, continue to press Free World nations to keep their shipping out of Bloc-Cuba trade.

9. In addition to current covert programs such as intelligence collection, radio broadcasts, recruitment of Cuban officials as agents, support of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) activities, and infiltration of propaganda materials, the following are recommended for approval and immediate initiation:

a. Intensify to maximum degree possible intelligence and counterintelligence coverage of Cuba;

b. Su

b. Support the efforts of certain Cuban exiles, who are associated with the original aims of the 26 July Movement and who believe that the Castro regime can be overthrown from within in order that they may: 1) cause

a split in the leadership of the regime at the national or provincial levels; and, 2) create a political base of popular opposition to the regime; and, 3) secure intelligence;

c. Assist Cuban exiles in developing a capability to launch balloons carrying leaflets and other propaganda materials from international waters into Cuba. Launch propaganda balloons after an operational capability has been established.

COORDINATOR'S RECOMMENDATION

I recommend approval of Alternative I.

ALTERNATIVE II

United States Policy

1. The ultimate objective [illegible] is the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime and its replacement by one compatible with the objectives of the United States [illegible] the aims of the Free World. To achieve this objective, the U.S. Government will apply increasing degrees of political, economic, psychological and military pressures, as appropriate opportunities present themselves or can be created, until the Castro/Communist regime is overthrown.

2. Our immediate objectives are to isolate the Castro/Communist regime from the Free World and from the Bloc; weaken it economically; promote internal dissension, erode its domestic political support; frustrate its subversive activities; [illegible] its influence in the hemisphere; increase the cost to the Bloc of sustaining the regime; and obtain the withdrawal of Russian troops from Cuba.

3. Isolating, undermining and discrediting the Castro/Communist regime through [illegible] feasible diplomatic, economic, [illegible] and covert actions may achieve the immediate objectives and could create propitious conditions in Cuba for further advance toward our ultimate objective.

4. We should be in a position to respond with open military support (to include such items as materiel, advisors, training, and Special Forces support and, if necessary, up to the full range of military forces), to a request for assistance from any anti-Castro/Communist group or groups in Cuba which demonstrate an ability to survive, which threaten the present regime, and whose aims are compatible with those of the U.S.

5. [illegible]ion of Cuba by U.S. military forces, as distinguished from military support upon request of indigenous forces, should not be undertaken in the absence of aggression or other Castro/Communist and/or

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Soviet actions that threaten the peace or security of the hemisphere. This does not preclude appropriate U.S. retaliation for isolated hostile acts by the Castro/Communist or Soviet forces.

6. To the extent possible, U.S. military forces employed against Cuba should be accompanied by U.S. militarily-trained free Cubans and by the armed forces of those Latin American nations desirous of participating in the U.S. effort.

7. Intensive, comprehensive and continuing intelligence gathering in depth on Cuba should be identified as a primary objective of the national intelligence effort.

8. Whenever possible, U.S. actions against Cuba should be multilateral, preferably based upon theTTreaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) or on resolutions adopted by the Organization of American States. The newly-won hemispheric solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be jeopardized by seeking OAS actions of marginal value and which might split the hemisphere.

Overt and covert annexes of specific actions in support of this policy will be prepared.

Discussion

The active pursuit of our ultimate objective involves a phased and controlled series of political, economic, psychological and military actions. Such actions might include leaflet dropping; propaganda urging sabotage, strikes, and opposition to the regime; psychological operations urging defections; large scale training of Cubans in the U.S. and the use of such Cubans inside Cuba; extensive air activity including both high and low level flights primarily directed toward surveillance and collection of intelligence, and which may also have the

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[illegible] the Castro forces on [illegible]; retaliatory measures, as appropriate, including the imposition of a POL blockade; [illegible]; severance of communications [illegible] Cuba; major acts of sabotage on shipping destined for Cuba and on key installations in Cuba; intensive naval patrols; and, ultimately, the use of U. S. military forces.

In addition, this course of action would involve a broad gamut of carefully timed political, economic, psychological and covert actions, such as OAS sanctions, Caribbean security arrangements, intensified surveillance of and publicity concerning Castro/Communist subversive activities in Latin America, application of Four Point shipping restrictions and other economic sanctions, and a series of actions designed to obtain, to the greatest extent possible, multilateral approval of an participation in the campaign to unseat the Castro/Communist regime.

This course of action has the advantage of attaining the objective more rapidly and under more controlled conditions than the alternative stated by the Coordinator. Indeed, this may be the only course of action that will accomplish the ultimate objective. It involves greater risks; and, in the short run, a greater expenditure of money and material and far greater numbers of personnel.

From the standpoint of international politics, the U. S. will probably be subjected to criticism for aggression from the uncommitted nations. It is difficult to predict the reaction of the Latin American governments. They may attack the U. S. for "intervening" or they may react favorably (as they did during the missile crisis). To a large extent, the reaction of the nations throughout the world, and particularly the Latin American nations, will depend upon how adroitly these actions are handled. For example, there may even be advantages to the fact that our active policy and the courses of action under it may

[illegible]ibl[illegible]al. If properly handled, the overt aspects of this policy may serve not only to mitigate any unfavorable reactions from other countries, but also to gain, particularly in Latin America, increasing appreciation of the threat of Castro/Communist Cuba.

The active pursuit of our objective will make it clear that the U. S. will not permit the maintenance of a communist base in the hemisphere. From the standpoint of military posture, the more active approach may be subjected to counteractions from the Sino-Soviet Bloc elsewhere. As we increase the pressures on Castro/Communist Cuba and the extent of our commitment to overthrow the regime, U. S. prestige becomes more deeply involved. The further we progress along this route, the more significant will be the loss of U. S. prestige if we alter or abandon it.

The successful execution of this policy will require careful timing and coordination of our actions and the development of detailed plans. While such plans would be designed to bring about the overthrow of the Castro regime within a given time frame for planning purposes, they would have to be sufficiently flexible to accommodate changes to the international situation.

In any case, at crucial points along the way, it will be necessary for the highest levels of our Government to review the actions already taken and those contemplated and to assess the advantages of continued and escalated activity against the disadvantages and dangers of such activity.

Commitment to this course of action does not exclude the possibility of actively pursuing the isolation of the Castro regime from the Bloc.

COORDINATOR'S RECOMMENDATION

I recommend approval of Alternative I.

STATEMENT OF DOD REPRESENTATIVE

I do not concur in the policy recommended by the Coordinator. Alternative I does not make the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime an objective of the U. S. In addition, Alternative I does not sufficiently contemplate the creation of opportunities to effect the downfall of that regime. The specific actions recommended in Alternative I are consistent with the policy recommended in Alternative II and, in many cases, would be among the initial steps that would be taken in executing that policy. I recommend adoption of Alternative II.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
(Prepared for the Meeting of Friday , January 25, 1963, 4 p.m.)

FROM : Coordinator of Cuban Affairs

SUBJECT: United States Policy Toward Cuba

United States Policy

On November 20, the President set forth the broad guidelines of United States policy with respect to Cuba in the following words:

"As for our part, if all offensive weapons systems are removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in the future, under adequate verification and safeguards, and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive communist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean. And, as I said in September, 'we shall neither initiate nor permit aggression in this hemisphere.'

"We will not, of course, abandon the political, economic and other efforts of this hemisphere to halt subversion from Cuba, nor our purpose and hope that the Cuban people shall some day be truly free. But these policies are very different from any intent to launch a military invasion of the island."

Objectives

Accordingly, the objectives of U.S. policy with respect to Cuba are:

1. Protecting the security of the United States and the other states of the Organization of American States (OAS) by assuring that offensive weapons are not reintroduced into Cuba;
2. Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba;
3. Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive military action against other Caribbean states;
4. Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime to direct and support subversion and insurrection within the other Hemisphere states;
5. Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of <u>divorcing</u> the Cuban Government from its support of Sino-Soviet Communist purposes;
6. Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of <u>replacing</u> the Cuban Government with a regime that would break with the Sino-Soviet Bloc, it being understood that our ultimate objective is replacement of the regime by one fully compatible with the goals of the United States;
7. Maximizing the cost to the Soviet Union of supporting the Castro regime;

8.

8. Maximizing the political isolation of the Castro regime from other free world states, and especially from states of the OAS. Whenever possible, U.S. actions against Cuba should be multilateral, preferably based upon the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) or on resolutions adopted by the Organization of American States. The newly-won hemispheric solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be jeopardized by seeking OAS actions of marginal value and which might split the hemisphere.

9. Being prepared to meet, with the employment of appropriate U.S. combat elements and/or logistical support, the wide variety of military contingencies that may arise from pursuit of the foregoing objectives; and;

10. Producing comprehensive intelligence related to the above objectives.

Supporting Actions

A. To achieve the foregoing objectives, the U.S. Government will be prepared to increase the political, economic, psychological and military pressures, as appropriate

opportunities

until the regime is overthrown

opportunities present themselves or can be created. The actions listed below are those requiring immediate approval and would be initiated in the sequence set forth below. Recommendations for further actions based upon the re-examination of existing programs and upon the development of new programs related to the foregoing objectives will be forthcoming.

1. In addition to current covert program, such as intelligence collection, recruitment of Cuban officials as agents, radio broadcasts, support of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) and other exile group activities and infiltration of propaganda materials:

   a) continue to intensify covert collection of intelligence within Cuba, especially within the regime;

   b) Support the efforts of certain Cuban exiles, who are associated with the original aims of the 26 of July Movement and who believe that the Castro regime can be overthrown from within in order that they may: 1) cause a split in the leadership of the regime at the national or provincial levels; and 2) create

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a political base of popular opposition to the regime; and, 3) secure intelligence;

c. Assist Cuban exiles in developing a capability to launch balloons carrying leaflets and other propaganda materials from international waters into Cuba. Launch propaganda balloons after an operational capability has been established.

2. WITH RESPECT TO THE ACTIONS LISTED BELOW, THE ~~Await~~ results of Mr. Donovan's imminent negotiations with Fidel Castro for freeing the 20-odd American prisoners SHOULD FIRST BE ASCERTAINED. ~~Any of the actions listed below~~, If these actions were taken before the conclusion of the negotiations, they could jeopardize the~~ir~~ release of the Americans

3. If these negotiations fail, or when the prisoners are recovered, proceed on the following timetable:

4. Inform NATO and OAS twelve hours in advance of the proclamation of the four point shipping orders. (The proclamation calls for the orders to go into effect in five days). These orders:

a. close United States ports to all vessels of a country whose vessels engage in carrying arms to Cuba;

b. ...

b. close United States ports to any ship which has carried goods in the bloc-Cuba trade within 120 days of the time it seeks to enter a United States port;

c. prohibit all United States flag ships and all ships owned by United States nationals or residents from entering any ports of Cuba and from carrying any goods bound to or from Cuba; and

d. prohibit any cargo sponsored by any department or agency of the United States from being shipped on vessels owned or controlled by persons who own or control vessels engaged in the trade between Cuba and the Soviet bloc.

5. At the termination of the U. S. Chiefs of Mission Conference - January 20-30, or at a later date dependent on the Donovan mission, Assistant Secretary Martin, or another representative of the President will visit the Presidents of Chile, Mexico and Brazil to convey to them the importance President Kennedy attaches to maintaining hemispheric solidarity by their supporting the following resolutions:

a. An OAS resolution condemning Cuba for its actions which continue to endanger the peace, deploring refusal to allow inspection, condemning the presence of Soviet troops, recommending continued surveillance and continued vigilance against subversive activities, and terminating the invocation of the Rio Treaty on the missile crisis, together with

b. An OAS resolution which would recommend 1) extension of arms embargo to all items of trade except food

and medicine (fall back position: extension of arms embargo to all strategic items); 2) prohibition of ~~All~~ ships of OAS member states from transporting embargoed items and deny use of ports to ships in Bloc-Cuba trade; 3) denial of Soviet over-flights and transit rights for flights to Cuba; and 4) a call on other states to take similar action.

6. After obtaining the maximum possible support of the key countries of Mexico, Chile and Brazil, the other OAS members will be approached in Washington and in their respective capitals, simultaneously. It should be possible for this consultation and OAS action on the resolutions to be completed within ten days. Prior to formal COAS approval of the resolutions, we will inform our NATO allies of the impending OAS action.

7. At the first NATO meeting after formal OAS action on the resolutions, we will request that NATO include Cuba on the list of countries to which shipment of COCOM list (strategic) items is prohibited.

8. After NATO decision on our COCOM request, we will seek

to get agreement from Free World industrial nations to prevent shipping of critical spare parts and equipment to Cuba, not on the COCOM list.

9. In addition to the four point shipping resolutions, and action under Section 107 of the Foreign Assistance Act, continue to press Free World nations to keep their shipping out of Bloc-Cuba trade.

B. Contingency Planning

New opportunities for accomplishing our objectives may arise either as a result of Bloc action in other parts of the world; as a result of aggressive moves (or isolated hostile actions) by the Castro-Communist regime itself; or as a result of uprisings or internal conflict within Cuba.

Our contingency planning, which will be undertaken immediately, should include preparations for increased multilateral and/or bilateral political and economic measures, large scale use of Cubans who are now inside Cuba; more extensive air activity including both high and low level flights primarily directed toward surveillance and collection of intelligence, and which may also have the effect of embarrassing the Castro government and keeping the Castro forces on continual alert; retaliatory measures, as appropriate, including the imposition of a POL blockade; harrass-

ment of Cuban officials in other countries; severance of communications to Cuba; major acts of sabotage on shipping destined for Cuba and on key installations in Cuba; intensive naval patrols; and, ultimately, the use of U. S. military force. To the extent feasible, U. S. military forces employed against Cuba should be accompanied by U. S. militarily-trained free Cubans and by the armed forces of those Latin American nations desirous of participating in the U. S. effort.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL"S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
(Prepared for the meeting of Friday, January 25, 1963, 4 p.m.).

FROM : Coordinator of Cuban Affairs

SUBJECT: United States Policy Toward Cuba

United States Policy

On November 20, the President set forth the broad guidelines of United States policy with respect to Cuba in the following words:

"As for our part, if all offensive weapons systems are removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in the future, under adequate verification and safeguards, and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive communist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean. And, as I said in September, 'we shall neither initiate nor permit aggression in this hemisphere.'

"We will not, of course, abandon the political, economic and other efforts of this hemisphere to halt subversion from Cuba, nor our purpose and hope that the Cuban people shall some day be truly free. But these policies are very different from any intent to launch a military invasion of the island."

Objectives

Accordingly, the objectives of U.S. policy with respect to Cuba are:

1. Protecting the security of the United States and the other states of the Organization of American States (OAS) by assuring that offensive weapons are not reintroduced into Cuba;
2. Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba;
3. Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive military action against other Caribbean states;
4. Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime to direct and support subversion and insurrection within the other Hemisphere states;
5. Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of <u>divorcing</u> the Cuban Government from its support of Sino-Soviet Communist purposes;
6. Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of <u>replacing</u> the Cuban Government with a regime that would break with the Sino-Soviet Bloc it being understood that our ultimate objective is replacement of the regime by one fully compatible with the goals of the United States;
7. Maximizing the cost to the Soviet Union of supporting the Castro regime;

8. Maximizing the political isolation of the Castro regime from other free world states, and especially from states of the OAS. Whenever possible, U.S. actions against Cuba should be multilateral, preferably based upon the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) or on resolutions adopted by the Organization of American States. The newly-won hemispheric solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be jeopardized by seeking OAS actions of marginal value and which might split the hemisphere.

9. Being prepared to meet, with the employment of appropriate U.S. combat elements and/or logistical support, the wide variety of military contingencies that may arise from pursuit of the foregoing objectives; and;

10. Producing comprehensive intelligence related to the above objectives.

Supporting Actions

A. To achieve the foregoing objectives, the U.S. Government will be prepared to increase the political, economic, psychological and military pressures, as appropriate

opportunities

opportunities present themselves or can be created. The actions listed below are those requiring immediate approval and would be initiated in the sequence set forth below. Recommendations for further actions based upon the re-examination of existing programs and upon the development of new programs related to the foregoing objectives will be forthcoming.

1. In addition to current covert program, such as intelligence collection, recruitment of Cuban officials as agents, radio broadcasts, support of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) and other exile group activities and infiltration of propaganda materials:

   a) continue to intensify covert collection of intelligence within Cuba, especially within the regime;

   b) Support the efforts of certain Cuban exiles, who are associated with the original aims of the 26 of July Movement and who believe that the Castro regime can be overthrown from within in order that they may: 1) cause a split in the leadership of the regime at the national or provincial levels; and 2) create

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a political base of popular opposition to the regime; and, 3) secure intelligence;

c. Assist Cuban exiles in developing a capability to launch balloons carrying leaflets and other propaganda materials from international waters into Cuba. Launch propaganda balloons after an operational capability has been established.

2. Await results of Mr. Donovan's imminent negotiations with Fidel Castro for freeing the 20-odd American prisoners. Any of the actions listed below, if taken before the conclusion of the negotiations could jeopardize their release.

3. If these negotiations fail, or when the prisoners are recovered, proceed on the following timetable:

4. Inform NATO and OAS twelve hours in advance of the proclamation of the four point shipping orders. (The proclamation calls for the orders to go into effect in five days). These orders:

a. close United States ports to all vessels of a country whose vessels engage in carrying arms to Cuba;

b.

b. close United States ports to any ship which has carried goods in the bloc-Cuba trade within 120 days of the time it seeks to enter a United States port;

c. prohibit all United States flag ships and all ships owned by United States nationals or residents from entering any ports of Cuba and from carrying any goods bound to or from Cuba; and

d. prohibit any cargo sponsored by any department or agency of the United States from being shipped on vessels owned or controlled by persons who own or control vessels engaged in the trade between Cuba and the Soviet bloc.

5. At the termination of the U. S. Chiefs of Mission Conference January 20-30, or at a later date, dependent on the Donovan mission, Assistant Secretary Martin, or another representative of the President will visit the Presidents of Chile, Mexico and Brazil to convey to them the importance President Kennedy attaches to maintaining hemispheric solidarity by their supporting the following resolutions:

a. An OAS resolution condemning Cuba for its actions which continue to endanger the peace, deploring refusal to allow inspection, condemning the presence of Soviet troops, recommending continued surveillance and continued vigilance against subversive activities, and terminating the invocation of the Rio Treaty on the missile crisis, together with

b. An OAS resolution which would recommend the extension of arms embargo to all items of trade except food

and medicine (fall back position: extension of arms embargo to all strategic items); 2) prohibition of AR ships from transporting embargoed items and deny use of ports to ships in Bloc-Cuba trade; 3) denial of Soviet over-flights and transit rights for flights to Cuba; and
4) a call on other states to take similar action.

6. After obtaining the maximum possible support of the key countries of Mexico, Chile and Brazil, the other OAS members will be approached in Washington and in their respective capitals, simultaneously. It should be possible for this consultation and OAS action on the resolutions to be completed within ten days. Prior to formal COAS approval of the resolutions, we will inform our NATO allies of the impending OAS action.

7. At the first NATO meeting after formal OAS action on the resolutions, we will request that NATO include Cuba on the list of countries to which shipment of COCOM list (strategic) items is prohibited.

8. After NATO decision on our COCOM request, we will seek

to get agreement from Free World industrial nations to prevent shipping of critical spare parts and equipment to Cuba, not on the COCOM list.

9. In addition to four point shipping resolutions, and action under Section 107 of the Foreign Assistance Act, continue to press Free World nations to keep their shipping out of Bloc-Cuba trade.

B. Contingency Planning

New opportunities for accomplishing our objectives may arise either as a result of Bloc action in other parts of the world; as a result of aggressive moves (or isolated hostile actions) by the Castro-Communist regime itself; or as a result of uprisings or internal conflict within Cuba.

Our contingency planning, which will be undertaken immediately, should include preparations for increased multilateral and/or bilateral political and economic measures, large scale use of Cubans who are now inside Cuba; more extensive air activity including both high and low level flights primarily directed toward surveillance and collection of intelligence, and which may also have the effect of embarrassing the Castro government and keeping the Castro forces on continual alert; retaliatory measures, as appropriate, including the imposition of a POL blockade; harrass-

ment of Cuban officials in other countries; severance of communications to Cuba; major acts of sabotage on shipping destined for Cuba and on key installations in Cuba; intensive naval patrols; and, ultimately, the use of U. S. military force. To the extent feasible, U. S. military forces employed against Cuba should be accompanied by U. S. militarily-trained free Cubans and by the armed forces of those Latin American nations desirous of participating in the U. S. effort.

(WITH REVISIONS)

38

CONFIDENTIAL
(WITH TOP SECRET ENCLOSURES)

January 22, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable McGeorge Bundy

COPIES TO : All Members of the NSC Executive Committee

SUBJECT : CUBA - Back-up Papers and a Summary of Recommendations of the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs

The enclosed papers are submitted by the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs.

1. Summary of Coordinator's Recommendations.

2. United States Policy Toward Cuba.

3. United States Policy in Cuba in the Organization of American States.

4. United States Policy Toward the Cuban Brigade.

5. Current Problems Concerning Cuba.

It is understood that the recommendations will be considered by EXCOM at their meeting at 10 a.m. on Thursday, January 24.

William H. Brubeck
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

As stated.

CONFIDENTIAL
(WITH TOP SECRET ENCLOSURES)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

(Prepared for the Meeting of Friday, January 25, 1963, 10 a.m.)

FROM : Coordinator of Cuban Affairs

SUBJECT: Summary of Coordinator's Recommendations

1. U. S. Policy Objectives

The following are the objectives of the U. S. with respect to Cuba:

a. Protecting the security of the United States and the other states of the Organization of American States by assuring that offensive weapons are not reintroduced into Cuba;

b. Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba;

c. Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive military action against other Caribbean states;

d. Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime to direct and support subversion and insurrection within the other OAS states;

e. Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of divorcing the Cuban Government from its support of Sino-Soviet Communist purposes;

f. Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of replacing the Cuban Government with a regime that would break with the Sino-Soviet Bloc, it

being understood that our ultimate objective is replacement of the regime by one fully compatible with the goals of the United States;

g. Maximizing the cost to the Soviet Union of supporting the Castro regime;

h. Maximizing the political isolation of the Castro regime from other Free World states, and especially from states of the OAS. Whenever possible, U. S. actions against Cuba should be multilateral, preferably based upon the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) or on resolutions adopted by the Organization of American States. The newly-won hemispheric solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be jeopardized by seeking OAS actions of marginal value and which might split the hemisphere;

i. Being prepared to meet, with the employment of appropriate U. S. combat elements and/or logistical support, the wide variety of military contingencies that may arise from pursuit of the foregoing objectives; and

j. Producing comprehensive intelligence related to the above objectives.

2. Supporting Actions

Actions in support of these objectives and their time sequence are set forth in the attached paper entitled "U. S. Policy Toward Cuba." They include the four point shipping regulations, OAS sanctions, NATO

action to include Cuba on the COCOM list, and approaches to Free World industrial nations to eliminate sale and shipment of critical items from their Cuban trade. Existing programs will be reviewed and further recommendations made as necessary. Planning for the variety of contingencies related to Cuba will be undertaken at once.

In addition to current covert programs such as intelligence collection, recruitment of Cuban officials, support of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) and other exile activities, infiltration of propaganda materials, and radio broadcasts, the following are recommended for approval and immediate initiation:

a. intensified covert collection of intelligence within Cuba, especially within the regime;

b. support of Cuban exiles who are seeking to return the 26 of July Movement to its original aims.

<u>NOTE</u>: It should be noted that approval of the foregoing actions may impair our ability to accomplish objective b. (Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba) because taking these actions could provide the U.S.S.R. with rationale for maintaining its forces in Cuba. Nevertheless, approval of the foregoing actions is recommended.

3. <u>Cuban Brigade</u>

Brigade leaders should be induced to accept a specially tailored civilian and military program for Brigade members.

The Brigade should be disbanded as a military unit and individual members urged to accept civilian training or to enlist in the existing U. S. military program for Cubans and join a Brigade reserve unit thereafter. Our moral obligation would be discharged to the Brigade members and creation of a privileged class in the exile community would be avoided.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

(Prepared for the Meeting of Friday, January 25, 1963, 4 p.m.)

FROM : Coordinator of Cuban Affairs

SUBJECT: United States Policy Toward Cuba

United States Policy

On November 20, the President set forth the broad guidelines of United States policy with respect to Cuba in the following words:

> "As for our part, if all offensive weapons systems are removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in the future, under adequate verification and safeguards, and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive communist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean. And, as I said in September, 'we shall neither initiate nor permit aggression in this hemisphere.'
>
> "We will not, of course, abandon the political, economic and other efforts of this hemisphere to halt subversion from Cuba, nor our purpose and hope that the Cuban people shall some day be truly free. But these policies are very different from any intent to launch a military invasion of the island."

Objectives

Accordingly, the objectives of United States policy with respect to Cuba are:

1. Protecting the security of the United States and the other states of the Organization of American States (OAS) by assuring that offensive weapons are not reintroduced into Cuba;
2. Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba;
3. Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive military action against other Caribbean states;
4. Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime to direct and support subversion and insurrection within the other Hemisphere states;
5. Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of divorcing the Cuban Government from its support of Sino-Soviet Communist purposes;
6. Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of replacing the Cuban Government with a regime that would break with the Sino-Soviet Bloc, it being understood that our ultimate objective is replacement of the regime by one fully compatible with the goals of the United States;

7. Maximizing the cost to the Soviet Union of supporting the Castro regime;

8. Maximizing the political isolation of the Castro regime from other free world states, and especially from states of the OAS. Whenever possible, U. S. actions against Cuba should be multilateral, preferably based upon the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) or on resolutions adopted by the Organization of American States. The newly-won hemispheric solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be jeopardized by seeking OAS actions of marginal value and which might split the hemisphere;

9. Being prepared to meet, with the employment of appropriate U. S. combat elements and/or logistical support, the wide variety of military contingencies that may arise from pursuit of the foregoing objectives; and

10. Producing comprehensive intelligence related to the above objectives.

Supporting Actions

A. To achieve the foregoing objectives, the U. S. Government will be prepared to increase the political economic, psychological and military pressures, as appropriate opportunities present themselves or can be created. The actions listed below are those requiring immediate approval and would be initiated in the sequence set forth below. Recommendations for further

actions based upon the re-examination of existing programs and upon the development of new programs related to the foregoing objectives will be forthcoming.

1. In addition to current covert program, such as intelligence collection, recruitment of Cuban officials as agents, radio broadcasts, support of the Cuban Revolutionary Council(CRC) and other exile group activities and infiltration of propaganda materials:

   a. Intensify covert collection of intelligence within Cuba, especially within the regime;

   b. Support the efforts of certain Cuban exiles, who are associated with the original aims of the 26 of July Movement and who believe that the Castro regime can be overthrown from within in order that they may: 1) cause a split in the leadership of the regime at the national or provincial levels; and 2) create a political base of popular opposition to the regime; and, 3) secure intelligence;

   c. Assist Cuban exiles in developing a capability to launch balloons carrying leaflets and other propaganda materials from international waters into Cuba. Launch propaganda balloons after an operational capability has been established.

2. With respect to the actions listed below, the results of Mr. Donovan's imminent negotiations with Fidel Castro for freeing the 20-odd American prisoners should first be ascertained. If these actions were taken before the conclusion of the negotiations they could jeopardize the release of the Americans.

3. If these negotiations fail, or when the prisoners are recovered, proceed on the following timetable:

4. Inform NATO and OAS twelve hours in advance of the proclamation of the four point shipping orders. (The proclamation calls for the orders to go into effect in five days). These orders:

    a. Close United States ports to all vessels of a country whose vessels engage in carrying arms to Cuba;

    b. Close United States ports to any ship which has carried goods in the Bloc-Cuba trade within 120 days of the time it seeks to enter a United States port;

    c. Prohibit all United States flag ships and all ships owned by United States nationals or residents from entering any ports of Cuba and from carrying any goods bound to or from Cuba; and

d. Prohibit any cargo sponsored by any department of the United States from being shipped on vessels owned or controlled by persons who own or control vessels engaged in the trade between Cuba and the Soviet Bloc.

5. At the termination of the U. S. Chiefs of Mission Conference - January 20-30, or at a later date dependent on the Donovan mission, Assistant Secretary Martin, or another representative of the President will visit the Presidents of Chile, Mexico and Brazil to convey to them the importance President Kennedy attaches to maintaining hemispheric solidarity by their supporting the following resolutions:

a. An OAS resolution condemning Cuba for its actions which continue to endanger the peace, deploring refusal to allow inspection, condemning the presence of Soviet troops, recommending continued surveillance and continued vigilance against subversive activities, and terminating the invocation of the Rio Treaty on the missile crisis, together with

b. An OAS resolution which would recommend 1) extension of arms embargo to all items of trade except food and medicine (fall back position: extension of arms embargo to all strategic items);

2) prohibition of ships of OAS member states from transportating embargoed items and deny use of ports to ships in Bloc-Cuba trade; 3) denial of Soviet over-flights and transit rights for flights to Cuba; and 4) a call on other states to take similar action.

6. After obtaining the maximum possible support of the key countries of Mexico, Chile and Brazil, the other OAS members will be approached in Washington and in their respective capitals, simultaneously. It should be possible for this consultation and OAS action on the resolutions to be completed within ten days. Prior to formal COAS approval of the resolutions, we will inform our NATO allies of the impending OAS action.

7. At the first NATO meeting after formal OAS action on the resolutions, we will request that NATO include Cuba on the list of countries to which shipment of COCOM list (strategic) items prohibited.

8. After NATO decision on our COCOM request, we will seek to get agreement from Free World industrial nations to prevent shipping of critical spare parts and equipment to Cuba, not on the COCOM list.

9. In addition to the four point shipping resolutions, and action under Section 107 of the Foreign Assistance Act, continue to press Free World nations to keep their shipping out of Bloc-Cuba trade.

B. Contigency Planning

New opportunities for accomplishing our objectives may arise either as a result of Bloc action in other parts of the world; as a result of aggressive moves (or isolated hostile actions) by the Castro-Communist regime itself; or as a result of uprisings or internal conflict within Cuba.

Our contingency planning, which will be undertaken immediately, should include preparations for increased multilateral and/or bilateral political and economic measures, large scale use of Cubans who are now inside Cuba; more extensive air activity including both high and low level flights primarily directed toward surveillance and collection of intelligence, and which may also have the effect of embarrassing the Castro government and keeping the Castro forces on continual alert; retaliatory measures, as appropriate, including the imposition of a POL blockade; harrassment of Cuban officials in other countries; severance of communications to Cuba; major acts of sabotage on shipping destined for Cuba and on key installations to Cuba; intensive naval patrols; and, ultimately, the use of U. S. military force. To the extent feasible, U. S. military forces employed against Cuba should be accompanied by U. S. militarily-trained free Cubans and by the armed forces of those Latin American nations desirous of participating in the U. S. effort.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

(Prepared for the Meeting of Thursday, January 24, 1963, at 10 a.m.)

FROM : Sterling J. Cottrell, Coordinator of Cuban Affairs.

SUBJECT: United States Policy re Cuba in the Organization of American States.

PROBLEM

To determine the future course of action which the U.S. should seek in the OAS with respect to Cuba.

Discussion

The Meeting of Foreign Ministers at Punta del Este in January 1962 put the problem of Cuba clearly in the hemispheric context. At that meeting the Foreign Ministers excluded Cuba from participation in the Inter-American system, declared an arms embargo, and directed vigilance against Cuban subversive activities in the hemisphere.

The U.S. invoked the Rio Treaty on October 22, 1962. Pursuant thereto, the Council of the OAS (COAS) continues to act provisionally as the Organ of Consultation under that Treaty. (OC)

Acting in this capacity, the COAS/OC on October 23 unanimously passed a resolution calling for the withdrawal of all offensive weapons from Cuba, recommending that member states take such action, including the use of armed force, as might be necessary to prevent continued receipt of military supplies from the USSR and to prevent the missiles in Cuba from threatening the peace of the hemisphere. In accordance with the resolution of the COAS/OC, the U.S. instituted its quarantine. Argentina, Venezuela and the Dominican Republic cooperated with us in the quarantine and 9 others offered their assistance and facilities.

With the conclusion of the U.S.-Soviet talks in New York, the Cuban problem reverts to the OAS context. With the Organ of Consultation still in being and committees of the Council continuing to concern themselves with subversion and possible extension of economic sanctions, the other American Republics are waiting for some lead from the U.S. as to what further steps could be taken.

COURSES

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COURSES OF ACTION

(1) Continue the COAS/OC in being under the Rio Treaty but take no further action at present.

Considerations:

The Rio Treaty was invoked and the COAS/OC brought into being for the specific purpose of considering the October missile crisis. If the purpose is considered fulfilled, the COAS/OC should either be terminated or its authorization enlarged to deal with changed circumstances.

(2) Under the Rio Treaty seek a resolution in COAS/OC which condemns Cuba for its actions which continue to endanger the peace, deplores refusal to allow inspection, condemns the presence of Soviet troops and recommends continued surveillance and continued vigilance against subversive activities.

Considerations:

This would promote U.S. objectives vis-a-vis Cuba and would represent one feasible, approprite, immediate step following the conclusion of the U.S.-Soviet New York talks.

Although the language would have to be negotiated, it is believed that unanimity or near-unanimity could be obtained.

Recent statements by Cuban leaders calling for armed insurrection in Latin America would be exploited in this connection.

It could be criticized for not constituting sufficiently vigorous action on the problem of Soviet troops, but it would put the OAS on record against their continued presence in the hemisphere and dramatize Castro's continued military subservience to the Soviet Union.

(3) Terminate the COAS/OC on the missile crisis. This would still leave COAS with its responsibilities under Resolutions II and VIII of Punta del Este (Which provided for a Special Consultative Committee on Security and a Special Committee to study the further suspension of trade.)

Considerations:

This step could be considered logical, since the COAS/OC was called into being to deal only with the October missile crisis.

Taken

Taken by itself, this course of action might raise doubts concerning the inter-American legal basis under which we are continuing our surveillance.

Psychologically, if this were the only action taken, it would appear as though the OAS considered the crisis over, the presence of Soviet troops unimportant, and its principle of verification surrendered (on-site inspection and re-introduction of offensive weapons)

(4) Combine (2) and (3).

Considerations:

This combination of actions is feasible and is likely to obtain unanimity or near-unanimity.

The termination of the COAS/OC makes strong language in the resolution more acceptable to the "soft" minority.

Termination of the OOAS/OC, even accompanied by the proposed resolution, is open to some of the criticism indicated under (3). Much of this could be mitigated if, however, the action is accompanied by the action suggested in (9), which imposes economic sanctions.

(5) Seek to enlarge the basis on which the Rio Treaty was invoked to encompass the presence of Soviet troops and seek a resolution in COAS/OC calling for their withdrawal.

Considerations:

With adequate consultation and preparation, we should be able to obtain a substantial majority.

Such action would give a better basis for urging such additional steps as (6) and (7) and (8).

It would seem undesirable to take this course by itself unless we seriously contemplate taking some additional strong enforcement action.

(6) In addition to (5), seek authorization under the Rio Treaty for collective action, including the use of armed force, to bring about the withdrawal of soviet troops in Cuba if the OAS call is not heeded.

Considerations:

Considerations:

This action should be seriously considered only if we are determined to use all possible means to obtain removal of Soviet troops.

While it should be possible with adequate consultation and preparation to obtain a substantial majority for further political and economic sanctions to help bring about the withdrawal of Soviet troops, it would be difficult to obtain the necessary 2/3 majority for authorization of the use of armed force.

(7) Seek a resolution in the COAS/OCto sever all diplomatic and consular relations with Cuba (probably possible only in conjunction with (5) or (11).

Considerations:

This would be consistent with general U.S. policy to increase the isolation of Cuba, but contrary to some present policies encouraging the maintenance of certain diplomatic missions in Cuba.

Although we could probably obtain the necessary 2/3 vote for such action (particularly if couched as a recommendation) it would be stoutly resisted by Mexico and Brazil and opposed by Chile, Bolivia and Uruguay, whose contrary arguments would have some appeal.

Probably no more than maximum of 15 votes could be obtained for this.

(8) Seek a resolution in the COAS/OC to sever all economic and commercial relations and all communications with Cuba (probably possible only in conjunction with (5) or (11).

Considerations:

The severance of all economic and commercial relations would go beyond our current embargo on trade with Cuba which provides for the exception on humanitarian grounds of the export from the U.S. to Cuba of certain foods, medicines, and medical supplies. Such action would expose us to charges of inhumanity and would probably nullify our public statements that we have no quarrel with the Cuban people.

A number of telecommunications between Latin America and Europe are routed through Cuba. Prohibition of these services would interrupt communications vital to many of our Latin American friends. Further, U.S. communications with Cuba should be maintained to facilitate the transmission of messages in the national interest and those for humanitarian reasons.

These

These considerations would make it extremely difficult to obtain a 2/3 majority in the COAS/OC.

(9) Seek resolution in COAS under Resolution VIII of Punta del Este which would recommend:

(a) extension of arms embargo to all items of trade except food and medicine (Fall back position: extension of arms embargo to all strategic items);

(b) prohibition of AR ships from transporting embargoed items and deny use of ports to ships in Bloc-Cuba trade;

(c) denial of over-flights and transit rights to Soviet aircraft on bloc-Cuba runs. (Points (b) and (c) could also be added to No. (8).)

Considerations:

This is feasible and consistent with our objectives, and could be taken independently of other steps.

With adequate consultation and preparation, near-unanimity should be possible. Brazil would probably not go along. The actual effect of extending the embargo so far as Latin America is concerned is more psychological than practical because Latin American countries ship little except food to Cuba. But it would show forward movement and would provide a useful argument with our allies if it included an appeal to other Free World nations to take similar steps.

It would offer a helpful (though not necessary) basis for U.S. unilateral steps in controlling shipping, implementing 107 of the Foreign Assistance Act, and for urging other states to control Soviet flights to Cuba.

(10) Intensify through COAS and SCCS programs of recommended controls over subversive activities. Seek COAS resolution warning Castro that continued subversive activity may result in action under Rio Treaty.

Considerations:

The course described in the first sentence of (10) is being presently pursued under the decision taken at Punta del Este and should be continued. However, it would be difficult to get unanimous or near unanimous support for the warning resolution because of the reference to the Rio Treaty.

(11)

(11) Invoke Rio Treaty on basis of Castro's continued subversive activities.

Considerations:

If we desire to institute more vigorous collective sanctions vs. the Castro regime for its subversive activities, it would be necessary to invoke the Rio Treaty since the present functions given the COAS and Special Consultative Committee on Security (SCCS) under Resolution II of Punta del Este provide authority only for surveillance and recommendations to governments for control measures.

The primary threat of Castro is his subversive activities in the hemisphere. Should the level of Castro-directed subversive activities in the Hemisphere increase appreciably, this would become a more feasible and desirable course. This becomes an increasing possibility in view of Castro's recent speech inciting insurrection in Latin America.

The basis of any such action should consist of the production of hard evidence of the direct involvement of the Cuban regime in subversive activities in the hemisphere. There is, however, insufficient hard evidence available at this time to obtain COAS action. (A U.S. project to collate all available evidence is under way.)

(12) Assign the functions and operations of the Advisory Defense Committee (ADC) to the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB). This could be done:

(a) by amending the OAS Charter to assign ADC functions to the IADB;

(b) by the COAS seeking the advice of the IADB; or

(c) having the OAS member governments designate their representatives on the IADB to serve also on the ADC.

Considerations:

As to (a), the proposed amendment would have to be referred to the Quito Conference (whose date has not been set). Moreover, amendment of the Charter is a difficult and tortuous process and requires ratification by 2/3 of the member governments.

As to (b), this is a feasible course of action which the COAS/OC could take without specific authority. It might be difficult, however, depending on the circumstances, to persuade the Council of the desirability of such action.

As

As to (c), member governments could take this course on an individual basis, but it would be necessary to convince them that "exceptional circumstances" prevailed which would justify this action under the OAS Charter.

COORDINATOR'S RECOMMENDATION

In selecting the optimum combination of actions to take with respect to the OAS, the political feasibility and international complications were key factors which I have carefully considered.

Courses of action (2) (3) (4) (9) (10) and (12) would advance us toward our objective, would be politically feasible, and would involve minimum adverse international effects. We could probably obtain a near-unanimous vote in the OAS for these courses except (10) and (12).

Courses (2) (5) (6) (9) (10) (11) and (12) would advance us considerably further toward our objective, but (6) and (11) particularly could create a split in hemispheric unity, and would involve adverse international effects, including a probable acute confrontation with the USSR.

I believe courses (1) (7) and (8) will not serve our best interests at this time.

I recommend that we take immediately courses (4) and (9).

Course (4) calls for (a) a COAS/OC resolution under the Rio Treaty which condemns Cuba for its actions which continue to endanger the peace, deplores refusal to allow inspection, condemns the presence of Soviet troops and recommends continued surveillance and continued vigilance against subversive activities, and (b) terminate the COAS/OC on the missile crisis. This would still leave COAS with its responsibilities under Resolutions II and VIII of Punta del Este which provided for a Special Consultative Committee on Security and for the COAS to study the further suspension of trade.

Course (9) calls for a resolution in COAS under Resolution VIII of Punta del Este which would recommend:

(a) extension of arms embargo to all items of trade except food and medicine (Fallback position: extension of arms embargo to all strategic items);

(b)

(b) prohibition of AR ships from transporting embargoed items and deny use of ports to ships in Bloc-Cuba trade;

(c) denial of overflights and transit rights to Soviet aircraft on Bloc-Cuba runs.

(d) a call upon other Free World nations to take similar actions.

Rationale

The steps I recommend would start movement forward towards our objective, carrying the OAS with us, without committing us to any further action.

After these initial measures are in effect, we should assess the situation and determine the feasibility of moving forward with any of the remaining courses of action, or any new courses which may be opened to us by events.

I believe we should develop our pressures steadily and gradually, bringing the OAS along with us, and keeping the situation under constant review for the optimum opportunity to initiate additional measures.

I do not believe we should take a track now which will break hemispheric unity. We may need unity later in an emergency.

Neither do I believe we should push the OAS into probable acute confrontation with the USSR at this time.

Both of these prices the U. S. may find it necessary to pay for action at a later date but not now, in my opinion.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

(Prepared for the Meeting of Thursday, January 24, 1963, at 10 a.m)

FROM : Coordinator of Cuban Affairs

SUBJECT: Cuban Brigade

PROBLEM

To determine the future of the Cuban Brigade (participants in the Bay of Pigs invasion recently released from Cuban prisons), and other Cubans who participated in or trained for the invasion. To determine the future of existing Cuban training programs.

DISCUSSION

Approximately 1500 Cubans participated in the Bay of Pigs invasion (known as Brigade 2506), the great majority of whom were captured. In December 1962 over 1100 were released.

A decision on the future of the Cuban Brigade and other Cubans trained militarily by the U. S. must logically proceed from whatever over all policy the U. S. adopts toward Cuba.

A trained Cuban Brigade would be of relatively marginal military value because of its quantitative limitations and restricted military capability, but its

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politico-psychological value as a symbol of Cuban resistance to Castro/Communism may more than compensate for its limited military utility.

Any moral responsibility to the Brigade must be weighed.

COURSES OF ACTION

Three courses of action appear feasible with respect to the Brigade's future.

(1) Induce the Brigade to disband as a military unit, with no further U. S. special assistance.

If this policy were adopted, Brigade members and their families would be eligible for the benefits now accorded to all needy Cuban refugees in the Miami area (approximately 105,000). These benefits are equivalent to those received by American citizens in Dade County, Florida who are in need. The principal ones include: financial grants of up to $100 per month for a family and up to $60 a month for an individual; hospitalization and out-patient facilities at county and private hospitals for acute illnesses; distribution of surplus food commodities; employment counseling; resettlement, including transportation and a transition grant; foster care for unaccompanied children; special English and refresher courses for doctors and lawyers at University of Miami; a student loan program for Cubans attending U. S. universities provides up to $1,000 a year; supplemental assistance to Dade County, Florida, is provided by HEW to cover 50 percent of cost of educating Cuban refugee children in primary and secondary schools; payment for a substantial part of special language courses and vocational training; and physical examinations and inoculations at time of entry into the U. S.

DOD has a program providing for enlistment in the U. S. Army of those Cuban nationals between the ages of 18 and 30 who pass entrance requirements. (A similar program for the Navy covers ages 18-26). The program provides 20-22 weeks of training at the conclusion of which they are transferred as individuals to U. S. Reserve status. They are not required to know English. A two week period for resettlement is also provided at the termination of the training.

Another DOD program enables former officers of the Cuban Army, Navy and Air Force to volunteer on a highly selective basis for programs in the U. S. Armed Forces. Training periods are from 20 to 36 weeks. English is necessary. The officers are in civilian status. They receive a salary from the Cuban Revolutionary Council and a per diem through DOD from AID funds which are no longer available.

Considerations:

This course of action would provide the simplest and most economical way of disposing of the problem, provide equal treatment for all eligible Cuban refugees; equivalent to benefits offered to American citizens.

Individual Cubans could continue to be accepted for service in the U. S. Armed Forces and their language, skill and country knowledge could be distributed through various U. S. units which might be used in an invasion.

The unsatisfactory aspects of this course are that it would appear to run counter to expectations of the Brigade as a result of Administration statements and actions; it would result in substantial loss of whatever "mystique" the Brigade possesses, which might be useful in unifying Cuban refugees; and a phasing out of this kind would probably engender some adverse political reaction domestically as well as from the Brigade and its sympathizers. Also it might have an undesirable effect on opinion in Latin America and other parts of the Free World concerning the determination of the United States

to unseat the Castro regime, and would lend weight to arguments that the U. S. may be leaning toward coexistence with the Castro regime.

(2) Train the Brigade and Cubans in training as a unit. Maintain and support them as a military reserve component of the U. S. Armed Forces.

Considerations:

Under this course of action whater "mystique" the Brigade possesses in the anti-Castro community could perhaps be exploited in the struggle for Cuban liberation, and used to bring about greater unity in the Cuban anti-Castro exile community.

It would constitute an immediate political and psychological advantage by demonstrating to the Cubans within Cuba, to the Cuban exile community, and to Latin Americans, the U. S. determination to establish a striking force symbolic of U. S. intent to overthrow the present Cuban regime.

It would satisfy one of the principal desires expressed by top Brigade leaders and would promote prestige and esprit among its members. It would appear to be in consonance with the statements and actions of the Administration in connection with the future of the Brigade.

But it would inevitably become a focal point for Cuban exile political activities in the Miami area, and morale, discipline and esprit would be difficult to maintain over the long term without early employment to retake Cuba. It could generate domestic political and military criticism by incorporating organized alien groups in the U. S. armed forces reserve component. There is a

risk that an impulsive, irrational act by Brigade members, as members of the U. S. reserve forces, could be a source of serious embarrassment to the U. S .

(3) Tailor a special civilian and military program for Brigade members. Encourage the Brigade to continue as a "fraternal" unit similar to the "Flying Tigers". Encourage those Brigade members who enter the current military training program for Cubans to establish a Brigade military reserve component which other U. S. militarily-trained Cubans could join.

Under existing authority, HEW could provide the following additional benefits for Brigade members in need, over and above those now offered: special employment counseling and placement service; extended student loans to provide for all institutional costs such as tuition, books, etc., even if this exceeds $1,000 per year (living costs to be provided by another agency); expanded vocational training in the Miami area; increased financial assistance to needy persons while in training; increased distribution of surplus food (with approval of the Department of Agriculture).

The following additional programs could be undertaken by HEW upon Presidential determination that such action would contribute to the defense and security of the United States or advance its foreign policy interests: scholarship grants for students; loans for vocational training anywhere in the United States; an expanded training program similar to a G. I. Bill of Rights, in the United States and/or abroad. The cost of these additional programs, assuming an expenditure of $2,500 per person per year would be about $2.5 million.

Establishment of additional programs, after a Presidential determination, would increase costs even more, and be subject to wider criticism as "unnecessary" privileges for Brigade members.

COORDINATORS'S RECOMMENDATION

1. I recommend course (3), a specially tailored program for Brigade members.

2. I recommend against a Presidential determination providing broader privileges for Brigade members.

3. I recommend no change in existing U. S. military training programs for Cubans, except that a Brigade reserve unit should be authorized and other Cuban reservists should be permitted to join.

4. I recommend that the Brigade be induced rather than forced to accept this proposal, and intend to arrange consultation with them immediately if this course of action is approved.

Rationale

Lacking an immediate military use for the Brigade we should disband the Brigade as such. Since we may in the future desire the presence in the U. S. Armed Forces of militarily-trained Cubans, we should encourage Brigade members to enlist in the existing military training program for Cubans and to enter a U. S. Reserve Unit thereafter.

Our programs should be designed to encourage the Brigade members to melt back into the exile community and engage in constructive pursuits pending the liberation of Cuba. We should offer them some special assistance but not to the extent that they become a perpetual privileged class within the community. Presidential action on their behalf would single them out unnecessarily.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

(Prepared for the Meeting of Thursday, January 23, 1963 at 10 a.m)

FROM : Coordinator of Cuban Affairs

SUBJECT: Current Problems Concerning Cuba

1. Verification of withdrawal of missiles.
2. Removal of Soviet troops from Cuba.
3. Release of all Americans in Cuban prisons plus Mr. Robert Geddes, British subject married to a U. S. citizen. X
4. Cuban subversive activities in the Western Hemisphere.
5. Future activities of Mr. Donovan. - Prog. to mif
6. Policy on low-level aerial surveillance as a political weapon against the Castro regime.
7. Policy re such Cuban groups as Alpha 66, Cuban Revolutionary Council and exile groups.
8. Preparation of a Psychological Annex to the basic paper on U. S. Policy Toward Cuba. X
9. Policy on extent of attributability acceptable in intensified intelligence collection; Policy on illegal infiltration and exfiltration.
10. Policy on resumption of KLM, Mexicana and Iberia flights to Cuba.

SECRET

This document consists of 4 pages
No. 1 of 10 Copies, Series B

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

S-E-C-R-E-T
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COUNTRY	Cuba	REPORT NO.	CS DB-3/652,924
SUBJECT	Analysis of the Cuban Situation by the Italian Embassy in Habana	DATE DISTR.	17 January 1963
		NO. PAGES	4
		REFERENCES	RD-W-2088 RD-W-2107
DATE OF INFO.	6 December 1962		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Italy, Rome (21 December 1962)	FIELD REPORT NO.	

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A qualified, astute observer (B) who has contacts in the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Appraisal of Content: 2, that the document is genuine.

The following is a translation of a report dated 6 December 1962 sent by the Italian Embassy in Habana to the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

In my dispatch of 9 November I reported on some of the considerations regarding the consequences which the recent crisis could have on the international position of Cuba. I will now add some comments on the conjecture which has been reported by some members of our representations.

1) The possibility that there will soon be a loosening of the political and economic ties with the USSR appears to me to be nil at this time. The fact that the talks with Mikoyan were long and difficult and that Castro expressed in private his opinion on Khrushchev (wishing that Stalin were still alive) does not mean that he can and will renounce that Soviet assistance which is vital to him. This assistance cannot be replaced by the Chinese.

Certainly the Chinese Ambassador to Habana will have done everything possible to convince Castro to resist (and in fact the latter held firm on the question of inspection). Certainly the activity of the Chinese representation here is intense. But the Peiping Government cannot replace the USSR in economic assistance. It does not seem probable to me that /China/ can furnish more than it has furnished to date, which consists of second quality foodstuffs, rather shoddy

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wool and silk material, and many trifles of which the stores in Habana are full. As for machinery and spare parts, /China/ is not in a position to compete with that merchandise supplied by the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland.

In substance Castro, even if he cannot exactly be defined as pro-Khrushchev, is tied to the USSR in such a way that he cannot for any reason release himself. I recall in this regard that on 2 November, after the visit of U Thant during the most acute moment of the crisis in Cuban-Soviet relations, he declared, "We are above all Marxist-Leninists and friends of the USSR. There will be no breaches in our relations."

Given this, I feel that the statements of the vice director of TASS as reported by the Embassy in Helsinki are a good resume of the situation, i.e., a) Soviet leaders have for some time felt perplexed with regard to Castro's character and person because he is reluctant to be "guided" docilely by Moscow. b) The USSR will continue to give all its economic support to Cuba because otherwise its prestige would suffer a grave blow particularly in Latin America.

2) Also excluded, it appears to me, is the possibility that the revolutionary regime of Castro can be changed into a "Titoist" regime. It is comprehensible that, as Ambassador Zoppi reported, some "non-aligned" countries and even some Latin American countries desire such a change and are doing everything possible to provoke it. It is also possible that some Cubans share these sentiments. But, in my opinion, it is impossible that such a change can take place while Castro is in power. As I pointed out in my previous report, it is not in Castro's temperament to become "non-aligned", to imitate anyone, and even less to take Tito as a model. Therefore Castro would have to be eliminated, and this possibility seems very remote.

3) As I noted in my 9 November report it is difficult for Castro to remain calm. Therefore the revolutionary regime will continue with all means at its disposition to disseminate subversive propaganda in the whole continent, as demonstrated by the fact that all the states of Latin America (including Mexico) are taking strong measures against the dissemination of this propaganda. But it is doubtful that today Castro can do much more and that he constitutes a real menace to the security of other countries, if only because he lacks the necessary funds. I tend to share the opinion of the Ambassador to Brazil that the Cuban leaders are trying to concentrate all their subversive efforts in one country, and that they have selected Venezuela for various reasons, including the old ill feeling between Castro and Betancourt. I note in passing that, according to what was told me by the aforementioned Ambassador, during the recent meeting of the OAS the Venezuelan representative accused the Cubans of promoting the recent attempts in his country but, when asked to furnish proof, he was unable to do so.

It would certainly be highly desirable if a serious pressure action on Cuba could be exercised within a purely Latin American framework as pointed out by our Embassy in

Buenos Aires. But it is an extremely remote possibility. The countries which could do it do not have the necessary material means. A partial solution would worsen the situation and a definitive solution could be directed only by Washington. I think therefore that only pressure which is accompanied by material strength can obtain results in Cuba.

In conclusion, in judging the Cuban situation it is necessary first to keep in mind the personality and temperament of Fidel Castro, the influence which he has on a part of the population, and finally his deep-rooted hate of the United States. It is useless to say that the Cuban revolutionary regime, purged of some fanaticism, could be a good example for other Latin American countries. This would not take into account the mentality of the Cuban leaders and particularly their chief, who accepts council from no one and intends to imitate no one. Furthermore it is too late to select another path. As Guevara said the other day in an interview for the Daily Worker, "this is a battle to the death with the United States in which the most possible damage must be done to the adversary."

Undoubtedly, after the events of October and November, Fidel Castro is in a descending parabola. But how long this descent will last no one can say today. The only certain thing is that the economic situation is getting worse every day and therefore the revolutionary regime needs the assistance of the whole Communist world. Only last night a commercial mission headed by Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, who heads the most important institution of the country - the Institute for Agrarian Reform - left. The mission will go first to Moscow and then to Peiping. It is evident that new agreements must be negotiated, as well as new credits, to permit the Cubans to last through 1963, which will certainly be the most difficult year.

But economic assistance can permit this country to survive, not resolve its problems. For a definitive solution it would be necessary in the first place for the Cubans to learn to work seriously and to use intelligently the machines which they have. Agricultural production, principally sugar cane, as has been recognized even by the fanatics of industrialization, constitutes the basis of the Cuban economy. But how can they hope for a good harvest if, for example, the tractors furnished by Hungary which should last ten years are unusable after two years?

It is not possible to forecast the fall of the regime solely on the basis of economic factors. The people suffer from an insufficiency of food and clothing. But for another year they will find a way to get by.

Summed up, the decisive and at the same time prudent policy followed by the United States in the recent months is the best and perhaps the only policy. After the danger of strategic weapons has been eliminated, the wisest measure is to let the situation mature. Certainly Fidel Castro will

present some more "headaches" to the United States; but the atmosphere is changed and -even without counting on the hypothetical coup d'etat of Castro which would force the solution of the problem - one can hope for a perhaps not too distant day when all will get tired of him. So long as the Cubans insist on the known five points and the United States refuses any guarantees, so long as the USSR is obliged to feed Castro to permit his survival, the less uncomfortable position appears to me to be that of the Government in Washington.

JFK Assassination System Date: 6/24/201

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TO : MR. JOHN H. CRIMMINS

TITLE : INTERDEPARTMENTAL COORDINATING COMMITTEE OF CUBAN AFFAIRS: REPORT ON THE STATUS OF ACTIONS DESIGNED TO COUNTER SUBVERSION

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JFK Assassination Records Review

Department of the Army EO 13526
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Review Date 8/12/2015 By Kurt Stover, ADA

Lt Col Haig/78029/8 Jan 64/md

10 JAN 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JOHN H. CRIMMINS
Coordinator of Cuban Affairs
Department of State

SUBJECT: Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs: Report on the Status of Implementation of Actions Designed to Counter Subversion

Enclosed herewith is the Report on the Status of Implementation of Actions Designed to Counter Subversion for the period 1 December 1963-1 January 1964. The format of this report adheres to the topic outline disseminated at the meeting of the Subcommittee on Subversion, September 13, 1963.

It is requested that this office be provided with 12 copies of the final report. It is assumed that each of the representatives will have an opportunity to consider the final report before it is forwarded.

Signed
Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
General Counsel

Enclosure
As Stated

Mr. Califano
Lt Col Haig
ASG

STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TO COUNTER SUBVERSION FOR THE PERIOD 1 DEC 63 - 1 JAN 64

3. Control of Clandestine Movement of Guerrillas and Arms.

a. General A. P. O'Meara, USA, Commander-in-Chief, US Southern Command, met with Vice Admiral Ray C. Needham, USN, Chief of Staff to Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic and members of their respective staffs during the period 11 to 15 December 1963. Discussions encompassed methods of improving the existing surveillance/ intercept system throughout the Caribbean. Existing US plans were reviewed, continuance of the ship visit program instituted in November 1963 was agreed upon, and combined exercises to test country capabilities to intercept simulated intruding ships were planned for early execution. Discussions by General O'Meara were continued with the Secretary of the Army and with representatives of the State Department, CIA and the Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

b. Commander Mine Division 44 with minesweepers USS STURDY and USS SWERVE completed visits to Central American ports in Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Guatemala. Deficiencies in the capabilities of all three countries to counter subversive infiltration were reported. Additional visits, designed to assist in correcting deficiencies, are planned. USCINCSO also plans, through Commanders of US Military Groups, to assist in developing existing capabilities.

c. Based upon information from CAS Panama representative on 8 November, USCINCSO directed US operations to find a small boat which reportedly left the Colon Free Zone with a cargo of arms destined for the vicinity of the Colombian-Venezuelan border. Daylight visual aerial surveillance flights were instituted immediately, with radar-equipped aircraft taking over surveillance during hours of darkness. Colombian and Venezuelan authorities were notified through US diplomatic channels, but no direct communications between US surveillance aircraft and Colombian forces in the vicinity of the probable landing area were established before termination on 14 November. This effort, though not successful, has evoked considerable effort by US State Department, Defense Department and CIA activities to improve capabilities and procedures.

d. Action was commenced in the Colon area to provide means to keep track of ships and boats entering or leaving the Colon Free Zone in order to monitor the movements of those suspected of carrying contraband. Assistance to USCINCSO was provided from the continental United States in carrying out surveys as to equipment required on as secretive a basis as possible, and special optical equipment to include probable night television was approved by the Secretary of the Army for expedited delivery to USCINCSO.

e. A joint survey and mobile training team from USCINCSO continued assistance to Venezuelan authorities in improving indigenous capabilities for surveillance and interception of intruders.

f. A US Southern Command Operations Plan 50-63 was developed to provide for three levels of operational assistance to Venezuela in surveillance and intercept operations. Representatives of the US Strike Command and the Air Defense Command visited USCINCSO to assist in developing detailed supporting plans.

g. Information was obtained by USCINCSO concerning in-country communications capabilities of Colombia and Venezuela to receive and disseminate surveillance information provided by US forces.

5. Strengthening of Counterinsurgency Capabilities.

a. US Army training included the following: 13 students from 6 countries completed CI operations course in the Canal Zone; 8 students from 5 countries completed CI orientation course in the Canal Zone; 24 students from 8 countries completed Military Intelligence course in the Canal Zone; 11 Chilean students completed special Military Intelligence orientation course; three Canal Zone-based CI Mobile Training Teams (MTT) carried out training programs in Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela; and one Canal Zone-based CI MTT commenced a training program of Panamanian National Guardsmen.

b. US Navy training included the following:

(1) The Small Craft Inspection and Training Team (SCIATT) completed training the third class of Central American nationals, bringing to 63 the total number of students trained since May 1963.

(2) The semiannual maintenance check of two Panamanian 40 foot Coast Guard Utility Boats (CGUBs) was commenced on 16 December by an on-the-job training (OJT) program. Work should be completed by 10 January 1964.

(3) Work was temporarily suspended on two 40 foot CGUBs in Costa Rica due to the lack of critical spare parts. It is anticipated work will be completed by 15 January 1964.

c. Increases in the stock levels of the Canal Zone stockpile of riot control equipment were directed on 20 December 1963. Increases will enable USCINCSO to respond to urgent requests from Latin American governments. Buildup concerned primarily tear gas grenades, gas masks, carbines and shotgun ammunition.

d. Final arrangements were made with the Bertram Boat Company of Miami for delivery of 10 outboard-inboard fiber glass boats to Cabamis, Venezuela for use in the Lake Maracaibo area. Boats, spares and an MTT will be delivered to destination by 14 January 1964.

e. Action has been taken to expedite the shipment of radio-electronic gear to Jamaica for use in the joint surveillance program designed to combat Castro-inspired insurgency in the Caribbean area. Equipment should arrive in Jamaica within the next few weeks.

f. A US Air Force Air Commando MTT demonstrated in Asuncion, Paraguay.

8. Other Special Actions.

a. Latin American Military Communications System (LAMCS) in Ecuador and Nicaragua and the Ground-to-Air facilities in Ecuador have been completed.

b. Authority to proceed with the LAMCS in Honduras was received from the US State Department on 17 December 1963. This facility should be completed within 120 days.

c. Emergency power units to improve reliability of US Army and Air Force Mission radio stations in Colombia and Venezuela, shipped from the United States, arrived in Bogota and Caracas respectively.

A S G O S A	353 CUBA SECRET	091.411	020 Staff	031.2 JCS	201 Reynolds, John

1-2-63

From: John Reynolds, KCS
To: C/Staff
Subj: Interdepartmental Coordinating Comte of Cuban Affairs: Rpt on Status of Implementation of Actions Designed to Counter Subversion (U)

rw Incl: None
Dis: Col. Haig 1-3-64
FW 1-30-63

OSA 3004

OSA 353 Cuba 1-2-63 FW 1-30-63

OSA FORM 3
31 MAY 49

THIS PAPER BELONGS TO:
Administrative Support Group Division, Office of the Secretary of the Army

★ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1963—683865

SAOGC/LtColHaig/lc/59856/18Dec63

OSA 353 CUBA

December 18, 1963

12-18-63

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL WADE ROBERT
Office of the Secretary of Defense
(International Security Affairs)

SUBJECT: State Paper Entitled "Terrorism in the Latin American Countries on the Critical Insurgency List"

FW 1-30-63

Enclosed herewith is a paper prepared by a member of the Cuban Coordinating Committee at the Department of State (Mr. William Bowdler, 182-3736) for use by the Department of State representative at the Special Group (Counterinsurgency) meeting on December 19, 1963. The paper was provided to this office by State on December 18 with the request that Department of Defense comments, particularly on the basic memorandum, be obtained. Although this office is very much concerned with the aspects of the paper which deal with the problem of Castro-inspired subversion, the broader implications of the paper pertain to the Latin American area and the military assistance programs related thereto. These are, of course, matters of primary concern to your office. Therefore, the attached paper is forwarded to you for appropriate action with the request that your comments, if any, be coordinated with this office so that they can be correlated to actions currently under the purview of this office.

Signed:
A. M. Haig
Lt Colonel, USA

for Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
General Counsel

Enclosure
As Stated

OSA, OSG
Mr Califano
LtCol Haig

SAOGC/LtColHaig/lc/59856/18Dec63

December 18, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, DDR&E
Office of the Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT: Anti-Sabotage Operations in Latin America

The Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs (ICCOCA) has recently considered a CIA proposal to provide guidance to US firms in Latin America confronted with Castro-communist inspired sabotage of their facilities and assets. CIA has contracted for the preparation of a report which will consolidate the experiences of several US firms in Latin America in combatting sabotage. After consideration by the ICCOCA this report will be furnished through our country teams in Latin America to local US firms to assist them in instituting appropriate anti-sabotage programs.

I would be most grateful if you would prepare a brief report designed to supplement the CIA project which would include enumeration of general guidelines which might be adopted by US firms in the Latin American area in combatting sabotage. In particular, an enumeration of known appropriate anti-sabotage devices available on the commercial market together with the manufacturer's names would be most helpful.

A member of my staff has discussed this project with Mr. Phelps of your staff, who has indicated that DDR&E might be of assistance in this matter based on a recent field trip to Venezuela where problems peculiar to that area were studied at the request of the US Ambassador. It is also possible that commercial devices developed for South Vietnam would have applicability in Latin America. Because this project is designed for distribution to several Latin American countries, it is requested that where possible guidelines be developed which might have general application throughout Latin America, but with emphasis on key subversive target areas. Present plans anticipate finalization of this project by December 23, 1963.

Signed:
A. M. Haig
Lt Colonel, USA
for Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
General Counsel

OSA, ASG
Mr Califano
LtCol Haig

SECRET

17 DEC 1963

OSA 353 CUBA 12-17-63

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JOHN H. CRIMMINS
Coordinator of Cuban Affairs
Department of State

SUBJECT: Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs: Report on the Status of Implementation of Actions Designed to Counter Subversion

Enclosed herewith is the Report on the Status of Implementation of Actions Designed to Counter Subversion for the period 1 November-1 December 1963. The format of this report adheres to the topic outline disseminated at the meeting of the Subcommittee on Subversion, September 13, 1963.

FW 1-30-63

It is requested that this office be provided with 12 copies of the final report. It is assumed that each of the representatives will have an opportunity to consider the final report before it is forwarded.

Signed
Joseph A. Califano, Jr.

Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
General Counsel

Enclosure
As Stated

Mr. Califano
Lt Col Haig
ASG

SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
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OSA, ASG Control No. 2975-E

STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TO COUNTER SUBVERSION FOR THE PERIOD 1 NOV - 1 DEC 1963

3. Control of Clandestine Movement of Guerrillas and Arms.

a. On 9 November 1963 the Commander-in-Chief, US Southern Command (USCINCSO) advised the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) of reports concerning suspected subversive arms smuggling into Venezuela or Colombia from the Colon Free Zone, Panama. USCINCSO initiated surveillance at first light on 9 November 1963 to detect and track surface vessels which might be engaged in the subversive traffic. The JCS directed the Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic (CINCLANT) to commence surveillance with radar equipped aircraft and to keep USCINCSO advised of all information. Suspected craft were not positively identified or intercepted; however, there were indications that an unidentified surface vessel off the Rio Hacha area of Colombia and in Colombian waters was probably in contact with small boats operating from the Colombian coastline at night.

b. As directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, USCINCSO developed a plan under which the United States could provide assistance to Venezuelan forces, on three levels of participation, designed to prevent the surreptitious movement of Castro-Communist arms and personnel into Venezuela. To be fully effective, the plan calls for US elements operating from Venezuelan territory which is not considered a likely subject for approval by the Government of Venezuela at the present time.

c. A joint survey and mobile training team of eleven men was provided by USCINCSO to Venezuela on 22 November 1963, upon approval of the concept by the Government of Venezuela. The purpose of the team is to train Venezuelan military personnel in organizing and operating a joint operations center; in improving capabilities in the plotting and coordination of intelligence data, and aerial photography; and in coordinating all Venezuelan military and paramilitary organizations involved in surveillance and intercept operations.

5. Strengthening of Counterinsurgency Capabilities.

a. Two minesweepers from the US Atlantic Command, USS STURDY and USS SWERVE with Commander Mine Division 44 embarked, commenced a schedule of visits to Caribbean ports in Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Guatemala. Visits are intended to assist each country in improving its coastal and off-shore surveillance effort, to improve intercept capabilities with respect to the prevention of infiltration of arms and subversive personnel through the countries' territorial waters, and to establish procedures which would provide for US assistance in final interception when requested. Visits in November, under the supervision of USCINCSO, covered Puerto Limon, Costa Rica; Bluefields and Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua; and Puerto Barrios, Guatemala.

b. Seventy-eight Latin American officers, previously enrolled, were in attendance during November at courses stressing counterinsurgency conducted by the US Army Canal Zone school. Two officers graduated from the US Army Counterinsurgency Course at Fort Bragg, North Carolina on 12 November 1963 and two additional officers are now in attendance.

c. Seven US Army Counterinsurgency Mobile Training Teams based in the Canal Zone, consisting of twenty officers and thirty-five enlisted men, provided training in seven Latin American countries during November.

d. Nine enlisted men from Chile were in attendance at Marine Corps schools at Camp Pendleton, California in November.

e. US Coast Guard training in small boat operations was provided in the Canal Zone for fifteen students from five Caribbean countries in the operation and maintenance of forty-foot Coast Guard utility boats. A Coast Guard mobile training team of one officer and two enlisted men, based in the Canal Zone, provided training in Costa Rica for the reconditioning of Coast Guard utility boats. Five members of the Costa Rican Guardia Civil are receiving on-the-job training in connection with reconditioning of the boats.

f. A US Air Force counterinsurgency team of five officers and eight enlisted men, based in the Canal Zone, provided training for Ecuadorian Air Force personnel in Ecuador.

g. At the request of USCINSO, and with the enthusiastic support of the Venezuelan Government, a small boat program has been initiated to provide security for the Lake Maracaibo region. Arrangements have been made through the US Navy under Military Credit Sales agreement for the manufacture of six (6) 25-foot and four (4) 31-foot inboard-outboard, fiberglass hull boats by Bertram Boat Company, Miami, for delivery in December 1963 or early January 1964. A SEAL-trained Mobile Training Team (MTT) of one officer and five enlisted men will be provided by the Navy and will report to the equipment supplier in time to become fully acquainted with the boats by 15 December. The MTT will accompany the boats to Venezuela and will remain up to two months in country to provide necessary familiarization training.

6. <u>Exchange of Intelligence on Cuban Surveillance.</u>

a. Upon receipt of intelligence pertaining to suspected arms smuggling from the Canal Free Zone, Panama into Colombia or Venezuela, the USCINCSO relayed this information to Colombia and Venezuela by the Military Alerting System. The US Ambassador to Colombia conveyed the information to the Government of Colombia. Colombian Navy and Air Force elements were assigned increased surveillance missions in the Caribbean coastal area of Colombia by Colombian military authorities and results of their surveillance activities were provided to USCINCSO by the US Military Group Commander in Colombia. The results of US air surveillance of the expected route and landing area, undertaken by US Air Force and Naval air elements were transmitted to the US Military Group Commander in Colombia for passage to the Colombian military authorities.

b. The motor vessel BLUE STAR, of Panamanian registry, was apprehended by Ecuadorian authorities in November 1963 as it was attempting the clandestine introduction of contraband articles

into Ecuador. Ship movement information had been provided to the US Naval Attache Bogota by the District Intelligence Officer of the Fifteenth Naval District. There was no apparent involvement of Cuban arms or Cuban trained personnel in this instance.

7. Other Special Actions.

a. Construction is now in progress on the Latin American Military Communications System (LAMCS) in Quito, Ecuador; the terminal station is expected to be completed in December 1963. The station in Nicaragua is expected to be completed in early December 1963.

b. In response to a request by USCINCSO, action was taken on 15 November 1963 to expedite delivery of communications equipment required to implement a Jamaican integrated coastal surveillance system. The system was originally approved as part of the $500 thousand one-time grant of Military Assistance material directed by the President in April 1963, but world-wide shortages of specific items threatened to delay shipment in some cases until FY 1965. In view of the urgency of this requirement, priorities were adjusted to provide delivery by 1 January 1964. The items include:

12	AN/GRC radios and installation kits
3	AN/ARC 3 radios
1	AN/PSM 6
1	Wattmeter

c. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Office of Public Safety, State-AID, are studying the possibility of increasing the stock level of certain items of Riot Control Equipment in the Canal Zone, in order to meet rapidly and effectively multiple contingencies that may occur in Latin America. In the past, the size of some requests have necessitated shipment of certain items directly from the United States, with resultant increase in cost and time. USCINCSO has been asked for his recommendations on stock levels.

CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

2 DEC 1963

In reply refer to:
I-28596/63

OSA 353 Cuba 12-2-63 f/w 1-30-63

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR., THE GENERAL COUNSEL, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

SUBJECT: Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs: Report on Status of Implementation of Actions to Counter Subversion (U)

The enclosure to your Memorandum No. 81, subject as above, dated 26 November 1963, has been received. The report appears to be complete and appropriate for submission to the President.

SIGNED

Frank K. Sloan
Deputy Assistant Secretary

Orig - Mr Califano

SECRETARY OF THE ARMY OFFICE
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ASG

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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

CONFIDENTIAL

26 NOV 1963

MEMORANDUM NO. 81 FOR GENERAL EARLE G. WHEELER (JCS)
MR. FRANK K. SLOAN, Dep Asst Sec/Def ISA (Regional Affairs)
MAJOR GENERAL J. D. ALGER, USA
REAR ADMIRAL W. F. A. WENDT, USN
MAJOR GENERAL J. W. CARPENTER, III, USAF
BRIGADIER GENERAL C. J. QUILTER, USMC

SUBJECT: Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs: Report on Status of Implementation of Actions Designed to Counter Subversion (U)

Reference: DA Memo #64, subject as above, dated September 19, 1963

Attached herewith is a final draft of the Report to the President of the Subcommittee on Cuban Subversion on Progress Made During September 1963 in Curbing Cuban Subversion in Latin America.

It is requested that comments, if any, be provided this office by 1200 hours, 2 December 1963. The Department of Defense portion of subject report is based on submissions provided in response to referenced memorandum.

Signed
Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
General Counsel

Enclosure
As Stated

cc: Mr. Yarmolinsky (OSD)

Lt Col Haig
Mr. Califano
ASG

DRAFT
11/13/63

SECRET

REPORT OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE

on CUBAN SUBVERSION

ACTION TAKEN DURING SEPTEMBER 1963 IN CURBING CUBAN SUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA

SECRET

DRAFT
11/13/63

I. Control of Travel to and From Cuba

Department of State

a. Instructed Embassy Tunis to call to the attention of the Foreign Ministry our concern at increased evidence of Aeroflot attempts to establish North Africa routes to Cuba, especially through Algeria, and our conviction that Tunisia has a valid case in thwarting any Bloc civil air penetration of Africa.

b. Instructed Embassy Conakry to contact Guinean Government officials, reminding them of their past assurances that no Aeroflot flights to Cuba would be permitted to use Conakry facilities, and to express our concern at recent indications that Aeroflot was preparing to establish service to Cuba via Conakry.

c. Instructed Consulate Fort au France to investigate and report on alleged landing and refuelling of Cubana aircraft at Guadeloupe. Also double-checked directly with the Shell Company, the supplier of the fuel. Instructed Embassy Paris to query the French Government about alleged Cubana use of the Guadeloupe facility, and to express our concern at this evidence of Cuba's attempt to use French Caribbean dependencies for flights to and

From

from Latin America.

d. Instructed Embassy Rio to make a new approach to the Brazilian Foreign Ministry to express our concern at Cuba's continuing use of "charter" flights to Brazil and the laxity of Brazilian officials in the control of passengers. During the course of the month the Brazilian Government began tightening controls against Cubana flights. Specifically, all requests for landing permission were henceforth to be processed by the Foreign Office, with appropriate delays. Also tighter passenger, crew and cargo controls were to be instituted when a Cubana flight is permitted to use Brazilian facilities.

e. Determined that the U.K. had specifically warned Cubana that no aviation fuel was available in Barbados and that H.M.G. would, in the future, respect Shell Company's decision to deny fueling to Cubana planes.

f. Continued Inter-Departmental efforts to prevent resumption of ferry service between Cuba and the U.S. which a British citizen, Harold Derber, has been attempting to establish during the past several month.

g.

g. Instructed Consul Georgetown to investigate and report on evidence the Department received which indicates that Cuba is planning to sell merchant vessels to British Guiana in order to facilitate the establishment of regular service for passengers and cargo.

Central Intelligence Agency

a. In connection with the Seventh Congress of the International Union (UIA) held in Habana September 29 - October 3, 1963 the Buenos Aires Station:

(1) encouraged the Argentine National Federation of Architects to oppose Argentine attendance at the Habana meeting, with the result that 25 of the 39 practicing architects who had planned to attend cancelled their participation;

(2) arranged to prevent the attendance of any officially authorized Argentine delegation at the Habana meeting, but encouraged the attendance of an official Argentine delegation of anti-Communist coloration at an international architects meeting to be held in Mexico in October;

(3)

(3) delivered a memorandum to the Minister of Interior concerning Cuban charter flights to Brazil which supported the Ambassador's request that the Argentine government express concern over such flights.

b. Rio de Janeiro Station continued to furnish the Embassy with data on Cubana flights to Brazil used in representations to the Brazilian Foreign Office. Also induced Rio airport officials to impose stringent passport control and baggage efforts. These efforts contributed to the Brazilian Government's failing to issue landing permits for Cubana flights on September 21, 24 and 25, 1963 forcing their cancellation. When Cubana, because of harassment at Rio, began using the landing facilities in Sao Paulo where controls were non existent, CIA initiated and obtained a local liaison agreement for similar harassment in the event of future Cubana flights to Sao Paulo.

c. Mexico City station inspired a press campaign of hoof and mouth and smallpox epidemics in Cuba, prior to the Architects Congress to discourage participation in the Habana meeting. The resulting quarantines and

innoculations

innoculations were a factor in discouraging 52 of the 60 Mexican professional architects who were expected to go to Habana from attending the Congress.

II. Control of Movement of Propaganda

Measures to counter act

III. Control of Clandestine Movement of Guerrillas and arms

Department of State

Made the necessary arrangements through Embassy Tegucigalpa with the Government of Honduras for the dispatch of three U.S. helicopters to give logistical assistance to the Honduran Army in its effort to locate and eliminate the band of guerrillas allegedly operating in the Patuca River area along the Honduran-Nicaraguan border.

Department of Defense

Three CH-13 helicopters from USSOUTHCOM supported Honduran armed forces conducting counter-insurgency operations in the Patuca River area. A total of 27 sorties were flown resulting in delivery of 3928 pounds of supplies, evacuation of 12 sick Honduran soldiers, airlift of 19 passengers to points in the operational area, and recovery of 400 pounds of supplies from the operational area.

IV.

IV. Control of Transfer of Funds

Department of State

a. Instructed Embassy Mexico City to inform the Mexican airline SAESA that their proposal to purchase surplus Cuban aircraft would in fact result in the accrual to Cuba of a significant amount of hard currency, and the U.S. would have to oppose the transaction. Further, if dollars were involved in the purchase, it would be a violation of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations.

b. Informed Department of Treasury, Foreign Assets Control Office, of the activities of Somondelp Enterprises, a Miami firm engaged in sending remittances to persons in Cuba in violation of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations.

c. Instructed Consulate, Belize to inform Mr. Richard Joyce, an American national, that his commercial transactions with Cuba were in violation of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations and that he is prohibited from engaging in such trade.

V.

V. Strengthening of Counter-Insurgency Capabilities

Department of Defense

a. Thirteen Latin American officers graduated from the counter-insurgency Operations Course of the U.S. Army School for Latin America in the Panama Canal Zone on 20 September. During the month, a total of 91 Latin American officers enrolled in courses stressing counter-insurgency at the Army Canal Zone school.

b. Eight U.S. Army counter-insurgency mobile training teams were providing training to the Armed Forces of five Latin American countries during the period. U.S. Air Force counter-insurgency training teams were in two countries.

c. In the Canal Zone, 15 students from five countries were under instruction in the operation of coast guard utility patrol craft used for coastal surveillance. Six students from two countries were undergoing similar training in the UnitedSStates

d. A U.S. Navy counter-insurgency training team is in Venezuela to assist in improving the security of oil installations in Lake Maracaibo.

e.

e. Costa Rica and Honduras were provided one Cessna 185 aircraft each for medical civic action and internal security purposes.

f. On May 25, 1963, three M-43B KAMAN helicopters were provided to the government of Colombia on a 90-day loan. The Colombian Government requested an extension of the loan and a 90-day extension has been approved.

Central Intelligence Agency

a. Guatemala Guantanamo City Station has recruited, on a trial basis, a former member of the 13 November guerrilla group and debriefings are in process. Negotiations continue with the Government of Guatemala for the formation of a new internal security service.

b. Lima Station has agreed to furnish the Peruvian Investigations Police (PIP) with an outboard motor to increase their patrol capability on rivers crossing the Bolivian frontier. Our information is that the rivers crossing this frontier have provided the primary avenues for recent attempts to gain clandestine entry of personnel and weapons into Peru.

VI.

VI. Exchange of Intelligence on Cuban Subversion

Department of Defense

Engineering installation work continued on radio stations for Managua, Nicaragua and Tegucigalpa, Honduras. No further progress has been made in reaching agreements with Colombia and Ecuador for rights to establish radio stations in those countries. Installation of the new trans-isthmian commercial cable in Panama is nearing completion.

Central Intelligence Agency

CIA Stations continued their exchange of intelligence information with local intelligence agencies. The following actions are of special significance:

a. The CIA Station in Buenos Aires furnished the Argentine State Intelligence Service (SIDE) with information on the travel of Argentines to Cuba, and requested that SIDE provide name traces and debrief these travellers on their return whenever feasible. SIDE provided the traces, but did not conduct any debriefings. The Station has not felt it feasible to try to remedy this omission in view of the personnel changes expected within SIDE after the new government is installed on 12 October.

b. As a result of information passed by the Bogota Station to the Administrative Department of Security (DAS) concerning Colombian travellers to Cuba, a number of passport violations have been discovered in which travellers to Cuba are using passports issued to other persons. There is a reluctance, however, on the part of the Colombian Government to prosecute this type of violation.

c. At the urging of the CIA Station in Lima, the National Intelligence Service (SIN) instructed one of its penetrations of leftist groups to campaign for a trip to Cuba in order to receive guerrilla warfare training. This asset has been offered, and has accepted, an opportunity to make the trip by the Leftist Revolutionary Movement (MIR), primary vehicle of Cuban subversive activities in Peru. Briefing and debriefing of the asset will be done by the SIN.

The Peruvian Naval Intelligence Service (PNIS) has, in response to the efforts of the Station in Lima, sent one of its agents to Chile where he will sign aboard a Chilean freighter calling at Habana. The asset has been given specific intelligence requirements to fulfill.

The

The Prime Minister and Minister of Government and Police has requested from the CIA representative in Lima any information that he might supply on subversive elements posing a threat to the Government of Peru. This request has opened an additional channel to the highest level of the Government with a concommitant prospectfor effective action when needed.

d. Through regular liaison channels, the Venezuelan General Directorate of Police (DIGEPOL) has been provided by CIA with the names of all Venezuelans known to have travelled to Cuba from February through August 1963. This activity will be carried out on a continuing basis; the names are now being integrated into the regular watch list kept at international airports in Venezuela. Thus far, at least three returnees have been arrested on the basis of the information supplied to DIGEPOL. DIGEPOL has indicated its appreciation of the data being supplied and desires that the arrangement be continued.

VII. Surveillance of Cuban Diplomatic, Commercial and Cultural Missions

No special actions to report.

VII.

VIII. Other Special Actions

United States Information Agency

a. The Agency's press service transmitted seven articles relating to Cuban subversion on its wireless file service to USIS offices throughout Latin America for placement in the local newspapers. Developments reported in these articles included demands by the Bolivian Senate for the ouster of the Cuban Chargé d'Affaires, terrorism and government counteraction in Venezuela, the seizure in Ecuador of an arms and explosives cache reportedly received from Cuba, several articles on the International Union of Architects Congress in Habana (emphasizing the intent of the Castro regime to use the Congress as a forum for its propaganda claims), and Assistant Secretary Martin's Los Angeles speech in which he pointed out the regime's affinity for Chinese communist doctrine and its continued emphasis on violent revolution and subversion. In all, the press service transmitted 27 articles and commentaries during September on the subject of Cuba, the other articles dealing for the most part with economic and political conditions inside the country as evidenced by the regime's own admissions and the reports of refugees.

b.

B. The Voice of America Spanish broadcasts to Latin America during September carried a total of 20 news analyses, commentaries, press round-ups, and interviews related to the subject of Cuban subversion. Some of the developments treated included the following:

A commentary on communist embassies as channels for subversion; a news analysis on the U.S. students who visited Cuba; Assistant Secretary Martin's Los Angeles speech; a news analysis on Cuban subversion as an obstacle in the normalization of U.S.-Soviet relations; a three-part series on university autonomy in Latin America; a feature on the letter of a Colombian student who went to Cuba on a scholarship and was disillusioned by the communist indoctrination; a commentary on Che Guevara's recent article on revolutionary strategy; and a commentary on guerrilla training in Cuba. Many of these items were repeated several times in the broadcasts. The "Rendezvous with Cuba" hour carried four or five commentaries ~~than~~ ~~fnix~~ and interviews nightly on economic and political developments inside Cuba. Of special note, the Cuban radio and Castro himself reacted angrily to Voice of America broadcasts about Che Guevara's article and to commentaries that Cuba had accepted an agricultural role in the

the communist bloc and had postponed its plans to industrialize.

c. On September 27, the Agency issued a circular instruction to allIits Latin American posts urging greater attention to opportunities for publicizing Cuban-stimulated subversion, suggesting the various types of information activities to support this effort, and requesting monthly reports of field actions taken to implement the instruction. This was done as a follow-up to the original instruction on Cuban subversion which was issued April 3, 1963.

Central Intelligence Agency

a. CIA in Brazilcassisted in the defection and exploitation of a Cuban atholete Roberto Perez Ondarse in Porto Alegre on 4 September 1963. Perez was a member of the Cuban basket-ball team which participated in the World University Games (FISU) held in Porto Alegre Brazil in early September 1963.

b. Assistance was given to the Government of Guatemala in the interrogation of some of those who were arrested in connection with the Communist Party documents that were confiscated in late May 1963.

Only one of those interrogated admitted to any involvement with the captured documents, the Communist Party, guerrillas, or anything else that could be construed as incriminating. The one who did admit knowledge denied that he was involved in any way. The Government of Guatemala wants to interrogate this person again at a later date.

c. CIA Station in Montevideo arranged for an interview between an Uruguayan military intelligence officer and a recent defector from the Montevideo Cuban Embassy during which extensive information regarding Cuban subversive activities was revealed. The Uruguayan officer prepared a report containing this data and presented it to the National Council of Government which has been slow to indicate concern over communist subversive activity in Uruguay. As a result of this report, the NCG has directed the Minister of Interior to appoint a special commission to study the problem of Communist subversion and to make recommendations as to what course of action should be taken by the Uruguayan Government. Should the Government wish to press for passage of

stronger

stronger anti-subversive legislation the Station has taken steps to prepare Uruguyan public opinion by planning simultaneous local press releases of the salient features of the defector report with similar press reporting in the United States where the defector will be brought to light.

SECRET

OSA 353 CUBA

29 October 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE GENERAL COUNSEL

SUBJECT: Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs: Report on Status of Implementation of Actions Designed to Counter Subversion (U)

10-29-63

1. (U) The following information is submitted in response to Memorandum No. 64, General Counsel, dated 19 September 1963.

2. (S) Reference Topic 5 (Strengthening of Counterinsurgency Capabilities):

a. Canal Zone -

(1) Fifteen students from six Latin American countries are attendees in the ten weeks Counterinsurgency Operations Course of the U. S. Army School of the Americas which began 30 September 1963.

FW 1-30-63

(2) There are 24 students from eight Latin American countries attending the 16 weeks Military Intelligence Course which began 23 August 1963.

b. CONUS -

(1) Three students from three Latin American countries are attending the Special Warfare Course at Fort Bragg, N. C.

(2) One Peruvian student is attending the Civil Affairs Course at Fort Gordon, Georgia.

c. In the month of October 1963, eight Counterinsurgency Mobile Training Teams (MTT) (14 Off-48 EM) were deployed in six countries to conduct counterinsurgency training.

d. A U. S. Army officer is attending the Command and General Staff School of the Uruguayan Army and upon completion of this course in December 1963, will be assigned to the OUSARMA, Uruguay. He will perform intelligence advisory functions as an additional duty.

e. An additional officer has been assigned as assistant USARMA in Guatemala, increasing the capability for intelligence assistance in that country.

OSA. ASG. CONTROL NO. 2505A FILE file (m)

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SUBJECT: Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs: Report on Status of Implementation of Actions Designed to Counter Subversion (U)

3. (S) Reference Topic 6 (Exchange of Intelligence on Cuban Subversion):

a. The number of intelligence exchange agreements between the U. S. Army and local military services in Latin America has been increased to 13.

b. The additional officer assigned as Assistant USARMA, Guatemala, raises the collection potential in that nation and may develop information which can be exchanged with Latin American countries.

J. D. ALGER
Major General, GS
Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff
for Military Operations
for Special Operations

G. S. BLANCHARD
Colonel, GS
Director of Special Warfare
ODCSOPS

SECRET

Lt Col Haig/78029/29Oct63/md

October 29, 1963

OSA 353-CUBA 10/29/63

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JOHN CRIMMINS
Coordinator of Cuban Affairs
Department of State

SUBJECT: Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs: Revision of the Paper Entitled "Training of Latin Americans in the United States"

At a meeting of the Subcommittee on Subversion on October 10, 1963, the Department of Defense (DOD) Representative was requested to review and up-date the DOD portions of pages 4, 5 and 6 of subject report. Enclosed herewith is a line in line out revision of the report. A revision has also been made to page 7, which is designed to make the DOD portions of the report current.

FW 1/30/63

Signed:
A. M. Haig
Lt Colonel, USA
for Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
General Counsel

Attachment
As Stated

sent Mr. Califano
Lt Col Haig
ASG

SECRETARY OF THE OFFICE

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SECRETARY OF THE ARMY OFFICE

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DOD Revision to Paper Entitled "Training of Latin Americans in the United States"

3. Military Assistance Programs

At the ~~present time~~ end of FY 63, ~~2,277~~ 1791 Latin American military students ~~are~~ were receiving, or ~~are programmed to receive~~ have received training in the United States under the Military Assistance Program. Courses vary in length from two-week orientation tours to 83-week flying training courses. However, the majority of instruction is for periods of less than six months, and is distributed in fields as follows:

Field		
Flying Instruction (8-83 weeks)	172	154
Command, Staff and Operational (direction and control of armed forces, 4-23 weeks)	748	638
Communications/Electronics (6-29 weeks)	66	36
Equipment Maintenance and Repair (5-28 weeks)	336	232
Logistics (2-14 weeks)	46	33
Administration (4-40 weeks)	8	7
Professional Specialized (Engineering, Medical, Legal etc., 4-20 weeks)	306	193
Orientation (2-3 weeks)	596	498

7. <u>Difficulties Encountered in Filling Available Military Quotas in the United States</u>

The failure of Latin American countries to take full advantage of military quotas offered has been a persistent problem. In 1962, for example, 15 per cent of the quotas offered were unfilled. This unfavorable situation derives from many causes. ~~During the current fiscal year 18 per cent of unfilled Army quotas have been due to inability to meet course pre-requisites; 22 per cent because of lack of sufficient funds; and 33 per cent because of political upheavals.~~ The armed forces of the average Latin American country are small, and the availability of qualified candidates who can be spared for extended periods of obligated service and the lack of a professional non-commissioned officer corps also tends to discourage the training of enlisted men in United States schools, since large sums from limited budgets to train enlisted men who will remain in service only a brief time. Another significant deterrent is the per diem rates required by law to be paid by some countries to service personnel sent outside their homeland. In Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Uruguay the legal rates for personnel serving abroad are too high to be supportable by defense budgets; while in other countries, such as Bolivia and Paraguay, the standard rates are too late to provide a reasonable living for students.

CONFIDENTIAL

October 19, 1963

MEMORANDUM NO. 74 FOR GENERAL EARLE G. WHEELER (JCS)
CAPTAIN E. R. ZUMWALT, JR., USN (OSD)
MAJOR GENERAL J. D. ALGER, USA
REAR ADMIRAL W. F. A. WENDT, USN
MAJOR GENERAL J. W. CARPENTER, III, USAF
BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAM K. JONES, USMC

SUBJECT: Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs: Report of Meeting of Subcommittee on Subversion

Circulated herewith for information is a report of the October 10, 1963 meeting of subject subcommittee.

Signed
Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
General Counsel

Attachment
As Stated

cc: Mr. Yarmolinsky (OSD) - sent

Mr. Califano
Lt Col Haig] retained in
ASG ← Gen Counsel

OSA 353 CUBA 10-19-63 FW: 1-30-63

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

October 14, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting of Subcommittee on Subversion, October 10, 1963

Outlined below is a summary of deliberations of subject subcommittee during the meeting of October 10 at 1430 hours in Room 6273, New State. Agenda is at Tab A.

Agenda Item 1

The Final Subcommittee Report for the months of July and August was circulated. The report has been circulated to points of contact by separate correspondence.

Agenda Item 2

The Subcommittee discussed the SCCS letter which referred to the recent trip of US students to Cuba. (Attached to enclosure 1) It was apparent to all that criticism of the US could be implied from this letter. The Chairman stated he would provide the SCCS with the substance of State's telegram 647, which outlines actions undertaken by the US Government against the students.

Agenda Item 3

a. CIA, in coordination with the Esso Corporation's Chief of Industrial Security, will prepare guidance data for distribution to Latin America which could be utilized by US commercial firms for the protection of their facilities against sabotage. The DOD representative was requested to ascertain whether ARPA had available some commercial protection devices which might be applicable for use in Latin America against sabotage attacks. The CIA representative stated he believed ARPA had developed some devices for this purpose.

CONFIDENTIAL

b. State will prepare a circular telegram to all Latin American Ambassadors requesting that an immediate review of Country Team Emergency and Evacuation Plans be conducted to insure that plans were adequate to meet a stepped-up campaign of Castro-inspired sabotage.

Agenda Item 4

In lieu of a written report on the Honduran guerrilla problem, the DOD representative proposed a firsthand report to the Subcommittee. Colonel Walter Hutchins, who has recently returned from assignment as US Military Attache to Honduras, presented a review of the subversion situation in that country and then answered questions from the Subcommittee. The general thrust of Colonel Hutchins' remarks confirmed that there has been considerable Castro subversive activity in Honduras. The most serious inroads are achieved through communist radio and press and communist educators. Colonel Hutchins commented that recent guerrilla activity along the Nicaraguan border was probably limited to groups totaling between 100 and 200 men. He emphasized that Cuban-trained Honduran guerrillas are successfully transiting by air through Grand Cayman Island and British Honduras with some transiting Havana to Jamaica via Belgrade. In response to a query from a State representative, Colonel Hutchins pointed out that he believed that both Honduran military and commercial interests were genuinely concerned with Castro subversion and that some of their leaders were perfectly capable of discerning the true nature of the communist threat to Honduras.

Agenda Item 5

The Chairman stated that the paper for training Latin Americans in the United States (included in the "Krulak Report"*) was too broad in scope for implementation by the Subcommittee and proposed that it be rewritten under narrower parameters. In this regard, the Defense representative was requested to review pages 4, 5 and 6 of the paper on training contained in the report with the view toward bringing the Defense portion up-to-date.

Miscellaneous

The Chairman stated that preparatory actions on the Isthmian meeting at San Salvador tentatively scheduled for the second half of November would be held in abeyance pending further developments in the Honduran situation.

A. M. Haig, Lt Colonel, GS

*Report prepared by the Subcommittee on Castro-Communist Subversion containing a series of action programs designed to impede the Castro-Communist subversive effort in Latin America.

October 9, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Subcommittee on Cuban Subversion.

SUBJECT: Meeting of October 10.

You are invited to a meeting of the Subcommittee on Cuban Subversion of the Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs to be held on Thursday, October 10, at 2:30 P.M. in Room 6263, State Department (ARA Conference Room).

AGENDA

1. Consideration of draft of monthly report for September.

2. Discussion of letter (copy attached) from SCCS of Pan American Union.

3. Status of papers on contingency planning.

4. Report by DOD on Honduran guerrilla problem.

5. Consideration of the paper on training of Latin Americans in the United States.

SPECIAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE ON SECURITY
COMISION ESPECIAL DE CONSULTA SOBRE SEGURIDAD
COMISSÃO CONSULTIVA ESPECIAL DE SEGURANÇA
COMMISSION SPÉCIALE DE CONSULTATION SUR LA SÉCURITÉ

PAN AMERICAN UNION
Washington 6, D.C., U.S.A.
Cable address: PAU WASH DC

October 1st., 1963

Sir:

As you know, the Special Consultative Committee on Security is presently holding the first of its regular meetings, in accordance with the statutes approved by the Council of the Organization on April 23 of this year.

For the better fulfillment of its work, and in accordance with Article 13 of these statutes, the Committee intends to request of the governments of the member states of the Organization any information that they may have regarding specific activities of international communism in this hemisphere.

Among the important activities of this kind are the trips that many individuals make to Cuba for well-know ulterior purposes. In this connection, I should greatly appreciate it if you would furnish the Committee with whatever information your government may deem it advisable to present regarding the trip that a large group of U.S. citizens recently made to Cuba at the invitation of that country's government, about which the Committee has learned through newspaper reports that have recently appeared in this country and in Latin America. This information would be treated with the confidence that your government deemed appropiate.

Thank you in advance for your valuable assistance in this matter.

Accept, Sir, the assurance of my highest consideration.

Julio Cesar Doig Sanchez
Chairman
Special Consultative Committee
on Security

Mr. Ward P. Allen
Alternate Representative of the United States
Council of the Organization of American States
Washington, D.C.

SECRET

OSA 353-CUBA

14 OCT 1963

MEMORANDUM NO. 71 FOR CAPTAIN E. R. ZUMWALT, JR., USN (OSD)
MAJOR GENERAL J. D. ALGER, USA
REAR ADMIRAL W. WENDT, USN
MAJOR GENERAL J. W. CARPENTER, III, USAF
BRIGADIER GENERAL W. K. JONES, USMC

10/14/63

SUBJECT: Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs: Actions Taken During July-August 1963 in Curbing Cuban Subversion in Latin America

FW 1/30/63

Attached is the final report of the Subcommittee on Subversion on Actions Taken During July-August 1963 in Curbing Cuban Subversion in Latin America.

Signed
Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
General Counsel

Attachment
As Stated

cc: Mr. Yarmolinsky (OSD)
DIA (Col Nigra)
Mr. Califano
Lt Col Haig
ASG

JAC (M)

OSA, ASG Control No. 2386 H FILE

SECRET REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED INCLOSURES

SECRET This document consists of 18 pages
No 14 of 44 Copies, Series A

REPORT OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE ON CUBAN SUBVERSION:

ACTIONS TAKEN DURING JULY-AUGUST 1963

IN CURBING CUBAN SUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

OSA, ASG Control No. 2386 H

1. Control of Travel to and from Cuba

Central Intelligence Agency

a. Developed highly useful information on frequency of Cuban "chartered" flights to Brazil, names and nationalities of passengers and crew, and lax measures of control followed by Brazilian authorities. Transmitted this information to station chiefs in the Latin American countries of the non-Brazilians travelling on those flights.

b. Maintained close watch over travel to and from Cuba. See Annex B for table of known travel of Latin Americans during July and August.

c. As a result of information furnished to him by the CIA Station in Buenos Aires and with the Station's urging, the Argentine Minister of Interior indicated that he would make every effort to prevent Argentine delegates from attending the International Union of Architects Congress in Havana.

d. At the urging of the CIA Station and the Embassy, the Bolivian Minister of Interior issued in mid-July an order prohibiting the granting of travel permits to Cuba or other bloc countries to Bolivian nationals.

e. Partly as a result of the efforts of the CIA station in Santiago, the Government of Chile prohibited the entry into Chile of organizers of the Cuban-sponsored Second Latin American Youth Congress, which had been scheduled to take place in Santiago in August. This was one of the factors which led to postponement of the Congress.

f. After considerable prodding by the CIA Station and the Embassy the Minister of Public Security of Costa Rica presented legislative proposals to the Costa Rican Assembly which will require all persons intending to travel to Communist countries to have their travel approved by a newly created Costa Rican security agency.

g. CIA Station in Mexico City developed information concerning the clandestine arrival of passengers in Vera Cruz

on Cuban merchant ships. Efforts are being made to obtain more information and to encourage stricter controls by the Mexican authorities.

Department of State

a. Instructed Embassy Conakry to try to persuade Guinean authorities to deny use of airport facilities by flights on Habana-Moscow route. These efforts achieved a temporary withholding of permission for future regular flights, at least until such time as the Soviets develop their own refueling facilities at Conakry.

b. Instructed Embassy Rio to approach Brazilian authorities to express our deep concern at the growing frequency of Cuban non-scheduled flights to Brazil and request their cooperation in curbing them. Also instructed our Embassies in several Latin American countries to work with CIA station chiefs in furnishing the names of nationals of those countries travelling on these flights to local authorities and urging them: (1) to institute tighter controls on their own citizens travelling to Cuba, and (2) to express their concern to the Brazilian Government over Cuban use of Brazil as a way station for transporting subversives.

c. As a result of representations made to the British Government about Cuban flights to the Cayman Islands carrying Latin American subversives, the British developed an administrative scheme which will effectively prohibit the use of British Caribbean dependencies by Cubana as transit points for passengers. The British intend to require transit visas of passengers passing through their areas, and to reject applications for such visas except in certain special cases. Persons not possessing visas would be prevented from leaving their aircraft, or would be returned to their point of origin.

d. Instructed Embassy Mexico City on August 29 to inform the Mexican airline CMA that the United States is opposed to a proposal that CMA operate charter flights to

carry refugees from Habana to Central America. CMA, as a result, stated that they had no intention of proceeding further with this project.

e. Instructed our missions in Curacao and the Hague to investigate a report that KLM was planning to renew scheduled Curacao-Habana flights and to reiterate US opposition to resumption of air service to Cuba. KLM assured our Embassy that there is no plan to initiate service, scheduled or non-scheduled, to Habana.

f. Instructed Embassy Ottawa to express our strong objections to a proposal that a Cubana charter flight pick up a second group of U.S. students in Montreal to fly them to Cuba. The flight was not authorized.

g. Instructed Consulate Georgetown to investigate Cubana approaches to secure flight facilities. Mission reported on August 1 that the Governor had no knowledge of any talks between the B.G. Ministry of Communications and the Cuban Government regarding landing rights for Cubana planes. The Governor indicated his intention to inquire further and to keep us advised. London reported that neither the Cuban nor the British Guiana Governments had raised the issue of landing rights with H.M.G.

h. Urged the governments of Mexico, Canada, Jamaica and the Netherlands to refuse to assist the Cuban Government in its efforts to find a short route for return of the 58 American students who illegally travelled to Cuba. Also informed Pan American Airways that we were opposed to a Cuban request for a PAA charter flight to fly the students from Habana to New York.

i. Instructed our missions at Port of Spain and Barbados on several occasions to approach these governments to express the concern of the U.S. at indications of Cuban interest in the use of their aviation facilities.

Embassy Port of Spain discussed with the Foreign Secretary of Trinidad various legal moves available that would enable

GOTT to control movements of aircraft within their territory, citing examples of such controls instituted by Mexico, Canada and Ireland. He indicated receptiveness to the proposal that the list of suggestions be made available to the aviation officials concerned.

j. During a previous reporting period Embassy Santiago urged the government of Chile to refuse visas to Cuban delegated to a preparatory meeting for the II Latin American Youth Congress scheduled for August in the Chilean capital. Inability of Cuban delegates to obtain Chilean visas for this meeting is one of the contributing factors to the Cuban sponsors announcing during August that the meeting had been postponed.

k. Sent general instructions to our missions in countries which participate in the International Union of Architects asking them to urge the cooperation of governmental authorities in preventing or discouraging the attendance of their nationals to the VII UIA Congress in Habana, September 29 - October 4, 1963. Followed this up with instructions to individual posts to try where feasible to dissuade architects from free world countries from serving on the jury for the selection of a Bay of Pigs monument.

l. Urged Canadian Government to block a plan to commence food parcel shipments to Cuba on a commercial basis that would have required the establishment of scheduled weekly charter flights by Canadian planes.

2. Control of Movement of Cuban Propaganda

Central Intelligence Agency

Responding to the urging of the CIA Station, police of the State of Guanabara seized large quantities of propaganda brought into Brazil by passengers on the special *Cubana* flights. For example, some 50 pounds of printed propaganda was taken from the various passengers who arrived on the 16 August *Cubana* flight.

3. Control of Clandestine Movement of Guerrillas and Arms

Department of Defense

a. Continued surveillance of the area surrounding Cuba during the months of July and August at the same rate and with the same emphasis as prior to 1 July 1963.

b. Continued to maintain U.S. Forces, primarily from within the Atlantic Command, available to assist other Caribbean governments in the interception of suspicious craft in territorial waters, as might be requested. No such requests were received from any other government during the period covered by this report. However, U.S. Forces did keep track of the location of the Soviet merchant freighter MITCHURINSK, which was suspected of carrying subversives and arms from Cuba to British Guiana in mid-July. MITCHURINSK was under U.S. surveillance from its departure from Habana until United Kingdom forces assumed the task of keeping this ship under surveillance upon its approach to Georgetown, British Guiana. Subsequently, British police search of MITCHURINSK in British Guiana waters revealed nothing of a suspicious nature.

Central Intelligence Agency

At the repeated urging of the CIA Station in Lima, the Peruvian Government late in August published a new anti-terrorists law providing a penalty of no less than five years imprisonment for persons who participate in guerrilla activities or in the illegal manufacture of weapons or explosives.

The Peruvian National Intelligence Service is working on a lead furnished by the CIA Station in Lima concerning a 200 ton vessel reportedly involved in arms traffic.

Department of State

Instructed our Consulate General in Georgetown to investigate reports that commercial cargoes (which could

conceal illicit arms traffic out of Cuba) had developed between British Guiana and Cuba. Investigations to date have been negative.

4. Control of Transfer of Funds

Department of State

Cooperated with the Foreign Assets Control Office of the Treasury Department in developing blocking controls with respect to Cuba which went into effect on July 9, 1963.

5. Strengthening of Counter-Insurgency Capabilities

Department of Defense

a. Continued the installation of military communications facilities in Latin America. Operational dates for the multi-channel radio stations to be installed in Managua, Nicaragua and Tegucigalpa, Honduras have been delayed to 15 October 1963 and 15 December 1963, respectively because of new engineering and contractual requirements. Negotiations are continuing with Colombia and Ecuador for installation of U.S. military radio facilities. Completion of a new commercial trans-isthmian cable in the Panama Canal Zone within the coming month is expected to improve military communications within the United States and the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command.

b. Continued the surveillance of Cuba by U.S. Forces, reporting as before to U.S. commanders, organizations and agencies. Reports of surveillance have been disseminated to all who have a requirement to know.

c. Established a 24 hour per day, 7 day per week duty watch at the U.S. Military Groups in the Caribbean countries in conjunction with implementation of the military alerting system. Continued efforts to staff the U.S. Southern Command Intelligence Center with properly cleared, trained personnel (this center is the military focal point for relaying information concerning the movement of subversives). Filled, partially, the authorized billets in

the U.S. Southern Command Intelligence Center and took under consideration the problem of an increase in the billet structure in the Center. The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command together with his intelligence officer visited Honduras and Nicaragua and determined that no significant problems existed which would interfere with effective operations in those countries.

d. Action previously initiated by the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Southern Command (COMUSNAVSO) to establish a Small Craft Inspection and Training Team (SCIATT) as a contribution to the Caribbean Surveillance System is progressing satisfactorily. Permanent assignment of U.S. Coast Guard personnel to SCIATT in the Canal Zone has been approved and the U.S. Coast Guard has taken appropriate implementing actions.

e. During the period of this report, the SCIATT conducted an on-the-job training course at Puntarenas, Costa Rica. Training was given to 13 members of the Guardia Civil of Costa Rica who were either newly assigned to the 40 foot Coast Guard utility boats (CGUBs) or were to be assigned as replacement crew members.

f. A quarterly inspection and evaluation of the CGUBs provided other Central American countries was conducted during the period 17 to 31 August by a mobile training team (MTT) made up of SCIATT personnel.

g. Continued efforts to improve the internal security of Latin American armies through the provision of Intelligence Advisors. Presently there are such advisors assigned to 14 Latin countries, emphasizing counterintelligence and countersubversion.

h. During the reporting period MTTs conducted training in counterinsurgency for the armed forces of Colombia, Bolivia, Venezuela, Peru and El Salvador.

i. Civic Action MTTs were sent to Guatemala, Bolivia, Colombia, El Salvador, Jamaica and Ecuador.

6. Exchange of Intelligence on Cuban Subversion

Central Intelligence Agency

CIA Stations throughout Latin America continued in a great majority of countries to furnish to the local internal security organizations with whom they are in liaison information concerning travelers to and from Cuba, as well as such information as came to CIA's attention concerning the movement of funds, arms and propaganda material. In many instances, the furnishing of information to the internal security service by the CIA Station was paralleled by the furnishing of similar information to the Foreign Office by the Ambassador or his representative. The response to this information has varied greatly. The Central American countries, in general, began to pay greater attention to the information and act on it. At the other extreme, the Brazilian Government during the reporting period showed little inclination to follow up on the information.

Department of State

a. Reiterated to the Foreign Minister of Peru our interest in having the facts of the Puerto Maldonado incident brought to the attention of the OAS, and urged that this action be taken as soon as possible.

b. Urged the Government of Guatemala to submit evidence of communist activity to the OAS.

7. Surveillance of Cuban Diplomatic, Commercial and Cultural Missions

Department of State

Instructed Embassy La Paz to follow up closely on charges of involvement by the Cuban mission in internal policies of Bolivia, and, at the Embassy's discretion, to point out to Bolivian officials the opportunity for a possible break in relations with Cuba. Embassy La Paz was not able to

press for a break when the evidence of Cuban intervention did not prove to be as conclusive as originally reported.

8. Other Special Actions

Department of State

a. Obtained action by the COAS on July 3 on the Lavalle Committee Report transmitting the document to the governments and urging them to implement the specific and general recommendations contained therein as soon as possible.

b. Through Embassy Managua informed the Nicaraguan Government of the matters which we wanted to have considered during the informal meeting of the Ministers of Security and Interior of the Isthmian countries held in Managua, August 26-28 in preparation for the second formal meeting of the Managua Security Conference countries later this year.

c. Explained in detail the nature of the Cuban threat and the related policy objectives of the U.S., during conversation in London and in Washington with Mr. Adam Watson, newly appointed British Ambassador to Cuba.

United States Information Agency

a. The Agency's press service during the reporting period transmitted 12 articles, commentaries, and back-grounders on its wireless file service to USIA posts through-out Latin America for placement in the local newspapers and the Voice of America Spanish broadcasts to Latin America carried a total of 28 commentaries and features on the subject of Cuban-based subversion. These stories were designed to alert people in Latin America to the dangers of this subversion.

b. In response to standing Agency instructions to give special attention to developments related to Cuba-based subversion, USIA posts in Latin America were prompt in reporting incidents and in providing editorial comments from

the Latin American press, all of which was used in the Agency's radio and press output.

The main developments treated in the Agency's radio and press coverage included Castro's July 26 speech urging revolutions in Latin America, the discovery of terrorist weapons factories in Guayaquil, the Ecuadorean Vice President's accusation of Cuban responsibility for terrorism, the Cuban use of Grand Cayman as a way station for subversive elements from Cuba, the expulsion from the University of a Bolivian youth leader for receiving funds from Cuba, Castro-trained guerrillas in Honduras, and Bolivian protests against meddling by the Cuban Embassy in the miner's strike. A Voice of American roving reporter in Latin America provided several reports on the subversion picture in countries he visited.

c. In support of the Agency's effort on Cuban-based subversion, the publications center in Mexico began work on three pamphlets during the period based on Castro's report of his visit to the Soviet Union (showing that he contradicted himself in some of his extravagant claims of Soviet progress), the losses suffered by Cuban labor under Castro, and the fate of political prisoners in Cuba. When completed, these pamphlets will be reproduced and distributed in quantity throughout the area.

ANNEX A

CIA Intelligence Annex

1. Travel to and from Cuba

Brazil

Chartered Cubana airlines flights between Cuba and Brazil have become a major means of transporting non-Cuban Latin Americans to and from Cuba. The five such flights since late July have carried nearly 400 non-Cubans.

The first of the recent series -- on 25 July -- brought 71 Latin American passengers to Havana for the 26 July celebrations. The other four flights -- on 15, 22, 28 and 29 August -- transported over 200 Latin Americans to Brazil from Havana. Some of the aircraft involved returned to Cuba with smaller numbers of passengers. Many of the 200 Latin American passengers had been delegates to the 26 July ceremonies, but others had apparently been in Cuba for longer periods and some had probably received training there. Of the passengers on these four flights to Brazil, 75 were natives of Caribbean area countries. Their circuitous travel through Brazil was evidently designed to help conceal the fact that they had been in Cuba.

Costa Rica

Two Costa Ricans were among the passengers on a chartered Cubana plane which was turned back to Havana at Grand Cayman on 11 July 1963. One was Luz Marina Hernandez Salazar, the only Costa Rican woman known to have been sent to Cuba for training as a guerrilla warfare instructor. She had been in Cuba since September 1962. The other Costa Rican passenger was Carlos Guillen, former head of the Costa Rican Society of Friends of the Cuban Revolution, who had been in Cuba since November 1962.

Ecuador

The CIA Station in Quito reports that the military junta, which assumed power in Ecuador on 11 July, can be expected to follow the guidance of the Embassy and the Station in controlling travel to and from Cuba and the Soviet bloc. The activities of Cuban subversives in Ecuador, at least for the present, have been greatly inhibited by the mass arrests of Communists and pro-Cubans and by the outlawing of the Communist Party by the junta.

Honduras

It is reported that the Honduran Communist Party has issued orders to its members not to attempt to travel to Cuba at the present time. This action is apparently the result of the increasing vigilance of the Honduran government and the greater implementation of stricter travel controls.

2. Movement of Cuban Propaganda

Guatemala

According to an unconfirmed report received in July, a Bureau of Information of the Communist Party of Guatemala is being formed in collaboration with Prensa Latina and is to be managed clandestinely. It expects to receive news by shortwave radio from Cuba and print bulletins for distribution by radio stations. This may indicate a pattern by which Prensa Latina will attempt to distribute on a more clandestine basis in other areas in Latin America.

Honduras

It was reliably reported that in mid-July 1963, a small coastal freighter landed 14 large boxes of Communist propaganda on the northern coast of Honduras, the boxes having been transferred at sea from a larger vessel. The report has not been confirmed.

3. Movement of Guerrillas and Arms

Argentina

Extremist members of the Peronist Party, apparently under the leadership of such figures as Hector Villalon and John William Cooke, were reported to be receiving encouragement and promises of large sums of money from Cuba in support of their efforts to train and organize subversive groups in Argentina. Villalon has stated that his plan calls for expanding and accellerating subversive activities in Argentina culminating in a complete take over within two years. There is no indication that Peron himself has agreed to this plan. It has been reported that leaders of the Communist Party of Argentina have been greatly annoyed by the tendency of the Castro regime to support the revolutionary Peronists without having consulted the Communist Party of Argentina.

It is reported that the so-called Army of National Liberation (ANL) of Argentina, which is a relatively small Castroist organization directed from Cuba by John William Cooke, has in recent weeks been negotiating for the purchase of arms and has been offered submachine guns, bazookas and other weapons by two or three private suppliers. It was reported, however, that the ANL was having difficulty getting enough dollars from Cuba to make significant purchases possible.

Bolivia

The Bolivian Ministry of Foreign Relations on 23 August protested formally to the Cuban Chargé d'Affaires in La Paz against the Cuban Embassy support to the miners during the recent crisis. Subsequently, however, Foreign Minister Fellman informed the Cuban Chargé that he need not fear that the Government of Bolivia would break diplomatic relations with Cuba. There has, in fact, been no hard information linking the Cuban Embassy with the present mining crisis in spite of some unconfirmed reports of Cuban support.

Brazil

Cuban Ambassador to Brazil, Raul Roa Kouri, is reported to have attempted to encourage peasant league leader Francisco Julio to revitalize the leagues in northern Brazil. According to some reports efforts are being made to unify the leadership and bring dissident elements under the general direction of Juliao. Other reports indicate that, although the Cuban Embassy is providing guidance and possibly financial support to the movement, it had not yet resolved the internal dissension in the leagues.

Colombia

From Colombia reports have been received of increasing Cuban assistance, primarily in the form of training courses by instructors who have been trained in Cuba, to the Worker-Student-Peasant Movement (MOEC). A small guerrilla band encountered by the Colombian army in July 1963 was broken up when five members of the band were killed and two others captured. A small quantity of arms and a considerable amount of books and pamphlets on revolutionary warfare, photographs of Fidel Castro, Camilo Cienfuegos and Mao Tse-tung, and bulletins of the MOEC were found at the camp site. Recent reports have indicated an increase in the terrorist efforts of the MOEC and increased promises of assistance from Che Guevara with regard to the training of additional MOEC members.

Costa Rica

There have been a number of unconfirmed reports alleging small-scale training of revolutionaries on Costa Rican territory for guerrilla activity in Nicaragua. For example, in mid-July an increased number of guerrillas were reportedly being trained in Costa Rica by Adolfo Garcia Barberena, well-known Nicaraguan revolutionary leader and member of the FLN (National Liberation Front -- a Communist-dominated, Cuban-supported,

anti-Nicaragua revolutionary group). In early August, Alberto Serrato, leader of the FLN in Costa Rica, (reportedly left with a group of Nicaraguans for the Costa Rican-Nicaraguan border. Another report indicated that Hector Bogantes Zamora, Costa Rican agitator was supposed to have left San Jose in mid-August for the Nicaraguan border to supervise the passage of Nicaraguan guerrillas from Costa Rica into Nicaragua. Bogantes, who recently returned from attending the May Day celebrations in Cuba, is said to have been assigned this responsibility by the Costa Rican Communist Party.

So far as we know, the GON, which is normally well-informed and highly sensitive to such activities on its borders, has not made any complaints or otherwise signified concern or awareness of these reported activities.

Honduras

The Honduran armed forces began to move against a group of pro-Castro guerrillas operating against the Nicaraguan Government and active in the vicinity of the Nicaraguan-Honduran border. The Nicaraguan National Guard has been conducting operations on its side of the border against the insurgents since July. The dense jungle and difficult terrain, however, will impede the efforts of both forces to eliminate the guerrillas.

Information on the guerrilla force is scanty and conflicting. It is apparently composed of members of the National Liberation Front (FLN), a Communist-dominated and Cuban-supported revolutionary organization active primarily in Honduras and Nicaragua since the fall of 1962. The strength of the force is not known.

Nicaragua

A captured guerrilla of the FLN (National Liberation Front - a Communist-dominated, Cuban-supported, anti-Nicaraguan group) confessed that he was a member of a group of 46 who entered Nicaragua from Honduras on 22 July.

He said that their mission was to establish a base camp in the Isabella mountains, Department of Jinotega, in order to indoctrinate the peasants and to train them in guerrilla tactics. He admitted that he had received six months' guerrilla warfare training in Cuba and that other FLN leaders had received similar training. He also said that the FLN training camp in Honduras was near El Lagarto, on the Patuca River.

4. Transfer of Funds

British Guiana

In British Guiana, Guiana Import-Export Corporation (Gimpex) received a one million dollar advance payment deposited by the Cuban Alimpex Corporation for goods to be delivered to Cuba in the future. Gimpex has, in turn, loaned this money to the Government of British Guiana. Cheddi Jagan's People's Progressive Party is the major stockholder in Gimpex. Mohammed Kassim, Manager of Gimpex, has indicated that Gimpex will be able to secure additional loans from Cuba in amounts sufficient to tide the Jagan government over any foreseeable crisis. It was also reported that Gimpex plans to buy aircraft, spare parts and other machinery in the United States for reshipment to Cuba.

General

Reports continue to be received from many places indicating that the suitcase full of currency is still one of the most common methods used by the Cubans for transmitting funds for use in supporting subversive activities throughout the hemisphere. Instances where such funds have been confiscated by the police have occurred recently in El Salvador, Panama and Ecuador.

ANNEX B

SECRET

KNOWN TRAVEL OF LATIN AMERICANS TO AND FROM C U B A - JULY 1963

NATIONALITY	JULY		PURPOSE OF TRIP TO CUBA
	TO	FROM	
ARGENTINA	6	0	26th of July Celebrations.
BOLIVIA	14	0	26th of July Celebrations.
BRAZIL	25	0	26th of July Celebrations.
BR. GUIANA	0	0	
CHILE	20	1	26th of July Celebrations. A returning Chilean Diplomat
COLOMBIA	29	1	26th of July Celebrations.
COSTA RICA	12	0	26th of July Celebrations.
DOM. REP.	37	0	26th of July Celebrations.
ECUADOR	2	0	26th of July Celebrations.
EL SALVADOR	4	1	26th of July Celebrations.
GUATEMALA	6	0	
HAITI	0	0	
HONDURAS	0	0	
JAMAICA	33	1	30-Football team. 3-to 26th of July Celebrations.
MEXICO	65	28	26th of July Celebrations.
NICARAGUA	5	0	26th of July Celebrations.
PANAMA	15	0	26th of July Celebrations.
PARAGUAY	3	0	26th of July Celebrations.
PERU	4	0	
TRINIDAD	0	0	
URUGUAY	17	15	26th of July Celebrations. Most attending will remain to work.
VENEZUELA	22	0	26th of July Celebrations.
T O T A L S	319	47	

SECRET

Annex C

SECRET

KNOWN TRAVEL OF LATIN AMERICANS TO AND FROM CUBA - AUGUST 1963

NATIONALITY	AUGUST TO	AUGUST FROM	PURPOSE OF TRIP TO CUBA
ARGENTINA	4	0	26th July Celebrations.
BOLIVIA	5	3	
BRAZIL	0	24	22-Returning from 26th July Celebrations.
BR. GUIANA	7	10	Herder Institute in Leipzig.
CHILE	22	47	8-Physical Ed. Seminar - 1-Seeking funds - 10-Returning from 26 July Celebrations.
COLOMBIA	6	14	
COSTA RICA	0	8	26th July Celebrations.
DOM. REP.	1	8	
ECUADOR	0	2	
EL SALVADOR	1	0	
GUATEMALA	3	0	1-Study at University of Sofia.
HAITI	0	0	
HONDURAS	0	8	
JAMAICA	0	2	
MEXICO	34	63	26th July Celebrations.
NICARAGUA	0	0	
PANAMA	6	0	26th July Celebrations.
PARAGUAY	0	0	
PERU	2	9	9-Returning were members of (MIR) who received guerrilla training.
TRINIDAD	0	0	
URUGUAY	10	16	26th July Celebrations.
VENEZUELA	3	0	26th July Celebrations.
T O T A L S	104	214	

SECRET

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10 APR 1962

CUBA PROJECT PROGRESS REPORT

4 - 11 April 1962

OPERATIONAL

1. An internal leader of the Movimiento Recuperacion Revolucionario (MRR) who was infiltrated into Cuba on 29 December 1961, and exfiltrated on 29 March 1962, said at a debriefing on 7 April that he considers only five clandestine resistance organizations in Cuba of national importance: The Directorio Revolucionario Estudantil (DRE), Movimiento Democratico Cristiano (MDC), Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo (MRP), Movimiento Recuperacion Revolucionario (MRR), and the 30th of November unit. Only these groups have the necessary motivation and discipline to establish coordination among themselves. There are a large number of other underground revolutionary units which claim to be of national importance but which consist of no more than two or three dozen men at most and can be found only in the area where they were established. Most of the small organizations appear to have been established by self-named leaders for personal reasons, financial gain through the sale of "bonds," or for future political opportunity when Fidel Castro is overthrown. Although the small groups are relatively inactive, their claims to importance have attracted numerous dissidents who could be more useful if they were members of the few larger and more effective organizations. Because

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of the boundless personal ambitions of the respective leaders and the geographic dispersion of the units, however, these small groups could never be effectively merged into a centrally directed larger organization. To use them effectively we would have to try to siphon off the membership into controlled groups. If this is not possible, they may serve a useful purpose by providing unwitting diversionary harrassment while the larger groups work toward the major goals.

2. A unilaterally recruited senior officer of the diplomatic service of a neutralist African country has been briefed and given training in secret writing and communications to assist him in reporting on our objectives in Cuba. He is now in Havana from where he plans to travel to other areas in Cuba of interest to us.

3. The Chief of the Danish Intelligence Service has agreed to cooperate with us on Cuban intelligence operations. He has identified several sources aboard ships transitting Cuban ports and has arranged for their periodic briefing and debriefing.

4. The Norwegian Intelligence Service has also agreed to cooperate with us in establishing case officer "centers" in Norway and Kiel, Germany, to handle Norwegian Merchant Marine sources who call at Cuban ports.

5. The Madrid Station Cuban refugee debriefing center is now in operation and results of the first interrogations are being reviewed

for dissemination. The most interesting and informative refugee thus far is the brother of Amando Hart, the Cuban Minister of Education and member of the twenty-five man ORI Central Committee. The center is also collecting travel and personal documents which may be used for agent operations.

6. We received valuable data on Cuban trade from the debriefing of a former official of the Ministry of Commerce who defected in Canada at the end of March. We ~~had been advised during~~ were informed in February by CIA sources that this official was disaffected and wished to work against Castro. We contacted him and attempted unsuccessfully to induce him to return to Cuba as our agent. We have since expedited his travel to Miami where he is being interrogated.

7. We are in contact with Eva Matos, the sister of Huber Matos, former associate of Fidel Castro, who broke with Fidel and has been in jail on the Isle of Pines since 1960. Although there is no practical method of effecting the escape or release of Huber at present, we will continue contact with his sister, who maintains correspondence with Huber through his father and his wife who are in Cuba.

CAC INFORMATION REPORTS

Following are highlights from selected interrogations of Cuban refugees processed through theCaribbean Admission Center (CAC) at

Opa-locka, Florida. This information is secured entirely from untrained observers and is presented partly as original unconfirmed data and partly as a supplement to intelligence already received from controlled reliable sources. All CAC information is screened for use in the daily and weekly Cuban summaries. During the past week [redacted] 1309 Cuban refugees through Miami, ~~prepared~~ 263 preliminary interrogation reports and disseminated 135 information reports.

8. Numerous reports confirm that all towns have been partitioned into "blocks" infiltrated by communist informants under the direction of block chiefs of the "Comite de Defensa." The informant system [illegible] [illegible] data procured from the telephone monitoring switchboards established in the telephone centrals of every town. One refugee from the Cuban Telephone Company described a switchboard panel in the "Principe plant" in Havana which was monitoring "20 or 30 positions." These informants, their chiefs, members of the militia, G-2, "chivatos" (provocation agents), and other Castro supporters are now generally labeled by the populace as communists rather than Castroists.

9. While the network of informants protects the home front, officials of the National Directorate of the Integrated Revolutionary Organization (ORI) are increasingly occupied with the export of Castroist-communism to the Western Hemisphere. Flight manifests of Cubana Airlines show that "hundreds of Latin Americans are being brought to

Cuba for training and indoctrination." In addition to regular commercial transportation, charter flights to service these persons are being run thrice monthly throughout South America. In order to avoid Cuban visas and entry-exit stamps in their passports, these persons are given visas on a separate sheet of paper. In Cuba all arrangements are made for them by the Instituto Cubano de Amistad con los Pueblos (ICAP).

10. Soviet military equipment has been reported in increasingly larger quantities and wider disbursement. One refugee said that he saw "20 or 25 wheel-mounted Soviet 100 mm field guns M-55 (identified from photographs) at a militia camp at Miranda near Camaguey.

11. Shortages of certain essential food items have resulted in widespread protests and, in a few instances, to open action by those directly affected. A group of "13 to 15 women" reportedly waylaid a milk truck, overpowered the driver, and each carried off two liters of milk.

12. Refugees described the existence of three resistance organizations, allegedly widespread in membership but limited in action. One, the Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucionario Militar (MRRM) is a group which has broken away from the Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucionario (MRR). Reportedly, its objective is to apprehend key Castro leaders "when the time is appropriate." MRRM is organized in all provinces except Matanzas and Camaguey where the movement has

now begun to develop a following. The second organisation, the Movimiento Democratico Cristiano (MDC), is described as oriented along traditional Christian democratic lines. It is said to have a "national coordinator, a national executive, provincial, military and political coordinators, and resistance chiefs." They claim that military and counter-revolutionary activities have been limited because of lack of equipment. A third organization, the Unidad Revolucionario (UR), is reported to be carrying out the sabotage of sugar fields by burning, using a small incendiary device made of gelatin, match heads, potassium permanganate tablets, and glycerine.

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OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : Califano Papers, Box 6, Folder 30. Assorted documents related to Cuban material support of Communist subversives in Latin America.

JFK Records Review
Department of the Army EO 13526
☒ Declassify ☐ Exclude ☐ Exempt
Authority________
☐ Refer To________
Review Date 3/12/2015 By [signature]

ARMS SHIPMENTS - TO AND FROM CUBA

SECRET

ARMS SHIPMENT

General: Arms smuggling is one of the "facts of life" in Latin America and has been engaged in by dissident elements for many years. Reports of Castro involvement in these activities have been frequent since shortly after his seizure of power early in 1959. None of these reports has ever been proven. With the arrival of large quantities of Soviet Bloc arms in 1961, Cuba recovered all U.S. arms in the hands of the populace and made it a crime punishable by death to have possession of weapons of U.S. manufacture. The U.S. arms furnished under the MAP to former Cuban governments together with those collected by Castro provide the Castro government with large stocks which could be shipped to subversive groups in other countries. Identification of these arms with Cuba would be extremely difficult.

TAB

1 Reports of Method of Operation

This Tab contains five items: (1) Two reports alledging arms smuggling by fishermen and by means of food products shipped to Latin America; (2) A report which indicates that a Cuban arms cache discovered in Brazil is not of Cuban origin; and (3) Two reports concerning a Cuban arsenal purportedly being used to supply arms for an invasion of some Caribbean country or an invasion of South America.

2 Reports of Arms Smuggling

This Tab contains a number of items reporting arms smuggling to Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Venezuela, British Guiana and Brazil. Note particularly the top item in which the British indicate the numerous reports on arms smuggling to British

SECRET

Guiana are without foundation and the second item which refutes the report contained in the Life Magazine article of 8 February.

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
CONTROLLED DISSEM

Exporting Revolution

COUNTRY	CUBA/LATIN AMERICA	REPORT NO.	TDCS DB-3/653,152
SUBJECT	POSSIBLE CONCEALMENT OF WEAPONS FOR SHIPMENT TO LATIN AMERICA	DATE DISTR.	6 FEBRUARY 1963
		PRECEDENCE	ROUTINE
DATE OF INFO.	LATE 1962	REFERENCES	IN 62553 35871
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	UNITED STATES (4 FEBRUARY 1963)		
APPRAISAL	6	FIELD REPORT NO.	

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE U.S. OWNER (C) OF A MARINA, FROM A FORMER CUBAN AIR FORCE OFFICER, FROM THE BROTHER OF AN EMPLOYEE OF A CANNERY IN SAN CRISTOBAL.

1. IN LATE 1962 A DAY-SHIFT EMPLOYEE AT A CANNERY IN SAN CRISTOBAL, PINAR DEL RIO PROVINCE, FOUND A HAND GRENADE WRAPPED IN NYLON AND BEDDED IN SHREDDED COCONUT IN A CAN WHICH HAD FELT UNUSUALLY HEAVY. (FIELD COMMENT: IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER THE CAN HAD GONE THROUGH THE CANNING PROCESS AND HAD BEEN SEALED.) AS A RESULT OF HIS DISCOVERY THE WORKER WAS ALMOST FIRED. ONE OF THE MILITIA GUARDS AT THE CANNERY SAID THAT AMMUNITION AND OTHER EQUIPMENT IS REGULARLY CANNED AND SHIPPED TO LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES. A SPECIAL NIGHT SHIFT WORKS AT THE PLANT.

2. (FIELD COMMENT: AN UNTESTED SOURCE REPORTED IN EARLY OCTOBER 1962 THAT IN JULY 1962 A STORY WAS CIRCULATING IN SAN

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
CONTROLLED DISSEM

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	XXX	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OBI	OO	FBI
STATE/DIR												REPCINCLANT		INS		EXO	

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

FORM 5-62 1Kb OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (15-20)

ANDRES, AN ISLAND POSSESSION OF COLOMBIA, THAT A PISTOL HAD BEEN FOUND EARLIER CONCEALED INSIDE A FROZEN CHICKEN WHICH HAD BEEN PART OF A SHIPMENT RECEIVED FROM CUBA.)

3. FIELD DISSEM: CINCARIB, CINCLANT.

END OF MESSAGE

An arms cache of weapons and ammunition recently discovered at the Ligas Camponesas guerrilla training center in the interior of the Brazilian state of Goias is believed by US Embassy and CAS officers to be of Brazilian rather than Cuban arms, despite a Brazilian newspaper suggestion that they were Cuban. There were also discovered about 125 copies of Communist publications including Che Guevara's well-known treatise on "Guerrilla Warfare". The training center was described as organized according to that book. A confidential report on the discoveries added that "members of the center want to be the Brazilian equivalent of those who fought in the Sierra Maestra and so bring the hard Chinese-Cuban type revolution to Brazil." Some 90 to 95 persons in the locality are reported members of or sympathetic to the Ligas Camponesas activities, but only 2 of the 24 for whom warrents were issued have yet been taken into custody. (Am Emb, Rio de Janeiro 1122, 10 December, CONFIDENTIAL, and CIA, Brasilia, IN 33026, 11 December, SECRET NOFORN)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY *Export of Rev.*

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY	Cuba/USSR/Latin America	REPORT NO.	CS-3/530,898
SUBJECT	1. Use of Soviet Fishing Boats to Transport Arms to Latin America 2. Belgian Arms Dealer in Habana	DATE DISTR.	11 December 1962
		NO. PAGES	1
DATE OF INFO.	Paras. 1 & 2: October 1962; Para. 3: August 1962	REFERENCES	RD -W-2107 RD-ACQ-01258
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Paras. 1, 2: France, Paris; Para. 3: Spain, Madrid Paras. 1, 2: 23 November 1962; Para. 3: 12 October 1962	FIELD REPORT NO.	38957

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Paras. 1 & 2: An official French service; Para. 3: CC-1197, Cuban refugee (F), a former employee of the Cuban diplomatic service, who visited Santiago de Cuba in August 1962, Appraisal of Content: 3.

1. Soviet fishing boats, under cover of fishing Atlantic waters, are transporting contraband arms to Latin American countries. The boats are met outside the territorial waters of those countries, and arms are transferred in small quantities. On board the Soviet boats are only Soviets and a very few Cubans or other Latin Americans who talk with those who pick up the arms. The arms being delivered are of American manufacture, including those obtained during the Batista regime and those taken during the Playa Giron invasion. The Soviet fishing boats also carry propaganda and pamphlets containing military instructions, the same type of material being sent by diplomatic pouch from Mexico.

2. A Belgian in Habana who says he represents a Belgian firm, has offered the Cuban Government any type and nationality of arms for payment in dollars. The Belgian has made a similar offer of sale of arms to a representative of an anti-Castro group in Habana.

3. In August 1962 a fisherman in Santiago de Cuba said that on several occasions he had been forced by the Government to use his boat for transporting small groups of men, in civilian clothes, and supplies of arms. He also knew of other fishermen who had been forced to do the same. The men and arms were carried to small islands or transferred to other boats at sea. Such trips sometimes lasted as long as four or five days. The fisherman did not know the purpose or final destination of the men and arms.

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE	X	ARMY	X	NAVY	X	AIR	X	NSA	X	OCR	X	DIA	X	FBI	2
REPCINCLANT	CINCARIB #		COAST GUARD	X								I&NS	X		

(Note: Washington distribution indicated by "X"; Field distribution by "#".)

SECRET

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Eyplart & Rev.

CIA INFORMATION REPORT CS-3/532,138

COUNTRY: CUBA

26 December 1962

SUBJECT: IDENTIFICATION OF CUBAN VESSELS ALLEGEDLY PREPARED TO INVADE A CARIBBEAN COUNTRY

DATE OF INFO: 28 NOVEMBER 1962

SOURCE: TRAVELING SALESMAN (F)

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: 3

HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: ACCORDING TO TDCS-3/530,589, DATED 6 DECEMBER 1962, AS OF MID-NOVEMBER TWO CUBAN SHIPS LOADED WITH PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT WERE XXXX SAID TO BE PREPARED FOR AN INVASION OF HAITI. SOURCE SAID HE WOULD PROVIDE THE NAMES OF THE SHIPS AND THEIR DEPARTURE DATE.

THE FRUCUBA AND THE FUNDADOR, CUBAN-FLAG VESSELS, WERE DOCKED AT THE ARSENAL DOCKS IN CASABLANCA (HABANA) IN LATE NOVEMBER. THESE XXXX VESSELS WERE SCHEDULED TO PARTICIPATE IN AN INVASION OF SOME CARIBBEAN COUNTRY.

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

SECRET

ARMS SHIPMENTS

CONFIDENTIAL

Export

CONFIDENTIAL

CUBA

Stockpile of War Materiel for Latin America (C)

19 January 1962

1 of 1

None

Early January 1962

Habana, c/a 7 January 62
C-6
DUJ 316/36-6-62

DUJ
DUJ
DUJ-43-62

1. Source reports an arsenal or stockpiling of war materiel at Casablanca, a Habana District, northeast shore of Habana Bay, Habana Province.

2. Source has heard this materiel is targeted for an invasion of South America.

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEARS INTERVALS NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED DOD DIR 5200.10

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

OPNS BRANCH

Venezuela Uncovers Communist Arms Cache

The Venezuelan Government -- in a raid on a small village near Caracas on 5 January -- uncovered a large cache of arms and equipment which it claims belonged to the pro-Castro Armed Forces of National Liberation, reputed to be emerging as a para-military arm of the Venezuelan Communist Party. Several tons of explosives and large quantities of hand bombs, arms, and ammunition were seized as well as a nearby clandestine Communist radio transmitter. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

SOURCE: TDCS 533,071 (S/NFD); FBIS (OUO); PRESS

ARMS SHIPMENTS

12 Feb 63 "All the information available to Her Majesty's Government and to the British authorities in British Guiana indicates that there is no truth whatever in the continuing reports that arms are being shipped to the colony from Cuba. Similar stories have appeared from time to time in the past, but upon examination all have been found to be without foundation."

(British Embassy in US to Reuters, AP and UPI).

SECRET

12 February 1963

SUBJECT: (U) Reported Arms Shipment from Cuba on 14 Jan 63

1. The 8 February 1963 edition of LIFE contains a story on Cuba with the following caption under the photo of a Russian freighter:

> "But refugees aboard the SHIRLEY LYKES said two ships put out from Mariel (Cuba) only last week with holds loaded with weapons sent by Castro to British Guiana."

2. A debrief report of a Cuban national who arrived at Port Everglades on 25 January 1963 contained the following statement:

> "I was told by an assistant ship inspector for the Port of Havana that on 14 January 1963 two launches captained by a man with what appeared to be an Italian accent had departed from the La Coubre wharf (Havana). Manifest on ship indicated the destination was British Guiana. However, the ship inspector had been told by the stevedores at the wharf that two launches were loaded with arms and the true destination was Venezuela."

TD/00-K-3249336 DTG 281805Z

3. The following information may refer to this arms shipment. An untested CIA source, a member of the Communist Party of Colombia in Cali, has stated that during a conversation on 5 January 1963 between Amado de Jesus Zapata, member of the Department of Valle Regional Committee of the Communist Party of Colombia (PCC), and P.I. Plata, a Cuban deep-cover agent working with the Seventh of January Worker - Student - Peasant Movement (MOEC), in Colombia and Venezuela, Plata said that the MOEC is not a local movement but rather a part of a Latin American concept which is being assisted by Castro and the Cuban Government. He said he has been in Cali for one year on a special assignment from the top leaders in Cuba to see that arms, propaganda, and instructions from Venezuela, originating in Cuba, get into the hands of the MOEC groups.

4. Plata said an important shipment for MOEC is due to arrive from Venezuela via Cucuta in February 1963. (Cucuta, capital of the Department of Norte de Santander, Colombia, is on the Venezuelan border and is a traditional center of smuggling between the two countries.)

CIA Report CS-3/5[illegible], [illegible] 10 Jan 63 Ref RD-W-2107

SECRET

5. Another report may also refer to this arms shipment. According to information dated 1 February 1963 from a CIA source and appraised by the CIA preparing office as possible true, Pedro MATOS, who together with the three-member regional command committee of the Partido Comunista de Venezuela (PCV) in the state of Zulia is responsible for PCV arms matters in that state, said recently that the party is awaiting a shipment of arms from Cuba and Panama but that the exact date of arrival is still unknown.

CIA Report TDCS-3/536,942, dtd 9 Feb 63 Ref IN 64876

6. Replies to DIA SICR's on this subject from NSA and CNO do not indicate any vessels departing Havana on or after 14 January bound for British Guiana, nor do State Department queries to Georgetown, British Guiana indicate the arrival of any arms. No reports have been received from service attaches in Venezuela or from sources in Panama concerning this particular matter.

Project Officer:
CDR Barton

SECRET

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Cuba

CONFIDENTIAL (When Filled In) | CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY NICARAGUA / HONDURAS / COSTA RICA / CUBA

REPORT NO. TDCS -3/534,035

SUBJECT PLANS TO LAND ARMS FROM CUBA IN HONDURAS

DATE DISTR. 16 JANUARY 1963

Export 3 Rev

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. 9 JANUARY 1963

REFERENCES IN 50511

PLACE & DATE ACQ. NICARAGUA, MANAGUA (15 JANUARY 1963)

APPRAISAL 3

FIELD REPORT NO. HNM-729

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A NICARAGUAN JOURNALIST (C) FROM A NICARAGUAN OFFICIAL (F) IN SAN JOSE; FROM CESAR AUGOSTO VILLAREAL CABEZAS

ACTION COPY
OPERATIONS AREA

1. ON 9 JANUARY 1963 CESAR AUGUSTO VILLAREAL CABEZAS, A NICARAGUAN REVOLUTIONARY LIVING IN SAN JOSE, SAID THAT HE WAS AWAITING INSTRUC_TIONS TO GO TO PUERTO CORTES, HONDURAS TO RECEIVE A SHIPMENT OF ARMS WHICH WILL COME FROM CUBA ON THE "CORK_C", A MERCHANT VESSEL OF UNKNOWN REGISTRY. HE SAID THAT THE INSTRUCTIONS TO GO TO PUERTO CORTES WILL COME FROM CUBA THROUGH DR. EMILIO ORTEGA TAPIA.

2. THE "CORK_C" WILL UNLOAD THE ARMS AT CAYO COCHINO WHERE THEY WILL BE RECEIVED BY GRIFFIN (FNU), WHO LIVES IN PUERTO CORTES. GRIFFIN WILL DELIVER THE ARMS TO VILLAREAL AT PUERTO CORTES.

3. THE ARMS WILL BE TAKEN FROM PUERTO CORTES TO PUEBLO NUEVO,

CONFIDENTIAL | CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS NO FOREIGN DISSEM | GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OBI	OO
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TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

DA IN 8112

FORM 5-62 1Kq OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

CONFIDENTIAL (When Filled In) NO FOREIGN DISSEM | TDCS-3/534,035 | IN 50511 | PAGE 2

NICARAGUA BY VILLAREAL, JULIO VELASQUEZ VELEZ, AND DR. HERNAN SILVA ARGUELLO WHERE THEY WILL BE TURNED OVER TO DR. EMILIO FLORES OBREGON.

4. (SOURCE COMMENT: THE DATE OF ARRIVAL OF THE "CORK C" IS UNKNOWN. CARLOS FONSECA AMADOR, NICARAGUAN COMMUNIST GUERRILLA LEADER IN HONDURAS, HAS RECEIVED ARMS FROM CUBA BY THE SAME SYSTEM.)

FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY CINCARIB CINCLANT.

ACTION: ACSI, NAVY, AF, JCS, OSD
INFO : DCSOP
DA IN 8112

END OF MESSAGE

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM

CONFIDENTIAL 0000

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET (When Filled In) 1963 FEB 9 11 41

COUNTRY VENEZUELA

REPORT NO. TDCS-3/536,942

DIAAP-3

SUBJECT POSSIBLE SHIPMENT OF ARMS FROM CUBA AND PANAMA TO WESTERN VENEZUELA

DATE DISTR. 9 FEBRUARY 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

REFERENCES IN 64876

DATE OF INFO. 1 FEBRUARY 1963

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VENEZUELA, MARACAIBO (1 FEBRUARY 1963)

FIELD REPORT NO. HVC-2651

APPRAISAL 3

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A MEMBER (C) OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF VENEZUELA IN MARACAIBO.

1. PEDRO MATOS, WHO TOGETHER WITH THREE MEMBER REGIONAL COMMAND COMMITTEE OF THE PARTIDO COMUNISTA DE VENEZUELA (PCV, COMMUNIST PARTY OF VENEZUELA) IN THE STATE OF ZULIA IS RESPONSIBLE FOR PCV ARMS MATTERS IN THAT STATE, SAID RECENTLY THAT THE PARTY IS AWAITING A SHIPMENT OF ARMS FROM CUBA AND PANAMA BUT THAT THE EXACT DATE OF ARRIVAL IS STILL UNKNOWN. (SOURCE COMMENT: ALTHOUGH THE LOCATIONS OF ARMS ARE KNOWN ONLY TO MATOS AND THE REGIONAL COMMAND COMMITTEE, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE AREA AROUND LA CONCEPCION AND LA PAZ, TOWNS APPROXIMATELY SOUTHWEST AND WEST, RESPECTIVELY, OF MARACAIBO CITY IN THE DISTRICT OF MARACAIBO, ARE SITES). (FIELD COMMENT: ACCORDING TO SOURCE, THE REGIONAL

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OBI	OO
STATE/DIR																

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

AAP-3

FORM 1K OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (15-20)

COMMITTEE OF THE PCV IN THE STATE OF ZULIA HAD BEEN DISSOLVED AS OF EARLY 3 '63 AND A THREE MEMBER REGIONAL COMMAND COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED).

2. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCLANT CINCARIB.

END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
STAFF MESSAGE DIVISION
INCOMING MESSAGE

RETRANSMITTED TO: SAC, TAC, CONAD, AFSC, MATS (per req Mr Kerp-CIN-25Feb62)

AF IN: 50955 (24 Feb 62) K/eld

ACTION: CIN-17 (18)

A/D: ARMY-2, NAVY-2, CMC-7, JCS-45, OSD-15 OSD/SDLU-1, STATE-15, CIA-11, NSA-7 XPD-3, ISI-2, IDS-2 (112) (Rlsd by Mr Kerp-CIN-25Feb62)

RC 41/24 FEB 62
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TO CSAF WASH DC
1127 USAF FAG FT BELVOIR VA//PROTECTED//
INFO CIARC ALBROOK AFB CZ
USAIRAS GUATEMALA BRAZIL VENEZUELA
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L XX CITE CHARLIE DASH NINE SGD HARRIS PARA MILITARY REP OF EURHPEAN WESTERN NATION ACCREDITED MEXICO REPORTED TWO TWO FEB HAVING RECD INFO FROM TWO DIFFERENT SOURCES THAT CUBAN SHIPLOAD OF ARMS HAD DEPARTED EITHER SANTIAGO DE CUBA OR BAHIA DE NIPE TWO XERO DEGREE FOUR FIVE MINUTES NORTH SEVEN FIVE DEGREES FOUR XERO MINUTES WEST DURING WEEK OF ONE ONE TO ONE SEVEN FEB PD SHIP REPORTEDLY HEADED FOR BRITISH GUIANA OR NORTHEAST BRAZIL PD LOCAL EMB INTEL AGENCIES UNABLE CONFIRM PARA SCP DASH THREE

BT

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS; NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED DOD DIR. 5200.10

ACTION: AF, (ARMY ACSI)
INFO : DCSOP, ORD
DA IN 205836

AFHQ FORM NOV 59 0-309a
PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF THIS FORM MAY BE USED.

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

The British consul in Santiago de Cuba has informed Washington and the Governor of British Guiana that two alleged US citizens, John Allram Johnson, aged 53, and his wife Margaret Frances Johnson, were leaving Cuba on 31 December on the Cuban vessel BAHIA DE TANAMA destined for Georgetown, British Guiana. On board with them were 17 cases in their name, including two large wood crates understood to be "very similar to those recently unloaded from a Soviet Union ship in Santiago de Cuba." The British consul notes the unlikelihood of US citizens' leaving Cuba in this manner, and the resulting doubt as to their real identities and intentions. (British Foreign Office to Washington, No. 9759, 31 December, 1962 (SECRET))

SECRET

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY	Cuba/British Guiana	REPORT NO.	00- K-3,210,102
SUBJECT	Shipment of Weapons to British Guiana	DATE DISTR.	21 Feb 62
		NO. PAGES	One
		REFERENCES	CD/00 Case 36159 H2/05676/G5 Case 35662 78/IWW/DOM-81/CX
DATE OF INFO.	Dec 1962		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	--; Dec 1962		

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: Cuban national, A 12 884 576, who arrived in the US on 3 Feb 1962. Source is an electrical engineer and advisor to underground groups in Cuba.

[This report was developed by an Army representative assigned to the office of preparation.]

I was advised by a Cuban merchant marine officer that the Cuban freighter, "Bahia de Nipe" left Cuba for British Guiana on 22 Dec 1961 with a cargo shipment of weapons. The boxes containing this equipment were stored in the bottom of the ship's hold and covered with mattresses and canvas. A cargo of sugar bags was placed on top of the weapons.

-end-

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State 02147

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

FEB 6 10 16 AM '63

36

Origin EUR

Info: SS G SAL ARA P USIA SCA NSC INR CIA NSA OSD ARMY NAVY AIR RMR

ACTION: Amembassy GEORGETOWN 286

UNCLASSIFIED MESSAGE REFERRING TO THIS MESSAGE BY CITE NUMBER WILL BE DESIGNATED EFTO

The Feb 8 edition of LIFE contains story on Cuba with following caption under photo of Russian freighter:

QUOTE

But refugees aboard the Shirley Lykes said two ships put out from Mariel (Cuba) only last week with holds loaded with weapons sent by Castro to British Guiana. UNQUOTE

Would appreciate any available comment.

END

RUSK

ACTION: STATE (ARMY ACSI)

INFO : DCSOP, OSA, JCS

DA IN 827722

Drafted by: EUR:BNA:RTepper:cjk 2/5/63

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: BNA - Mr. Knox

Clearances:

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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FORM 8-61 DS-322

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

54
Action
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Control: 4682
Rec'd: February 7, 1963
12:57 PM

FROM: Georgetown

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 245, February 7, NOON

Reference: Department's 286 February 6.

Neither harbor master nor shipping companies have any knowledge Cuban ships en route Georgetown. Guiana Import-Export agents for sales rice Cuba, states it is always notified as soon as rice ships leave Cuba so that necessary arrangements at RMB wharf can be made. It denies having received any notice recently. Governor also reports negative results his inquiries.

CONGEN has had numerous inquiries AP story mentioned TOUSI 18. Appreciate any clarification (not for release to press) Department can give.

MELBY

TEK/18

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS 84 OFFICIAL USE ONLY

PARIS AFP IN ENGLISH TO THE FAR EAST 1905 7 FEB 63 E

(EXCERPT) GEORGETOWN--BRITISH GUIANA IN A STATE OF NEAR PANIC TODAY AFTER NEWSPAPERS AND RADIO STATIONS PUT OUT A WASHINGTON NEWSPAPER REPORT THAT CUBA WAS SENDING TWO SHIPS FULL OF SOVIET ARMS TO THIS COUNTRY. PREMIER CHEDDI JAGAN CALLED THE REPORT FROM THE WASHINGTON EVENING STAR FANTASTIC AND UNFOUNDED. A SPOKESMAN IN THE HOME AFFAIRS MINISTRY SAID THE GOVERNMENT EXPECTED NO ARMS FROM THE SOVIET UNION OR CUBA.

7 FEB 749P FG/OP

04289

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

CONFIDENTIAL

Cuba

FEB 9 11 17 AM '63

59

Origin
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ACTION: AmConGen GEORGETOWN 293

Info:
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RMR

1963 FEB 11 14 04
DIA-3

UrTel 245

Washington ~~investigation~~ intelligence agencies have no information to confirm alleged munitions shipments from Cuba to Georgetown.

Story originated with caption current edition Life Magazine to effect two Russian ships carrying munitions from Mariel, Cuba to BG. O'Leary of Washington Evening Star apparently seized on Life story as basis Evening Star article. Unlikely any responsible US official confirm story as O'Leary alleged in article.

If repeat if Department is asked by press, we plan say we have no information but are making inquiries.

END

RUSK

Drafted by: EUR:BNA:RJTepper:ldd 2/8/63

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: EUR/BNA - M. Gordon Knox

Clearances:
INR - Mr. Packman
EUR/P - Mr. McGowan
INR/CS - Mr. Simmons
~~ARA - Mr. Sneer~~
CCA - Mr. Follestad

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM 8-61 DS-322

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY	British Guiana/Cuba	REPORT NO.	OO-B-3,247,344
SUBJECT	Jagan's Political-Economic Viewpoints/Expropriation of Foreign Properties Linked to Foreign Aid/Futility of Jagan's 5-Year Plan/Peoples Progressive Party Infiltration of United Front/Arms Smuggling from Cuba/Filariasis Disease Common in Guiana Back Country.	DATE DISTR.	11 Jan 63
		NO. PAGES	
		REFERENCES	
DATE OF INFO.	Thru Oct 62		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	British Guiana/Thru Oct 62		

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: US national, executive in a US aluminum company.

Source has frequently traveled to and within British Guiana in connection with geological surveys for his company. He has known Jagan for about nine years, and on his latest trip had several conversations with Jagan.

1. On the basis of many conversations with Cheddi Jagan (mostly concerning possible investments by my company in British Guiana), I am convinced that he is not a Communist. In fact, Jagan does not know what he is. He is simply looking for anything new that will help to pull up his people quickly. In this context he sees Soviet and Chinese Communism as the two principal Twentieth Century economic experiments -- and as economic experiments he is willing to try them.

2. In talking with me, Jagan has made clear that he is not a "Castro Type." He wants help from anybody. The one thing that might in the future seriously hinder his getting economic aid from the USSR is that he demands that aid be without strings.

3. Both Jagan and his Trade Minister, Frank Hubbard, have told me that Jagan would hesitate to do anything (such as confiscating foreign properties in an attempt to increase revenues) which would offend the US or the UN for fear of ruining any future chances of obtaining US or UN aid. Jagan is of course quite conscious that he is still under the UK and that it is therefore unconstitutional for him to expropriate anything. After British Guiana achieves independence, I am confident Jagan would not expropriate anything if he is getting aid from the US or the UN -- that is, until the money is spent. If at any point (after independence) Jagan is receiving no such aid and has no prospects of receiving such aid, then anything could happen. I would, however, temper this somewhat depressing estimate of Jagan by commenting that in 1953 when he entered office, he was something of a wild-eyed fanatic without direction. Since then he has matured considerably.

4. The PPP capability for increasing the industrial wealth of British Guiana is hopeless. Jagan indiscriminately wants all kinds of factories. His "Five Year Plan" is no plan at all. In his eagerness to do something for British Guiana, Jagan thinks he ought to build any kind of factory that the country does not have. Whenever he thinks of something, he just tells a subordinate to add it to the Plan. But there is no one in the Jagan government who has done or can do the marketing research, etc., which is necessary for any such investment.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

STATE		ARMY		NAVY		AIR		FBI		AEC				

5. In the last elections Jagan ordered some of his (Indian) Peoples Progressive Party (PPP) supporters to join the United Front Party (UFP) in order to impress the world in general and the US in particular that democracy in British Guiana was working. By virtue of the fact that the UFP membership was "growing," it was "obvious" that Jagan was not a dictator. I was told this by two Indian Guianese who were working for Jagan.

6. I was in British Guiana for about 12 months on my latest trip. Since much of this time was devoted to geological surveying in the hinterland, I was accompanied by an Indian Guianese doctor. A well-educated man of the upper-middle class, he told me that arms were being smuggled into the country from Cuba. He did not go into any detail on the subject, but he did mention that his sons, who were members of the Progressive Youth Organization (PYO) frequently brought arms into their home, kept them for a while, and then disposed of them. The doctor was so much concerned -- and pessimistic -- about the situation that he emigrated from the country shortly after I departed.

7. Malaria is not a factor now. Even well into the interior there is less than 1 percent incidence. But anywhere away from the coast filariasis presents a problem. At first I did not believe it when my Indian Guianese doctor said that mosquito bites incurred in the day-time were harmless but mosquito bites at night would infect with filariasis. After several months in the back country I believed him. The disease seems to affect women more than men, causing women's legs to swell. But the disease's affect on men's sexual organs was not exactly encouraging. I never did understand why, but my doctor said that to be effective in detecting the disease a blood test must be made at night (preferably between 11 p.m. and 1 a.m.), and analyzed quickly. If filariasis is treated promptly, a man's sexual prowess can be saved. We found that the disease is very common throughout the country.

- end -

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY	Cuba/British Guiana	REPORT NO.	OO- K-3,210,102
SUBJECT	Shipment of Weapons to British Guiana	DATE DISTR.	21 Feb 62
		NO. PAGES	One
		REFERENCES	CD/OO Case 36159 H2/05676/G5 Case 35662 78/IWW/DOM-81/CX
DATE OF INFO.	Dec 1962		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	--; Dec 1962		

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: Cuban national, A 12 884 576, who arrived in the US on 3 Feb 1962.

Source is an electrical engineer and advisor to underground groups in Cuba.

[This report was developed by an Army representative assigned to the office of preparation.]

I was advised by a Cuban merchant marine officer that the Cuban freighter, "Bahia de Nipe" left Cuba for British Guiana on 22 Dec 1961 with a cargo shipment of weapons. The boxes containing this equipment were stored in the bottom of the ship's hold and covered with mattresses and canvas. A cargo of sugar bags was placed on top of the weapons.

-end-

COMMUNICATIONS

SECRET

COMMUNICATIONS

There is little information available on the Castro/Communist communication network with Latin America. Over the past years there are numerous reports indicating that communications are carried by visitors to and from Cuba, that Cuban Embassies serve as communication points for Castro/Communist subversive groups in various countries, and that directions to subversive groups are transmitted by clandestine radio transmitters in Cuba. Preceding items on radio propaganda and propaganda shipments, arms shipments, and the training of personnel in Cuba are closely related to communications. Information on Communist organizations and the Communist apparatus also are related to the question of communication.

There have been some references to instructions from Cuba; however, such evidence is not available and copies of those documents made available in the past would not withstand scrutiny.

TAB

1 Electronic Communications

This Tab contains three items: (1) A general comment on electrical communications; (2) An item indicating the use of amateur radio stations for communications; and (3) A report of a clandestine receiving station in the Dominican Republic.

2 Documents

This Tab contains an item referring to documents obtained from the plane crash in Peru. Initially, the Peruvian press and Peruvian officials indicated these documents proved Castro/Communist sponsor-

SECRET

ship of a revolution in Brazil; however, the Brazilian Government has not taken public note of the document.

3 Couriers

This Tab contains illustrative reports of travellers to and from Cuba who may act as couriers. This item is closely related to information on individuals and groups travelling to Cuba for training or propaganda.

ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS

There are numerous reports of a highly classified nature concerning electronics communications between Cuba and the Bloc, within Cuba, and between Cuba and Latin America. Some reports infer that Prensa Latina facilities may be used for other than news purposes and there are frequent reports of clandestine radio instructions to Latin America from Cuba and between clandestine stations in Latin America.

ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

Export

C O N F I D E N T I A L

CUBA

Central "Hom" Radio Transmitting Station, Rancho Boyeros Airport, Habana Province (C)

30 January 1962

1 of 1

None

19-20 January 1962

Rancho Boyeros, Jan 62
C-3
DUJ 316/37-1-62

DUJ
DUJ
DUJ-39-62

1. Sub-Source reports that the Government of Cuba had planned to inaugurate a in amateur radio transmitting station at the Rancho Boyeros Airport, south of Habana City, on the 19th or 20th of January 1962.

2. The purpose of the station was to be communication between Cuba and Tegucigalpa, Honduras, on the 9077 frequency.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

CONFIDENTIAL

OPNS BRANCH

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY	Dominican Republic/Cuba	REPORT NO.	CS-3/535,788
SUBJECT	Clandestine Radio Receiving Station in Santo Domingo	DATE DISTR.	1 February 1963
		NO. PAGES	1
		REFERENCES	RD
DATE OF INFO.	22 January 1963		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Dominican Republic, Santo Domingo 22 January 1963	FIELD REPORT NO.	HDC-553

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Foreign businessman (B) with good contacts in Dominican political circles. Appraisal of Content: 3.

One of the under-cover receiving stations for radio messages from Habana is believed to be in a house at Calle Espaillat 56. The house is occupied by Johnson (fnu), who has an electrician's repair shop there.

Headquarters Comment. Johnson (fnu) is probably identifiable with the Johnson (fnu) reported by another source as a Communist member of the Agrupacion Politica Catorce de Junio (APCJ - 14th of June Political Group). See CS-3/511,814, of 24 May 1962. Also see CS-3/528,287, of 14 November 1962, from an official British service, which reports on a clandestine group of pro-Castro Dominicans who are in radio contact with Habana from a repair shop in Santo Domingo..

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

The CIA station in Rio de Janeiro has reported that some efforts may be made to put pressure on President Goulart to publicly take some note of the Cuban intervention in Brazil's internal affairs, allegedly shown by some 16 pages of Spanish-language documents found in the Varig plane crash which carried a Cuban delegation to their deaths in November. The documents are considered by a Brazilian source who made them available to the CIA station to be "explosive, since they prove the Cubans are sponsoring revolution in Brazil." Paraphrases of these documents have appeared in the Lima press; but it is unlikely that President Goulart will give any support to publicizing them. (CIA, Rio de Janeiro, IN 43586, 2 January, SECRET NOFORN)

SECRET

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

2-1123

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY	Paraguay/Cuba	REPORT NO.	CS -3/536,454
SUBJECT	Paraguayan Travelers to and From Cuba	DATE DISTR.	7 February 1963
		NO. PAGES	2
		REFERENCES	RD
DATE OF INFO.	December 1962 - 20 January 1963		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Paraguay, Asuncion (24 January 1963)	FIELD REPORT NO.	HYA-833

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Paraguayan security officer (B) from a member of the Paraguayan Communist Party (C). Appraisal of Content: 2.

1. On about 20 January 1963 Cantero, a leader of the Partido Comunista Paraguayo (PCP - Paraguayan Communist Party) in Paraguay,[1] met with five rural leaders of the PCP from the areas of Villarrica, Concepcion, Piribebuy, Tebycuarymi, and Guarambare. These leaders received political instructions from the PCP for their trip to Cuba, where they will receive military and political training in rural organization. Lopez (fnu)[2] is the leader from Piribebuy, and Ignacio Acosta[3] is the leader from Tebycuarymi.

2. Federico Tatter, a retired ensign in the Paraguayan Navy, entered Paraguay from Cuba in the first half of December to assume military direction of the Frente Unido de Liberacion Nacional (FULNA - United Front for National Liberation).

3. Anibal Garcete[4] has returned to Paraguay from Cuba to organize the sugar-cane workers. Garcete is a PCP member masquerading as a member of the Colorado Party.

1. Field Comment. Cantero is the PCP pseudonym of a person whose true name is unknown.

Source Comments

2. Lopez was born about 1937.

3. Acosta is a cousin of Wigberto Acosta, a long-time member of the PCP.

5
4

[illegible] Comment. Wigberto Acosta was reported in June 1960 [illegible] have been a PCP member active in the labor dispute in [illegible] Tabyonarymi area involving the sugar cane worker's [illegible]mand for higher salaries.

4. Source Comment. [illegible] was mentioned in confidential PCP correspon[illegible] which time he was an officer in the Federation of Sugar Cane Workers.

On 4 December Brazilian President Goulart telephoned General Alves, commander of the First Army with headquarters in Rio de Janeiro and the highest ranking extreme leftist in the Brazilian armed forces. He told Alves to choose four or five junior officers of his absolute confidence to escort certain people who were arriving from Cuba via Bolivia. Goulart said the people were coming with "much material." (CIA, Sao Paulo, IN 30353, 6 December, SECRET NOFORN)

Eight Dominican pro-Castro leaders were aboard the Czech airlines flight to Cuba which transited Shannon Airport on 14 December, according to an official Irish service. The Dominicans included Maximo Lopez Molina, Tomas Parmenio Erickson, and Gustavo Ricart, leaders of the outlawed Dominican Popular Movement (MPD), one of the most active pro-Communist groups in the Dominican Republic. The eight Dominicans were among the ten who were deported from the Dominican Republic to France earlier this year. Another source reported last November that the Cuban ambassador in Paris had a meeting with the ten Dominican deportees to discuss helping them travel to Cuba without passports. (CIA Dublin, TDCS-3/531,991, 21 December, SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

Premier Castro is to deliver the closing speech at the Congress of Women of the Americas on 15 January in Havana. Havana Radio announced that the congress, scheduled to begin 11 January, will be attended by more than 200 delegates from Latin America, the U. S., and Canada, as well as by guests from many other non-American countries. Delegations from Communist China, Albania, Czechoslovakia, North Korea, and North Vietnam arrived in Havana on 9 January. (FBIS 03 and 51, 10 January, OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

SABOTAGE

SABOTAGE

A number of acts of sabotage have been committed in various Latin American states. There is no conclusive evidence available to link these acts of sabotage with the Castro/Communist apparatus.

Portions on training indicate that sabotage is being taught to trainees in Cuba.

TAB

1 Reports of Sabotage

This Tab contains four items: (1) A report that Cuba is training personnel for sabotage missions in the U.S.; (2) A report that Dominicans are leaving Cuba to sabotage cane fields in the Dominican Republic; (3) A report on the controversial sabotage of the Maracaibo oil fields in Venezuela. (Not substantiated by evidence available to the U.S.); and (4) Report of an unsuccessful attempt to sabotage a bridge in Venezuela.

2 Terrorist Activities

This Tab contains an item reporting Castro/Communist inspired terrorist activities in Venezuela linked to the Maracaibo sabotage.

1

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

An expert Cuban electrical technician in the Borjita sugar mill has told a former close associate who is now a regular clandestine source that Cuba is training personnel in the techniques of using explosives prior to sending them to the United States on sabotage missions. It is intended that such persons will go in the guise of anti-Communist refugees, and the sabotage will be so arranged that in some cases it will be taken to be merely accidents. The electrical technician added that there is a large Communist espionage ring operating with a ring in the United States across the border, with several plans already under way. (CIA DDP IN 29517, 4 December, SECRET NOFORN)

SECRET

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

A Dominican exile in Cuba reportedly told a source who was there about mid-December that Dominican Communists are leaving Cuba for the Dominican Republic to sabotage the cane fields there. (CIA, Panama City, IN 48599, 11 January, SECRET NOFORN)

INCOMING TELEGRAM **Department of State**

42-41 ... 45 CONFIDENTIAL

Action

ARA

Info

SS
G
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RMR

Control: 1171
Rec'd: NOVEMBER 3, 1962
11:29 P.M.

FROM: CARACAS

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 548, NOVEMBER 3, 9 P.M.

NIACT

DEPARTMENT PASS CINCARIB, CINCLANT

FOREIGN MINISTER FALCON BRICENO INFORMS ME HE WILL ARRIVE WASHINGTON SUNDAY NIGHT TO MAKE SPECIAL SPEECH IN OAS/OC MONDAY RE CUBAN SITUATION UNDERSCORING CUBAN INSPIRED SUBVERSION AND SABOTAGE AGAINST VENEZUELA.

HE WILL PRESENT INTERCEPTED CABLE TO VENEZUELAN STUDENTS AND OTHER EVIDENCE WHICH HE HOPES OBTAIN FROM INTERIOR MINISTRY. HE ASKS IF DEPARTMENT CAN PROVIDE HIM SUNDAY AT VENEZUELAN EMBASSY WITH TRANSCRIPT RAUL CASTRO'S STATEMENT AFTER MARACAIBO SABOTAGE IN WHICH PRESS CLAIMS RAUL TOOK CUBAN CREDIT FOR INCIDENT.

SUGGEST DEPARTMENT MAKE THIS AND ALL OTHER USEFUL FBIS INTERCEPTS AS WELL OTHER EVIDENCE AVAILABLE TO HIM.

FALCON'S ARRIVAL NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON WILL BE AVAILABLE VENEZUELAN EMBASSY THERE. PLEASE EXTEND COURTESIES. HE PLANS STAY US ABOUT EIGHT DAYS.

STEWART

SMD

NOTE: PASSED TO CINCARIB, CINCLANT 11/4/62.
MESSRS. MOSKOWITZ, BOWDLER AND ALLEN (ARA) NOTIFIED
12:10 A.M., 11/4/62 TEM.

CONFIDENTIAL

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET (When Filled In) — CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

Mr. Rowen has seen

ASD / DASD / EXEC / D/RA / EUR / NESA / WH / FE / SSB / FEA / D/AC / DIS / D/PL / C/PL / P/PL / PLACE / DATE / APPRAISAL / COMP / WPS / C/L / OPR

COUNTRY	VENEZUELA	REPORT NO.	TDCS -3/537,176
SUBJECT	CONTINUATION OF COMMUNIST TERRORIST ACTIVITIES	DATE DISTR.	13 FEBRUARY 1963
		PRECEDENCE	PRIORITY
DATE OF INFO.	8 AND 12 FEBRUARY 1963	REFERENCES	IN 67419
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	VENEZUELA, CARACAS (13 FEBRUARY 1963)		
APPRAISAL	2	FIELD REPORT NO.	HVC 2655

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: PARA 1: FORMER POLICE OFFICIAL (C) WITH CONTACTS IN THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE NATIONAL GUARD; PARA 2: U.S. BUSINESSMAN (B) WITH EXCELLENT CONTACTS IN THE VENEZUELAN MILITARY.

1. ON THE EVENING OF 8 FEB 63 NATIONAL GUARD SOLDIERS WHO WERE PROTECTING THE CARACAS-LA GUAIRA TURNPIKE SURPRISED A GROUP OF MEN AT THE ENTRANCE TO TUNNEL NUMBER 1 WHO WERE ATTEMPTING TO DESTROY TURNPIKE BRIDGE NUMBER 1. FIRE WAS EXCHANGED FOR ABOUT THIRTY MINUTES BETWEEN THE SOLDIERS AND THE MEN IN THE TUNNEL AND LATER A BOX CONTAINING ABOUT 1ØØ POUNDS OF DYNAMITE WAS FOUND BELOW THE BRIDGE.

2. TWO CAR LOADS OF GUERILLAS ATTACKED THE NATIONAL GUARD HEADQUARTERS AT DABAJURO, A PIPE LINE OUTPOST BETWEEN AMUAY, IN THE PARAGUANA PENINSULA AND LAKE MARACAIBO, STATE OF ZULIA, IN WESTERN VENEZUELA, ON 12 FEB. ABOUT 1ØØ SHOTS WERE EXCHANGED BUT ALL THE GUERILLAS ESCAPED.

SECRET — CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

DA IN 16985

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OBI	OO	EXO
STATE/DIR																	

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

SECRET

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FORM 1K OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (15-20)

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET
(When Filled In)

TDCS -3/537,176

IN 67419

PAGE 2

3. (FIELD COMMENT: TERRORIST ACTIVITIES HAVE BEEN INCREASING IN VENEZUELA. SEVERAL MEMBERS OF THE FUERZAS ARMADAS DE LIBERACION NACIONAL (FALN, ARMED FORCES OF NATIONAL LIBERATION) TOOK TEMPORARY POSSESION OF THE OFFICE OF THE PREFECT IN THE TOWN OF SAN DIEGO DE LOS ALTOS, ABOUT 2Ø MILES FROM CARACAS, ON 4 FEB. THEY TIED UP THE POLICEMEN ON GUARD, STOLE A FEW RIFLES, AND PAINTED THE WALLS WITH ANTI-GOVERNMENT SLOGANS. ON 5 FEB AN ATTACK WAS MADE ON THE HOME OF COLONEL JOSE ANTONIO GONZALEZ, COMMANDER OF THE MILITARY TRIBUNAL, LOCATED IN A WELL-TO-DO RESIDENTIAL AREA OF CARACAS. THIS WAS FOLLOWED BY ANOTHER ATTACK ON 12 FEB WHICH RESULTED IN THE GOVERNMENT ESTABLISHING ROAD BLOCKS AND SENDING TROOPS AND POLICE INTO THE AREA. ON THE MORNING OF 9 FEB AN ARMED ATTACK WAS MADE ON THE AMERICAN (PORTION GARBLED WILL FWD) * WHERE OFFICES WERE SET ON FIRE AND EQUIPMENT DESTROYED, AND ON THE NIGHT OF 9 FEB SEARS WAREHOUSE IN ANTIMANO WAS COMPLETELY DESTROYED BY MEMBERS OF THE FALN. THREE BRIDGES ON THE PAN AMERICAN HIGHWAY, BARQUISIMETO AREA, STATE OF LARA, WERE DAMAGED BY BOMBS ON 12 FEB AND AN ATTEMPT WAS MADE ON THAT DAY TO BLOW UP A CREOLE OIL LINE IN CATIA LA MAG, FEDERAL DISTRICT, BUT ONLY ONE SMALL BOMB EXPLODED CAUSING MINOR DAMAGES).

4. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCLANT CINCARIB.

* 5. HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: MISSING PORTION WILL BE DISSEMINATED ONLY IF IT MATERIALLY AFFECTS THE SENSE OF THIS REPORT.

END OF MESSAGE

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET ACTION: ACSI, NAVY, AF, JCS, OSD
INFO : DCSOPS

000

DA IN 16985

Extremist And Police Activities In Venezuela

Venezuela has been afflicted over the past several months with a rash of Castro-Communist terrorist actions. Many incidents, involving shootings and robberies, are connected with the Movement of the Revolutionary Left, the Venezuelan Communist Party, and the Armed Forces of National Liberation -- the Castro-Communist group credited with the destruction at the Maracaibo oil fields during the Cuban crisis. These activities are probably designed to discredit and weaken the Betancourt Government.

The police have demonstrated considerable proficiency in preventing major outbreaks and in acting rapidly to arrest terrorists. They have rounded up extremists responsible for the holdup and looting of a printing supply warehouse and the burning of the Dupont paint warehouse and have captured the Communist leader of guerrilla bands operating in the Falcon area of northwestern Venezuela.
(CONFIDENTIAL)

COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION
FOR LATIN AMERICA

COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION FOR LATIN AMERICA

Information on the Communist apparatus for Latin America and its relationship with Cuba and the Sino Soviet Bloc is largely derived from highly classified intelligence which is provided separately. From the reports contained in this section, it may be concluded that the organizational links vary from country to country depending upon, among other factors, the legal status of the Communist party, whether diplomatic representation is located in a country, the relative strength of Communist alliances with other leftist or opposition parties, and the character of current government leadership in these countries. Next attached is an unclassified report prepared in October for release as a White Paper. Although this paper was not released due to the missile crisis, it represents an agreed summary (State, DOD, CIA and USIA) of the Communist apparatus in Latin America. The report contains briefs on Communist activities in each of the Latin American countries.

The reports vary with respect to the country priority for Castro/Communist action in Latin America. Brazil, Venezuela, and British Guiana are mentioned most frequently as the likely priority targets. There are also conflicting reports on the relative independence of Castro from the Soviet Union and indications that the publicized Sino Soviet disagreements are reflected in local Communist organizations throughout Latin America.

TAB 1 — Cuban Relationships and Policies Toward Latin America

This tab contains relevant excerpts from the draft NIE now under preparation. (USIB is meeting on this item and

the most current agreed positions will be made available to you in the event there is any significant change.) Also included at this tab are a number of significant reports indicating the probable orientation of Castro/Communist actions directed toward Latin America. The last item at this tab summarizes the unsuccessful armed incursions of 1959 (Panama, Nicaragua, and Dominican Republic).

TAB 2 Soviet Activities and Conflicts

This tab contains a number of items indicating possible Cuban-Soviet conflicts as reflected in Latin America. The last two items reflect the concern attached to the possible establishment of a Soviet fishing port in Cuba.

TAB 3 Situation in Latin America

This tab contains a number of current situation and pertinent background reports on various Latin American countries in the following order: Central America, Panama and Mexico; Bolivia; Brazil (4); Colombia; Costa Rica; Ecuador; Haiti; Mexico; Panama; Peru (4); and Venezuela (3).

4 October 1962

MEMORANDUM: Cuban Subversion in Other Latin American Countries

I. General Summary

1. The Castro regime denies that material support is being given any anti-regime group outside Cuba. Castro claims that such assistance is unnecessary since the people of these countries, thanks to Cuba's example, are becoming aware of their revolutionary potential. The publicly stated position of the Cuban leaders is that their country, "the first socialist state in America," has become the example, the "beacon". In fact, however, Cuba's moral and material support to Communist and Communist-influenced groups has been felt in varying degrees in every one of the 19 other Latin American republics. The Castro regime has become an effective instrument of the Sino-Soviet effort to weaken and eventually destroy democratic political institutions in Latin America.

2. Cuban subversion has become more subtle since 1959, when a Cuban-mounted expeditionary force was launched against the Dominican Republic and smaller "invasion forces" left Cuba for abortive attacks on the governments of Panama, Nicaragua, and Haiti. Now Cuban subversive efforts generally fall in three categories:

a. The indoctrination and training of hundreds of Latin Americans in Cuba;

b. The intensive propaganda beamed at Latin America by Cuban radio stations and circulated through printed material and the Cuban-subsidized international "news" agency, and;

c. The covert material support given subversive groups in other countries.

II. Cuban Subversive Programs

A. Training of Latin Americans in Cuba:

3. Fidel Castro announced on 9 June 1961 that his government would grant 1,000 scholarships to "poor students" from other Latin American countries for the next school term and 100 scholarships to students from other countries of the world. Hundreds of young Latin Americans have been subjected to Communist indoctrination. In addition to whatever formal training they receive in Cuba, many of them receive training in guerrilla warfare and other techniques of revolution.

4. Cuban refugees who have arrived recently in the United States have provided detailed information on the training programs offered to some of these young Latin Americans.

a. One refugee, a deserter from Castro's army, reported from personal knowledge that in late 1961 there were a number of students from Chile, Ecuador, Argentina, Guatemala, and Brazil living in a Havana suburb who regularly attended classes in Marxism-Leninism, propaganda techniques, and other subjects to prepare them for active revolutionary roles in their homelands. He reported that those male students who were between 16 and 20 years of age were sent as part of their training to the Minas del Frio training center in Oriente province. During this phase of their training they received familiarization in the use of small arms and hiked to the top of Cuba's highest mountain, Pico Turquino, in the Sierra Maestra, the locale of Castro's guerrilla warfare against the Batista dictatorship.

b. Another refugee, who lived in Oriente province, learned from conversations with militia-men in the area and from Latin Americans training there that continuous training of students from other Latin American countries is going on at Las Arenas, Oriente. The trainees receive instruction in military tactics, guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, propaganda, and Communist ideology. The refugee did not know how many Latin Americans were involved, but believed the duration of each course was about eight weeks, after which another group replaced the one that had been training.

5. Much of the travel of Latin American students to Cuba for training and indoctrination is handled by the Instituto Cubano de Amistad con los Pueblos (ICAP - Cuban Institute for Friendship with Peoples).

6. Cuba is also a major takeoff point for Latin Americans traveling to and from the Sino-Soviet bloc. Over 400 Latin Americans returned from last July's Communist-sponsored Youth Festival in Helsinki aboard a Soviet passenger vessel with the 400-man Cuban delegation. They disembarked in Havana and stayed in Cuba some weeks before some of them began returning to their home countries. Others may well be remaining in Cuba for some time.

B. Cuban Propaganda:

7. International broadcasts by Cuban radio stations maintain a relatively constant propaganda level at all times, with regularly scheduled and special broadcasts to specific countries as well as general transmissions to all of Latin America. The general theme of all these broadcasts is that "the Cuban example" is awakening the "people" of Latin America to the opportunity for revolutionary action against the "corrupt" regimes in power and against "Yankee imperialism" which allegedly supports them.

8. There are regular programs beamed by Havana radio to Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Peru, and Honduras. They are all subversive in content and frequently incite to rebellion. These programs to specific countries are apparently directed and produced with the guidance of exiles from the countries concerned resident in Cuba.

9. The program to the Dominican Republic, for instance, is announced as the program of the Dominican Liberation Movement (MLD), and the program is entitled Patria Libre. At present, Radio Havana beams the 20 minute Patria Libre program to the Dominican Republic on Thursdays and Saturdays. Just prior to the program, the Radio Havana announcer explains that the station is making its facilities available to the MLD for its program. There are some areas in the Dominican Republic where, due to the absence of local radio stations, the Cuban broadcasts are the only ones heard. Last July, the subversive content of these broadcasts to the Dominican Republic led the Dominican government to protest to the Organization of American States.

10. The content of such broadcasts is exemplified in the stated goals of the "Voice of Revolutionary Nicaragua," the program which is regularly beamed by Radio Havana to Nicaragua. On 31 August this program celebrated its first anniversary by repeating its original statement of its purposes:

> "The Voice of Revolutionary Nicaragua has set itself the goal of contributing to pointing out the real way to Nicaragua's liberation from the dominion of Yankee imperialism and the Somoza tyranny. Elections (scheduled for next February to choose President Somoza's successor) with the Somozas in power, and under the State Department's economic and political control of Nicaragua, will be a farce. Without. . a prior revolutionary overthrow of the Somoza tyranny there can be no free elections in Nicaragua nor can a popular government be established. This program will be at the service of the revolutionaries and against the electioneers...The Voice of Revolutionary Nicaragua will defend the Cuban revolution because it is an important part of the Latin American people's liberating revolution."

11. Cuban propaganda is also disseminated through the offices of Presna Latina, the Cuban-subsidized international "news agency" which has close working relations with TASS, the New China News Agency, and other propaganda media for the Sino-Soviet bloc.

12. Cuban printed material is circulated throughout the hemisphere; Che Guevara's book on guerrilla warfare has received wide distribution. Periodically, the Mexican government, most recently last August, has been obliged to confiscate large quantities of propangenda materials from Latin Americans passing through that country enroute from Cuba to their homelands.

C. Cuban covert support for subversive groups:

13. Cuban covert support for Communist or pro-Communist groups in other Latin American countries is provided in a number of ways. In the five Latin American countries where Cuban diplomatic missions are still resident (Mexico, Brazil, Uruguay, Chile, and Bolivia), these missions have often been the channel. The Cuban embassy in Mexico is known to have provided

frequent assistance to exiles from Guatemala, Nicaragua, and other Central American countries living in Mexico. In other instances, assistance is provided through travelers coming from Cuba and through Prensa Latina representatives.

14. The assistance is usually financial. The Cubans appear to have been careful since 1959 to avoid being caught in a blatant act of subversion that could be used to justify concerted inter-American action. Financial assistance is often just as useful and much less risky than actual weapons deliveries. In a number of American countries, small arms and other weapons are available for a price. Unscrupulous or careless arms dealers in the US have also contributed to the arms traffic from which pro-Castro groups have benefitted, directly or indirectly.

15. As the following country-by-country rundown indicates, Cuban support for subversive activity has affected in varying degrees every one of the 19 other Latin American countries.

a. Argentina: Ernesto "Che" Guevara, an Argentine by birth, has retained his deep interest in Argentina's political affairs. On 25 May, the Argentine national holiday, he addressed the group of Argentine citizens resident in Cuba and told them that he hoped that next year they would be celebrating in Argentina under "the flag of socialism." At another point in this address he said: "Our revolution is one which needs to expand its ideas...and other people are helping us. Let the other peoples of the hemisphere get angry and take up arms or seize power and aid us in this task which is the task of the entire hemisphere and of humanity."

The Argentine community in Cuba last April organized the "Cuban-Argentine Friendship Institute" with headquarters in Havana. One of the leaders is John William Cooke, who was for a time chief of former Argentine dictator Peron's political machine in Argentina. Cooke continues active in that faction of the Peronista party which seeks concerted action with the Argentine Communists. Cooke maintains regular contact with sympathizers inside and outside Argentina through travelers and through his wife, Alicia Eguren de Cooke, a resident of Montevideo, Uruguay, who apparently has regular means of communication with individuals in Argentina. Argentine citizens have been recruited through this channel to go to Cuba for training. There are also strong indications that terrorist activities by Argentine Peronists and Communists have been encouraged and perhaps assisted through this channel.

Prior to the diplomatic break between Argentina and Cuba last February, the Cuban embassy in Buenos Aires provided financial assistance to anti-government groups there. An Argentine journalist who has contacts in the Communist party there reported last December, for instance, that the Argentine Communist party had received the sum of 50,000 pesos from the Cuban embassy as a contribution to the railway workers who were then on strike in the province of Cordoba.

Though the Cuban embassy is no longer in Buenos Aires, Cuban clandestine assistance to Argentine Peronist-Communist groups continues. On 19 July of this year the federal police in Buenos Aires reported the unearthing of a center of Communist and Peronist activities in the capital. Two Buenos Aires policemen were shot and killed at a surburban warehouse in June. Investigations revealed that a quantity of explosives and propaganda were stored in the warehouse. The trail led to the arrest of one Jose Maria Aponte, a journalist and known Peronist activist, and one Mario Massi, owner of the firm which owned the warehouse. It was revealed that Massi had been maintaining contact with Cuban Communists, with John William Cooke, and with an unidentified woman associated with the Cuban embassy in Uruguay who was probably Alicia Eguren de Cooke referred to above. According to the Argentine police investigation, some 150 Argentine citizens had been sent from Argentina to Cuba (through Uruguay and Mexico) for training in guerrilla warfare. On their return to Argentina, these men were to be used in planned activities in the provinces of Formosa, Tucuman, Salta, and the wooded areas of eastern Argentina. A number of other individuals were apprehended by the Argentine police in connection with the subversive activity revealed in these investigations.

b. Bolivia: Bolivia has been the recipient of special Cuban attentions. The number of Bolivians receiving "scholarships" in Cuba this year--between 130 and 150-- appears disproportionately high. The Bolivian government felt obliged to request the departure of Cuban Ambassador Tabares in 1960 and of Cuban Charge Garcia Trians in 1961 for blatant intervention in internal Bolivian affairs, including support for Bolivian Communists and attempts to incite extreme leftist members of the governing MNR party to leave the party. In June 1961, the Bolivian government published a series of documents linking the Cuban embassy with a Communist conspiracy to seize control of the government. One of these documents, a statement by an arrested Bolivian agitator who had been in close contact with the Cuban embassy, gave the names of a number of Bolivians who had received financial support from the Cuban embassy. This evidence was used to justify the request for the Cuban charge's recall.

The present Cuban charge in Bolivia, Ramon Aja, has also been active though perhaps a bit more discreet than his predecessors. He has been particularly energetic in cultivating relations with Bolivian campesinos. The peasant union in the Cliza Valley of Bolivia has been reported to be the recipient of Cuban financial assistance.

c. Brazil: During the past two years the Castro regime has developed increasingly close ties with Francisco Juliao, self-proclaimed Marxist and leader of the Peasant Leagues in the troubled northeast region of Brazil. Juliao, whose wife and children are resident in Cuba, has traveled there on several occasions, and a number of his associates and rank-and-file members of the Leagues have gone to Cuba for agricultural training which is undoubtedly heavily larded with ideological indoctrination. Transportation direct from northeast Brazil to Cuba has been provided by Cubana airlines on at least one occasion. Circumstantial evidence strongly suggests that Juliao has received financial assistance for his movement from the Cuban government. Brazilian Communist leaders have privately stated, in

fact, that Juliao's Peasant Leagues have received not only money but also shipments of small arms from Cuba. These Brazilian Communist leaders also said that the reason Juliao sent his family to Cuba was his fear that they might be endangered in the civil war he expects to erupt shortly in Brazil.

The Cuban government has also during the past year cultivated particularly close relations with leaders of the dissident Communist Party of Brazil (CPB). One of the CPB leaders who had visited Cuba last May told a friend of a long conversation he had had with Fidel Castro in late May. Castro expressed identity of feeling with the dissident Brazilian Communists and criticized the regular Communist party for its failure "to take a strong revolutionary line" in accordance with the decision of the 22nd party congress of the Communist party of the Soviet Union. Castro approved the insurrectionary policy of the CPB and urged the leaders to organize guerrilla activities and start the revolutionary movement in Brazil "as soon as possible." Castro advised them that government reprisals against revolutionary action in Brazil would serve only to increase popular discontent in Brazil and swell the ranks of the revolutionaries. He advised CPB leaders to give special emphasis to securing as wide a base as possible among agricultural workers and the inhabitants of rural areas.

The Cuban embassy in Rio de Janeiro, like Cuban embassies elsewhere in Latin America, has been a source of assistance to Communist and pro-Communist elements. Last May leaks to the Brazilian press reported discussions in the Brazilian cabinet on the subversive activities being directed by Cuban ambassador Joaquin Hernandez Armas. The Navy and Army Ministers are reported to have expressed particular concern over Hernandez' activities.

d. Chile: Senator Salvador Allende, leader of Chile's Communist-dominated popular front and a leading presidential aspirant, has made at least two trips to Cuba.

The Cuban embassy in Santiago is the source of propaganda support for pro-Communist groups, mostly those associated with Allende, who are intent on coming to power in Chile through elections or revolution. Orlando Prendes, cultural attache of the Cuban embassy, is known to be supervising the printing of Cuban propaganda on a clandestine printing press in the home of Julio Bocanegra, who also prints propaganda for the Chilean Communist party. This activity has been going on for some time. As long ago as August, 1961, Chilean officials investigating political agitation and resulting unrest in the Salamanca area learned that after a visit to the area by a Cuban diplomat the previous month, pro-Cuban propaganda was being distributed in the area, and Communists and pro-Communists there were saying "The mountains of Salamanca are going to be the Chilean Sierra Maestra."

Last March, when Cuban Minister of Education Armando Hart went to Chile for an international conference he took with him several sacks of propaganda.

e. Colombia: The United Front for Revolutionary Action (FUAR), organized early this year by Colombian extremists, is believed to have received financial assistance from Cuba to promote its objective of creating a guerrilla movement aimed at the overthrow of the government. A Colombian

citizen who has contacts among FUAR members reported last June that Fidel Castro had just given the group $15,000 and promised further financial aid semi-annually. Gloria Gaitan de Valencia, the wife of a FUAR leader and the daughter of the Colombian leader Gaitan whose assassination in 1948 sparked the disastrous Bogota rioting, is a long-time personal friend of Fidel Castro. He has visited Cuba frequently and probably returns to Colombia with specific advice and assistance from the Cuban government. The FUAR has succeeded in drawing members from the extremist wing of the regular Colombian Communist party who are dissatisfied with that party's reluctance to engage in ipen revolutionary action.

f. Costa Rica: The small Costa Rican Communist party, the Popular Vanguard party (PVP), is charged by the Cuban government with the selection of young men to be trained in Cuba. Riboberto Carmona and Jose Murillo, PVP members, left Costa Rica last June for training under this program, and PVP leaders had plans for organizing guerrilla training programs in Costa Rica under the direction of the Costa Ricans who had received training in Cuba.

g. The Dominican Republic: The provisional Council of State, which is preparing the country for its first free elections this December in more than 30 years, has been a major target for Cuban subversion. A cadre of Dominican Communists is headquartered in Cuba, and clandestine contact is probably maintained with sympathizers inside the Doninican Republic. Broadcasts to the Dominican Republic from Cuba have helped incite the frequent riots in Santo Domingo. The fact that broadcasts from Cuba have on occasion referred to very recent events in the Dominican Republic strongly suggests the presence of clandestine radio contacts between the two countries.

h. Ecuador: The Communist party of Ecuador has formed the nucleus of a small guerrilla organization. This group was drawn largely from the pro-Castro Revolutionary Union of Ecuadorean Youth (URJE), which was involved in a two-day battle with government forces last April. The leader of the April affair, as well as several other Ecuadoreans involved in subversive activities, has received guerrilla training in Cuba. A URJE leader told a friend last June that this organization has so far in 1962 received $22,000 in financial aid from the Cuban government.

Manuel Araujo Hidalgo, pro-Communist former Ecuadorean Minister of Interior who has visited Cuba and who recently traveled in Communist China, appears to be working with the URJE. He is reported to have received a considerable amount of money from the Cuban government for his efforts, according to a private statement by the URJE leader.

i. El Salvador: On 1 March 1961, the Salvadoran government broke relations with the Castro regime after it had received evidence of conversation between the Cuban charge, Roberto Lassalle, and leading Salvadoran Communists in which Lassale urged increased revolutionary activity.

j. Guatemala: On 5 March 1962, a Cuban arrived in Mexico with a message for a leader then in Mexico of the Guatemalan Communist-influenced

13 November group, which had recently engaged in guerrilla activity in Guatemala. The Cuban gave him $4,000 which he said was the first installment of a total of $10,000 to be used to establish a new guerrilla front in Guatemala. On 8 March, Castro's emissary gave the Guatemalans the balance of the $10,000 and told one of the 13 November leaders that the decision to provide them with the money was taken by Fidel Castro personally. Castro, he said, had sent instructions that the group did not have to account for how the money was spent, that no strings were attached, and that he hopes they are successful so he can provide them with additional assistance.. Later the Cuban emissary met with leaders in Mexico of the orthodox Guatemalan Communist party. These Guatemalan Communists had apparently complained that the Cuban money was not going to them. They were told that Castro wanted the money to go to the 13 November group because this group had demonstrated its capacity to fight the Guatemalan government, a capacity which the Guatemalan Communists had not shown. The Cuban said: "It is not a matter of standing around with Arab fatalism waiting for events to take place--- We should act efficiently so as to precipitate the death of imperialism. Because of this we are ready to help anyone who may decide to struggle against imperialism anywhere."

Cuban propaganda media have sought through publicizing the activities of the 13 November group to increase its prestige and chances for success. A Prensa Latina reporter published an alleged interview with 13 November leader Yon Sosa.

k. Haiti: A cadre of Haitian Communists led by Rene Depestre is resident in Cuba, and many thousands of Haitian citizens living in eastern Cuba are now being subjected to Communist regimentation and indoctrination.

l. Honduras: Prior to the break in Cuban-Honduran diplomatic relations in April 1961, Cuban personnel under the cover of consular and diplomatic offices engaged in proselyting in the north coast region of Honduras. Honduras now is the target of a particularly vicious regular radio program beamed especially to Honduras by Radio Havana. Many Hondurans are in Cuba under the "scholarship" program.

m. Mexico: The Cuban embassy in Mexico City, the consulate in Merida, and the "Cuban-Mexican Cultural Center" in Merida have all engaged in propaganda activities designed to encourage the pro-communist cause in Mexico, particularly the Communist-influenced National Liberation Movement (MLN). Former Cuban ambassador in Mexico Portuondo is reported by people in close contact with MLN leaders to have concluded an agreement whereby some of the money sent by Havana to cover the expense of the embassy is earmarked as a contribution to the MLN. Mexican officials were disturbed at the participation of Cuban embassy officials in inciting the anti-US demonstrations by Mexican students in July and August 1960. Mexican authorities have periodically impounded quantities of Cuban propaganda being sent through Mexico to other Latin American countries. The most important aspect of Mexico in Cuban propaganda and subversive operations in Latin America is its use by the Cubans as a way station or jumping off place between Cuba itself and the rest of Latin America.

n. <u>Nicaragua</u>: A cadre of Nicaraguan Communists is based in Cuba. Contact between them and pro-Castro Nicaraguans in Nicaragua and in exile in other countries of the Caribbean area is maintained at least on a sporadic basis. A number of Nicaraguans periodically have traveled to Cuba and some have received training there in guerrilla tactics. Reliable reports indicate that some of these Cuba-trained Nicaraguans have been among the small guerrilla bands that have infiltrated Nicaragua across the largely unguarded Hondruan border. The Nicaraguan government is the target of a regularly broadcast Radio Havana program to Nicaragua which is announced as the program of "free Nicaraguans."

o. <u>Panama</u>: Cuban financial assistance is believed to be channeled to the pro-Communist National Action Vanguard (VAN) in Panama. One of the VAN leaders, Deputy Thelma King, is a frequent traveler to Cuba and claims to be a personal friend of Fidel Castro.

p. <u>Paraguay</u>: Paraguayen exiles in Uruguay and Brazil have received Cuban financial assistance. Four members of the United Front for National Liberation (FULNA), a Communist Paraguayan exile group in Uruguay, receive the equivalent of $230 monthly each from the Cuban embassy in Uruguay to finance clandestine pro-Castro activities in Uruguay, according to a Paraguayan exile in Uruguay who is in close touch with FULNA.

q. <u>Peru</u>: At least eight Peruvians traveled to Cuba by way of Mexico last June to receive training and indoctrination in that country. Other Peruvian Communists or pro-Communists have long been in Cuba and a regularly broadcast Radio Havana program is beamed to Peru.

r. <u>Uruguay</u>: The Cuban embassy in Montevideo has been engaged in promoting pro-Castro propaganda. In January 1961 the Uruguayan government was obliged to declare the Cuban ambassador persona non grata for intervening in internal Uruguayan affairs.

s. <u>Venezuela</u>: The Castro regime has been extremely vitriolic in its propaganda blasts against the Betancourt administration in Venezuela. Cuban assistance has been channeled to members of the militant opposition Leftist Revolutionary Movement (MIR), which is attempting to develop a guerrilla movement in Venezuela with the aid of its ally, the regular Venezuelan Communist party. While there is little evidence to indicate direct Cuban involvement in this Communist effort, a significant number of the leading figures involved, including Fabricio Ojeda, are known to have traveled to Cuba, where they probably received financial and other assistance in addition to official encouragement and propaganda support for their activities.

EXCERPT FROM DRAFT NIE 85-63, 4 FEBRUARY 1963

Policies Toward Latin America

42. Here Castro has more capability for independent action than in any other field except the internal politics of Cuba. Castro is deeply committed to a policy of armed insurrection throughout Latin America. Because of his own experience he has a deep-seated belief that only through insurrection can revolution be promoted in Latin America. Further, he apparently believes that a successful revolution in another Latin American country would give great impetus to the revolutionary movement and would also consolidate his own regime in Cuba. In trying to foment insurrections, he apparently does not believe it crucial that he cannot now give direct military assistance to them, nor does he seem to consider it important whether he has or has not Soviet support. For the Soviets, however, such an inflexible approach smacks of the Chinese position and causes great problems in dealing with other Latin American Communists. Most important, however, it is probable that the Soviets believe such a posture will damage Soviet prospects for penetration of Latin America and inevitably bring about a confrontation with the US.

EXCERPT FROM DRAFT NIE 85-63, 4 FEBRUARY 1963

18. Cuban overseas military capabilities remain severely limited by lack of the requisite air or sea lift. The Cubans could probably not undertake an overseas operation on a ssale larger than one battalion. For political as well as military reasons, the Castro regime is most unlikely to undertake military operations of this nature. It would prefer to concentrate on rendering clandestine support to local insurgents.

EXCERPT FROM DRAFT NIE 85-63, 4 FEBRUARY 1963

31. The decline of his prestige has at least for the moment reduced Castro's capability for subverting popular groups and moving them into action against their own governments and against US interests. Local fidelistas have encountered greater difficulty in mobilizing mass support for anti-government strikes and demonstrations on other than local issues.

EXCERPT FROM DRAFT NIE 85-63, 4 FEBRUARY 1963

32. Nonetheless, Castro continues his appeal for revolution in Latin America on the Cuban model. Those Latin Americans who are committed to violent revolution continue to look to Castro for help, particularly from his training program in Cuba and his large-scale dissemination of printed and broadcast propaganda. Communist agitators are concentrating their efforts increasingly in rural areas, as they have done in Peru recently. In addition, there has been an increase in sabotage and other violence perpetrated by extremists, of the sort not requiring the participation of large popular groups, yet designed to provoke drastic countermeasures by governments and to increase popular anti-government sentiment. These widespread activities have demonstrated that the ability of local Communists to engage in terrorist and subversive activities and their willingness to accept Cuban and Soviet support do not dpend upon Castro-s prestige or upon their opinion of his doctrines and policies.

Che Guevara's mother, who lives in Argentina, told a clandestine source in mid-December that during her recent visit to Cuba her son told her that Cuban leaders now feel they will have to rely more and more on their own efforts to promote Communist penetration in South America. Guerrillas will be used on a large scale after they have received training in Cuba, Guevara said. He explained to his mother that this is necessary since both he and Castro feel Khrushchev "let them down" and has no further interest in spreading Communism in South America. Guevara added that he and Castro believe they and the Chinese are better Communists than Khrushchev. (CIA DD/P Buenos Aires, 19 December, SECRET)

Comment: This report is consistent with recent public speeches by Guevara which have emphasized the important role of Cuba with respect to the "anti-imperialist revolution" in Latin America. (SECRET)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

CIA Report 21 Dec 62 Rome

Translation of report dated 6 Dec 62 from Italian Embassy Havana to Foreign Ministry in Rome. "As I noted in my 9 November report is is difficult for Castro to remain calm. Therefore the revolutionary regime will continue with all means at its disposition to disseminate subversive propaganda in the whole continent, as demonstrated by the fact that all the states of Latin America (including Mexico) are taking strong measures against the dissemination of this propaganda. But it is doubtful that today Castro can do much more and that/he constitutes a real menace to the security of other countries, if only because he lacks the necessary funds. I tend to share the opinion of the Ambassador to Brazil that the Cuban leaders are trying to concentrate all their subversive efforts in one country, and that they have selected Venezuela for various reasons, including the old ill feeling between Castro and Betancourt. I note in passing that, according to what was told me by the aforementioned Ambassador, during the recent meeting of the OAS the Venezuelan representative accused the Cubans of promoting the recent attempts in his country but, when asked to furnish proof, he was unable to do so."

SECRET (NOFORN) (CONTROLLED DISSEMINATION)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

A relative of a leading Communist in Cuba (who has previously given reliable advance information of important developments) expressed the opinion on 30 November that there will be revolts in Caribbean countries which will masquerade as "national revolutions" so as to negate the accusation of Cuban complicity. In fact, however, these revolutions will be directed from Cuba through revolutionaries from various countries who are now being trained in Cuba. (CIA DD/P IN 48717, 12 January, SECRET)

Comment: This points up what is probably the most effective means of Cuban subversion in Latin America - the training of hundreds and perhaps thousands of Latin Americans in Cuba. (SECRET)

The recent spate of public addresses by leading Cuban officials on the subject of insurrection in other Latin American countries reflects a more aggressive stance than prior to the "missile crisis" and suggests that a decision to step up Cuban support for subversive groups in other Latin American countries may be under discussion within the inner circle of Cuban leaders.

Che Guevara and Education Minister Armando Hart have been in the forefront since late November in publicly expressing the view that the only road to the "liberation" of the Latin American peoples is the road of insurrection. Fidel Castro's earlier public line had been to deny the necessity for Cuba to "export" its revolution; Cuba's "example" was sufficient. This line is given only perfunctory attention in the recent Guevara and Hart speeches. The line emerging in these speeches appears even stronger than that espoused in the "Second Declaration of Havana" promulgated last February which suggested that in certain circumstances Communist-dominated coalitions could come to power by peaceful means. The whole tenor of the recent speeches suggests that Cuba intends to provide every assistance within its means to Latin American insurgents. The attention given in the Cuban press to developments in Venezuela in recent weeks strongly suggests a more than academic interest in developments there.

Canadian Ambassador Kidd, speculating on the "Trotsky-like dedication to permanent revolution" apparent in a 21 November speech by Armando Hart, commented that Cuban leaders may be attempting to counter "the humiliation of the withdrawal of the Russian missiles" by making renewed efforts to "light revolutionary fires in neighboring countries." (Comment on: Canadian Embassy, Havana, 23 November, CONFIDENTIAL) (SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

SUPPLEMENT

THE CASTRO THREAT TO LATIN AMERICA

Despite diminished prestige, especially among government leaders, Castro retains great influence over politically unsophisticated Latin Americans. He is also supported by Western Hemisphere Communist parties and the vast majority of extreme leftists. Castro's main appeal lies in his claim to be the leader of a successful revolution against "Yankee imperialism" and in the support he is ready to provide subversive activities throughout Latin America.

The degree to which Cuba is involved in current hemisphere unrest is not clear. Antigovernment nationals and Communists of various Latin American countries, however, have made frequent visits to Cuba to receive pro-Castro indoctrination and propaganda. During 1962, 1,000 to 1,500 are believed to have received intensive education and training in sabotage and guerrilla warfare. Significant representation has been noted from Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Paraguay, and Nicaragua. There is no definite proof that Cuba is now exporting arms to any dissident groups, but propaganda materials, explosives, and financial support are reliably reported to have been furnished.

Cuban leaders have also called with increasing frequency for open rebellion as the "only road" to liberation for the Americas; they have been especially vociferous since the first of the year. Leading officials, such as Castro, Blas Roca, Che Guevara, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, and Juan Marinello are among those calling for revolutionary violence. The "Betancourt tyranny" in Venezuela has been designated a primary target, but Peru and Chile apparently also have high priority. The use of the <u>Prensa Latina</u> organization and the agent network already in existence makes it virtually sure that Havana will intensify its clandestine activities.

Latin American governments are generally now more alert to Castro's threat. Inadequate security forces and widespread poverty throughout the area, however, make it almost certain that Cuban-supported insurgency will have an effect out of proportion to the number of people involved.
(SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

Cuban Developments

Following Fidel Castro's call for revolution in Latin America in his 2 January speech, other Cuban speakers are emphasizing the same theme. Che Guevara told a group of Central American delegates in Havana recently that they must prepare for simultaneous revolutions in all Central American countries and pointed to Venezuela and Chile as major targets for revolution. Long-time Communist leader Blas Roca, on 23 January, praised Venezuelan Communists for their recent acts of sabotage and pledged continued Cuban support for the struggle of the people against the Betancourt "tyranny." Venezuela has long been a major Castro-Communist target, and Blas Roca's remarks imply Cuban support for the present upsurge of Communist activity there.

(EXCERPT FROM UNCLASSIFIED DEPARTMENT OF STATE WHITE PAPER ON CUBA ISSUED AUG 1960)

1. Armed Incursions.

No sooner had the Revolutionary Government of Cuba taken power than it launched a program for exporting its revolution to other countries in the Hemisphere, particularly in the Caribbean area. The memories of the invasions and attempted invasions of Panama, of Nicaragua, and of the Dominican Republic, following closely upon one another in the spring and summer of 1959 are still fresh. Support of Cuban officials for military expeditions against the Governments of these countries, although vehemently denied, has been established beyond reasonable doubt. With the invasion of the Dominican Republic came the realization among the American Republics that international tensions in the Caribbean area, to which Cuba had significantly contributed, had risen to the extent that a Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American States was necessary.

The Investigating Committee appointed by the Council of the OAS, acting provisionally as Organ of Consultation under the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, in the Panama case in June, 1959 concluded "that the Republic of Panama was the victim of an invasion, organized abroad, that sailed from a Cuban port and was composed almost entirely of foreigners". The Committee report stated that the Chairman of the Committee was able to confirm that 82 of 84 imprisoned invaders

were Cubans. Further, the Government of Panama, prior to the departure of the invasion group from Cuba informed the Cuban Government of reports about this impending event, invoking the 1928 Habana Convention on the Duties and Rights of States in the Event of Civil Strife. The Cuban Foreign Minister in turn assured Panama that the Cuban Government would take the necessary preventive measures.

In connection with several of the invasions or attempted invasions of Nicaragua from Costa Rica and Honduras in June, 1959, and the individuals organizing them, documentary and other types of evidence which came to light demonstrated Cuban officials support in the form of arms and financial contributions.

Official Cuban complicity in the invasion of the Dominican Republic in the same month was clear. The expedition was organized, trained, and equipped in Cuba with the undoubted assistance of Cuban officials. An officer on active duty with the Cuban Rebel Army was one of the expedition's leaders. The Cuban Navy escorted the three landing craft used by the invading force on their voyage to the Dominican Republic.

Even during the Fifth Meeting of Consultation in Santiago, Chile, a report was received of the invasion of Haiti on August 13, 1959 by a group of armed men coming from Cuba. The Haitian Government after the Santiago meeting expressed its fears of further invasion attempts. It charged that the August 13 invasion from Cuba was a violation of the 1928 Habana Convention on Duties and Rights of States in the Event of Civil Strife. The assistance of Cuban officials, including the Cuban

Ambassador to Haiti and his five military attaches, in the attempt to overthrow the Haitian Government was denounced by that Government. The Cuban Government, though admitting that the invasion was launched in Cuba and all but one of the participants were Cubans, conveniently disavowed the acts of the Cuban citizens involved.

EXCERPT FROM DRAFT NIE 85-63, 4 FEBRUARY 1963

33. There have been indications of disapproval of Castro-s policies on the part of those Latin American Communist parties which are committed to a more gradual and less violent approach to revolution. Castro has shown himself willing to collaborate with any group, Communist or not, willing to resort to violence and in so doing to circumvent some of the regular Communist parties. Some of the latter resent such tactics and have appealed to the Soviets against Castro. It seems likely that the question of relations with other Latin American Communist parties, as well as the question of tactics, is likely to hamper Communist revolutionary efforts in Latin America and cause strains in Soviet-Cuban relations.

EXCERPT FROM DRAFT NIE 85-63, 4 FEBRUARY 1963

29. . . . Among much of the revolutionary left, discussion has tended to shift to the need for indigenous, nationalist revolutions, and away from internationalism and alliance with Moscow-oriented Communists and <u>fidelistas.</u>

Panamanian Communist Party (PDP) leader Ruperto Thomas' recent trip to Cuba was evidently an effort to persuade Castro to support the PDP rather than the more activist Panamanian pro-Communist VAN group. When he returned to Panama on 14 December, Thomas reportedly said that Jorge Turner, who also went to Havana in September and has not returned, and other VAN leaders are still campaigning against the PDP in Cuba. However, the Cubans claim to have told VAN leaders they must cooperate with the PDP to get Castro support.

The Castro government seems consistently to favor the VAN with funds and international trips. The Cubans may distrust the PDP's poor organization and believe VAN charges that the PDP is infiltrated. However, the VAN is a rather unstable group and the Cubans are probably trying to keep on good terms with both. Thomas said he received no military training but was taught a few things like how to dismantle a machine gun.

Thomas commented that no particular group seemed to be in command in Cuba, resulting in such disorder that it was a wonder the revolution had survived. He believes the ORI is merely a mechanism.

Mexico would not issue Thomas a visa, so he returned to Panama via Prague where he talked with Czech Communist officials and may have pleaded the PDP case against VAN with them. (CIA Panama City TDCS-3/ 531,754, 20 Dec, SECRET)

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET (When Filled In) NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY VENEZUELA EAST GERMANY

REPORT NO. TDCS-3/537,107

SUBJECT VENEZUELAN ATTENDANCE AT THE EAST GERMAN COMMUNIST PARTY CONGRESS

DATE DISTR. 12 FEBRUARY 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. JANUARY 1963

REFERENCES IN 65920

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VENEZUELA, CARACAS (1 & 7 FEBRUARY 1963)

APPRAISAL 2

FIELD REPORT NO. HVC 2652

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE PARA 1: A MEMBER (B) OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF VENEZUELA, FROM A FELLOW CELL MEMBER WHO WORKS IN THE NATIONAL PARTY OFFICES.
PARA 2: A MEMBER (B) OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF VENEZUELA, FROM POMPEYO MARQUEZ.

1. JESUS FARIA, MEMBER OF THE NATIONAL SECRETARIAT OF THE PARTIDO COMUNISTA DE VENEZUELA (PCV, COMMUNIST PARTY OF VENEZUELA), AND OLGA LUZARDO FINOL, SECRETARY OF WOMEN'S AFFAIRS OF THE PCV, WERE TWO OF THE DELEGATES OF THE PCV TO THE EAST GERMAN COMMUNIST PARTY CONGRESS HELD DURING JAN '63. THEY RETURNED TO VENEZUELA WITH A LENGTHY DOCUMENT WHICH CLEARLY DISCUSSES THE IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE COMMUNIST PARTIES OF CHINA AND THE USSR. THIS DOCUMENT IS BEING CIRCULATED AMONG SOME MEMBERS OF THE PCV.

2. POMPEYO MARQUEZ, MEMBER OF THE NATIONAL SECRETARIAT OF THE PCV, ON 1 FEB SAID THAT THE VENEZUELAN AND CUBAN DELEGATIONS AT THE EAST

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OBI	OO

STATE/DIR

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

DA IN 16376

SECRET

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FORM 5-62 1K OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (15-20)

GERMAN COMMUNIST PARTY CONGRESS TOOK A NEUTRAL POSITION REGARDING THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CHINA AND THE USSR WHEREAS THE OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COMMUNIST PARTY REPRESENTATIVES STRONGLY SUPPORTED THE POSITION OF THE USSR. REPRESENTATIVES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES AT THE CONGRESS CAUTIONED THAT EXTREME CARE SHOULD BE TAKEN BY THE PCV IN USING GUERRILLA FORCES.

3. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCLANT CINCARIB.

ACTION: ACSI, NAVY, AF, JCS, OSD
INFO : DCSOP, DIA
DA IN 16376

END OF MESSAGE

Cuban Anniversary Celebrations (See pictures following)

The Cuban Armed Forces parade in Havana yesterday included infantry, naval, artillery, armor, and air formations. The most significant display was that of SA-2 missiles and possible cruise missiles.

Ground units included 15 companies of the 2d Western Army, units of the National Militia, and other infantry units in a "new parade step" resembling the goose step. The artillery unit had antitank guns, heavy artillery, multiple rocket launchers and AA artillery. Three battalions of medium tanks, heavy tanks and assault guns, along with the surface-to-air and possible cruise missiles made up the final unit of the parade.

The air formations included helicopters, propeller-type training planes, and MIG-15's, 19's and 21's.

Soviet participation in the parade has not been established, although Soviets and Czechs may have piloted some of the aircraft.

Premier Castro's speech following the parade brought no surprises aside from its unusual brevity. He made an effort to indicate Cuban control of the air defense system, including the SA-2's, and, in a probable reference to US reconnaissance flights, said there could be an incident "at any time". end here

Castro reiterated the five demands he first made after the announcement that the Soviets would withdraw offensive missiles from Cuba. He included his usual anti-US statements and slurs at President Kennedy and made a low-keyed appeal for "unity" within the Communist Bloc. He called for revolution in Latin America, with special emphasis on Venezuela, and cited Cuba's "historic task . . . of serving as an example" for that revolution.

In the USSR, Cuban and Soviet spokesmen lauded Cuban-Russian friendship and unity, and the Soviet spokesman, Suslov, pledged that his country would "never leave Revolutionary Cuba alone in distress." (CONFIDENTIAL)

SOURCE: VARIOUS

reportedly continues, the threat of retaliatory action from forces rallying around deposed Air Force Chief Lemus has apparently diminished, and the majority of the armed forces still supports President Ydigoras. The President's intention with regard to leftist ex-President Arevalo, who plans to return and seek the presidency in next December's elections, is an unsettling factor. The armed forces universally oppose Arevalo. Some factions want to replace Ydigoras with a civilian-military junta and call new elections before Arevalo becomes eligible to run in March. Should Arevalo return, the military will probably move to prevent his candidacy and the coming months may be critical.

Honduran President Villeda Morales, although not a strong leader, is expected to complete his term. The ruling Liberal Party will probably retain the Presidency in the October elections, and maneuvering for the nomination has begun. Rodas Alvarado, President of the Congress and one of the three leading contenders, has used his position to build up strength, but the armed forces regard him as the least desirable and a developing anti-Rodas coalition may prevent his nomination. Either of the three leading candidates would probably follow the present government's policies, including its relatively soft Communist stand. The Communists, while not yet a direct threat, are steadily increasing their influence in the labor field and are exploiting the country's discouraging political, economic, and social conditions.

El Salvador, faced with a serious Communist threat about two years ago, continues to show political and economic progress, but there are clouds on the horizon. President Rivera, who assumed control last summer in a full return to constitutional government, still has widespread support and military backing. The government is moving ahead with its reform program, but there is some resistance to the proposed new income taxes. Communist activities have been curbed, but the Communists still retain a subversive capability particularly among labor and student groups. There is concern over the likely election of a pro-Communist as rector of the university, a center of subversion and intrigue.

Costa Rica continues to be one of the most democratic and politically stable countries in Latin America but there are reverberations of unrest stemming from the deteriorating economic situation. The ruling National Liberation Party, which was returned to power in last year's election in a bitterly contested but peaceful election, represents the liberal left, although it includes a number of moderates such as President Orlich and some members of his cabinet. The Communist Party is small and illegal but well organized and effectively led. It recently instigated disorders in the banana zone and, while not an immediate threat, has long-range potential should economic conditions worsen.

Panama is relatively quiet. Although Panama has failed to receive any commitment for a long-sought renegotiation of the Canal Zone treaty, continuing talks on areas of disagreement and some concessions have eased tensions and softened violent anti-US propaganda. Public emotion may again be aroused, however, by the recent petition, filed by a Communist lawyer, requesting the Supreme Court to declare the treaty unconstitutional. President Chiari has also indicated he expects to press for increased compensation during the forthcoming talks. On the internal scene, President Chiari has failed to provide a strong administration. Corruption continues; the cabinet is divided by conflicting loyalties and ambitions; badly needed reforms have not yet been adopted; and the chronically depressed economy remains stagnant.

The stability which has marked the 30-year dominance of Mexico's Party of Revolutionary Institutions (PRI) is gradually being eroded. Extreme right and left factions of the PRI are vying for domination. In attempting to placate both, President Lopez Mateos has adopted inconsistent and vacillating policies, pleasing neither group. Forces outside the PRI also pose an increasing threat -- particularly the recently formed Independent Peasant Central (CCI) with which leftist ex-President Cardenas is associated. The CCI, organized to exploit unrest among the landless peasants, may also attempt to challenge the PRI politically. To undercut the CCI, the government plans to complete the land distribution program by the end of Lopez Mateos' term late next year. Although this may alleviate discontent in the agrarian sector, rising population and mounting unemployment will continue to be major problems.
(SECRET)

Construction of the fishing port in the Bay of Havana, whose announcement as a Soviet undertaking caused so much concern last fall, will be directed by a team of Soviet technicians and Cuban engineers and will start in February - according to a Havana radio announcement. The port is to be completed by the end of 1963 and is to cost 12 million pesos, which will be met by a loan from the Soviet Union, to be amortized over 10 years. The port is expected to serve 130 vessels of the Soviet fishing fleet and from 24 to 30 of the Cuban fleet. It will have installations such as freezer plants for 10,000 tons of fish, factories for processing sea products, machinery for making no less than 80 tons of ice a day, a floating dock to repair ships of up to 2,500 tons, and well-equipped repair shops. The announcement emphasized that the port is to be operated by and will be the "absolute property of the Cuban state."

It has also been announced that Poland has now formulated plans for building the shipyard envisaged in the port of Mariel. The installation will be managed by Cuban technicians who are presently receiving training in Polish shipyards on the Baltic. Ship construction will reportedly reach a level of 70,000 tons per year. (FBIS 58, 17 January, and Daily Report, 16 January, OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

48
Action

CONFIDENTIAL

PASSED TO
GEN. CARROLL ☐
GEN. QUINN ☐
GEN. HALL ☐
COL. GILLIS ☐

Control: 7384
Rec'd: February 11, 1963
9:11 p.m.

FROM: Kingston

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 567, February 11, 6 p.m.

PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED
Ref by msg number in unclassified reply prohibited.

Exporting Revolution

Permanent Secretary External Affairs Ministry told Embassy today that GOJ concerned over reports it had received that USSR furnishing Cubans not only fishing vessels, but also torpedo boats and submarine chasers. He foresaw Soviet-supplied ships as having potential adverse effect on Jamaican fishing industry as well as presenting possible security problem. He asked whether US could provide more detailed information on these ships which would operate from Soviet-built "fishing base" in Cuba.

In view of reports, he planned to urge Cabinet to take early action on deciding and publicizing limits of Jamaican territorial waters in order to avoid incidents with Soviets and Cubans. He is considering recommending to Cabinet that Jamaica claim territorial waters of six-and-six miles. Jamaica now apparently claims three-mile limit.

Although GOJ obviously counting on receipt US military equipment, seems unlikely that this expression GOJ concern motivated primarily by desire to speed up delivery. Embassy inclined to view Jamaican approach as healthsome indication GOJ at technical level beginning to appreciate ramifications of Cuban problem.

ACTION: STATE(ARMY ACSI)
INFO : DCSOP, OSA, JCS, USDEL IADB
DA IN 16465

DOHERTY

SMD:CT

WORKING COPY

SAL, EUR, IO, UFW, USIA, NSC, INR, CIA, NSA, OSD, ARMY, NAVY, AIR, COM, BMR

CONFIDENTIAL

3

SUPPLEMENT

THE SITUATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA, PANAMA, AND MEXICO

Central America is relatively stable. Preparations are under way for President Kennedy's scheduled meeting with the Chiefs of State of these countries at San Jose, Costa Rica, on 18 and 19 March. Tensions are rising, however, in those countries having elections scheduled this year; Mexico's political stability is threatened; and the Cuban subversive potential remains a problem throughout the area.

During the forthcoming meeting, an attempt will be made to center discussions on areas of common interest. Economic integration of the Central American region -- one of the major objectives of the Alliance for Progress Program -- will undoubtedly be emphasized. Central America, which has been moving toward greater political unity, has begun to take steps toward economic integration, and presently envisages the creation of a Common Market by 1965. The Cuban subversive threat is also likely to be given top priority. All of the Central American countries regard this as one of the major problems and are seeking ways to meet it.

On 3 February, Nicaraguans are scheduled to cast ballots for the first time in nearly 30 years for a Presidential candidate who is not a member of the Somoza family. Rene Schick -- the government's Liberal Party (PLN) candidate and hand-picked by the Somozas -- is expected to win easily, however. Effective opposition to Schick collapsed when the major opposition party -- Traditionalist Conservative (PCT)-- boycotted the elections because the government refused to permit OAS supervision. The only opponent is Diego Manuel Chamorro Bolanos, a last-minute candidate of the splinter Nicaraguan Conservative Party (PCN), whose entry into the race seems to have been engineered by the government to provide a semblance of opposition. Castro-Communist elements, militant conservatives and others may attempt to create disorders before or during the elections, but the Nicaraguan National Guard is believed capable of controlling any troubles short of a general uprising or well-coordinated rebel invasion -- neither of which seems likely.

Anti-Somoza Nicaraguans have alleged fraudulent registrations and may attempt to challenge the elections. Although Schick may not turn out to be a Somoza puppet, opposition suspicions will be reinforced with the likely retention of General Anastasio Somoza as Director of the National Guard.

Repercussions in Guatemala from the recent abortive Air Force revolt have not been too serious. Although plotting

[illegible] continues, the threat of retaliatory action from forces rallying around deposed Air Force Chief [illegible] has apparently diminished, and the majority of the armed forces still supports President Ydigoras. The President's intention with regard to leftist ex-President Arevalo, who plans to return and seek the presidency in next December's elections, is an unsettling factor. The armed forces universally oppose Arevalo. Some factions want to replace Ydigoras with a civilian-military junta and call new elections before Arevalo becomes eligible to run in March. Should Arevalo return, the military will probably move to prevent his candidacy and the coming months may be critical.

Honduran President Villeda Morales, although not a strong leader, is expected to complete his term. The ruling Liberal Party will probably retain the Presidency in the October elections, and maneuvering for the nomination has begun. Rodas Alvarado, President of the Congress and one of the three leading contenders, has used his position to build up strength, but the armed forces regard him as the least desirable and a developing anti-Rodas coalition may prevent his nomination. Either of the three leading candidates would probably follow the present government's policies, including its relatively soft Communist stand. The Communists, while not yet a direct threat, are steadily increasing their influence in the labor field and are exploiting the country's discouraging political, economic, and social conditions.

El Salvador, faced with a serious Communist threat [illegible] two years ago, continues to show political and economic progress, but there are clouds on the horizon. President Rivera, who assumed control last summer in a full return to constitutional government, still has widespread support and military backing. The government is moving ahead with its reform program, but there is some resistance to the proposed new income taxes. Communist activities have been curbed, but the Communists still retain a subversive capability particularly among labor and student groups. There is concern over the likely election of a pro-Communist as rector of the university, a center of subversion and intrigue.

Costa Rica continues to be one of the most democratic and politically stable countries in Latin America but there are [illegible] reverberations of unrest stemming from the deteriorating economic situation. The ruling National Liberation Party, which was returned to power in last year's election in a bitterly contested but [illegible] election, represents the liberal left, although it includes a number of moderates such as President Orlich and some members of his cabinet. The Communist Party is small and illegal but [illegible] effectively led. It recently instigated disorders in the banana zone and, while not an immediate threat, has long-range potential should economic conditions worsen.

(REVERSE BLANK)

Panama is relatively quiet. Although Panama has failed to receive any commitment for a long-sought renegotiation of the Canal Zone treaty, continuing talks on areas of disagreement and some concessions have eased tensions and softened violent anti-US propaganda. Public opinion may again be aroused, however, by the recent petition, filed by a Communist lawyer, requesting the Supreme Court to declare the treaty unconstitutional. President Chiari has also indicated he expects to press for increased compensation during the forthcoming talks. On the internal scene, President Chiari has failed to provide a strong administration. Corruption continues; the cabinet is divided by conflicting loyalties and ambitions; badly needed reforms have not yet been adopted; and the chronically depressed economy remains stagnant.

The stability which has marked the 30-year dominance of Mexico's Party of Revolutionary Institutions (PRI) is gradually being eroded. Extreme right and left factions of the PRI are vying for domination. In attempting to placate both, President Lopez Mateos has adopted inconsistent and vacillating policies, pleasing neither group. Forces outside the PRI also pose an increasing threat -- particularly the recently formed Independent Peasant Central (CCI) with which leftist ex-President Cardenas is associated. The CCI, organized to exploit unrest among the land-less peasants, may also attempt to challenge the PRI politically. To undercut the CCI, the government plans to complete the land distribution program by the end of Lopez Mateos' term late next year. Although this may alleviate discontent in the agrarian sector, rising population and mounting unemployment will continue to be major problems.
(SECRET)

Campesino Strike Scheduled in Bolivia

A planned Campesino (peasant) strike in Bolivia today could lead to violence if it occurs. The Government reportedly plans to block all entrances into La Paz, and campesinos loyal to the government are assembling and arming to counter the strikers who are led by pro-Communist Torribio Salas. A government spokesman claims that the Cuban and Czechoslovak Embassies are financing the strike and that the Cubans are training campesino militia in other areas as well.

President Paz has reportedly said he will do everything to prevent the strike but will call on loyal campesinos for aid if he fails. If armed conflict develops between the two groups of campesinos, the Armed Forces would probably be forced to step in. President Paz might also have to take action against trouble makers like Salas, something he has tried to avoid.
(CONFIDENTIAL)

SOURCE: ARMA LA PAZ CX-11 (C)

Three top Brazilian Communist Party officials, including Luis Carlos Prestes, are reported leaving for Cuba via Prague prior to 15 January to discuss certain political problems with the Cuban Communists responsible for pro-Cuban activities in the different Latin American countries. Before leaving they planned to be briefed by a Brazilian Communist Party member who has just returned from a visit to party leaders in Uruguay, Argentina, Chile, Peru, and Bolivia to get their opinions about holding the "Latin American Congress in Support of Cuba," now rescheduled for March, in Rio or Sao Paulo. (CIA, Rio de Janeiro, IN 42868, 31 December, SECRET NOFORN)

The National Executive Commission of Brazil's orthodox Communist Party (PCB) reportedly planned to meet on 7 January to discuss the party position in relation to Francisco Juliao, Brazilian Peasant-League leader who has been closer to Brazil's dissident hard-line Communist Party than to its orthodox group (CPB). The PCB leaders planned to consider the possibility of sending a high-level party delegation to Cuba to confer with Fidel Castro, not only to improve relations but to protest a report that Castrol is supporting Juliao. (CIA Sao Paulo, TDCS-3533404, 9 January, SECRET)

Comment: Cuba has for some time had a divisive influence on Brazilian Communist affairs. The dissident Communist Party formed in late 1961 has - like Juliao - favored a more revolutionary line and has apparently received considerably more support from Cuba than has the orthodox party. Another indication of the divisive influence of Cuba is the report that Francisco Leivas Otero, PCB leader responsible for matters pertaining to Cuba, attacked party subservience to the CPSU at a national PCB conference on 29 November. Leivas maintained that the PCB should discuss the Sino-Soviet dispute with complete independence, rather than maintain silence on it as it had been doing. (SECRET)

SECRET

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET (When Filled In) — CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS — NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY MEXICO/BRAZIL

REPORT NO. TDCS -3/537,187

SUBJECT CLOSE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VICENTE LOMBARDO TOLEDANO AND PRESIDENT MATEOS; REASONS FOR LOMBARDO'S TRIP TO BRAZIL

DATE DISTR. 14 FEBRUARY 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. 12 FEBRUARY 1963

REFERENCES IN 67594

PLACE & DATE ACQ. MEXICO, MEXICO CITY (12 FEBRUARY 1963)

APPRAISAL 2

FIELD REPORT NO. HMM 7016

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A PERSON (B) IN CLOSE PERSONAL CONTACT WITH LOMBARDO.

1. ON 12 FEBRUARY VICENTE LOMBARDO TOLEDANO, SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE PARTIDO POPULAR SOCIALISTA (PPS - POPULAR SOCIALIST PARTY) CONFERRED WITH HUMBERTO ROMERO PEREZ, PRIVATE SECRETARY OF ADOLFO LOPEZ MATEOS, PRESIDENT OF MEXICO. LOMBARDO TOLD ROMERO HE WANTED THE PRESIDENT TO KNOW ABOUT HIS TRIP TO BRAZIL AND WHY HE WAS GOING. HE ASKED ROMERO TO TELL LOPEZ MATEOS THAT HE WOULD LEAVE MEXICO CITY FOR RIO DE JANEIRO ON 13 FEBRUARY, AND EXPECTED TO BE BACK IN MEXICO CITY ON 23 FEBRUARY. LOMBARDO TOLD ROMERO HE WOULD CONTACT HIM ON HIS RETURN FROM BRAZIL IN ORDER TO ARRANGE A PRIVATE MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT. LOMBARDO SAID HE HAD SEVERAL THINGS

ASD DASD EXEC D/BA EUR NESA WHE FE SSR FKRA FEA D/AD DIS D/P C/ST P/FL COMA MAPL PROG COMP M&T VPS C/L OPR

DA IN 17084

SECRET — CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS — NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OBI	OO
STATE/DIR																

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

SECRET

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FORM 1K OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (15-20)

TO DISCUSS WITH LOPEZ MATEOS.

2. LOMBARDO GAVE ROMERO THE FOLLOWING REASONS FOR HIS TRIP TO BRAZIL. HE SAID THAT A GROUP OF BRAZILIAN PERSONALITIES AND INTELLECTUALS HAD CONVOKED A CONGRESS WHICH IS SCHEDULED TO BE HELD IN RIO DE JANEIRO IN MARCH 1963. HE SAID THE TWO PRINCIPAL AIMS OF THE CONGRESS ARE:

A. TO CREATE AN ORGANIZATION IN DEFENSE OF CUBA.

B. TO EXAMINE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONDITIONS EXISTING IN LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES IN ORDER TO PROMOTE THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF LATIN AMERICA.

3. LOMBARDO SAID THAT SOMETHING WENT WRONG IN BRAZIL BECAUSE, APART FROM THE COMMITTEE WHICH CONVOKED THE CONGRESS, A SECOND SEPARATE COMMITTEE HAD SPRUNG UP WHOSE AIMS ARE THE SAME, AND THAT A SORT OF RIVALRY HAS DEVELOPED BETWEEN THE TWO GROUPS. LOMBARDO SAID THE RESULT WAS "THAT MY COMRADES IN EUROPE HAVE ASKED ME TO GO TO BRAZIL TO INTERVENE IN THE MATTER, TO TRY TO ORGANIZE A SINGLE UNITED COMMITTEE, AND MAKE DEFINITE PREPARATIONS FOR THE HOLDING OF THE CONGRESS IN ORDER TO ENSURE ITS SUCCESS." LOMBARDO SAID "THE COMRADES IN EUROPE" SHOULD HAVE SENT AN ARGENTINE, A CHILEAN, A URUGUAYAN, OR SOMEONE NEARER BRAZIL, BUT THEY INSISTED ON SENDING HIM BECAUSE HE HAS EXPERIENCE, AND THEY ARE CONVINCED THAT HE CAN STRAIGHTEN THINGS OUT SATISFACTORILY.

4. LOMBARDO TOLD ROMERO THAT IF THE CONGRESS IS HELD IN MARCH AS

SECRET

SECRET (When Filled In) | CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS NO FOREIGN DISSEM | TDCS-3/537,187 | IN 67594 PAGE 3

SCHEDULED, HE WILL NOT ATTEND IT. HE SAID "THE PRIMA DONNAS" AND ORNAMENTAL FIGURES WILL TAKE OVER THEN, AND I AM NOT ONE OF THOSE." ROMERO REMARKED THAT LOMBARDO IS A MAN OF WORK. LOMBARDO SAID, "I GO TO ORGANIZE SO THE CONGRESS WILL NOT FAIL, THAT IS MY MISSION, NOTHING MORE, AFTER THAT ANY ONE FROM MEXICO CAN ATTEND."

5. (FIELD COMMENT. LOMBARDO'S PLAN TO LEAVE MEXICO ON 13 FEBRUARY FOR PANAMA AND RIO DE JANEIRO HAS ALREADY BEEN REPORTED.)

6. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR FBI I&NS CINCARIB.

ACTION: ACSI, NAVY, AF, JCS, OSD

INFO : DCSOP

DA IN 17084

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET | CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS NO FOREIGN DISSEM

SECRET

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ACTION ARA-4

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

CSM 9-6 BRAZ

FOR RM USE ONLY

A-234 NO.

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO : RIO DE JANEIRO

FROM : Amcongen, SAO PAULO DATE: February 6, 1963

SUBJECT : Sample survey of worker sentiment shows receptivity toward communism; São Paulo business leaders reported by one observer as generally unconcerned over Communist danger.

REF

Two straws in the wind that have come recently to my attention indicate the existence of an unhealthy attitude toward communism on the part of at least some segments of São Paulo's working and managerial classes. Further indications in support of or in refutation of these signs will be submitted as they are noted.

On January 31, I was visited by the two top American executives of a Brazilian subsidiary of a large American corporation.§ They said that their firm, following a practice instituted some years ago of periodically sampling worker sentiment in their plants, had just finished a small survey conducted very informally by trusted Brazilian employees among 55 or 60 of their semi-skilled workers to discover how the latter would feel about the establishment in Brazil of a communist system of government. The result of this survey was so shockingly different from that of earlier pulse-taking that these executives thought the Consulate General should know about it. Eighty percent of the workers approached had indicated that while they did not pretend to know much about communism, they thought they would be better off under a communist regime than they are at present. Among the reasons most commonly given were that things were so bad in Brazil that any change would be for the better and that communism would put an end to the rascality (malandragem) which is so prevalent. The other twenty percent thought that communism would be bad for the country.

§ Names withheld at their request.

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FORM 4-62 DS-323

FOR DEPT. USE ONLY [X] In [ ] Out

DMBraddock:tmn 2-6-63

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Sao Paulo
A-234

The company executives attributed the pro-communist sentiment as revealed, mainly to the economic difficulties experienced by low-income families as a result of the rampant inflation. They said their labor relations were good, that while their pay scales were not as high as those in some other industries, some popular fringe benefits were provided, and that to the best of their knowledge there had been no communist agitators at work among their employees.

Not long before this visit I was lunching one day at the Jockey Club with Sr. Paulo Ayres Filho, a Brazilian banker and pharmaceutical manufacturer who is the spark-plug of IPES (Instituto de Pesquisas Economicas e Sociais), the principal democratic action group in the local business world. Looking around him at the other tables, occupied by a good many well-known figures of São Paulo's conservative upper classes, Sr. Ayres said to me, "Apart from the two of us, there isn't a man in this dining room who is seriously concerned over the communist danger in Brazil."

No conclusions, obviously, should be drawn from such slender indications. It has been my observation, however, that most Brazilians either believe that a communist take-over would be impossible in Brazil, or believe that even if it occurred, it would take a relatively mild form with which they could live. The Brazilian's boasted calm, which is genuine and in most circumstances a virtue, could in the present state of affairs be the cause of his undoing.

Daniel M. Braddock
Minister Consul General

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY	Colombia/Cuba	REPORT NO.	CS -3/536,069
SUBJECT	Cuban Support of Guerrillas in Colombia	DATE DISTR.	4 February 1963
		NO. PAGES	1
		REFERENCES	RD
DATE OF INFO.	October 1962		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Germany, Munich (14 December 1962)	FIELD REPORT NO.	

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: An official German service, from "a fairly reliable source with contacts in Buenos Aires." Appraisal of Content: 6.

1. Maximo Gruber, a major in the Cuban Army and one of the leaders of the G-2 section, has been appointed technical leader of the Communist guerrillas in Sumapaz, Colombia.[1] Gruber, a Polish Jew, was formerly a commissar in Spain. His wife is European. His son Maximo is a graduate of the Lenin Institute in Moscow. On his frequent trips to Bolivia, Uruguay, and Cuba he carries a Bolivian diplomatic passport identifying him as "traveling inspector of the Bolivian Foreign Ministry."

2. Gruber is being assisted in his tasks in Colombia by Jaime Guerra, also known as Captain Veneno. One of his liaison officers to the Communist Party of Colombia is Blanca Diaz y Collazo, a lawyer and former member of the Cuban Embassy in Bogota, who was trained in Prague in 1952.

1. Headquarters Comment. An official British service reported in April 1961 that Maximo Grobart, nationality unknown, was training guerrillas in the Sumapaz area; Grobart, who claimed to be of Hungarian origin, had a Cuban passport in the name of José Blanco and might have had other passports of different nationalities.

54

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

S-E-C-R-E-T

COUNTRY	Costa Rica/Cuba	REPORT NO.	CS -3/534,724
SUBJECT	Departure of Costa Rican Communist to Live in Cuba	DATE DISTR.	22 January 1963
		NO. PAGES	1
		REFERENCES	RD
DATE OF INFO.	November 1962		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Costa Rica, San José (23 November 62)	FIELD REPORT NO.	HRS-3006

SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Costa Rican (B) with good contacts in Costa Rican Communist Party circles. Appraisal of Content: 2.

Carlos Guillen Fernandez, Costa Rican Communist who was formerly very active in the Sociedad de Amigos de la Revolucion Cubana (Society of Friends of the Cuban Revolution), left Costa Rica on 14 November, on his way to Cuba, where he planned to remain indefinitely and to work.

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY Ecuador/Cuba/Latin America

REPORT NO. CS-3/535,791

SUBJECT Request by Cuban Diplomat in Chile to Member of the Revolutionary Union of Ecuadorean Youth for Information on Leftist Activity in Ecuador

DATE DISTR. 1 February 1963

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES RD-W-2107

DATE OF INFO. Mid-January 1963

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Ecuador, Guayaquil (22 January 1963)

FIELD REPORT NO. HEG-2108

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Member (C) of the Revolutionary Union of Ecuadorean Youth. Appraisal of Content: 3.

Alfredo Vera Arrata, a member of the National Executive Council of the Revolutionary Union of Ecuadorean Youth (URJE) until his expulsion from URJE during its National Convention held in early January 1963, has received a letter from Pedro Martinez Pirez, First Secretary of the Cuban Embassy in Santiago, Chile, in which he asks Vera to send a person to Chile to inform him on current leftist activity in Ecuador. Vera plans to send Jaime Galarza Zavala, also expelled from URJE, if funds can be raised for the trip.

Field Comment. Martinez is in charge of Cuban subversive activities in Chile, Peru, and Ecuador.

SECRET

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET (When Filled In) CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS CONTROLLED DISSEM Mr. Rowen has seen

COUNTRY CUBA/HAITI

REPORT NO. TDCS DB-3/653,274

SUBJECT PLANNED MILITARY COUP TO OVERTHROW PRESIDENT DUVALIER OF HAITI

DATE DISTR. 14 FEBRUARY 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. 8 FEBRUARY 1963

REFERENCES IN 67457

PLACE & DATE ACQ. UNITED STATES (28 JANUARY, 8 FEBRUARY 1963)

APPRAISAL 3

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE AN OFFICER (B) OF NEWS DISTRIBUTING MEDIA; FROM A COLLEAGUE OF EUSEBIO MUJAL BARNIOL.

ASD
DASD
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PROG
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MGT
WPS
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SPR

1. PAUL E. MAGLOIRE, FORMER HAITIAN PRESIDENT, IS PLANNING TO OVERTHROW PRESIDENT FRANCOIS DUVALIER OF HAITI IN A MILITARY COUP. MAGLOIRE CLAIMS TO HAVE THE BACKING OF THE HAITIAN ARMY. THE DATE OF THE COUP IS EXPECTED TO BE SET AT A SECRET MEETING WHICH WILL BE HELD IN NEW YORK ON 20 FEBRUARY.

2. MAGLOIRE EXPECTS TO RECEIVE FINANCIAL SUPPORT AND MANPOWER FROM CERTAIN CUBANS IN EXILE. ANTONIO RODRIGUEZ Y ECHAZABAL, FORMER CUBAN AMBASSADOR TO HAITI, IS LINING UP CUBAN EXILE SUPPORT. RODRIGUEZ HOPES THAT IF THE CUBANS PLAY A PROMINENT ROLE, THEY

SECRET CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS CONTROLLED DISSEM

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OBI	OO	EXO

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TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

DA IN 17056 SECRET 000

FORM 5-62 1K OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (15-20)

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET (When Filled In) CONTROLLED DISSEM TDCS DB-3/653,274 IN 67457 PAGE 2

MIGHT BE GIVEN A BASE FROM WHICH TO OPERATE ACTIVELY AGAINST CÀSTRO IN THE FUTURE. (SOURCE COMMENT: RODRIGUEZ HAD BEEN A DELEGATE OF THE 26 JULY MOVEMENT IN PUERTO PRINCIPE UNTIL JANUARY 1959 WHEN HE WAS NAMED AMBASSADOR TO HAITI BY FIDEL CASTRO RUZ.

IN LATE 1959 RODRIGUEZ MANAGED TO ESCAPE ASSASSINATION).

3. EUSEBIO MUJAL BARNIOL OF THE CONFEDERACION DE TRABAJADORES DE CUBA EN EXILIO (CTCE-CONFEDERATION OF CUBAN WORKERS IN EXILE) IS ASSISTING RODRIGUEZ, A RELATIVE.

4. FIELD DISSEM:STATE, CINCLANT, CINCARIB.

ACTION: ACSI, NAVY, AF, JCS, OSD
INFO : DCSOP
DA IN 17056

END OF MESSAGE

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

[illegible]CRET

CLASSIFICATION [illegible] CONTROL

COUNTRY [illegible] CUBA

REPORT NO. [illegible]

SUBJECT [illegible] STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS [illegible] AGAINST [illegible]

DATE DISTR. [illegible]

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. [illegible] FEBRUARY 196[illegible]

FIELD REPORT NO. [illegible]

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

[illegible] WITH GOOD CONNECTIONS [illegible] STUDENTS [illegible]

[illegible] AGITATORS [illegible] ALL MEMBERS OF THE VANGUARD [illegible]

[illegible] (VANGUARD) OF THE [illegible]

[illegible] POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE) INCLUDING [illegible]

[illegible] ALEJANDRO [illegible]

[illegible] BELONGING TO THE [illegible]

[illegible] YOUTH AND [illegible]

[illegible] YOUTH [illegible]

[illegible] MEXICO [illegible]

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[illegible] CRET

[illegible] INFORMATION REPORT [illegible]

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

[illegible]CRET

TDCS -[illegible]

PAGE [illegible]

MEXICO TO DECLARE HIM UNWELCOME BECAUSE OF HIS OPPOSITION TO THE REGIME OF FIDEL CASTRO RUZ, COMMUNIST PRIME MINISTER OF CUBA. [illegible] LEONEL PADILLA GUTIERREZ, A LEADING MEMBER OF THE [illegible], IS ALSO TRYING TO ORGANIZE AND INCITE THE MEXICAN WORKERS AND FARMERS TO DEMONSTRATE AGAINST BETANCOURT'S VISIT.

[illegible] FIELD DISSEM: STATE FBI CINCARIB.

[illegible] ONE ACSI NAVY AF JCS OSD
[illegible] 1 [illegible]
[illegible] 17415

END OF MESSAGE

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

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CIA INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY	PANAMA/CUBA IN : 9477 (13 Feb 63) R/b	REPORT NO.	TDCS 3/537,022
SUBJECT	CUBAN PROPOSAL TO THE PARTIDO DEL PUEBLO TO ASSIST IN ESTABLISHMENT OF CUBAN ESPIONAGE NET IN PANAMA	DATE DISTR.	12 FEBRUARY 1963
		PRECEDENCE	ROUTINE
DATE OF INFO.	17 DECEMBER 1962	REFERENCES	IN 38943
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	PANAMA, PANAMA CITY (21 DEC 62)		
APPRAISAL	2 - THAT THOMAS IS ACCURATELY QUOTED	FIELD REPORT NO.	

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: REGIONAL OFFICER (B) OF THE PARTIDO DEL PUEBLO, FROM THOMAS WHO IS A PERSONAL FRIEND.

ACTION: IN-9
INFO: IA-30, IA-CTIC-2 (41)

1. ON 17 DECEMBER 1962, RUPERTO LUTHER THOMAS, NATIONAL SECRETARY OF PROPAGANDA OF THE PARTIDO DEL PUEBLO (PDP - PEOPLE'S PARTY - COMMUNIST), SAID THAT WHILE HE WAS IN CUBA HE HAD COMMITTED THE PDP TO ACCEPT A PROPOSAL MADE BY THE CUBANS, WHO PROPOSE TO ESTABLISH AN ESPIONAGE NET IN PANAMA, TARGETED AGAINST UNITED STATES MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN THE CANAL ZONE, TO BE FUNDED THROUGH THE PDP. THOMAS SAID THE CUBANS ARE EXTREMELY INTERESTED IN THE MOVEMENTS OF MILITARY SHIPS THROUGH THE PANAMA CANAL, AND THAT THEY TOLD HIM THAT THE NET WOULD REQUIRE TWO MEN, ONE A RADIO TECHNICIAN, THE OTHER A CODE EXPERT. THOMAS WISHED TO KNOW WHETHER A RADIO TRANSMITTER COULD BE BOUGHT IN PANAMA.

2. THOMAS SAID THAT HE HAD REPORTED THE CUBAN PROPOSAL TO THE NATIONAL EXECUTIVE

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

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/EXO/ REP CINCLANT

CIA INFORMATION REPORT

COMMITTEE (CEN) OF THE PDP ON 16 DECEMBER BUT THAT HE HAD NOT TOLD THE CEN THAT HE HAD COMMIT[illegible] THE PDP TO ACCEPT THE PROPOSAL. THOMAS WAS WORRIED ABOUT THE MATTER BECAUSE AT THE 16 DECEMBER MEETING MIGUEL PORCELL, NATIONAL SECRETARY OF ORGANIZATION OF THE PDP, HAD OPPOSED THE IDEA. HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE PDP SHOULD ENGAGE IN SUCH ACTIVITY AND SAID THAT IF THE CUBANS WANTED THIS KIND OF INFORMATION THEY SHOULD GET IT THEMSELVES. RUBEN SOUZA, NATIONAL SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE PDP, DISAGREED WITH PORCELL, SAYING THAT SO LONG AS THE PDP COULD USE THE INFORMATION DEVELOPED BY SUCH AN OPERATION HE BELIEVED THE CUBAN PROPOSAL SHOULD BE ACCEPTED. THE SUBJECT WAS TO BE DISCUSSED FULLY AT THE CEN MEETING SCHEDULED TO BE HELD 18 DECEMBER 1962. (FIELD COMMENT: THOMAS WENT TO CUBA 14 SEPTEMBER AND RETURNED TO PANAMA, VIA ZURICH, 14 DECEMBER. TDCS 3/531,754 GIVES FURTHER DETAILS OF THOMAS' EUROPEAN TRAVEL.)

3. FIELD DISSEM: STATE, ARMY, NAVY, AIR, CINCLANT, CINCARIB.

END OF MESSAGE

ACTION: ACSI, NAVY, AF, JCS, OSD
INFO : DCSOP
DA IN 16496

SECRET

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

ASD DASD EXEC D/RA EUR NESA FE SSI FEA D/AC DIS C/SI P/PL COMP WPS C/L OPR

SECRET (When Filled In)

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY PERU

REPORT NO. TDCS -3/537,185

SUBJECT 1. DECISION OF GUARDIA CIVIL JUDGE TO RELEASE COMMUNISTS
2. COMMUNIST LEGAL ADVISER IN GUARDIA CIVIL

DATE DISTR. 14 FEBRUARY 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

REFERENCES IN 67560

DATE OF INFO. 12 FEBRUARY 1963

PLACE & DATE ACQ. PERU, LIMA (12 FEBRUARY 1963)

APPRAISAL 2

FIELD REPORT NO. HPL 2756

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE COMPETENT AMERICAN OBSERVER (B).

1. MAJOR GUILLERMO HINOSTROZA, WHO WAS NAMED AS THE GUARDIA CIVIL JUDGE TO TAKE THE STATEMENTS OF THE COMMUNISTS ACCUSED OF PLOTTING SUBVERSION, DECIDED ON 12 FEBRUARY 63 THAT HE COULD NOT ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR BRINGING THE COMMUNISTS TO TRIAL. HE INTENDS TO RELEASE THEM ON 15 FEBRUARY IN THE ABSENCE OF A DECISION BY THE GOVERNING JUNTA (FIELD COMMENT: THE PRESS REPORTED HINOSTROZA'S APPOINTMENT AS AD HOC JUDGE OR MAGISTRATE FOR THE SECOND POLICE JUDICIAL ZONE IN THE ARRAIGNMENT PROCESS. IT ALSO REPORTED THAT COLONEL ENRIQUE DIEZ CANSECO WAS THE GUARDIA CIVIL LEGAL ADVISOR IN THE CASE. ACCORDING TO A USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE WITH GOOD

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

DA IN 17081

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SECRET (When Filled In)	CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS NO FOREIGN DISSEM	TDCS -3/537,185	IN 67560 PAGE 2

CONTACTS AMONG COMMUNIST PARTY LEADERS, THE PARTY IS PLEASED THAT DIEZ CANSECO IN THE CASE BECAUSE HE WAS A COMMUNIST SYMPATHIZER WHO CONTRIBUTED TO THE PARTY IN THE NINETEEN FORTIES. PARTY RECORDS FURNISHED BY THE POLICE IN 1950 SHOW ACTUALLY THAT HE WAS A PARTY MEMBER).

2. NAVY CAPTAIN ENRIQUE CARBONNEL, CHIEF OF THE SERVIÇIO DE INTELLIGENCIA NACIONAL, PLANNED TO DISCUSS THE SITUATION WITH THE PRESIDENT OF THE JUNTA AND URGE HIM TO PREVENT THE RELEASE OF THE COMMUNISTS. JAVIER CAMPOS MONTOYA, CHIEF OF THE STATE SECURITY DIVISION OF THE POLICIA DE INVESTIGACIONES DEL PERU, INSISTS THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAS AMPLE EVIDENCE, INCLUDING SOME CONFESSIONS, ON WHICH TO CONVICT THE COMMUNISTS. CAMPOS EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT AT THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE JUDGE, WHOM HE DESCRIBES AS WEAK, BUT HE HAS SOME HOPE THAT THE JUNTA WILL OVERRIDE THE DECISION.

3. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCARIB.

ACTION: ACSI, NAVY, AF, JCS, OSD

INFO : DCSOP

DA IN 17081

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET	CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS NO FOREIGN DISSEM

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Three Cuban nationals have been identified, according to a usually reliable and competent source, among the leaders of the 17 December strike violence at the US-owned Cerro de Pasco mine in La Oroya, Peru. One of the three Cubans has also been active in promoting the seizure of ranchland in the Peruvian highlands by Andean Indians. Communist-led Indians were said to have planned to synchronize a major new seizure campaign with the violence against Cerro de Pasco. No such incidents have been reported yet. (SECRET)

Peruvian Communist Elements Coordinating Their Activities

Orthodox Communists in Peru are apparently putting aside their differences and moving toward closer co-operation with the extremist Trotskyist faction, believed to be leading the recent outbreak of disorders. The groups are reportedly co-ordinating previously random plans to carry out extensive destruction of industrial and agricultural installations and to provoke uprisings. Cubans and other Latin American nationals as well as Havana and Moscow-trained Peruvians are said to be instrumental in this latest development.

Members of the Peruvian junta have expressed serious concern over the internal situation and hinted that they favor strong action. Although constitutional guarantees have been suspended in a fourth department and several Army units have been moved into the areas of disorders, the junta has taken no further action. It has requested riot control equipment from the US and says it is ready to embark on an anti-Communist program upon assurance that the equipment is forthcoming. (SECRET)

SOURCE: EMB LIMA 612 and 613 (S); AIRA LIMA C-1 (C)

Peruvian Junta Makes Firm Anti-Communist Move

Continued Communist-incited disorders and an alleged Havana-Moscow plan to take over the government prompted the military junta to suspend constitutional guarantees in Perú and institute a nationwide state of siege early on 5 January. Military commanders assumed political control in their respective zones, and a reported 800 Communist Party leaders and pro-Communist subversives have been arrested. The Lima headquarters of several Communist and Communist-front organizations, as well as their publications, have been closed.

According to the Communist plan, subversive activity was to have been intensified between 15 and 20 January in all parts of Peru, with assaults on banking and commercial institutions, military garrisons, vital communications facilities, and universities. A clandestine radio station operating on the Bolivian border allegedly was to direct and co-ordinate this activity.

The junta has regarded members of the leftist but non-Communist American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) a greater danger than the Communists and originally tended to blame them for the disorders. There is no proof that APRA has been involved in anything but legititmate strike activity. Suspension of constitutional guarantees would enable the junta to strike at APRA to discredit and weaken it before the scheduled elections next June. (SECRET)

SOURCE: EMB LIMA 622 (S), 623 (LOU) and 624 (U)

SUPPLEMENT

THE VENEZUELAN SITUATION

A number of high-ranking Cuban leaders since the first of the year have publicly called for revolution in other Latin American countries, with Venezuela singled out as a country with top priority.

Coinciding with these appeals have been reports that the Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV) planned to step up terrorist activity to discredit President Betancourt before his US visit. The recent incidence of terrorism, which has included attacks on the US Chamber of Commerce office building and the burning of Sears, Roebuck warehouses, is apparently part of this campaign.

Involved in the current terrorism is the Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN). The FALN, although purporting to represent all of the opposition, includes some prominent Communists and is emerging as a paramilitary force of the PCV with its main strength in the Caracas area.

Guerrilla bands also operate in western Venezuela, but there is no firm evidence that their activity is coordinated with that in the Caracas area. Venezuelan army units, with air support, have been used in a recent campaign against these guerrillas.

The armed forces are generally capable of maintaining internal security and of defending the nation's borders against neighboring countries. The vast majority supports constitutionality and is loyal to the Betancourt government. The armed forces would not hesitate, however, to take over the government in order to maintain order or to forestall a Communist uprising. The armed forces were earlier greatly frustrated over the government's inaction against Communist-instigated disorders. Betancourt's recent willingness to take more vigorous action, however, coupled with the strong support given the US during the Cuban crisis, has overcome much of this dissatisfaction, and armed forces' support of the government is greater now than it was six months ago.

The officer corps is generally free of Communist penetration, although there has been some infiltration in the Marine corps, two or three battalions having been involved in leftist-led revolts during the spring of 1962. (SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Extremist And Police Activities In Venezuela

Venezuela has been afflicted over the past several months with a rash of Castro-Communist terrorist actions. Many incidents, involving shootings and robberies, are connected with the Movement of the Revolutionary Left, the Venezuelan Communist Party, and the Armed Forces of National Liberation -- the Castro-Communist group credited with the destruction at the Maracaibo oil fields during the Cuban crisis. These activities are probably designed to discredit and weaken the Betancourt Government.

The police have demonstrated considerable proficiency in preventing major outbreaks and in acting rapidly to arrest terrorists. They have rounded up extremists responsible for the holdup and looting of a printing supply warehouse and the burning of the Dupont paint warehouse and have captured the Communist leader of guerrilla bands operating in the Falcón area of northwestern Venezuela. (CONFIDENTIAL)
SOURCE: VARIOUS

SECRET

SECRET—NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Venezuelan Communists Plan to Increase Violence

As part of its terrorist campaign, the Venezuelan Communist Party reportedly plans to mark the fourth anniversary of Betancourt's presidency on 13 February by guerrilla bombings in the Caracas area. Other Communists are to see to it that the capital is flooded with propaganda that day. According to unconfirmed reports, Venezuelan authorities have charged the Castro government with ordering the recent terrorism in both Venezuela and Colombia under an extensive plan to create collective panic and insecurity in both countries. Colombian military authorities have reportedly drawn up a plan to prevent terrorism in Colombia's cities.
(SECRET)

SOURCE: TDCS 3/537,117 (S); FBIS (U)

14 Feb 63

IX.B.2

~~TOP~~ SECRET - SENSITIVE

Leites/Mandelstam/DRAFT/14 Mar 63/frc

SUBJECT: Alternative US Public Posture on Subversion in Latin America

1. Although our public posture on subversion in Latin America may be too firmly established for instant and radical revision, the following analysis is offered on the assumption that some change in emphasis is both possible and desirable, now or at some time in the future.

2. Given the existence of a Communist state, of either major persuasion, what is the likelihood that it will engage in subversion toward neighboring states?

a. Total. All experience of the past forty years demonstrates that a Communist state emanates subversion as the sun emanates heat.

b. But let us be clear that two kinds of subversion are involved:

(1) Hardware-centered - that is, funds, guns, tools of sabotage.

(2) Egalitarian and libertarian ideals.

3. How much does this fact of inevitable subversion raise the probability of Communism spreading to target countries?

a. Subversion is never a sufficient condition - and frequently not a necessary one.

b. If subversion is really dangerous to a target state, there is *per se* something seriously wrong in that state. (France's "Nasser Fallacy" of 1956; France embarked on the Suez adventure on the assumption that if Nasser were disposed of, the trouble in Algeria would magically disappear. Although the game was not played out, few would dispute the conclusion that France's assumption was wrong; or, for that matter,

~~TOP~~ SECRET - SENSITIVE

that France would have been in an even deeper morass if her military forces had managed with the British to occupy Cairo.)

4. How feasible is it to control subversion at the source without destroying the Communist State?

Usually it is infeasible to do so or the costs are prohibitive.

For instance, the costs of a protracted tight quarantine which could prevent the export both of hardware-oriented and idea subversion, would be very high, even if the activity were accepted by Cuba and the Soviet Union. This would mean inspecting every vessel, searching every traveler, forcing planes down for inspection, etc. We submit (a) that ideas would still be exported and (b) that by so doing we would magnify the importance of Cuba beyond imagination. It would become a kind of forbidden fruit. The analogy with prohibition in this country comes to mind. This course involves an increment of prestige and lure to Cuba which would be likely to outweigh the doubtless desirable diminution in the export of trained subversives and associated hardware. Furthermore, given the success of such an effort, the obvious Soviet counter would be to use other channels which we could not surveil without major East-West confrontation. The Cuban subversion export organization might well move to Moscow, Prague and/or even Peiping. Therefore, to take a public stance opposed to Cuban subversion without having resolved on invasion is to be committed to a policy bound to demonstrate US impotence.

5. If we want to control subversion at the source by destroying the Communist State, Cuba, how useful is it for us publicly to emphasize hardware-centered subversion as the reason?

a. For many people outside of the US, even the export of subversion by force and sabotage also involves ideas and dedication, as well as funds, arms, and other equipment. (We, for example, are not ashamed of the Bay of Pigs expedition <u>except that it failed</u>.)

b. Usually attitudes toward violent subversion depend on attitudes toward thetarget. (Example: acts against Jiminez, Trujillo did <u>not</u> offend US/ most of Latin America/ most of the world; the parallel today: Somoza, Ydigoras, Stroesser). We run the danger of falling into the USSR projection of the US as the "world gendarme." Subversion directed against the Dutch government would outrage not only all Americans, but also all non-Communist Europeans; its legitimacy is total. But the same can not be said for most LA governments. The difference is decisive and perhaps sometimes neglected.

c. Most people generally recognize that when violent subversion is powerful, it is because it taps fundamental sources of discontent.

d. We in the US tend to look at subversion in Latin America from the point-of-view of hardware. But a great deal of the subversion in Latin America is or at least appears as idea-centered, not hardware-centered. The export of "armed aggression" by dedicated revolutionaries is only a part of the process. Another part, which is at least as important, and probably more so, is the export of propaganda. This, however, to much of the world, including Latin America outside of the oligarchies, will appear as an export of ideas and ideals (perhaps wrong, but nevertheless ideas). Our approach, then, tends to pass rather than meet the

Latino viewpoints. We are very close to putting ourselves into the position of the Tsarist gendarmes who tried to use brute force against the power of ideas. The trap is that we may seem thereby to be acknowledging the decline and imminent fall of our <u>own</u> ideas.

e. One consequence of this line of reasoning would be that, if we ever find it necessary to invade Cuba, we should do so "to stop the firing squads," "to guarantee free elections," -- but <u>not</u> to save Somoza.

6. How feasible is it for us to control both kinds of subversion at the target rather than at the source?

a. It is often feasible. This is how we have in fact successfully controlled subversion except in the dubious case of S. Vietnam. Even in the difficult case of Greece, we succeeded by a combination of military and economic measures.

b. The point is not that this is always a feasible way of handling the problem; rather it <u>is</u> often practicable and also often the most desirable way.

7. Suppose that we decided to invade Cuba to control subversion with the result (three cases):

a. That we restored the <u>status quo ante</u> Castro.

b. That for reasons of expediency we try to maintain Castro's "reforms" -- i.e., what many Latinoes would regard as "socialism."

c. That we gave the Cuban people an obvious free choice, no matter what ensued.

How would the prospects for Communism in the Western Hemisphere be affected?

Case A: Boomerang - we would almost certainly enhance the prospects for Communism.

Case B: There would be strong popular Latin American support, some governmental outrage, but the prospects for Communism would be diminished.

Case C: Paradoxically, the result would depend on what ensued, because most Latin Americans do not trust the US (and particularly would be skeptical of "free elections" if US soldiers were present).

CONCLUSIONS

1. Conditions in most parts of Latin America are such that subversion (Cuban or Bloc or both) is really dangerous.

2. Since this is so, the US public posture should not recognize this; and we should abstain from public pronouncements that subversion is conceivably a casus belli.

3. The point-of-view set forth in this paper, insofar as it can be made operative, may tend to bring a fundamental alignment between the US public posture and LA opinion.

4. The US course of action towards any LA country has to weigh the advantages and disadvantages, in any given case at any given time, of subversion control (a) at source or (b) at point of impact.

5. The same principles would apply if another Communist-oriented government were to come to power in any part of Latin America.

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 6/24/201

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DATE : 00/00/0000
PAGES : 17

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CONTROL OF TRANSFER OF FUNDS
CONTROL OF MOVEMENT OF CUBAN PROPAGANDA
CONTROL OF CLANDESTINE MOVEMENT OF GUERRILLAS AND ARMS
EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE ON CUBAN SUBVERSION
SURVEILLANCE OF CUBAN DIPLOMATIC, COMMERCIAL AND CULTURAL MISSIONS
STRENGTHENING OF COUNTER-INSURGENCY CAPABILITIES

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B; 4
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 04/09/1998

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : Califano Papers, Box 4, Folder 6. Draft report concerning control of access to and surveillance of Cuba.

NO STATE OBJECTION
TO DECLASSIFICATION
BY [signature] DATE 01/14/16

Department of the Army EO 13526
☒ Declassify ☐ Exclude ☐ Exempt
Authority
☐ Refer To
Review Date 12/16/15 By [signature]

1. Control of Travel to and from Cuba

Central Intelligence Agency

a. Developed highly useful information on frequency of Cuban "chartered" flights to Brazil, names and nationalities of passengers and crew, and lax measures of control followed by Brazilian authorities. Transmitted this information to station chiefs in the Latin American countries of the non-Brazilians travelling on these flights.

b. Maintained close watch over travel to and from Cuba. See Annex B for table of known travel of Latin Americans during July and August.

c. As a result of information furnished by him by the CIA Station in Buenos Aires and with the Station's urging, the Argentine Minister of Interior indicated that he would make every effort to prevent Argentine delegates from attending the International Union of Architects Congress in Havana.

d. At the urging of the CIA Station and the Embassy the Bolivian Minister of Interior issued in mid-July an order prohibiting the granting of travel permits to Cuba on other bloc countries to Bolivian nationals.

e. Partly as a result of the efforts of the CIA station in Santiago, the Government of Chile prohibited the entry into Chile of organizers of the Cuban sponsored Second Latin American Youth Congress, which had been scheduled to take place in Santiago in August. This was one of the factors which led to postponement of theCongress.

f. After considerable prodding by the CIA Station and the Embassy the Minister of Public Security of Costa Rica has presented legislative proposals to the Costa Rican Assembly which will require all persons intending to travel to Communist countries to have their travel approved by a newly created Costa Rican security agency.

g. CIA Station in Mexico City developed information concerning the clandestine arrival of passengers in Vera Cruz on Cuban merchant ships. Efforts are being made to obtain more information and to encourage stricter controls by the Mexican authorities.

Department of State

a. Instructed Embassy Conakry to try to persuade Guinean authorities to deny use of airport facilities by flights on Habana-Moscow route. These efforts achieved a temporary withholding of permission for future regular flights, at least

until such time as the Soviets develop their own refueling facilities at Conakry.

b. Instructed Embassy Rio to approach Brazilian authorities to express our deep concern at the growing frequency of Cuban non-scheduled flights to Brazil and request their cooperation in curbing them. Also instructed our Embassies in several Latin American countries to work with CIA station chiefs in furnishing the names of nationals of those countries travelling on these flights to local authorities and urging them: (1) to institute tighter controls on their own citizens travelling to Cuba, and (2) to express their concern to the ~~government of~~ Brazilian GOVERNMENT over Cuban use of Brazil as a way station for transporting subversives.

c. As a result of representations made to the British government about Cuban flights to the Cayman Islands carrying Latin American subversives, the British developed an administrative scheme which will effectively prohibit the use of British Caribbean dependencies by Cubana as transit points for passengers. The British intend to require transit visas of passengers passing through their areas, and to reject applications for such visas except in certain special cases. Persons not possessing visas would be prevented from leaving their aircraft, or would be

returned to their point of origin.

d. Instructed Embassy Mexico City on August 29 to inform the Mexican airline CMA that the United States is opposed to a proposal that CMA operate charter flights to carry refugees from Havana to Central America. CMA, as a result, stated that they had no intention of proceeding further with this project.

e. Instructed U.S. Missions in Curacao and the Ha gue to investigate a report that KLM was planning to renew its scheduled Curacao-Habana flights and to reiterate US opposition to resumption of air service to Cuba. KLM assured our Embassy that there is no plan to initiate service, scheduled or non-scheduled, to Habana.

f. Instructed Embassy Ottawa to express our strong objections to a proposal that a Cubana charter flight pick up a second group of U.S. students in Montreal to fly them to Cuba. The flight was not authorized.

g. Instructed Consulate Georgetown to investigate Cubana approaches to secure flight facilities. Mission reported on August 1 that the Governor had no knowledge of any talks between the B.G. Ministry of Communications and the Cuban Government regarding landing rights for Cubana planes. The Governor

indicated his intention to inquire further and to keep us advised. London reported that neither the Cuban nor the British Guiana Governments had raised the issue of landing rights with H.M.G.

h. Urged the governments of Mexico, Canada, Jamaica and the Netherlands to refuse to assist the Cuban government in its efforts to find a short route for return of the 58 American students who illegally travelled to Cuba. Also informed Pan American Airways that we were opposed to a Cuban request for a PAA charter flight to fly the students from Habana to New York.

i. Instructed our missions at Port of Spain and Barbados on several occasions to approach these governments to express the concern of the U.S. at indications of Cuban interest in the use of their aviation facilities.

Embassy Port of Spain discussed with the Foreign Secretary of Trinidad various legal moves available that would enable GOTT to control movements of aircraft within their territory, citing examples of such controls instituted by Mexico, Canada and Ireland. He indicated receptiveness to the proposal that the list of suggestions be made available to the aviation officials concerned.

j. During a previous reporting period Embassy Santiago

urged the government of Chile to refuse visas to Cuban delegates to a preparatory meeting planning for the II Latin American Youth Congress scheduled for August in the Chilean capital. Inability of Cuban delegates to obtain Chilean visas for this meeting is one of the contributing factors to the Cuban sponsors announcing during August that the meeting had been postponed.

k. Sent general instructions to our missions in countries which participate in the International Union of Architects asking them to urge the cooperation of govermmental authorities in preventing or discouraging the attendance of their citizens to the VII UIA Congress in Habana, September 29-October 4, 1963. Followed this up with instructions to individual posts to try where feasible to dissuade architects from free world countries from serving on the jury for the selection of a Bay of Pigs monument.

l. Urged Canadian Government to block a plan to commence food parcel shipments to Cuba, on a commercial basis, that would have required the establishment of scheduled weekly charter flights by Canadian planes.

2. Control of Movement of Cuban Propaganda

Central Intelligence Agency

Responding to the urging of the CIA Station police of the State of Guanabara seized large quantities of propaganda brought into Brazil by passengers on the special Cubana flights. For example, some 50 pounds of printed propaganda was taken from the various passengers who arrived on the 16 August Cubana flight.

3. Control of Clandestine Movement of Guerrillas and Arms

Department of Defense

a. Continued surveillance of the area surrounding Cuba during the month of July at the same rate and with the same emphasis as prior to 1 July 1963.

b. Continued to maintain U.S. Forces, primarily from within the Atlantic Command, available to assist other Caribbean governments in the interception of suspicious craft in territorial waters, as might be requested. No such requests were received from any other government during the period covered by this report. However, U.S. Forces did keep track of the location of the Soviet merchant freighter MITCHURINSK, which

was suspected of carrying subversives and arms from Cuba to British Guiana in mid-July. MITCHURINSK was under U.S. surveillance from its departure from Havana until United Kingdom forces assumed the task of keeping this ship under surveillance upon its approach to Georgetown, British Guiana. Subsequently, British police search of MITCHURINSK in British Guiana waters revealed nothing of a suspicious nature.

Central Intelligence Agency

At the repeated urging of the CIA Station in Lima the Peruvian Government late in August published a new anti-terrorists law providing a penalty of no less than five years imprisonment for persons who particiate in guerrilla activities or in the illegal manufacture of weapons or explosives.

The Peruvian National Intelligence Service is working on a lead furnished by the CIA Station in Lima concerning a 200 ton vessel reportedly involved in arms traffic.

Department of State

Instructed our Consulate General in Georgetown to investigate reports that commercial cargoes (which could conceal illicit arms traffic out of Cuba) had developed between British Guiana and Cuba. Investigations to date have been negative.

4. Control of Transfer of Funds

Department of State

Cooperated with the Foreign Assets Control Office of the Treasury Department in developing blocking controls with respect to Cuba which went into effect on July 9, 1963.

5. Strengthening of Counter-Insurgency Capabilities

Department of Defense

a. Continued the installation of military communications facilities in Latin America. Operational dates for the multi-channel radio stations to be installed in Managua, Nicaragua and Tegucigalpa, Honduras have been delayed to 15 October 1963 and 15 December 1963, respectively because of new engineering and contractual requirements. Negotiations are continuing with Colombia and Ecuador for installation of U.S. military radio facilities. Completion of a new commercial trans-isthmian cable in the Panama Canal Zone within the coming month is expected to improve military communications within the United States and the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command.

b. Continued the surveillance of Cuba by U.S. Forces, reporting as before to U.S. commanders, organizations and agencies.

Reports of surveillance have been disseminated to all who have a requirement to know.

c. Established a 24 hour per day, 7 days per week duty watch at the U.S. Military Groups in the Caribbean countries in conjunction with implementation of the military alerting system. Continued efforts to staff the U.S. Southern Command Intelligence Center with properly cleared, trained personnel (this center is the military focal point for relaying information concerning the movement of subversives). Filled, partially, the authorized billets in the U.S. Southern Command Intelligence Center and took under consideration the problem of an increase in the billet structure in the Center. The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command together with his intelligence officer visited Honduras and Nicaragua and determined that no significant problems existed which would interfere with effective operations in those countries.

d. Action previously initiated by the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Southern Command (COMUSNAVSO) to establish a Small Craft Inspection and Training Team (SCIATT) as a contribution to the Caribbean Surveillance System is progressing satisfactorily.

Permanent assignment of U.S. Coast Guard personnel to SCIATT in the Canal Zone has been approved and the U.S. Coast Guard has taken appropriate implementing actions.

e. During the period of this report, the SCIATT conducted an on-the-job training course at Puntarenas, Costa Rica. Training was given to 13 members of the Guardia Civil of Costa Rica who were either newly assigned to the 40 foot Coast Guard utility boats (CGUBs) or were to be assigned as replacement crew members.

f. A quarterly inspection and evaluation of the CGUBs provided other Central American countries was conducted during the period 17 to 31 August by a mobile training team (MTT) made up of SCIATT personnel.

g. Continued efforts to improve the internal security of Latin American armies through the provision of Intelligence Advisors. Presently there are such advisors assigned to 14 Latin countries, emphasizing counterintelligence and counter-subversion.

h. During the reporting period MTTs conducted training in counterinsurgency for the armed forces of Colombia, Bolivia, Venezuela, Peru and El Salvador.

i. Civic Action MTTs were sent to Guatemala, Bolivia, Colombia, El Salvador, Jamaica and Ecuador.

6. Exchange of Intelligence on Cuban Subversion

Central Intelligence Agency

CIA Stations throughout Latin America continued in a great majority of countries to furnish to the local internal security organizations with whom they are in liaison information concerning travelers to and from Cuba, as well as such information as came to CIA's attention concerning the movement of funds, arms and propaganda material. In many instances, the furnishing of information to the internal security service by the CIA Station was paralleled by the furnishing of similar information to the foreign office by the Ambassador or his representative. The response to this information has varied greatly. The Central American countries, in general, began to pay attention to the information and take action on it. At the other extreme, the Brazilian Government during the reporting period showed little inclination to follow up on the information.

Department of State

a. Reiterated to the Foreign Minister of Peru our interest in having the facts of the Puerto Maldonado incident

brought to the attention of the OAS, and urged that this action be taken as soon as possible.

b. Urged the Government of Guatemala to submit evidence of communist activity to the OAS.

7. Surveillance of Cuban Diplomatic, Commercial and Cultural Missions.

Central Intelligence Agency

(To be filled in by Mr. Wheeler)

Department of State

Instructed Embassy La Paz to follow up closely on charges of involvement of Cuban mission in internal politics of Bolivia, and, at the Embassy's discretion, to point out to Bolivian officials the opportunity for a possible break in relations with Cuba. Embassy La Paz was not able to press for a break when the evidence of Cuban intervention did not prove to be as conclusive as originally reported.

S. Other Special Actions

Department of State

a. Obtained action by the COAS on July 3 on the Lavalle Committee Report transmitting the document to the governments and urging them to implement the specific and general recommendations contained therein as soon as possible.

b. Through Embassy Managua informed the Nicaraguan Government of the matters which we wanted to have considered during the informal meeting of the Ministers of Security and Interior of the Isthmian countries held in Managua, August 26-28 in preparation for the second formal meeting of the Managua Security Conference countries later this year.

c. Reassured President Schick of Nicaragua in the most emphatic terms that the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty did not mean that our attitude toward Castro has altered in the slightest, and stressed our interest in seeing steady progress by all the Isthmian countries in implementing the recommendations of the Managua Security Conference to block Cuban subversive efforts.

d. Explained in detail the nature of the Cuban threat and the related policy objectives of the U.S., during conversation in London and in Washington with Mr. Adam Watson, newly appointed British Ambassador to Cuba.

United States Information Agency

a. The Agency's press service during the reporting period transmitted 12 articles, commentaries, and backgrounders on its wireless file service to USIA posts throughout Latin America for placement in the local newspapers and the Voice of America Spanish broadcasts to Latin America carried a total of 28 commentaries and features on the subject of Cuban-based subversion in addition to the regular reporting of developments in the hourly newscasts.

b. In response to standing Agency instructions to give special attention to developments related to Cuba-based subversion, USIS posts in Latin America were prompt in reporting incidents and in providing editorial comments from the Latin American press, all of which was used in the Agency's radio and press output.

The main developments treated in the Agency's radio and press coverage included Castro's July 26 speech urging revolutions in Latin America, the discovery of terrorist weapons factories in Guayaquil, the Ecuadorean Vice President's accusation of Cuban responsibility for terrorism, the statement by State Department Press Officer Richard Phillips that "potential subversive agents" from Cuba to the Caribbean area were passing through Gran Cayman, the expulsion of a Bolivian youth leader for receiving funds from Cuba, Castro-trained terrorists in Honduras, and Bolivian protests against meddling by the Cuban Embassy in the miner's strike. A Voice of America roving reporter in Latin America provided several reports summaries on the subversion picture in countries he visited.

c. In support of the Agency's effort on Cuban-based subversion, the publications center in Mexico began work on

three pamphlets during the period based on Castro's report of his visit to the Soviet Union (showing that he contradicted himself in some of his extravagant claims of Soviet progress), the losses suffered by Cuban labor under Castro, and the fate of political prisoners in Cuba. When completed, these pamphlets will be reproduced and distributed in quantity throughout the area.

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CONTROL OF TRAVEL TO AND FROM CUBA
CONTROL OF TRANSFER OF FUNDS
SURVEILLANCE OF CUBAN DIPLOMATIC, COMMERCIAL AND CULTURAL MISSIONS
CONTROL OF CLANDESTINE MOVEMENT OF GUERILLAS AND ARMS
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September 30, 1963

TO: Members of Subcommittee on Castro-Communist Subversion.

FROM: Chairman, Subcommittee on Cuban Subversion

SUBJECT: Report for July - August on Actions Taken to Combat Castro-Communist Subversion.

Attached is a draft of the Subcommittee's report for July and August on actions taken to counteract Castro-communist subversion in the hemisphere. The draft has been prepared on the basis of the material which you furnished with certain modification. The CIA member will note that I have extracted from his submission the items of action taken and placed these in the body of the report. The intelligence information contained in the submission I have made into an annex. I think it is very useful to have the intelligence data form part of the report, and request that in the future the CIA member prepare his submission in two parts.

May I have your comments on the draft by close of business October 1, 1963.

Copies to: CIA - Mr. Wheeler (2)
DOD - Col. Haig (2) — #6, #7
USIA - Mr. Wagley (1)
RAR - Mr. Hart (1)
Justice - Mr. Geogheghan (1)

2 Oct 63
M/R Called
Bob Fjelstad advised etc - Stapped w/
V-3 - Air Staff & Army - Haig

ARA:WGBowdler:jg
9/30/63

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

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1. Control of Travel to and from Cuba

Central Intelligence Agency

a. Developed highly useful information on frequency of Cuban "chartered" flights to Brazil, names and nationalities of passengers and crew, and lax measures of control followed by Brazilian authorities. Transmitted this information to station chiefs in the Latin American countries of the non-Brazilians travelling on these flights.

b. Maintained close watch over travel to and from Cuba. See Annex B for table of known travel of Latin Americans during July and August.

c. As a result of information furnished by him by the CIA Station in Buenos Aires and with the Station's urging, the Argentine Minister of Interior indicated that he would make every effort to prevent Argentine delegates from attending the International Union of Architects Congress in Havana.

d. At the urging of the CIA Station and the Embassy the Bolivian Minister of Interior issued in mid-July an order prohibiting the granting of travel permits to Cuba on other bloc countries to Bolivian nationals.

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e. Partly as a result of the efforts of the CIA station in Santiago, the Government of Chile prohibited the entry into Chile of organizers of the Cuban sponsored Second Latin American Youth Congress, which had been scheduled to take place in Santiago in August. This was one of the factors which led to postponement of theCongress.

f. After considerable prodding by the CIA Station and the Embassy the Minister of Public Security of Costa Rica ~~has~~ presented legislative proposals to the Costa Rican Assembly which will require all persons intending to travel to Communist countries to have their travel approved by a newly created Costa Rican security agency.

g. CIA Station in Mexico City developed information concerning the clandestine arrival of passengers in Vera Cruz on Cuban merchant ships. Efforts are being made to obtain more information and to encourage stricter controls by the Mexican authorities.

Department of State

a. Instructed Embassy Conakry to try to persuade Guinean authorities to deny use of airport facilities by flights on Habana-Moscow route. These efforts achieved a temporary withholding of permission for future regular flights, at least

until such time as the Soviets develop their own refueling facilities at Conakry.

b. Instructed Embassy Rio to approach Brazilian authorities to express our deep concern at the growing frequency of Cuban non-scheduled flights to Brazil and request their cooperation in curbing them. Also instructed our Embassies in several Latin American countries to work with CIA station chiefs in furnishing the names of nationals of those countries travelling on these flights to local authorities and urging them: (1) to institute tighter controls on their own citizens travelling to Cuba, and (2) to express their concern to the ~~government of~~ Brazilian GOVERNMENT over Cuban use of Brazil as a way station for transporting subversives.

c. As a result of representations made to the British government about Cuban flights to the Cayman Islands carrying Latin American subversives, the British developed an administrative scheme which will effectively prohibit the use of British Caribbean dependencies by Cubans as transit points for passengers. The British intend to require transit visas of passengers passing through their areas, and to reject applications for such visas except in certain special cases. Persons not possessing visas would be prevented from leaving their aircraft, or would be

returned to their point of origin.

d. Instructed Embassy Mexico City on August 29 to inform the Mexican airline CMA that the United States is opposed to a proposal that CMA operate charter flights to carry refugees from Havana to Central America. CMA, as a result, stated that they had no intention of proceeding further with this project.

e. Instructed U.S. Missions in Curacao and the Ha gue to investigate a report that KLM was planning to renew sh scheduled Curacao-Habana flights and to reiterate US opposition to resumption of air service to Cuba. KLM assured our Embassy that there is no plan to initiate service, scheduled or non-scheduled, to Habana.

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g. Instructed Consulate Georgetown to investigate Cubana approaches to secure flight facilities. Mission reported on August 1 that the Governor had no knowledge of any talks between the B.G. Ministry of Communications and the Cuban Government regarding landing rights for Cubana planes. The Governor

indicated his intention to inquire further and to keep us advised. London reported that neither the Cuban nor the British Guiana Governments had raised the issue of landing rights with H.M.G.

h. Urged the governments of Mexico, Canada, Jamaica and the Netherlands to refuse to assist the Cuban government in its efforts to find a short route for return of the 58 American students who illegally travelled to Cuba. Also informed Pan American Airways that we were opposed to a Cuban request for a PAA charter flight to fly the students from Habana to New York.

i. Instructed our missions at Port of Spain and Barbados on several occasions to approach these governments to express the concern of the U.S. at indications of Cuban interest in the use of their aviation facilities.

Embassy Port of Spain discussed with the Foreign Secretary of Trinidad various legal moves available that would enable GOTT to control movements of aircraft within their territory, citing examples of such controls instituted by Mexico, Canada and Ireland. He indicated receptiveness to the proposal that the list of suggestions be made available to the aviation officials concerned.

j. During a previous reporting period Embassy Santiago

urged the government of Chile to refuse visas to Cuban delegates to a preparatory meeting planning for the II Latin American Youth Congress scheduled for August in the Chilean capital. Inability of Cuban delegates to obtain Chilean visas for this meeting is one of the contributing factors to the Cuban sponsors announcing during August that the meeting had been postponed.

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l. Urged Canadian Government to block a plan to commence food parcel shipments to Cuba, on a commercial basis, that would have required the establishment of scheduled weekly charter flights by Canadian planes.

2. Control of Movement of Cuban Propaganda

Central Intelligence Agency

Responding to the urging of the CIA Station police of the State of Guanabara seized large quantities of propaganda brought into Brazil by passengers on the special Cubana flights. For example, some 50 pounds of printed propaganda was taken from the various passengers who arrived on the 16 August Cubana flight.

3. Control of Clandestine Movement of Guerrillas and Arms

Department of Defense

a. Continued surveillance of the area surrounding Cuba during the month of July at the same rate and with the same emphasis as prior to 1 July 1963.

b. Continued to maintain U.S. Forces, primarily from within the Atlantic Command, available to assist other Caribbean governments in the interception of suspicious craft in territorial waters, as might be requested. No such requests were received from any other government during the period covered by this report. However, U.S. Forces did keep track of the location of the Soviet merchant freighter MITCHURINSK, which

was suspected of carrying subversives and arms from Cuba to British Guiana in mid-July. MITCHURINSK was under U.S. surveillance from its departure from Havana until United Kingdom forces assumed the task of keeping this ship under surveillance upon its approach to Georgetown, British Guiana. Subsequently, British police search of MITCHURINSK in British Guiana waters revealed nothing of a suspicious nature.

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At the repeated urging of the CIA Station in Lima the Peruvian Government late in August published a new anti-terrorists law providing a penalty of no less than five years imprisonment for persons who particiate in guerrilla activities or in the illegal manufacture of weapons or explosives.

The Peruvian National Intelligence Service is working on a lead furnished by the CIA Station in Lima concerning a 200 ton vessel reportedly involved in arms traffic.

Department of State

Instructed our Consulate General in Georgetown to investigate reports that commercial cargoes (which could conceal illicit arms traffic out of Cuba) had developed between British Guiana and Cuba. Investigations to date have been negative.

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Department of State

Cooperated with the Foreign Assets Control Office of the Treasury Department in developing blocking controls with respect to Cuba which went into effect on July 9, 1963.

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Department of Defense

a. Continued the installation of military communications facilities in Latin America. Operational dates for the multi-channel radio stations to be installed in Managua, Nicaragua and Tegucigalpa, Honduras have been delayed to 15 October 1963 and 15 December 1963, respectively because of new engineering and contractual requirements. Negotiations are continuing with Colombia and Ecuador for installation of U.S. military radio facilities. Completion of a new commercial trans-isthmian cable in the Panama Canal Zone within the coming month is expected to improve military communications within the United States and the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command.

b. Continued the surveillance of Cuba by U.S. Forces, reporting as before to U.S. commanders, organisations and agencies.

Reports of surveillance have been disseminated to all who have a requirement to know.

c. Established a 24 hour per day, 7 days per week duty watch at the U.S. Military Groups in the Caribbean countries in conjunction with implementation of the military alerting system. Continued efforts to staff the U.S. Southern Command Intelligence Center with properly cleared, trained personnel (this center is the military focal point for relaying information concerning the movement of subversives). Filled, partially, the authorized billets in the U.S. Southern Command Intelligence Center and took under consideration the problem of an increase in the billet structure in the Center. The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command together with his intelligence officer visited Honduras and Nicaragua and determined that no significant problems existed which would interfere with effective operations in those countries.

d. Action previously initiated by the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Southern Command (COMUSNAVSO) to establish a Small Craft Inspection and Training Team (SCIATT) as a contribution to the Caribbean Surveillance System is progressing satisfactorily.

Permanent assignment of U.S. Coast Guard personnel to SCIATT in the Canal Zone has been approved and the U.S. Coast Guard has taken appropriate implementing actions.

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f. A quarterly inspection and evaluation of the CGUBs provided other Central American countries was conducted during the period 17 to 31 August by a mobile training team (MTT) made up of SCIATT personnel.

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Department of State

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brought to the attention of the OAS, and urged that this action be taken as soon as possible.

b. Urged the Government of Guatemala to submit evidence of communist activity to the OAS.

7. Surveillance of Cuban Diplomatic, Commerical and Cultural Missions.

Central Intelligency Agency

(To be filled in by Mr. Wheeler)

Department of State

Instructed Embassy La Paz to follow up closely on charges of involvement of Cuban mission in internal politics of Bolivia, and, at the Embassy's discretion, to point out to Bolivian officials the opportunity for a possible break in relations with Cuba. Embassy La Paz was not able to press for a break when the evidence of Cuban intervention did not prove to be as conclusive as originally reported.

8. Other Special Actions

Department of State

a. Obtained action by the COAS on July 3 on the Lavalle Committee Report transmitting the document to the governments and urging them to implement the specific and general recommendations contained therein as soon as possible.

b. Through Embassy Managua informed the Nicaraguan Government of the matters which we wanted to have considered during the informal meeting of the Ministers of Security and Interior of the Isthmian countries held in Managua, August 26-28 in preparation for the second formal meeting of the Managua Security Conference countries later this year.

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a. The Agency's press service during the reporting period transmitted 12 articles, commentaries, and backgrounders on its wireless file service to USIA posts throughout Latin America for placement in the local newspapers and the Voice of America Spanish broadcasts to Latin America carried a total of 28 commentaries and features on the subject of Cuban-based subversion in addition to the regular reporting of developments in the hourly newscasts.

b. In response to standing Agency instructions to give special attention to developments related to Cuba-based subversion, USIS posts in Latin America were prompt in reporting incidents and in providing editorial comments from the Latin American press, all of which was used in the Agency's radio and press output.

The main developments treated in the Agency's radio and press coverage included Castro's July 26 speech urging revolutions in Latin America, the discovery of terrorist weapons factories in Guayaquil, the Ecuadorean Vice President's accusation of Cuban responsibility for terrorism, the statement by State Department Press Officer Richard Phillips that "potential subversive agents" from Cuba to the Caribbean area were passing through Gran Cayman, the expulsion of a Bolivian youth leader for receiving funds from Cuba, Castro-trained terrorists in Honduras, and Bolivian protests against meddling by the Cuban Embassy in the miner's strike. A Voice of America roving reporter in Latin America provided several reports on the subversion picture in countries he visited.

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three pamphlets during the period based on Castro's report of his visit to the Soviet Union (showing that he contradicted himself in some of his extravagant claims of Soviet progress), the losses suffered by Cuban labor under Castro, and the fate of political prisoners in Cuba. When completed, these pamphlets will be reproduced and distributed in quantity throughout the area.

GROUP 1
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declassification

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ANNEX A

CIA Intelligence Annex

1. Travel to and from Cuba

Brazil

Chartered Cubana Airlines flights between Cuba and Brazil have become a major means of transporting non-Cuban Latin Americans to and from Cuba. The five such flights since late July have carried nearly 400 non-Cubans.

The first of the recent series -- on 25 July -- brought 71 Latin American passengers to Havana for the 26 July celebrations. The other four flights -- on 15, 22, 28 and 29 August -- transported over 200 Latin Americans to Brazil from Havana. Some of the aircraft involved returned to Cuba with smaller numbers of passengers. Many of the 200 Latin American passengers had been delegates to the 26 July ceremonies, but others had apparently been in Cuba for longer periods and some had probably received training there. Of the passengers on these four flights to Brazil, 75 were natives of Caribbean area countries. Their circuitous travel through Brazil was evidently designed to help conceal the fact that they had been in Cuba.

Costa Rica

Two Costa Ricans were among the passengers on a chartered Cubana plane which was turned back to Havana at Grand Cayman on 11 July 1963. One was Luz Marina Hernandez Salazar, the only Costa Rican woman known to have been sent to Cuba for training as a guerrilla warfare instructor. She had been in Cuba since September 1962. The other Costa Rican passenger was Carlos Guillen, former head of the Costa Rican Society of Friends of the Cuban Revolution, who had been in Cuba since November 1962.

Ecuador

The CIA Station in Quito reports that the military junta, which assumed power in Ecuador on 11 July, can be expected

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to follow the guidance of the Embassy and the Station in controlling travel to and from Cuba and the Soviet bloc. The activities of Cuban subversives in Ecuador, at least for the present, have been greatly inhibited by the mass arrests of Communists and pro-Cubans and by the outlawing of the Communist Party by the junta.

Honduras

It is reported that the Honduran Communist Party has issued orders to its members not to attempt to travel to Cuba at the present time. This action is apparently the result of the increasing vigilance of the Honduran government and the greater implementation of stricter travel controls.

2. Movement of Cuban Propaganda

Guatemala

According to an unconfirmed report received in July, a Bureau of Information of the Communist Party of Guatemala is being formed in collaboration with Prensa Latina and is to be managed clandestinely. It expects to receive news by shortwave radio from Cuba and print bulletins for distribution by radio stations. This may indicate a pattern by which Prensa Latina will attempt to distribute on a more clandestine basis in other areas in Latin America.

Honduras

It was reliably reported that in mid-July 1963, a small coastal freighter landed 14 large boxes of Communist propaganda on the northern coast of Honduras, the boxes having been transferred at sea from a larger vessel.

3. Movement of Guerrillas and Arms

Argentina

Extremist members of the Peronist Party, apparently under the leadership of such figures as Hector Villalon and John William Cooke, are apparently receiving encouragement and promises of large sums of money from Cuba in support of their efforts to train and organize subversive groups in Argentina.

Villalon has stated that his plan calls for expanding and accellerating subversive activities in Argentine culminating in a complete take over within two years. There is no indication that Peron himself has agreed to this plan. It has been reported that leaders of the Communist Party of Argentina have been greatly annoyed by the tendency of the Castro regime to support the revolutionary Peronists without having consulted the Communist Party of Argentina.

It is reported that the so-called Army of National Liberation (ANL) of Argentina, which is a relatively small Castroist organization directed from Cuba by John William Cooke, has in recent weeks been negotiating for the purchase of arms and has been offered submachine guns, bazookas and other weapons by two or three private suppliers. It was reported, however, that the ANL was having difficulty getting enough dollars from Cuba to make significant purchases possible.

Bolivia

The Bolivian Ministry of Foreign Relations on 23 August protested formally to the Cuban Chargé d'Affaires in La Paz against the Cuban Embassy support to the miners during the recent crisis. Subsequently, however, Foreign Minister Fellman informed the Cuban Chargé that he need not fear that the Government of Bolivia would break diplomatic relations with Cuba. There has, in fact, been no hard information linking the Cuban Embassy with the present mining crisis in spite of some unconfirmed reports of Cuban support.

Brazil

Cuban Ambassador to Brazil, Raul Roa Kouri, is reported to have attempted to encourage peasant league leader Francisco Juliao to revitalize the leagues in northern Brazil. According to some reports efforts are being made to unify the leadership and bring dissident elements under the general direction of Juliao. Other reports indicate that, although the Cuban Embassy is providing guidance and possibly financial support to the movement, it had not yet resolved the internal dissension in the leagues.

Colombia

Colombia

From Colombia reports have been received of increasing Cuban assistance, primarily in the form of training courses by instructors who have been trained in Cuba, to the Worker-Student-Peasant Movement (MOEC). A small guerrilla band encountered by the Colombian army in July 1963 was broken up when five members of the band were killed and two others captured. A small quantity of arms and a considerable amount of books and pamphlets on revolutionary warfare, photographs of Fidel Castro, Camilo Cienfuegos and Mao Tse-tung, and bulletins of the MOEC were found at the camp site. Recent reports have indicated an increase in the terrorist efforts of the MOEC and increased promises of assistance from Che Guevara with regard to the training of additional MOEC members.

Costa Rica

In mid-July an increased number of guerrillas were reportedly being trained in Costa Rica by Adolfo Garcia Barberena, well-known Nicaraguan revolutionary leader and member of the FLN (National Liberation Front -- a Communist-dominated, Cuban-supported, anti-Nicaragua revolutionary group). In early August, Alberto Serrato, leader of the FLN in Costa Rica, left with a group of Nicaraguans for the Costa Rican-Nicaraguan border. The purchase of arms and supplies and the recruitment of Nicaraguans for a movement against Nicaragua are also reportedly underway in Costa Rica.

Hector Bogantes Zamora, Costa Rican agitator, left San Jose in mid-August for the Nicaraguan border to supervise the passage of Nicaraguan guerrillas from Costa Rica into Nicaragua. Bogantes, who recently returned from attending the May Day celebrations in Cuba, was assigned this responsibility by the Costa Rican Communist Party.

Honduras

The Honduran armed forces began to move against a group of pro-Castro guerrillas operating against the Nicaraguan Government and active in the vicinity of the Nicaraguan-Honduran border. The Nicaraguan National Guard has been conducting operations on its side of the border against the insurgents since July. The dense jungle and difficult terrain, however, will impede the efforts of both forces to eliminate the guerrillas.

Information on the guerrilla force is scanty and conflicting. It is apparently composed of members of the National Liberation Front (FLN), a Communist-dominated and Cuban-supported revolutionary organization active primarily in Honduras and Nicaragua since the fall of 1962. The strength of the force is not known.

Nicaragua

A captured guerrilla of the FLN (National Liberation Front - a Communist-dominated, Cuban-supported, anti-Nicaraguan group) confessed that he was a member of a group of 46 who entered Nicaragua from Honduras on 22 July. He said that their mission was to establish a base camp in the Isabella mountains, Department of Jinotega, in order to indoctrinate the peasants and to train them in guerrilla tactics. He admitted that he had received six months' guerrilla warfare training in Cuba and that other FLN leaders had received similar training. He also said that the FLN training camp in Honduras was near El Lagarto, on the Patuca River.

4. Transfer of Funds

British Guiana

In British Guiana, Guiana Import-Export Corporation (Gimpex) received a one million dollar advance payment deposited by the Cuban Alimpex Corporation for goods to be delivered to Cuba in the future. Gimpex has, in turn, loaned this money to the Government of British Guiana. Cheddi Jagan's People's Progressive Party is the major stockholder in Gimpex. Mohammed Kassim, Manager of Gimpex, has indicated that Gimpex will be able to secure additional loans from Cuba in amounts sufficient to tide the Jagan government over any foreseeable crisis. It was also reported that Gimpex plans to buy aircraft, spare parts and other machinery in the United States for reshipment to Cuba.

General

Reports continue to be received from many places indicating that the suitcase full of currency is still one of the most common methods used by the Cubans for transmitting funds for use in supporting subversive activities throughout the hemisphere. Instances where such funds have been confiscated by the police have occurred recently in El Salvador, Panama and Ecuador.

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SECRET

July 18, 1963

MEMORANDUM NO. 53 FOR GENERAL EARLE G. WHEELER (JCS)
CAPTAIN E. R. ZUMWALT, JR., USN (OSD)
MAJOR GENERAL J. D. ALGER, USA
REAR ADMIRAL W. WENDT, USN
MAJOR GENERAL J. W. CARPENTER, III, USAF
BRIGADIER GENERAL H. M. ELWOOD, USMC

SUBJECT: Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs: Report on Status of Implementation of Actions Designed to Counter Subversion (U)

References: a. SecArmy memo, subj: ICCCA: Movement of Subversives and Subversive Trainees, dated 15 Mar 63.
b. Spec Asst to SecArmy memo, subj: ICCOCA: Report on the Status of Implementation of Actions Approved by The President, dated 20 Mar 63.
c. Spec Asst to Sec Army memo, subj: ICCOCA: Report on the Status of Actions Approved by the President, dated 29 Apr 63.
d. Spec Asst to SecArmy memo, subj: ICCOCA: Report on Status of Implementation of Actions Designed to Counter Subversion, 27 Jun 63.

Attached herewith is a final draft of the Report to the President of the Subcommittee on Cuban Subversion on Progress Made During the April-June Period in Curbing Cuban Subversion in Latin America.

It is requested that comments, if any, be provided this office by 1200 hours, 22 July 1963. The Department of Defense portion of subject report is based on submissions furnished in response to reference d.

OSA, ASG Control No. 1673 Q

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DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

Future Subcommittee Progress Reports will be prepared on a monthly basis for the previous month's activities and will follow the format utilized in the attached draft. It is requested that appropriate points of contact provide this office (Room 2E-614) by 1600 hours on 1 August 1963 and each month thereafter, a report, in duplicate, on the status of those actions approved by the President and assigned to their respective organizations. Additionally, this report should include any other actions taken to counter Castro subversion.

Signed
Joseph A. Califano, Jr.

Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
General Counsel

Attachment
As Stated

cc: Mr. Yarmolinsky (OSD)

Mr. Califano
Lt Col Haig
ASG

SECRET

REPORT OF SUB-COMMITTEE ON CUBAN SUBVERSION
ON PROGRESS MADE DURING APRIL-JUNE PERIOD
IN CURBING CUBAN SUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA

SECRET

1. <u>The Department of State:</u>

A. Participated in the preparations for and the holding of the Managua meeting on subversion, which was held April 3-4.

B. Headed an inter-departmental team which visited the Isthmian countries to encourage implementation of the recommendations for curbing subversion which were agreed on at the Managua meeting.

C. Prepared a report on the inter-departmental team's suvery of the Central American countries, containing recommendations for further action in this field, and advised affected U. S. agencies and foreign service posts of the guidelines for operation of the military alerting system.

D. Worked in the OAS in drafting a report containing practical recommendations to counteract Castro/communist subversion in the fields of the movement of travel, propaganda and funds, and prepared the ground for a COAS decision to transmit the report to member Governments urging them to implement the recommendations contained therein.

E. Drew official and public attention in Latin American countries to the capture of Peruvians who were returning from Habana by an overland route through Bolivia, and urged the Peruvian Government to make details of this case known to the OAS.

F. Helped publicize the capture of an Ecuadoran subversive who was returning to Ecuador from Cuba by way of Prague with $25,000 in cash on his person, and requested the Ecuadoran Government to make an official report of this matter to the OAS.

G. Sent a U.S. Consul to Gran Cayman to investigate Cuban flights to that island, and secured the cooperation of the Costa Rican Government in preventing the use of LACSA aircraft to transport subversives to San Jose off-landed in Gran Cayman.

H. Approached the British Government various times to seek its cooperation in preventing the use of Gran

Cayman and its other Caribbean possessions as traffic refueling or transit stops for planes flying to and from Cuba.

I. Continued pressure on the Dutch Government and KLM airline officials not to resume KLM flights to Cuba, thus limiting the access to Cuba by Free World airlines.

J. Obtained the cooperation of CMA airline (Mexico) to keep its mail and cargo flights to Cuba on an unscheduled basis and to avoid carrying passengers on the Habana-Mexico City leg of its service.

K. Continued efforts with the Canadian and Mexican Governments to secure their cooperation in preventing Cubans from introducing Russian IL-18's on flights between Habana and their countries.

L. Urged the Brazilian Government not to grant landing rights for Soviet Bloc or Cuban planes servicing Cuba, and continued efforts to keep Brazil from signing a civil air agreement with Cuba.

M. Sought cooperation of various African Governments in preventing the use of African airports as transit points for regular USSR-Cuba air service with TU-114's or as refueling stops for ferrying IL-18's to Cuba.

N. Initiated action to request US-owned and controlled oil companies in the Caribbean and Latin America to refuse bunkers voluntarily to vessels and aircraft in the Cuba trade.

O. Requested the Spanish Government to limit or eliminate service to Cuba by Iberia airlines and Spanish shipping companies.

P. Blocked initiation of an ocean ferry service between Habana and Florida by employing various delaying and obstructing tactics.

Q. Ordered, as of April 1, that all U.S. passports be marked not valid for travel to Cuba to insure that ban on travel to Cuba would be more effectively enforced.

R. Informed the Mexican Government that Americans were not permitted to travel to Cuba without authorization and requested their assistance in preventing U.S. citizens from transiting Mexico en route to Cuba.

S. Instructed posts in Latin America to encourage host governments to take appropriate measures to discourage participation of their nationals in Cuba's May Day celebrations, and to prevent charter flights from their country to Cuba for the celebration.

T. Informed affected governments of the names of their nationals who had returned from Cuba on the Cuban plane which flew the new Cuban Ambassador and his party to Brazil, and suggested that they take this matter up with Brazil. Also called this Cuban action to the attention of the Brazilian Government.

U. Worked through Chilean Government and university circles to block the holding of the Communist-inspired II Latin American Youth Congress scheduled for Santiago, Chile in August 1963.

V. Encouraged the President of Honduras to have his immigration officials request clearance from our Embassy in Tegucigalpa before granting visas to Cubans wishing to enter Honduras from Cuba.

W. Encouraged the Benelux and Italian Governments to maintain visa requirements for Cubans travelling to their countries despite Cuba's having done away with visa requirements for their nationals who visit Cuba.

2. The Department of Defense:

A. Continued surveillance of the area surrounding Cuba at the same rate and with the same emphasis as existed prior to that date. Between 25 April and 23 May 1963 additional sea surveillance was realized between Cuba and Haiti, due to the stationing of the Caribbean Ready Amphibious Squadron at the entrance of the Gulf of Gonaives occasioned by the deterioration of internal conditions in Haiti.

B. Continued the installation of military communications facilities in Latin America. Due to noncommunication difficulties, the multi-channel radio station scheduled for installation at Managua, Nicaragua by 1 July 1963 will be completed on or about 27 July 1963. Entry negotiations have been completed with Honduras, with the military radio facilities installation scheduled for completion on or about 10 October 1963. Negotiations are continuing in Colombia and Ecuador for the installation of military radio facilities.

C. Continued the surveillance of Cuba by U. S. forces, reporting as before, to U. S. commanders, organizations and agencies. Reports of subversive movement, obtained by U.S. surveillance have been made available for immediate transmittal through U. S. military alerting system.

D. Reached agreement with CIA on steps to be taken to prevent duplication of effort in operating a U.S. military alerting system and furnished guidance on this matter to USCINCSO and CINCLANT. After clarification of the role of the U. S. Military Groups by USCINCSO the military alerting system was again placed in operation effective 15 June 1963.

E. Maintained U. S. forces, for the most part from within the Atlantic Command, available to respond to assist in the final interception of suspicious craft in territorial waters, upon the request of the country concerned. Currently, forces are assigned by the United Commander involved to meet the singular problem encountered. In somewhat similar circumstances, U. S. forces of Atlantic Command have responded to this requirement in the cases of the Venezuelan ship ANZOATEGUI and the Italian ship CANNA REGIA.

F. Had the U. S. Coast Guard Mobile Training Team (MTT) report for duty in the Canal Zone on 15 May 1963 to perform as a Small

Craft Inspection and Training Team (SCIATT). Members of the SCIATT accompanied by a representative from the staff of Commander U. S. Naval Forces, Southern Command (COMUSNAVSO) have completed an in-country evaluation of 40-foot Coast Guard Utility Boats (CGUBs) in five Central American countries and a detailed program through mid-November has been prepared for improving the material readiness and handling of the CGUBs provided by MAP. Action is underway to expedite delivery of spare parts required for maintenance of the boats.

COMUSNAVSO has now initiated a request to establish SCIATT billets with permanent personnel for an initial period of three years in order to fully develop the Central American CGUB program. The success of this program would be a major contribution to the Caribbean Surveillance System. U. S. Commander in Chief, Southern Command (USCINCSO) has recommended approval of COMUSNAVSO's request to CNO and action is being coordinated with OSD/ISA, JCS and USCG to obtain approval and appropriate funding for permanent billets.

The 40-foot CGUB permanently assigned to the U. S. Naval Station, Rodman, Canal Zone, for use by the SCIATT has been delivered and is in the process of being activated.

G. Continued efforts to improve the internal security of Latin American armies through the provision of Intelligence Advisors. Presently there are such advisors assigned to 14 Latin countries, emphasizing counterintelligence and counter-subversion.

H. Continued, through its intelligence agencies, work on studies concerning Castro/Communist subversion directed against Latin America.

I. Increased to 12 the number of Latin American countries in which there are intelligence exchange arrangements between U. S. and local military services.

3. The Central Intelligence Agency:

A. Completed efforts to improve U.S. government communications in Latin America by the installation of the remaining two commercial leased circuits into Guatemala City and Managua, and the stationing on a permanent basis of 35 CIA radio operators in Latin America in replacement of temporary duty personnel. In November 1962, CIA's active radio facilities in 20 Latin American capitals were augmented with on-line cryptographic facilities and temporary personnel to handle the bulk of all U.S. government communications in the area. These facilities, known as Joint Communications Centers, are now being operated by CIA on a 24-hour basis, as a service to all U.S. government agencies. Latin American traffic handled by the CIA base radio station near Washington has increased from 3,000,000 groups handled in October 1962 to 15,000,000 groups handled in March 1963.

B. Increased its efforts designed to control the movement of persons, arms and propaganda materials to and from Cuba. A summary of actions by country follows:

1. Argentina - Station, in conjunction with the Embassy, has continued to press the Argentine government to enact effective travel control legislation and to adopt measures recommended by the Special Consultative Committee on Security of the OAS. Information on Argentines travelling to Cuba is being furnished to the Argentine government by the station. Several potential travellers to Cuba have been spotted and are being assessed by the station. Information from three recent returnees from Cuba is being obtained through debriefings. Station reports that because of increased Mexican controls, all truly clandestine travel to Cuba from Argentina is now via Prague. The Argentine Security Service has informed the station that mail censorship and customs controls at the docks and airports are 95% effective in preventing the entrance of Cuban propaganda through these channels. Local dissemination of propaganda is regulated by an Argentine inter-agency committee, which reviews any new propaganda items and takes action to stop dissemination of any item judged to be pro-Cuban or pro-Communist. During May the Argentine government issued a new decree which restricts Communist activities within Argentina. The station has continued to press the Security Service to urge regulation of travel to Cuba, but the adoption of such measures has been delayed pending government receipt on an official basis of the OAS recommendations. Through several assets the station is working on leads which it is hoped will reveal the basic sources of illegal arms sales in Argentina.

2. Bolivia - Station has been urging Bolivian government to adopt stricter travel controls, without apparent results so far. Names of travellers known to have returned from Cuba are being furnished to the Bolivian government. Thus far, no action is known to have been taken by the Bolivian government on the strength of such information. Station comments that problem with Bolivia is not in lack of information available to government on Cuban subversion, but in getting Bolivia to do something about it. The station has also furnished considerable information, including some surreptitiously acquired documents, to the Ambassador for his use in urging Bolivian government action against Cuba. Considerable information is also being obtained through the interrogation of Peruvian guerrillas captured attempting to cross into Peru early in June.

3. Brazil - Information on Brazilians who have received subversive training in Cuba has been made available to the National Security Council through CIA liaison with the NSC's Security Service. While the Brazilians have stated that the information is "of interest," there is no firm indication to date that they have the capability or desire to really follow up on the information furnished.

An asset of the CIA station in Rio is in a position to harass and delay Cuba-bound travellers in those instances where the station is able to tip him off regarding their destination. He can also harass returnees when informed in advance. The station is taking steps to get appropriate information to him promptly. The station has indicated that in spite of its increased efforts, there are no indications of any basic change in the Brazilian attitude toward Cuba, and it is unlikely that the Brazilian government will take adequate steps to combat Cuban subversion.

4. Chile - Chilean internal security authorities, at urging of station, are trying to impede and harass travellers to and from Cuba. Government is now requiring passport applicants to state destination, and passports must be turned in after travel. The Foreign Minister has stated much progress is being made, with cooperation of the Mexican government, and that travel of Chileans to Cuba has been dramatically reduced in recent weeks. Station and Embassy are continuing pressure on Cuban government in this regard. Names of travellers to Cuba are being passed to the Ambassador, who furnishes them to President Alessandri (who has asked that this collaboration be kept secret). Information from CIA unilateral operations

against Cuban Embassy is being used by a newly created Chilean surveillance team in checking out purpose of travel projected and in following up on returnees from Cuba. The station has an agent in daily contact with leaders of the extreme militant left and is exploring the possibilities of sending three station assets to Cuba for training and intelligence missions. A Cuban First Secretary was declared persona non grata during April for using false identity documents, and the Cuban charge d'affaires was subsequently recalled by his own government. Two new sources have recently been recruited by the station who are in a position to furnish valuable information concerning not only certain aspects of the situation within Cuba, but details concerning travel to and from Cuba by both legal and illegal means. The station is now in the process of debriefing an asset who recently returned to Santiago after spending one month in Cuba as a trainee. Efforts are being made to have other station assets included in future training programs.

5. Colombia - Chief of Customs has indicated to station his willingness to institute an improved travel control system. Station believes it has identified a courier operating between Colombia and Cuba and has mounted an operation to uncover his Colombian contacts. One station asset is now in Cuba attending guerrilla warfare training, another is being debriefed after his recent return from Cuba, and a third expects to depart soon for two months training in Cuba. The station is continuing to develop leads provided by one recent returnee, and thus far this investigation has involved members of both the Colombian Congress and the Bogota municipal government. A Colombian Civic Action Group, composed of influential local businessmen, which is subsidized and directed by the station, has established an anti-Castro propaganda unit. This group is actively collecting evidence of Cuban subversion in Colombia to support its propaganda campaign.

6. Costa Rica - Local authorities appear to be inclined to cooperate in a program of harassing travellers to Cuba. A station asset in the Costa Rican Security Service has been confiscating the passports of persons returning from Cuba and has cooperated in other ways. One station asset is expected to travel to Cuba soon for training. The "Kennedy Groups," which were organized at the time of the President's visit to Costa Rica, are being encouraged to collect information of all sorts concerning Cuban subversive activities, and to participate in propaganda activities aimed at Cuban subversion. Other station propaganda assets have kept up a

steady campaign against Cuban activities, and the Costa Rican Security Service, at the urging of the CIA station, has destroyed tons of propaganda brought into the country from Cuba.

7. Dominican Republic - Efforts to get Juan Bosch to take active steps against Communists and travellers to and from Cuba have been fruitless to date, as have been efforts to establish a new and effective internal security organization in the Dominican Republic. Bosch appears to have lost his previously stated enthusiasm for such a service, but efforts to persuade him to approve a proposed budget for the service are continuing.

8. Ecuador - Station reports that, largely as a result of both overt and covert propaganda activities of U.S. agencies in Ecuador, the public awareness of Cuban subversion has changed from apathy to genuine concern. The government, however, is no more inclined to take action than before. The National Director of Immigration has stated that he personally would like to do whatever he can to stop travel to Cuba, which he realizes is for subversive purposes, but present laws do not permit him to impede travel via third countries. He is exploring possibilities of reprisals against citizens who return from Cuba. He has checked a list of names and passport numbers obtained by CIA from airline manifests in Mexico, and reports that not one name or passport number corresponds with official Ecuadoran records, indicating the possibility of fabrication of passports by Cuba.

A recent Ecuadoran returnee from Cuba, recruited by the station, lost his hand in testing a homemade bomb made in accordance with instructions received in Cuba. He made a public statement and wide publicity was arranged by the station and USIS. Plans are to keep this incident alive as proof of revolutionary training given in Cuba for terrorist activity in Ecuador.

The station chief has accompanied the American Ambassador on visits to the Ecuadoran Ministers of Defense and Government to stress the threat of Cuban backed subversion.

Approximately 7,000 pounds of Communist propaganda are being destroyed monthly as a result of a unilateral operation of the CIA Base in Guayaquil.

There have been at least two recent cases of Ecuadoran returnees from Cuba being arrested upon their arrival, one of them having been found in possession of a large sum of U.S. dollars, and another allegedly having a plan of revolutionary action found on his person. In both cases the Ecuadoran authorities had been informed of the pending arrivals of these individuals by the CIA station.

9. El Salvador - The station has called to the attention of the Chief of the Salvadoran Security Service the fact that the stamping of passports "not valid for travel to Cuba" is not being done on a regular basis, and received assurance that the Foreign Office and Immigration Police would be reminded of their obligation to do this. The station is embarking on an expanded program of assistance to Department 2 of the Ministry of Defense, which is in fact the Salvadoran Clandestine Internal Security Service. That service has indicated a willingness and desire to combat Cuban subversion, but so far it has lacked both know-how and equipment to do so.

10. Guatemala - The CIA station in Guatemala City has found its efforts in this field hampered considerably by the apathy and disorganization of the Guatemalan government. Early this year the only effective Internal Security Service in Guatemala was disbanded by President Ydigoras, and no adequate organization has been established since the Peralta government came into power. Through unilateral assets the station has been able to keep itself reasonably well informed concerning guerrilla activities and travel to and from Cuba. However, it has been unable to bring about any effective counter Cuban activity on the part of the Guatemalan government.

11. Jamaica - New and more stringent regulations concerning travel to Cuba were adopted by the Jamaican government during May, partially as a result of the urging of the CIA station. The Jamaican Internal Security authorities have shown a willingness to do everything they can to control such travel, and have indicated a high degree of cooperation with the CIA station.

12. Haiti - Because of the continued political crisis in Haiti, the CIA station activities there with regard to Cuban activities have been severely limited and have consisted primarily of checks made by unilateral station

assets who have reported from Cape Haitien, Port de Paix and La Gonave and La Tortue Islands that they were unable to uncover any evidence of travel to or from Cuba. No cooperation between the station and Haitian authorities can be expected under the present political circumstances.

13. Honduras - The CIA station in Tegucigalpa has persistently prodded security elements of the Honduran government in an effort to persuade that government to undertake the actions agreed to at Managua. The government has now begun stamping most new passports "invalid for travel to Cuba." However, revalidated passports are not being so stamped. Station assets have succeeded in publicizing some Cuban subversive activities, including the return of eight leftist labor leaders from a trip to Cuba and the sabotage of a fishing vessel which was being used by anti-Castro Cuban exiles to surveil the northern coast of Honduras. Several alleged Cuban agents are now being held in jail pending legal proceedings against them.

14. Mexico - A CIA source states the Cuban Embassy has continued to issue visas on pieces of paper separate from the passport, but the government's practice of stamping all passports to show travel to or from Cuba has largely nullified this effort by travellers to avoid the stigma of travel to Cuba. All Cubans arriving in Mexico, whether in transit or otherwise must have Mexican visas. This is not true of other nationalities, who need no visa if in transit. The government continues to confiscate propaganda material from Cuba sporadically at the airport. The government recently refused visas to five Cuban doctors who wished to attend a Urology Congress in Mexico. Several station assets have recently travelled to Cuba for intelligence purposes. Through unilateral penetrations of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City, the CIA station continues to acquire information on types of Cuban visas granted to travellers, as well as some advance travel data.

15. Panama - At the urging of station, the Guardia Nacional has been ordered to increase its vigilance concerning returnees from Cuba and to prevent them from establishing an effective organization. Several recent returnees from Cuba are being debriefed regarding their training and contacts, and several CIA assets are

expecting to leave for Cuba in the near future for training. CIA has increased its personnel assigned to travel control functions at the Panama City airport, now permitting a three-man detail for each eight-hour shift. Station is continuing its pressure on Panamanian officials to tighten travel controls.

16. Nicaragua - The Nicaraguan Security Services with whom the CIA station is in liaison have been cooperative in their efforts to take suitable action based on the Managua resolutions. Cuban activity in Nicaragua appears to be at a minimum, and the government has the will and ability to control it.

17. Peru - Through the cooperation of a Peruvian intelligence organization, CIA officers have been able to participate in the interrogation of several Cuba-trained guerrillas who were recently captured when they attempted to enter Peru near Puerto Maldonado. The interrogation should provide additional data on guerrilla training, Soviet activities in Cuba, and particularly on Cuban support to guerrilla activities in Peru. Further information has been obtained through a unilateral asset of the station who is active in guerrilla activities of the MIR. An investigation of small arms manufacture in a machine shop in Lima is underway at the urging of the station. The station has furnished additional technical equipment to the Peruvian Naval Intelligence Service to increase its capability to intercept clandestine radio communications from Cuba, and partly as a result of CIA station urging, that organization has been able to obtain 12 investigators assigned by another Peruvian internal security service to assist in the investigation of subversive activities in the port areas of Peru. A Communist penetration agent, who is being run jointly by the Peruvian Internal Security Service and the CIA station, has been offered an opportunity to go to Cuba for training. Considerable information concerning the Peruvian MIR plans for financing the acquisition of arms, communications equipment and other information concerning MIR guerrilla activities has been acquired through a unilateral asset of the station.

18. Uruguay - Station has made arrangements with local service to pigeonhole or "lose" applications for good conduct certificates - which are needed to secure passports, and must be renewed every six months - in cases where information from the CIA station or from the Uruguayans'

own sources indicated intention of travelling to Cuba. Pertinent information from CIA unilateral operations is being passed regularly to cooperating Uruguayan officials. Station has a further check in that the Mexican Ambassador to Uruguay is now checking all applicants for Mexican visas with the station. On the basis of information furnished to him, he held up visa applications of Uruguayan Communist Labor delegates who planned to attend May Day celebrations in Havana. Creation of this bottleneck may force some travellers to abandon the Mexican route to Cuba and turn to the longer and far more expensive route via Prague. Information on past travel to Cuba by Uruguayans, furnished by the station, was included in a study of Cuban subversion prepared by Uruguayan Military Intelligence Service for the National Council of Government.

19. Venezuela - Travel information from the Caracas Airport is now being received on a daily basis by the CIA station. Venezuelan internal security officials have indicated a strong disposition to take all possible steps to repress Cuban subversive activities. The station has been passing pertinent information from unilateral sources to appropriate Venezuelan officials and, in some instances, action has been taken in accordance with the stations's request. Four Venezuelan officials have been trained in covert mail intercept techniques by a CIA technician and one additional Venezuelan security official is now undergoing training in the United States in the field of police administration, clandestine operations and audio surveillance. Venezuelan student teams, operating under the control of the CIA station, are intensifying their efforts to spot and recruit members of extremist youth groups who are likely to be sent to Cuba for training purposes.

4. The U.S. Information Agency:

A. Issued a detailed information policy guidance to all its Washington media divisions on March 28 setting forth the basic themes to be followed and types of materials to be developed in exposing Castro-Communist subversive activities in the hemisphere. This was followed on April 3 by a circular instruction (USIA CA-2819) to all USIS field posts in Latin America urging each to stimulate local press and radio attention to evidence of Cuban-based subversion and to report promptly local developments, official comment, and editorials, for cross-play to other countries.

B. Broadcast over Voice of America a total of 26 features and commentaries on the subject of Cuban-based subversion in its Spanish-language transmissions to Latin America during the three month period. This was in addition to regular reporting of developments on the subject in the Voice's hourly newscasts. Prominent attention was given to the Managua Ministers Meeting, the OAS reports of the Special Consultative Committee on Security and the Lavalle Committee, the capture in Bolivia and Peru of Cuban-trained guerrillas, the discovery of a subversive plot in Ecuador, and terrorism and counter-measures in Venezuela. Special features included editorial round-ups from the Latin American press on subversion, a dramatization of an incident in Ecuador, a chronology of subversive acts involving Cuban diplomats, and a history of subversion. In the usual Voice of America practice, these features and commentaries were sent to USIS field posts in tape recordings after short-wave broadcast for placement on the hundreds of local medium-wave stations in the area.

C. Transmitted by teletype through its press service a total of 33 articles on Cuban-based subversion during the three-month period to USIS posts throughout Latin America for placement in the local press. These included news stories, commentaries, and backgrounders on essentially the same developments which were treated by the Voice of America. The Agency's Information Officers in each country were provided with copies of the OAS reports for use in their personal contacts with press and radio personnel. A pamphlet based on the letters from the Guatemalan ex-communist leader Carlos Manuel Pellecer to Castro and Khrushchev in which he revealed communist subversive tactics was developed by the Agency's publications center in Mexico for reproduction and distribution throughout the area. Work was completed also on a cartoon book, The Despoilers, the story of two young Cubans who tour the communist bloc encountering oppression and food shortages and return home to find the same conditions developing in their own country. The cartoon book is being distributed in over a million copies throughout Latin America.

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JFK Review

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25 June 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: (See distribution below)

SUBJECT : Report On The Cold War Use of Radio Broadcasting by CIA

1. We have made a complete survey of the use of radio broadcasting in the cold war mission of CIA. The essential parts of the report and recommendations are contained in the attached memorandum dated 15 May 1953 and entitled "Report On the Cold War Use of Radio Broadcasting by CIA". (Operational information and other sensitive matter contained in the original, but deleted from the attached, will be separately supplied where appropriate to the interested area divisions.)

2. The policy outlined in the attached memorandum has been approved by the Deputy Director for Plans, who has directed the following actions:

a. Undertake, in collaboration with each area division, a country by country analysis of all indigenous broadcasting and television systems for the purpose of devising plans for their penetration, where feasible, or an explanation where it appears not to be feasible.

b. Develop and submit, in collaboration with the appropriate personnel and training offices, a plan for the recruitment and training of officers qualified for covert broadcasting operations.

c. Explore with the State Department the possibilities of a joint undertaking to exploit fully, in the interest of efficiency and economy, material derived from escapee interrogations and other intelligence sources, covert as well as overt, to support all U.S. propaganda efforts.

d. Develop and recommend, in collaboration with area divisions, an improved method for the issuance and dissemination of policy guidance to the field.

e. Prepare and submit, in collaboration with General McClelland, a project to produce broadcasting devices capable of electronic intrusion into Communist broadcasts; to develop special techniques for their use; and to continue research and development of other unconventional methods of broadcasting suitable to our mission.

3. Chief of Operations,

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3. Chief of Operations, DD/P, has authorized the circulation of the attached material with the request that you cooperate in the carrying out of the DD/P's directive. Particular attention is called to item 2. a. above.

4. Mr. C. Lloyd Egner, assisted by Mr. Stanley P. Richardson, have been assigned the responsibility for staff coordination of these matters on behalf of CPP and will be available to you for assistance in planning and supporting broadcasting operations.

/s/ C. Tracy Barnes

C. TRACY BARNES
Chief
Political and Psychological
Warfare

Attachment
As stated above

Distribution
DD/P - 1
ADCO - 1
Chiefs, All Areas - 1 ea.
Chiefs, Senior Staffs - 1 ea.
C/TS - 1
PP/C/OPS - 1
PP/CPY - 1
PP/C/PAD - 1
PP/Mr. Egner - 2
RI - 1

15 May 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

SUBJECT : Report On The Cold War Use of Radio Broadcasting by CIA

Attached hereto is our report on CIA radio broadcasting as a cold war weapon. It is grouped into the following sections:

1. Section 1, Page 1, deals with RADIO AS A MEDIUM IN THE COLD WAR. It shows in the main that the countries having the most to fear from Communism are doing the least to counter its radio propaganda.

2. Section 2, Page 2, deals with CAPABILITIES. It embraces a discussion of the techniques available to CIA.

3. Section 3, Page 3, discusses broad TARGETS and appraises our current and planned activities against them.

4. Section 4, Page 4, deals with the principal PROBLEMS peculiar to covertly directed broadcasting, and their solution.

5. Section 5, Page 10, contains RECOMMENDATIONS for a body of principles to govern over-all CIA policy in its present and future activities in this field.

(For a detailed statement of present CIA radio broadcasting assets, reference is made to CPY to CPP memorandum of 25 February 1953, entitled "Preliminary Survey of Radio Broadcasting Media", TS 86889.)

(The original "Report On The Cold War Use of Radio Broadcasting By CIA," from which this document is excerpted, was dated 15 May 1953, TS 88465.)

(The data on broadcasting hours by countries was obtained from FBID and VOA, that on available receivers from OSI/ORR and VOA, and that on Soviet jamming transmitters from ONE.)

/s/ C. Lloyd Egner

C. LLOYD EGNER

Attachment, as stated.

PP/CLE:ha

15 May 1953

REPORT ON THE COLD WAR USE OF RADIO BROADCASTING BY CIA

1. Radio As a Medium in the Cold War

a. The USSR and its satellites, including China, broadcast to countries outside the Orbit 1,395 hours per week of aggressive psychological warfare.

b. The free world responds with 1,015 hours per week.

c. This gives the enemy a numerical advantage of approximately seven to five. In reality, the Communist advantage is much greater because of their successful interference with free world broadcasts to the Orbit through jamming and the penalties they impose on their own peoples for listening to foreign broadcasts. It is estimated that these measures reduce the effectiveness of free world broadcasts to the Orbit by as much, if not more than, 50 percent. An illustration is that the Communists devote an estimated 900 transmitters to the jamming of free world broadcasts. There is no jamming of Orbit broadcasts to the Western world, nor any restrictions on listening to them.

d. Only the English speaking world holds its own numerically in the over-all radio war with the Orbit. VOA, BBC and Canada together broadcast 238 hours per week against the Orbit; whereas the Orbit countries combined direct 222 hours per week to English language audiences in North America, the United Kingdom, and the Pacific area.

e. In the rest of the world, the balance is drastically in favor of the Communists. They broadcast 1, 173 jam-free hours to all other countries around the world in multiple languages, compared with a mere 264 hours broadcast to all Orbit countries by non-English speaking nations of the free world.

f. Of the total of 1,015 broadcast hours beamed by all the free world to the Orbit, CIA, through TPTONIC and other quasi-clandestine stations, broadcasts 513 hours, or more than half, in the name of exiles from Communist dominated areas.

g. The greatest disparity in effort is most noticeable in Western Europe. France, which receives 89 hours of broadcasts per week from the Orbit as a whole, responds with only 35 to the Orbit. Italy receives 97 hours from the Orbit but broadcasts only 44 to it, Spain 94 to 12, Greece 89 to 9, Turkey 34 to 7. Even relatively aggressive Yugoslavia receives 194 broadcast hours from the Orbit against its output to the Orbit of only 89 hours.

h. The one-sided

h. The one-sided contest is even more marked in a comparison of the broadcast output of the USSR alone, without the satellites, against Europe. It subjects Spain, Greece and Italy together, for instance, to 140 hours of broadcasts per week. The combined broadcasts of these three countries to the USSR, however, number only 19 hours per week. France and Turkey who, together, receive 64 hours per week from the USSR, make no broadcasts at all to the USSR.

i. Appendix I gives a compilation by country or area of the international broadcasts to and from USSR and the satellites. It shows that the Communists are outslugging the free world, and that Western Europe, in particular, is doing far less than it should in the radio propaganda battle with the Orbit.

2. <u>Capabilities</u>

Several techniques are available to CIA for the use of radio broadcasting in its covert psychological warfare mission.

a. Overt international broadcasting on fixed frequencies under cover of covertly controlled emigre groups. This technique normally would be calculated to reach wide audiences by means of high power and the use of multiple frequencies; but it invites heavy jamming, is costly and presents security, control and political problems in the acquisition and maintenance of suitable bases and frequency allocations.

* * * * * * *

b. Quasi-clandestine broadcasts in the name of notional or "captive" resistance movements using relatively low power and employing a frequency switching technique to evade jamming. This technique presents more manageable security and control problems, delivers a signal in spite of jamming and costs less than high power, but it places a burden on listeners and presents special problems in avoiding interference with broadcasts of friendly countries.

* * * * * * *

c. Subsidization of overt nonpolitical, but anti-Communist, religious broadcasts. * * *

d. Through covert penetration and/or support, the manipulation of free world domestic broadcasting systems for the purpose (1) strengthening their anti-Communist broadcasts to the Orbit and/or (2) influencing them to more aggressive anti-Communist, pro-Western attitudes in their domestic services.

This technique lends itself naturally to clandestine operations. It requires a minimum of U.S. personnel, presents no

problems concerning

problems concerning bases and management, and requires relatively small investments and expense. It would be advantageous beyond the immediate PP field. In such a post an agent could observe communist infiltration, spot forthcoming political changes by observing changes in government propaganda directives, recruit agents with reliable cover for other covert undertakings and cooperate in planning for denial of the facilities to an enemy in the event of hostilities.

We believe it should be the agency's established policy to carry out such penetrations wherever opportunities offer or can be created. A glance at the world map is sufficient to indicate the immensity of this field of potentialities, both as concerns the countries on the peripheries of the USSR and Communist China in Europe, the Near East and Far East; and in Latin America as well. We propose that an immediate start be made, in cooperation with Area Divisions, on a country-by-country survey of possibilities in this area and that action be taken to achieve penetration wherever this study indicates it may be feasible.

* * * * * * * * * *

e. Use of purchased or free time through covert channels on existing radio systems in friendly countries. * * *

f. Electronic penetration of enemy broadcasts. [Example--the "Ghost" Voice operations of World War II.] This technique is discussed in para 5.c.(6) below.

g. To exploit the amateur ["ham"] broadcasters, large numbers of whom exist in Russia. * * * A project is being drafted to explore the possibilities of this technique.

h. Broadcasting from airplanes. This has been carried out experimentally in two areas with disappointing results due primarily to operational and equipment limitations which make for limited audience coverage at best. It is, moreover, very costly and also presents special security problems. It is not recommended, except for possible hit-and-run operations. Airborne transmitters might be used on occasion to simulate messages from agents inside the USSR or satellites. This is a deception technique rather than broadcasting but should, we believe, be explored.

3. <u>Targets in order of importance, with estimate of Adequacy of present Projects</u>

a. USSR.--Radio is the only consistent medium for piercing the Soviet iron curtain. It is estimated that there are approximately 4,000,000 receiving sets in the USSR, of which 75 to 80 per cent are believed to be equipped with frequency bands capable of receiving foreign shortwave broadcasts. Virtually all of them readily receive long and medium wave signals. Not all of these receivers are

in the hands of

in the hands of private individuals, however; and the number of those having access to shortwave receivers is estimated to be constantly decreasing due to Soviet efforts to increase group listening by means of wired networks. Nevertheless, it would appear that there will be a sizeable potential audience for foreign broadcasts in all three wave bands for some time to come. One indication of this is the fact that at present the USSR is broadcasting approximately 900 hours per day over 160 transmitters in 26 or more languages to its own people. Many of these transmissions are to areas and over frequencies which lie within our transmitting capabilities.

Our assets for exploiting this potential audience, including projects still in the planning stage, are far from adequate.

b. Communist China.--Like the USSR, the Communist government of China relies heavily on radio broadcasting for communication with the people. It utilizes more than 50 national and regional stations for this purpose, operating chiefly on medium and long wave but to some extent, also, on shortwave. * * *

* * * * * * * * * * *

c. European Satellites.--The preponderance of CIA broadcasting efforts are centered on this area. * * *

d. The Free World.--Many countries afford opportunities for relatively inexpensive exploitation by covert penetration of indigenous broadcasting systems and use of free or purchased time. * * * (See Para. 2.d.)

4. Problems of Covert Broadcasting

a. Cover

(1) a radio transmitter that can be heard cannot be hidden. Put another way, there are no known methods for concealing from technical monitors the geographical source of broadcasts, although the non-technical listening public can be and often is deceived. Cover for broadcasting operations, therefore, presents a formidable problem. Autonomous emigre organizations, which offer the most credible cover, generate factionalism as well as control, security and management problems. [These difficulties could, however, be minimized by positive agency control through a compartmentalization which separates the cover organization from program and transmitting operations and lays down strict requirements on security, budget control, and high professional standards.] See Chart, Annex II.

(2) Religious broadcasting presents few cover headaches, but is of doubtful propaganda value.

(3) The best cover

(3) The best cover is afforded by covert penetration of friendly systems, (a Western European nation talking back to USSR, etc., as discussed in 2.d. above).

(4) Commercial broadcasting cover presents some possibilities in the free world but none for broadcasting to the Soviet Orbit.

b. Bases

(1) Because governments object to providing bases for aggressive psychological warfare which they do not influence or control, it is difficult to find bases in areas suitable for broadcasting to the Orbit. Furthermore, adequate broadcasting facilities take time to plan, build, and staff and long tenure is therefore important. However, the political climate of a country can change abruptly, with resulting uncertainty as to length of tenure. Munich, for instance, which once furnished an excellent base for a variety of broadcasts targeted to the Orbit, appears to be becoming less and less satisfactory.

Cover and control problems are closely related to this. A base for a secure and competently managed operation should be less difficult to obtain than for a loosely organized one.

(2) Seaborne transmitters offer much in mobility but, antenna limitations restrict their effective power. As in the case of the VOA COURIER, stationary antennas on land are required for maximum effectiveness. Thus, the political problem becomes the same as for land transmitter bases, and costs in investment and maintennance are considerably higher than land based operations. Moreover, the difficulties of providing credible cover for a covert seaborne operation are manifest. While this office will continue to study VOA experience in this field, it sees no prospect of any agency use for it.

(3) The VOA presently controls numerous broadcasting bases and are developing additional bases, in areas of the world suitable for our purposes. The necessary agreements with host countries have already been negotiated; power, housing, transportation and other logistics have been provided. The present management of VOA are sympathetic to sharing these bases with CIA. In addition to the saving in cost, this would furnish us secure areas for transmitters with the minimum of housekeeping problems. If the difficult but not insurmountable problem of cover can be resolved, such locations would be ideal for our purposes.

c. Information Support

(1) To supplement available normal news sources, broadcasting to Orbit countries is dependent for program material

upon intelligence

upon intelligence reports, interrogation of defectors, escapees and exiles, indigenous newspapers and a regular flow of intercepts from enemy broadcasts. These are indispensable to credible, interesting, and timely broadcasts. Despite our vast potential resources and large U.S. expenditures in these fields, the effective "take" is far from adequate, rarely timely, and unnecessarily costly. FBID, VOA, and several others monitor the same foreign broadcasts to extract the same or similar information. Several U.S. agencies interrogate the same exiles for PW information, whereas a single interrogator, trained in PW needs, could supply most, if not all, the requirements not only for all radio but all other PW activities better and faster. A cleared consultant, on behalf of one of our more successful operations, produced on abundance of excellent support information and evaluation data. The same data, properly sterilized and speedily disseminated, could equally serve the VOA and any other covert or overt PW effort targeted to the same area.

This complex problem needs a high level decision by State and CIA and the appointment of a small team of officers experienced in both PW and interrogation work with power to devise an effective and efficient program to exploit our rich resources.

d. <u>To Deliver a Signal That Can Be Heard</u>

(1) Soviet jamming of propaganda broadcasts raises serious questions concerning our ability to deliver a signal that can be heard above the jamming. To be sure, some of our broadcasts get through because they are unable simultaneously to jam broadcasts in all areas nor do they in practice jam a given broadcast transmission at all hours.

For future planning purposes, however, these factors seem clear:

(a) Soviet capabilities for jamming are large and on the increase.

(b) The degree of their jamming seems to be related to their estimate of the harmful effect of the broadcasts on their interests. Hence, the more effective parts of our propaganda are likely to be jammed even though other parts get through.

(c) We have no present capabilities to monitor their jamming if they use--as they probably do in congested areas--low-powered local jammers.

(2) Prudent planning would, therefore, require that any substantial future investments by CIA in radio broadcasting transmitters include provision for all possible techniques to ensure our broadcasts being heard to the maximum in spite of jamming.

(3) What techniques

(3) What techniques are available to meet this requirement?

(a) To deliver a signal of such power as to be heard above the jamming. Here we are at a disadvantage in that a low-powered and inexpensive local jammer is capable of rendering unintelligible a signal of substantially higher power from a distant point. The greater the power of our transmitter the more complicated the installation and the more expensive the investment. And the more difficult becomes the cover and security problems as well as the political considerations involved in base negotiations. Since the enemy is not required to equal our power with his jammers, we would therefore be fighting a losing battle if we attempted to "slug it out" on a power basis only.

(b) Jamming evasion through the device of varying the frequency has so far proven to be an effective means of laying down a signal that can be heard clearly despite jamming. This method requires constant dial changing by the listener and must assume therefore a desire on his part to hear the program sufficient to overcome the annoyance of dial twisting. When used in combination with appropriate programming techniques and the use of two or more frequencies simultaneously this has so far proven to be the most effective means of jamming avoidance.

Such frequency shiftings cannot be accomplished within the legal rules laid down for international broadcasting. These must, therefore, be "black" broadcasts in the sense that they can be credibly denied by our Government as well as the government of the host country. The movement at will through various frequencies produces an annoying interference for the listeners to broadcasters to whom those frequencies are legally assigned. This interference, while fully justified in the case of USSR and satellite assigned frequencies, must be avoided in the case of frequencies assigned to our friends.

Our broadcasts using this technique have so far avoided annoyance to friendly countries by the use of very low power. This limits us to a small part of the total Soviet Orbit target and that only on the periphery. The same techniques can be used with higher power and at greater distances from the target. To avoid interference with friendly nations' broadcasts the base must be located in an area which, with the proper antenna adjustments, permits our signal to "skip" over the territory of friendly countries in its path. An example would be that, given a transmitting base in Saudi Arabia for broadcasts to the USSR, the facility would have to be engineered so that its signal would not interfere with local broadcast reception in Turkey and other friendly countries in between.

(c) The development of unconventional broadcasting

techniques for

techniques for the penetration of enemy domestic radio broadcasting services might well enable us to overcome the handicaps imposed by the jamming of our conventional broadcasts to the Soviet orbit and seize the cold war initiative in the radio sphere. It is a field which has been neglected thus far.

Some possibilities in this area are described in the "Project Troy" report of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Vol. IV, Annex 26) of 1 February, 1951.

Among them is the "intrusion," or "side-band injection," technique which was used successfully by the Russians against Germany during World War II. It would enable us to intrude our own propaganda messages into radio programs being broadcast on enemy home channels. It would enable us in effect to talk to the Soviet, satellite and neutral radio audiences over enemy facilities or compel the enemy to disrupt his own broadcast service in an effort to prevent it. It could also be used in turning Soviet propaganda broadcasts to Western Europe to the advantage of our friends. The Troy report observes as to the technique itself:

"This would be an effective and annoying technique which would be extremely difficult to counter."

Utilization of this technique appears to be within our capabilities at the moment. It has been field tested and is ready for use as soon as the necessary technical adaptations can be made to conventional transmitters. The time and cost involved in mounting a facility for utilizing this technique is now being explored by ADCO at the suggestion of this office.

Another unconventional technique being developed by an agency consultant and now almost ready for field testing is the so-called "cuddling" device. This operates on the theory that we can transmit an interfering signal into an orbit domestic radio service which will cause the listening audience to shift to our nearby program in endeavoring to tune out the interference on his own home program.

Other unconventional means of carrying the cold war to the Orbit by means of clandestine radio might be capable of invention and development, and the scientific and practical potentialities in this field should be explored to the utmost.

This office is convinced that emphasis must be placed more and more on unconventional radio broadcasting techniques if the cold war of the air waves is not to become more one-sided than it already is in favor of the Communists. Properly developed and utilized, those techniques already perfected or in the process of perfection and those which might be invented might even be

the means of

the means of shifting the whole radio propaganda war balance in our favor. They would be indispensable in the event of hot war. We, therefore, are impressed with the necessity of developing our capacities in this direction to the utmost and proceeding immediately with the covert procurement of bases and equipment needed for the task.

To recapitulate, it would seem desirable for CIA to limit its present and future conventional radio broadcasting acitvities to the absolute minimum and that any new undertakings should provide:

1 A maximum transmitter power of 100,000 watts capable of accommodating:

2 Built in jamming evasion capabilities; and

3 Built in unconventional broadcasting capabilities.

4 Bases in secure and protected areas which permit the use of the jamming evasion technique without interference with friendly countries. A study of base possibilities is now being made by this office.

e. Lead Time

(1) (a) Radio broadcasting facilities cannot be created over night. From the time that plans are finally approved, it takes 12 to 18 months to design, construct and install a transmitter. Prior to such approval time is required for the planning cycle, negotiation for bases, the staffing problem, etc.

(b) Deep cover penetration of existing radio stations or systems likewise require time for development .

(2) All in all, it would be prudent to estimate that upwards of two years are required from the conception of a project for broadcasting and its implementation. Hence, the planning must be long-range. It is not possible to improvise broadcasting capabilities for targets of opportunity, such as Stalin's death.

f. Control and Management

(1) Control by CIA of the substance of broadcast and the management of broadcasting operations should be absolute and through officers directly responsible to agency control.

(2) The doctrine of compartmentalization should be strictly enforced. No one, excepting the handful of technicians required

to operate

to operate a transmitter, should be allowed near the transmitter site. The delivery of tapes, etc., should be through a cutout. Likewise, the studio and programming activity should be separated from the operation of the transmitter as well as from any other activities of the cover organization. If two or more language groups use the same facilities they should be compartmented from each other.* * * *

(See Para. 4.a.(1))

g. Evaluation

(1) In the Preliminary Survey of Radio Broadcasting (25 February 1953--TS 86889) attention was called to the need for a continuing evaluation of all radio broadcasting operations with particular reference to coverage and impact, and sources for the essential information were outlined.

(2) PP/OPS, in collaboration with this office, has initiated this much-needed undertaking.

h. Personnel

(1) There is a shortage of professional and technical personnel qualified for covert radio broadcasting. A program of selective recruitment should be undertaken in coordination with any plans for new radio projects.

(2) A training program in covert broadcasting techniques should also be initiated. This training should be undertaken in safe houses by detail of qualified instructors from covert training for basic indoctrination; to be supplemented by area instruction by the area desks and specialized radio training by Commo. and this office.

5. Recommendations

Pending clarification of CIA's future responsibility in the cold war we have made certain assumptions as to the criteria which should govern agency activities in radio broadcasting.

Our thesis is that CIA should use radio broadcasting in covert Psychological Warfare only under the following conditions:

a. That the task cannot be performed by VOA or other overt media.

b. That any contemplated operation follow strict concepts for clandestine operations, including

(1) Positive and direct agency control of both management and policy.

(2) Strict security requirements including compartmentation of all elements of broadcasting operations.

(3) Maintenance of

(3) Maintenance of sufficient cover to permit credible denial of official connection by U.S. or host country government.

c. That no direct broadcast operation be undertaken by CIA until every possibility has been exhausted to have the task undertaken by another country (or countries) through penetration, manipulation and/or control of, or covert purchase of time on, indigenous radio facilities.

Our foremost objective should be to exploit the broadcasting systems of friendly and neutral countries. This generally is possible in two ways:

(1) To stimulate our friends to greater aggressive effort in their international broadcasts to the Soviet orbit; and

(2) To influence the output of the domestic services of friendly and neutral states in the interests of the Western cause.

Within this frame of reference we made the following recommendations:

(1) Proceed to exploit the many possibilities to use indigenous radio systems in friendly and neutral nations with the objectives of (a) increasing the amount and effectiveness of their propaganda efforts against USSR and the satellites, (b) exposing and inhibiting Communist fifth column activities and (c) the maintenance of pro-U.S. and pro-Western attitudes.

These missions should be undertaken in closest collaboration with the USIS missions to the end that all that can be accomplished overtly.

(2) Undertake a recruitment and training program to make available highly qualified and thoroughly indoctrinated officers preferably with natural cover to undertake and to support such missions.

(3) In cooperation with State, develop a positive program for information support of all propaganda activities through maximum use of intelligence and defector sources.

(4) Strengthen and streamline the machinery for policy guidance, with Washington headquarters responsible for broad policy only and the field missions to be given the widest possible latitude in the application of those policies to local requirements and the exploitation of targets of opportunity. A mature staff officer experienced in P.W. should be available in the mission to (a) feed propaganda lines, (b) expedite P.W. support (c) coordinate with USIS

and (d) generally

and (d) generally backstop the operation.

(5) Establish machinery for evaluating the substance, coverage, impact and management of radio operations.

(6) Proceed with the development of capabilities to electronically intrude upon and otherwise exploit the Communist radio broadcasting to their own and foreign audiences. It is important to have these facilities reacy at the earliest possible date for possible use in the cold war--Not to have them available at the outbreak of hot war would be a tragic mistake.

* * * * * * * * * * *

[Note: Recommendations with respect to specific targets have been transmitted to the appropriate divisions.]

(10) A small staff element should be created to supervise CIA planning and operations in covert radio broadcasting. This staff should be instructed to expedite the implementation of the above recommendations and provide a continuing review of CIA Policy and Program for the use of this Media.

/s/ C. Lloyd Egner

C. LLOYD EGNER

15 May 1953

JFK Assassination System
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14 OCT 1963

MEMORANDUM NO. 71 FOR CAPTAIN E. R. ZUMWALT, JR., USN (OSD)
MAJOR GENERAL J. D. ALGER, USA
REAR ADMIRAL W. WENDT, USN
MAJOR GENERAL J. W. CARPENTER, III, USAF
BRIGADIER GENERAL W. K. JONES, USMC

SUBJECT: Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs: Actions Taken During July-August 1963 in Curbing Cuban Subversion in Latin America

Attached is the final report of the Subcommittee on Subversion on Actions Taken During July-August 1963 in Curbing Cuban Subversion in Latin America.

Signed
Joseph A. Califano, Jr.

Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
General Counsel

Attachment
As Stated

cc: Mr. Yarmolinsky (OSD)
DIA (Col Nigra)
Mr. Califano
Lt Col Haig
ASG

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REPORT OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE ON CUBAN SUBVERSION:

ACTIONS TAKEN DURING JULY-AUGUST 1963

IN CURBING CUBAN SUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA

SECRET

OSA, ASG Control No. 23866

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
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1. Control of Travel to and from Cuba

Central Intelligence Agency

a. Developed highly useful information on frequency of Cuban "chartered" flights to Brazil, names and nationalities of passengers and crew, and lax measures of control followed by Brazilian authorities. Transmitted this information to station chiefs in the Latin American countries of the non-Brazilians travelling on those flights.

b. Maintained close watch over travel to and from Cuba. See Annex B for table of known travel of Latin Americans during July and August.

c. As a result of information furnished to him by the CIA Station in Buenos Aires and with the Station's urging, the Argentine Minister of Interior indicated that he would make every effort to prevent Argentine delegates from attending the International Union of Architects Congress in Havana.

d. At the urging of the CIA Station and the Embassy, the Bolivian Minister of Interior issued in mid-July an order prohibiting the granting of travel permits to Cuba or other bloc countries to Bolivian nationals.

e. Partly as a result of the efforts of the CIA station in Santiago, the Government of Chile prohibited the entry into Chile of organizers of the Cuban-sponsored Second Latin American Youth Congress, which had been scheduled to take place in Santiago in August. This was one of the factors which led to postponement of the Congress.

f. After considerable prodding by the CIA Station and the Embassy the Minister of Public Security of Costa Rica presented legislative proposals to the Costa Rican Assembly which will require all persons intending to travel to Communist countries to have their travel approved by a newly created Costa Rican security agency.

g. CIA Station in Mexico City developed information concerning the clandestine arrival of passengers in Vera Cruz

on Cuban merchant ships. Efforts are being made to obtain more information and to encourage stricter controls by the Mexican authorities.

Department of State

a. Instructed Embassy Conakry to try to persuade Guinean authorities to deny use of airport facilities by flights on Habana-Moscow route. These efforts achieved a temporary withholding of permission for future regular flights, at least until such time as the Soviets develop their own refueling facilities at Conakry.

b. Instructed Embassy Rio to approach Brazilian authorities to express our deep concern at the growing frequency of Cuban non-scheduled flights to Brazil and request their cooperation in curbing them. Also instructed our Embassies in several Latin American countries to work with CIA station chiefs in furnishing the names of nationals of those countries travelling on these flights to local authorities and urging them: (1) to institute tighter controls on their own citizens travelling to Cuba, and (2) to express their concern to the Brazilian Government over Cuban use of Brazil as a way station for transporting subversives.

c. As a result of representations made to the British Government about Cuban flights to the Cayman Islands carrying Latin American subversives, the British developed an administrative scheme which will effectively prohibit the use of British Caribbean dependencies by Cubana as transit points for passengers. The British intend to require transit visas of passengers passing through their areas, and to reject applications for such visas except in certain special cases. Persons not possessing visas would be prevented from leaving their aircraft, or would be returned to their point of origin.

d. Instructed Embassy Mexico City on August 29 to inform the Mexican airline CMA that the United States is opposed to a proposal that CMA operate charter flights to

carry refugees from Habana to Central America. CMA, as a result, stated that they had no intention of proceeding further with this project.

e. Instructed our missions in Curacao and the Hague to investigate a report that KLM was planning to renew scheduled Curacao-Habana flights and to reiterate US opposition to resumption of air service to Cuba. KLM assured our Embassy that there is no plan to initiate service, scheduled or non-scheduled, to Habana.

f. Instructed Embassy Ottawa to express our strong objections to a proposal that a Cubana charter flight pick up a second group of U.S. students in Montreal to fly them to Cuba. The flight was not authorized.

g. Instructed Consulate Georgetown to investigate Cubana approaches to secure flight facilities. Mission reported on August 1 that the Governor had no knowledge of any talks between the B.G. Ministry of Communications and the Cuban Government regarding landing rights for Cubana planes. The Governor indicated his intention to inquire further and to keep us advised. London reported that neither the Cuban nor the British Guiana Governments had raised the issue of landing rights with H.M.G.

h. Urged the governments of Mexico, Canada, Jamaica and the Netherlands to refuse to assist the Cuban Government in its efforts to find a short route for return of the 58 American students who illegally travelled to Cuba. Also informed Pan American Airways that we were opposed to a Cuban request for a PAA charter flight to fly the students from Habana to New York.

i. Instructed our missions at Port of Spain and Barbados on several occasions to approach these governments to express the concern of the U.S. at indications of Cuban interest in the use of their aviation facilities.

Embassy Port of Spain discussed with the Foreign Secretary of Trinidad various legal moves available that would enable

GOTT to control movements of aircraft within their territory, citing examples of such controls instituted by Mexico, Canada and Ireland. He indicated receptiveness to the proposal that the list of suggestions be made available to the aviation officials concerned.

j. During a previous reporting period Embassy Santiago urged the government of Chile to refuse visas to Cuban delegated to a preparatory meeting for the II Latin American Youth Congress scheduled for August in the Chilean capital. Inability of Cuban delegates to obtain Chilean visas for this meeting is one of the contributing factors to the Cuban sponsors announcing during August that the meeting had been postponed.

k. Sent general instructions to our missions in countries which participate in the International Union of Architects asking them to urge the cooperation of governmental authorities in preventing or discouraging the attendance of their nationals to the VII UIA Congress in Habana, September 29 - October 4, 1963. Followed this up with instructions to individual posts to try where feasible to dissuade architects from free world countries from serving on the jury for the selection of a Bay of Pigs monument.

l. Urged Canadian Government to block a plan to commence food parcel shipments to Cuba on a commercial basis that would have required the establishment of scheduled weekly charter flights by Canadian planes.

2. Control of Movement of Cuban Propaganda

Central Intelligence Agency

Responding to the urging of the CIA Station, police of the State of Guanabara seized large quantities of propaganda brought into Brazil by passengers on the special Cubana flights. For example, some 50 pounds of printed propaganda was taken from the various passengers who arrived on the 16 August Cubana flight.

3. Control of Clandestine Movement of Guerrillas and Arms

Department of Defense

a. Continued surveillance of the area surrounding Cuba during the months of July and August at the same rate and with the same emphasis as prior to 1 July 1963.

b. Continued to maintain U.S. Forces, primarily from within the Atlantic Command, available to assist other Caribbean governments in the interception of suspicious craft in territorial waters, as might be requested. No such requests were received from any other government during the period covered by this report. However, U.S. Forces did keep track of the location of the Soviet merchant freighter MITCHURINSK, which was suspected of carrying subversives and arms from Cuba to British Guiana in mid-July. MITCHURINSK was under U.S. surveillance from its departure from Habana until United Kingdom forces assumed the task of keeping this ship under surveillance upon its approach to Georgetown, British Guiana. Subsequently, British police search of MITCHURINSK in British Guiana waters revealed nothing of a suspicious nature.

Central Intelligence Agency

At the repeated urging of the CIA Station in Lima, the Peruvian Government late in August published a new anti-terrorists law providing a penalty of no less than five years imprisonment for persons who participate in guerrilla activities or in the illegal manufacture of weapons or explosives.

The Peruvian National Intelligence Service is working on a lead furnished by the CIA Station in Lima concerning a 200 ton vessel reportedly involved in arms traffic.

Department of State

Instructed our Consulate General in Georgetown to investigate reports that commercial cargoes (which could

conceal illicit arms traffic out of Cuba) had developed between British Guiana and Cuba. Investigations to date have been negative.

4. Control of Transfer of Funds

Department of State

Cooperated with the Foreign Assets Control Office of the Treasury Department in developing blocking controls with respect to Cuba which went into effect on July 9, 1963.

5. Strengthening of Counter-Insurgency Capabilities

Department of Defense

a. Continued the installation of military communications facilities in Latin America. Operational dates for the multi-channel radio stations to be installed in Managua, Nicaragua and Tegucigalpa, Honduras have been delayed to 15 October 1963 and 15 December 1963, respectively because of new engineering and contractual requirements. Negotiations are continuing with Colombia and Ecuador for installation of U.S. military radio facilities. Completion of a new commercial trans-isthmian cable in the Panama Canal Zone within the coming month is expected to improve military communications within the United States and the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command.

b. Continued the surveillance of Cuba by U.S. Forces, reporting as before to U.S. commanders, organizations and agencies. Reports of surveillance have been disseminated to all who have a requirement to know.

c. Established a 24 hour per day, 7 day per week duty watch at the U.S. Military Groups in the Caribbean countries in conjunction with implementation of the military alerting system. Continued efforts to staff the U.S. Southern Command Intelligence Center with properly cleared, trained personnel (this center is the military focal point for relaying information concerning the movement of subversives). Filled, partially, the authorized billets in

the U.S. Southern Command Intelligence Center and took under consideration the problem of an increase in the billet structure in the Center. The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command together with his intelligence officer visited Honduras and Nicaragua and determined that no significant problems existed which would interfere with effective operations in those countries.

d. Action previously initiated by the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Southern Command (COMUSNAVSO) to establish a Small Craft Inspection and Training Team (SCIATT) as a contribution to the Caribbean Surveillance System is progressing satisfactorily. Permanent assignment of U.S. Coast Guard personnel to SCIATT in the Canal Zone has been approved and the U.S. Coast Guard has taken appropriate implementing actions.

e. During the period of this report, the SCIATT conducted an on-the-job training course at Puntarenas, Costa Rica. Training was given to 13 members of the Guardia Civil of Costa Rica who were either newly assigned to the 40 foot Coast Guard utility boats (CGUBs) or were to be assigned as replacement crew members.

f. A quarterly inspection and evaluation of the CGUBs provided other Central American countries was conducted during the period 17 to 31 August by a mobile training team (MTT) made up of SCIATT personnel.

g. Continued efforts to improve the internal security of Latin American armies through the provision of Intelligence Advisors. Presently there are such advisors assigned to 14 Latin countries, emphasizing counterintelligence and counter-subversion.

h. During the reporting period MTTs conducted training in counterinsurgency for the armed forces of Colombia, Bolivia, Venezuela, Peru and El Salvador.

i. Civic Action MTTs were sent to Guatemala, Bolivia, Colombia, El Salvador, Jamaica and Ecuador.

6. Exchange of Intelligence on Cuban Subversion

Central Intelligence Agency

CIA Stations throughout Latin America continued in a great majority of countries to furnish to the local internal security organizations with whom they are in liaison information concerning travelers to and from Cuba, as well as such information as came to CIA's attention concerning the movement of funds, arms and propaganda material. In many instances, the furnishing of information to the internal security service by the CIA Station was paralleled by the furnishing of similar information to the Foreign Office by the Ambassador or his representative. The response to this information has varied greatly. The Central American countries, in general, began to pay greater attention to the information and act on it. At the other extreme, the Brazilian Government during the reporting period showed little inclination to follow up on the information.

Department of State

a. Reiterated to the Foreign Minister of Peru our interest in having the facts of the Puerto Maldonado incident brought to the attention of the OAS, and urged that this action be taken as soon as possible.

b. Urged the Government of Guatemala to submit evidence of communist activity to the OAS.

7. Surveillance of Cuban Diplomatic, Commercial and Cultural Missions

Department of State

Instructed Embassy La Paz to follow up closely on charges of involvement by the Cuban mission in internal policies of Bolivia, and, at the Embassy's discretion, to point out to Bolivian officials the opportunity for a possible break in relations with Cuba. Embassy La Paz was not able to

press for a break when the evidence of Cuban intervention did not prove to be as conclusive as originally reported.

8. Other Special Actions

Department of State

a. Obtained action by the COAS on July 3 on the Lavalle Committee Report transmitting the document to the governments and urging them to implement the specific and general recommendations contained therein as soon as possible.

b. Through Embassy Managua informed the Nicaraguan Government of the matters which we wanted to have considered during the informal meeting of the Ministers of Security and Interior of the Isthmian countries held in Managua, August 26-28 in preparation for the second formal meeting of the Managua Security Conference countries later this year.

c. Explained in detail the nature of the Cuban threat and the related policy objectives of the U.S., during conversation in London and in Washington with Mr. Adam Watson, newly appointed British Ambassador to Cuba.

United States Information Agency

a. The Agency's press service during the reporting period transmitted 12 articles, commentaries, and backgrounders on its wireless file service to USIA posts throughout Latin America for placement in the local newspapers and the Voice of America Spanish broadcasts to Latin America carried a total of 28 commentaries and features on the subject of Cuban-based subversion. These stories were designed to alert people in Latin America to the dangers of this subversion.

b. In response to standing Agency instructions to give special attention to developments related to Cuba-based subversion, USIA posts in Latin America were prompt in reporting incidents and in providing editorial comments from

the Latin American press, all of which was used in the Agency's radio and press output.

The main developments treated in the Agency's radio and press coverage included Castro's July 26 speech urging revolutions in Latin America, the discovery of terrorist weapons factories in Guayaquil, the Ecuadorean Vice President's accusation of Cuban responsibility for terrorism, the Cuban use of Grand Cayman as a way station for subversive elements from Cuba, the expulsion from the University of a Bolivian youth leader for receiving funds from Cuba, Castro-trained guerrillas in Honduras, and Bolivian protests against meddling by the Cuban Embassy in the miner's strike. A Voice of American roving reporter in Latin America provided several reports on the subversion picture in countries he visited.

c. In support of the Agency's effort on Cuban-based subversion, the publications center in Mexico began work on three pamphlets during the period based on Castro's report of his visit to the Soviet Union (showing that he contradicted himself in some of his extravagant claims of Soviet progress), the losses suffered by Cuban labor under Castro, and the fate of political prisoners in Cuba. When completed, these pamphlets will be reproduced and distributed in quantity throughout the area.

ANNEX A

CIA Intelligence Annex

1. Travel to and from Cuba

Brazil

Chartered Cubana airlines flights between Cuba and Brazil have become a major means of transporting non-Cuban Latin Americans to and from Cuba. The five such flights since late July have carried nearly 400 non-Cubans.

The first of the recent series -- on 25 July -- brought 71 Latin American passengers to Havana for the 26 July celebrations. The other four flights -- on 15, 22, 28 and 29 August -- transported over 200 Latin Americans to Brazil from Havana. Some of the aircraft involved returned to Cuba with smaller numbers of passengers. Many of the 200 Latin American passengers had been delegates to the 26 July ceremonies, but others had apparently been in Cuba for longer periods and some had probably received training there. Of the passengers on these four flights to Brazil, 75 were natives of Caribbean area countries. Their circuitous travel through Brazil was evidently designed to help conceal the fact that they had been in Cuba.

Costa Rica

Two Costa Ricans were among the passengers on a chartered Cubana plane which was turned back to Havana at Grand Cayman on 11 July 1963. One was Luz Marina Hernandez Salazar, the only Costa Rican woman known to have been sent to Cuba for training as a guerrilla warfare instructor. She had been in Cuba since September 1962. The other Costa Rican passenger was Carlos Guillen, former head of the Costa Rican Society of Friends of the Cuban Revolution, who had been in Cuba since November 1962.

Ecuador

The CIA Station in Quito reports that the military junta, which assumed power in Ecuador on 11 July, can be expected to follow the guidance of the Embassy and the Station in controlling travel to and from Cuba and the Soviet bloc. The activities of Cuban subversives in Ecuador, at least for the present, have been greatly inhibited by the mass arrests of Communists and pro-Cubans and by the outlawing of the Communist Party by the junta.

Honduras

It is reported that the Honduran Communist Party has issued orders to its members not to attempt to travel to Cuba at the present time. This action is apparently the result of the increasing vigilance of the Honduran government and the greater implementation of stricter travel controls.

2. Movement of Cuban Propaganda

Guatemala

According to an unconfirmed report received in July, a Bureau of Information of the Communist Party of Guatemala is being formed in collaboration with Prensa Latina and is to be managed clandestinely. It expects to receive news by shortwave radio from Cuba and print bulletins for distribution by radio stations. This may indicate a pattern by which Prensa Latina will attempt to distribute on a more clandestine basis in other areas in Latin America.

Honduras

It was reliably reported that in mid-July 1963, a small coastal freighter landed 14 large boxes of Communist propaganda on the northern coast of Honduras, the boxes having been transferred at sea from a larger vessel. The report has not been confirmed.

3. Movement of Guerrillas and Arms

Argentina

Extremist members of the Peronist Party, apparently under the leadership of such figures as Hector Villalon and John William Cooke, were reported to be receiving encouragément and promises of large sums of money from Cuba in support of their efforts to train and organize subversive groups in Argentina. Villalon has stated that his plan calls for expanding and accellerating subversive activities in Argentina culminating in a complete take over within two years. There is no indication that Peron himself has agreed to this plan. It has been reported that leaders of the Communist Party of Argentina have been greatly annoyed by the tendency of the Castro regime to support the revolutionary Peronists without having consulted the Communist Party of Argentina.

It is reported that the so-called Army of National Liberation (ANL) of Argentina, which is a relatively small Castroist organization directed from Cuba by John William Cooke, has in recent weeks been negotiating for the purchase of arms and has been offered submachine guns, bazookas and other weapons by two or three private suppliers. It was reported, however, that the ANL was having difficulty getting enough dollars from Cuba to make significant purchases possible.

Bolivia

The Bolivian Ministry of Foreign Relations on 23 August protested formally to the Cuban Chargé d'Affaires in La Paz against the Cuban Embassy support to the miners during the recent crisis. Subsequently, however, Foreign Minister Fellman informed the Cuban Chargé that he need not fear that the Government of Bolivia would break diplomatic relations with Cuba. There has, in fact, been no hard information linking the Cuban Embassy with the present mining crisis in spite of some unconfirmed reports of Cuban support.

Brazil

Cuban Ambassador to Brazil, Raul Roa Kouri, is reported to have attempted to encourage peasant league leader Francisco Julio to revitalize the leagues in northern Brazil. According to some reports efforts are being made to unify the leadership and bring dissident elements under the general direction of Juliao. Other reports indicate that, although the Cuban Embassy is providing guidance and possibly financial support to the movement, it had not yet resolved the internal dissension in the leagues.

Colombia

From Colombia reports have been received of increasing Cuban assistance, primarily in the form of training courses by instructors who have been trained in Cuba, to the Worker-Student-Peasant Movement (MOEC). A small guerrilla band encountered by the Colombian army in July 1963 was broken up when five members of the band were killed and two others captured. A small quantity of arms and a considerable amount of books and pamphlets on revolutionary warfare, photographs of Fidel Castro, Camilo Cienfuegos and Mao Tse-tung, and bulletins of the MOEC were found at the camp site. Recent reports have indicated an increase in the terrorist efforts of the MOEC and increased promises of assistance from Che Guevara with regard to the training of additional MOEC members.

Costa Rica

There have been a number of unconfirmed reports alleging small-scale training of revolutionaries on Costa Rican territory for guerrilla activity in Nicaragua. For example, in mid-July an increased number of guerrillas were reportedly being trained in Costa Rica by Adolfo Garcia Barberena, well-known Nicaraguan revolutionary leader and member of the FLN (National Liberation Front -- a Communist-dominated, Cuban-supported,

anti-Nicaragua revolutionary group). In early August, Alberto Serrato, leader of the FLN in Costa Rica, (reportedly left with a group of Nicaraguans for the Costa Rican-Nicaraguan border. Another report indicated that Hector Bogantes Zamora, Costa Rican agitator was supposed to have left San Jose in mid-August for the Nicaraguan border to supervise the passage of Nicaraguan guerrillas from Costa Rica into Nicaragua. Bogantes, who recently returned from attending the May Day celebrations in Cuba, is said to have been assigned this responsibility by the Costa Rican Communist Party.

So far as we know, the GON, which is normally well-informed and highly sensitive to such activities on its borders, has not made any complaints or otherwise signified concern or awareness of these reported activities.

Honduras

The Honduran armed forces began to move against a group of pro-Castro guerrillas operating against the Nicaraguan Government and active in the vicinity of the Nicaraguan-Honduran border. The Nicaraguan National Guard has been conducting operations on its side of the border against the insurgents since July. The dense jungle and difficult terrain, however, will impede the efforts of both forces to eliminate the guerrillas.

Information on the guerrilla force is scanty and conflicting. It is apparently composed of members of the National Liberation Front (FLN), a Communist-dominated and Cuban-supported revolutionary organization active primarily in Honduras and Nicaragua since the fall of 1962. The strength of the force is not known.

Nicaragua

A captured guerrilla of the FLN (National Liberation Front - a Communist-dominated, Cuban-supported, anti-Nicaraguan group) confessed that he was a member of a group of 46 who entered Nicaragua from Honduras on 22 July.

He said that their mission was to establish a base camp in the Isabella mountains, Department of Jinotega, in order to indoctrinate the peasants and to train them in guerrilla tactics. He admitted that he had received six months' guerrilla warfare training in Cuba and that other FLN leaders had received similar training. He also said that the FLN training camp in Honduras was near El Lagarto, on the Patuca River.

4. Transfer of Funds

British Guiana

In British Guiana, Guiana Import-Export Corporation (Gimpex) received a one million dollar advance payment deposited by the Cuban Alimpex Corporation for goods to be delivered to Cuba in the future. Gimpex has, in turn, loaned this money to the Government of British Guiana. Cheddi Jagan's People's Progressive Party is the major stockholder in Gimpex. Mohammed Kassim, Manager of Gimpex, has indicated that Gimpex will be able to secure additional loans from Cuba in amounts sufficient to tide the Jagan government over any foreseeable crisis. It was also reported that Gimpex plans to buy aircraft, spare parts and other machinery in the United States for reshipment to Cuba.

General

Reports continue to be received from many places indicating that the suitcase full of currency is still one of the most common methods used by the Cubans for transmitting funds for use in supporting subversive activities throughout the hemisphere. Instances where such funds have been confiscated by the police have occurred recently in El Salvador, Panama and Ecuador.

ANNEX B

KNOWN TRAVEL OF LATIN AMERICANS TO AND FROM C U B A - JULY 1963

NATIONALITY	JULY		PURPOSE OF TRIP TO CUBA
	TO	FROM	
ARGENTINA	6	0	26th of July Celebrations.
BOLIVIA	14	0	26th of July Celebrations.
BRAZIL	25	0	26th of July Celebrations.
BR. GUIANA	0	0	
CHILE	20	1	26th of July Celebrations. A returning Chilean Diplomat
COLOMBIA	29	1	26th of July Celebrations.
COSTA RICA	12	0	26th of July Celebrations.
DOM. REP.	37	0	26th of July Celebrations.
ECUADOR	2	0	26th of July Celebrations.
EL SALVADOR	4	1	26th of July Celebrations.
GUATEMALA	6	0	
HAITI	0	0	
HONDURAS	0	0	
JAMAICA	33	1	30-Football team. 3-to 26th of July Celebrations.
MEXICO	65	28	26th of July Celebrations.
NICARAGUA	5	0	26th of July Celebrations.
PANAMA	15	0	26th of July Celebrations.
PARAGUAY	3	0	26th of July Celebrations.
PERU	4	0	
TRINIDAD	0	0	
URUGUAY	17	15	26th of July Celebrations. Most attending will remain to work.
VENEZUELA	22	0	26th of July Celebrations.
T O T A L S	319	47	

Annex C

SECRET

KNOWN TRAVEL OF LATIN AMERICANS TO AND FROM CUBA - AUGUST 1963

NATIONALITY	AUGUST TO	AUGUST FROM	PURPOSE OF TRIP TO CUBA
ARGENTINA	4	0	26th July Celebrations.
BOLIVIA	5	3	
BRAZIL	0	24	22-Returning from 26th July Celebrations.
BR. GUIANA	7	10	Herder Institute in Leipzig.
CHILE	22	47	8-Physical Ed. Seminar - 1-Seeking funds - 10-Returning from 26 July Celebrations.
COLOMBIA	6	14	
COSTA RICA	0	8	26th July Celebrations.
DOM. REP.	1	8	
ECUADOR	0	2	
EL SALVADOR	1	0	
GUATEMALA	3	0	1-Study at University of Sofia.
HAITI	0	0	
HONDURAS	0	8	
JAMAICA	0	2	
MEXICO	34	63	26th July Celebrations.
NICARAGUA	0	0	
PANAMA	6	0	26th July Celebrations.
PARAGUAY	0	0	
PERU	2	9	9-Returning were members of (MIR) who received guerrilla training.
TRINIDAD	0	0	
URUGUAY	10	16	26th July Celebrations.
VENEZUELA	3	0	26th July Celebrations.
T O T A L S	104	214	

SECRET

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26 NOV 1963

MEMORANDUM NO. 81 FOR GENERAL EARLE G. WHEELER (JCS)
MR. FRANK K. SLOAN, Dep Asst Sec/Def ISA (Regional Affairs)
MAJOR GENERAL J. D. ALGER, USA
REAR ADMIRAL W. F. A. WENDT, USN
MAJOR GENERAL J. W. CARPENTER, III, USAF
BRIGADIER GENERAL C. J. QUILTER, USMC

SUBJECT: Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs: Report on Status of Implementation of Actions Designed to Counter Subversion (U)

Reference: DA Memo #64, subject as above, dated September 19, 1963

Attached herewith is a final draft of the Report to the President of the Subcommittee on Cuban Subversion on Progress Made During September 1963 in Curbing Cuban Subversion in Latin America.

It is requested that comments, if any, be provided this office by 1200 hours, 2 December 1963. The Department of Defense portion of subject report is based on submissions provided in response to referenced memorandum.

Signed
Joseph A. Califano, Jr.

Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
General Counsel

Enclosure
As Stated

cc: Mr. Yarmolinsky (OSD)

Lt Col Haig
Mr. Califano
ASG

DRAFT
11/13/63

SECRET

REPORT OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE

on CUBAN SUBVERSION

ACTION TAKEN DURING SEPTEMBER 1963 IN CURBING CUBAN SUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA

SECRET

I. Control of Travel to and From Cuba

Department of State

a. Instructed Embassy Tunis to call to the attention of the Foreign Ministry our concern at increased evidence of Aeroflot attempts to establish North Africa routes to Cuba, especially through Algeria, and our conviction that Tunisia has a valid case in thwarting any Bloc civil air penetration of Africa.

b. Instructed Embassy Conakry to contact Guinean Government officials, reminding them of their past assurances that no Aeroflot flights to Cuba would be permitted to use Conakry facilities, and to express our concern at recent indications that Aeroflot was preparing to establish service to Cuba via Conakry.

c. Instructed Consulate Fort au France to investigate and report on alleged landing and refuelling of Cubana aircraft at Guadeloupe. Also double-checked directly with the Shell Company, the supplier of the fuel. Instructed Embassy Paris to query the French Government about alleged Cubana use of the Guadeloupe facility, and to express our concern at this evidence of Cuba's attempt to use French Caribbean dependencies for flights to and from

from Latin America.

d. Instructed Embassy Rio to make a new approach to the Brazilian Foreign Ministry to express our concern at Cuba's continuing use of "charter" flights to Brazil and the laxity of Brazilian officials in the control of passengers. During the course of the month the Brazilian Government began tightening controls against Cubana flights. Specifically, all requests for landing permission were henceforth to be processed by the Foreign Office, with appropriate delays. Also tighter passenger, crew and cargo controls were to be instituted when a Cubana flight is permitted to use Brazilian facilities.

e. Determined that the U.K. had specifically warned Cubana that no aviation fuel was available in Barbados and that H.M.G. would, in the future, respect Shell Company's decision to deny fueling to Cubana planes.

f. Continued inter-Departmental efforts to prevent resumption of ferry service between Cuba and the U.S. which a British citizen, Harold Derber, has been attempting to establish during the past several month.

g.

g. Instructed Consul Georgetown to investigate and report on evidence the Department received which indicates that Cuba is planning to sell merchant vessels to British Guiana in order to facilitate the establishment of regular service for passengers and cargo.

Central Intelligence Agency

a. In connection with the Seventh Congress of the International Union (UIA) held in Habana September 29 - October 3, 1963 the Buenos Aires Station:

(1) encouraged the Argentine National Federation of Architects to oppose Argentine attendance at the Habana meeting, with the result that 25 of the 39 practicing architects who had planned to attend cancelled their participation;

(2) arranged to prevent the attendance of any officially authorized Argentine delegation at the Habana meeting, but encouraged the attendance of an official Argentine delegation of anti-Communist coloration at an international architects meeting to be held in Mexico in October;

(3)

(3) delivered a memorandum to the Minister of Interior concerning Cuban charter flights to Brazil which supported the Ambassador's request that the Argentine government express concern over such flights.

b. Rio de Janeiro Station continued to furnish the Embassy with data on Cubana flights to Brazil used in representations to the Brazilian Foreign Office. Also induced Rio airport officials to impose stringent passport control and baggage efforts. These efforts contributed to the Brazilian Government's failing to issue landing permits for Cubana flights on September 21, 24 and 25, 1963 forcing their cancellation. When Cubana, because of harassment at Rio, began using the landing facilities in Sao Paulo where controls were non existent, CIA initiated and obtained a local liaison agreement for similar harassment in the event of future Cubana flights to Sao Paulo.

c. Mexico City station inspired a press campaign of hoof and mouth and smallpox epidemics in Cuba, prior to the Architects Congress to discourage participation in the Habana meeting. The resulting quarantines and

innoculations

innoculations were a factor in discouraging 52 of the 60 Mexican professional architects who were expected to go to Habana from attending the Congress.

II. Control of Movement of Propaganda

Measures to counter act

III. Control of Clandestine Movement of Guerrillas and arms

Department of State

Made the necessary arrangements through Embassy Tegucigalpa with the Government of Honduras for the dispatch of three U.S. helicopters to give logistical assistance to the Honduran Army in its effort to locate and eliminate the band of guerrillas allegedly operating in the Patuca River area along the Honduran-Nicaraguan border.

Department of Defense

Three OH-13 helicopters from USSOUTHCOM supported Honduran armed forces conducting counter-insurgency operations in the Patuca River area. A total of 27 sorties were flown resulting in delivery of 3928 pounds of supplies, evacuation of 12 sick Honduran soldiers, airlift of 19 passengers to points in the operational area, and recovery of 400 pounds of supplies from the operational area.

IV.

IV. Control of Transfer of Funds

Department of State

a. Instructed Embassy Mexico City to inform the Mexican airline SAESA that their proposal to purchase surplus Cuban aircraft would in fact result in the accrual to Cuba of a significant amount of hard currency, and the U.S. would have to oppose the transaction. Further, if dollars were involved in the purchase, it would be a violation of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations.

b. Informed Department of Treasury, Foreign Assets Control Office, of the activities of Somondelp Enterprises, a Miami firm engaged in sending remittances to persons in Cuba in violation of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations.

c. Instructed Consulate, Belize to inform Mr. Richard Joyce, an American national, that his commercial transactions with Cuba were in violation of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations and that he is prohibited from engaging in such trade.

V.

V. Strengthening of Counter-Insurgency Capabilities

Department of Defense

a. Thirteen Latin American officers graduated from the counter-insurgency Operations Course of the U.S. Army School for Latin America in the Panama Canal Zone on 20 September. During the month, a total of 91 Latin American officers enrolled in courses stressing counter-insurgency at the Army Canal Zone school.

b. Eight U.S. Army counter-insurgency mobile training teams were providing training to the Armed Forces of five Latin American countries during the period. U.S. Air Force counter-insurgency training teams were in two countries.

c. In the Canal Zone, 15 students from five countries were under instruction in the operation of coast guard utility patrol craft used for coastal surveillance. Six students from two countries were undergoing similar training in the UnitedSStates

d. A U.S. Navy counter-insurgency training team is in Venezuela to assist in improving the security of oil installations in Lake Maracaibo.

e.

e. Costa Rica and Honduras were provided one Cessna 185 aircraft each for medical civic action and internal security purposes.

f. On May 25, 1963, three M-43B KAMAN helicopters were provided to the government of Colombia on a 90-day loan. The Colombian Government requested an extension of the loan and a 90-day extension has been approved.

Central Intelligence Agency

a. Guantanamo City Station has recruited, on a trial basis, a former member of the 13 November guerrilla group and debriefings are in process. Negotiations continue with the Government of Guatemala for the formation of a new internal security service.

b. Lima Station has agreed to furnish the Peruvian Investigations Police (PIP) with an outboard motor to increase their patrol capability on rivers crossing the Bolivian frontier. Our information is that the rivers crossing this frontier have provided the primary avenues for recent attempts to gain clandestine entry of personnel and weapons into Peru.

VI.

VI. Exchange of Intelligence on Cuban Subversion

Department of Defense

Engineering installation work continued on radio stations for Managua, Nicaragua and Tegucigalpa, Honduras. No further progress has been made in reaching agreements with Colombia and Ecuador for rights to establish radio stations in those countries. Installation of the new trans-isthmian commercial cable in Panama is nearing completion.

Central Intelligence Agency

CIA Stations continued their exchange of intelligence information with local intelligence Agencies. The following actions are of special significance:

a. The CIA Station in Buenos Aires furnished the Argentine State Intelligence Service (SIDE) with information on the travel of Argentines to Cuba, and requested that SIDE provide name traces and debrief these travellers on their return whenever feasible. SIDE provided the traces, but did not conduct any debriefings. The Station has not felt it feasible to try to remedy this omission in view of the personnel changes expected within SIDE after the new government is installed on 12 October.

b. As a result of information passed by the Bogota Station to the Administrative Department of Security (DAS) concerning Colombian travellers to Cuba, a number of passport violations have been discovered in which travellers to Cuba are using passports issued to other persons. There is a reluctance, however, on the part of the Colombian Government to prosecute this type of violation.

c. At the urging of the CIA Station in Lima, the National Intelligence Service (SIN) instructed one of its penetrations of leftist groups to campaign for a trip to Cuba in order to receive guerrilla warfare training. This asset has been offered, and has accepted, an opportunity to make the trip by the Leftist Revolutionary Movement (MIR), primary vehicle of Cuban subversive activities in Peru. Briefing and debriefing of the asset will be done by the SIN.

The Peruvian Naval Intelligence Service (PNIS) has, in response to the efforts of the Station in Lima, sent one of its agents to Chile where he will sign aboard a Chilean freighter calling at Habana. The asset has been given specific intelligence requirements to fulfill.

The

The Prime Minister and Minister of Government and Police has requested from the CIA representative in Lima any information that he might supply on subversive elements posing a threat to the Government of Peru. This request has opened an additional channel to the highest level of the Government with a concomitant prospectfor effective action when needed.

d. Through regular liaison channels, the Venezuelan General Directorate of Police (DIGEPOL) has been provided by CIA with the names of all Venezuelans known to have travelled to Cuba from February through August 1963. This activity will be carried out on a continuing basis; the names are now being integrated into the regular watch list kept at international airports in Venezuela. Thus far, at least three returnees have been arrested on the basis of the information supplied to DIGEPOL. DIGEPOL has indicated its appreciation of the data being supplied and desires that the arrangement be continued.

VII. Surveillance of Cuban Diplomatic, Commercial and Cultural Missions

No special actions to report.

VII.

VIII. Other Special Actions

United States Information Agency

a. The Agency's press service transmitted seven articles relating to Cuban subversion on its wireless file service to USIS offices throughout Latin America for placement in the local newspapers. Developments reported in these articles included demands by the Bolivian Senate for the ouster of the Cuban Chargé d'Affaires, terrorism and government counteraction in Venezuela, the seizure in Ecuador of an arms and explosives cache reportedly received from Cuba, several articles on the International Union of Architects Congress in Habana (emphasizing the intent of the Castro regime to use the Congress as a forum for its propaganda claims), and Assistant Secretary Martin's Los Angeles speech in which he pointed out the regime's affinity for Chinese communist doctrine and its continued emphasis on violent revolution and subversion. In all, the press service transmitted 27 articles and commentaries during September on the subject of Cuba, the other articles dealing for the most part with economic and political conditions inside the country as evidenced by the regime's own admissions and the reports of refugees.

b.

B. The Voice of America Spanish broadcasts to Latin America during September carried a total of 20 news analyses, commentaries, press round-ups, and interviews related to the subject of Cuban subversion. Some of the developments treated included the following:

A commentary on communist embassies as channels for subversion; a news analysis on the U.S. students who visited Cuba; Assistant Secretary Martin's Los Angeles speech; a news analysés on Cuban subversion as an obstacle in the normalization of U.S.-Soviet relations; a three-part series on university autonomy in Latin America; a feature on the letter of a Colombian student who went to Cuba on a scholarship and was disillusioned by the communist indoctrination; a commentary on Che Guevara's recent article on revolutionary strategy; and a commentary on guerrilla training in Cuba. Many of these items were repeated several times in the broadcasts. The "Rendezvous with Cuba" hour carried four or five commentaries and interviews nightly on economic and political developments inside Cuba. Of special note, the Cuban radio and Castro himself reacted angrily to Voice of America broadcasts about Che Guevara's article and to commentaries that Cuba had accepted an agricultural role in

the communist bloc and had postponed its plans to industrialize.

c. On September 27, the Agency issued a circular instruction to allUSIS Latin American posts urging greater attention to opportunities for publicizing Cuban-stimulated subversion, suggesting the various types of information activities to support this effort, and requesting monthly reports of field actions taken to implement the instruction. This was done as a follow-up to the original instruction on Cuban subversion which was issued April 3, 1963.

Central Intelligence Agency

a. CIA in Brazilassisted in the defection and exploitation of a Cuban athelete Roberto Perez Ondarse in Porto Alegre on 4 September 1963. Perez was a member of the Cuban basket-ball team which participated in the World University Games (FISU) held in Porto Alegre Brazil in early September 1963.

b. Assistance was given to the Government of Guatemala in the interrogation of some of those who were arrested in connection with the Communist Party documents that were confiscated in late May 1963.

 Only

Only one of those interrogated admitted to any involvement with the captured documents, the Communist Party, guerrillas, or anything else that could be construed as incriminating. The one who did admit knowledge denied that he was involved in any way. The Government of Guatemala wants to interrogate this person again at a later date.

c. CIA Station in Montevideo arranged for an interview between an Uruguayan military intelligence officer and a recent defector from the Montevideo Cuban Embassy during which extensive information regarding Cuban subversive activities was revealed. The Uruguayan officer prepared a report containing this data and presented it to the National Council of Government which has been slow to indicate concern over communist subversive activity in Uruguay. As a result of this report, the NCG has directed the Minister of Interior to appoint a special commission to study the problem of Communist subversion and to make recommendations as to what course of action should be taken by the Uruguayan Government. Should the Government wish to press for passage of

stronger

stronger anti-subversive legislation the Station has taken steps to prepare Uruguyan public opinion by planning simultaneous local press releases of the salient features of the defector report with similar press reporting in the United States where the defector willbe brought to light.

JFK Assassination System
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PRESIDENT'S REPORT - SOVIET OFFENSIVE WEAPONS IN CUBA - 1962
CUBAN SUBVERSION
SOVIET MILITARY FORCES IN CUBA

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JFK Review

Department of the Army EO 13526
☒ Declassify ☐ Exclude ☐ Exempt
Authority________
☐ Refer To________
Review Date 6/19/2015 By Ken E Stoner

CLASSIFIED TESTIMONY - PART II

NO.	SUBJECT:	DATE:
1.	Statement by LtGen Joseph F. Carroll, DirDIA before the Cmte on Foreign Affairs, HR, WashDC	Undated
2.	Statement by the DirCIA for use of the staff of the Preparedness Investigating Subcmte of Senator Stennis	7 Jan 63
3.	SecDef testimony before House Appropriations Cmte	11 Feb 63
4.	SecDef testimony before House Appropriations Cmte	12 Feb 63
5.	SecDef testimony before House Appropriations Cmte	13 Feb 63
6.	SecNav testimony before HASC	18 Feb 63
7.	Ltr to SecArmy from Mr. Martin, AsstSecState with attached statement by Mr. Martin before the Latin American Subcomte of HFAC on subject of communist subversion of the hemisphere	19 Feb 63
8.	SecDef testimony before SASC (Vol. I -A.M.)	19 Feb 63
9.	SecNav testimony before HASC	19 Feb 63
10.	Statement of SecDef accompanied by General Maxwell D. Taylor, ChJCS	20 Feb 63
11.	Excerpts of Navy testimony before HASC	20 Feb 63
12.	SecDef testimony before SASC	21 Feb 63
13.	Excerpt of SecAirForce testimony before HASC	21 Feb 63
14.	SecDef testimony before SASC (Cuba)	22 Feb 63
15.	Statement by the DirCIA for use of the staff of the Preparedness Investigating Subcmte of Senator Stennis (Cuban Subversion in LA)	26 Feb 63 (Transmittal Slip)
16.	Statement by Secretary of Defense to the Permanent Subcmte on Investigations of the Committee on Government Operations - U.S. Senate	13 March 63

CLASSIFIED TESTIMONY - PART II (Cont'd)

NO.	SUBJECT:	DATE:
17.	Memo for Mr. Bromley Smith from Mr. McGiffert Subj: Cuba -- with Items 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 included as attachments	8 Mar 63
18.	Study on Cuba as a Base for --------prepared by Bob Mandelstam and LtCol Patchell for use by Sec McNamara at Stennis Comm hearings, in the form of Memo to Sec/Def	Undated
19.	Memo for Mr. Robt A. Hurwitch, Subj: Missile Crisis Section of the President's Draft Rept to Congress on US Participation in the UN During 1963, fr Mr. Califano w/draft of President's message atchd	29 Mar 63
20.	Interim Report by Preparedness Inves/Sub Comm of the Comm on Armed Services US Senate, on the Cuban Military Buildup, OATSD(LA) Control # 5812(8)	Undtd

TRANSMITTAL SLIP	DATE 26 Feb 6(

TO:
Mr. Califano for Secy. Vance

ROOM NO.	BUILDING
3E985	Pentagon

REMARKS:

SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
OFFICE
10 00 AM '63

FROM:
CIA - William A. Tidwell

ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION
	Code143	6614

FORM NO. 241 1 FEB 55 REPLACES FORM 36-8 WHICH MAY BE USED. GPO : 1957—O-439445 (47)

STATEMENT BY THE DIRECTOR FOR USE OF THE STAFF OF THE PREPAREDNESS INVESTIGATING SUBCOMMITTEE OF SENATOR STENNIS

25 February 1963

CUBAN SUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA

I. Introduction

The public pronouncements of Cuban leaders, the daily record of events in Latin America, and reports from our intelligence sources within Communist and other left-extremist elements throughout this hemisphere all agree on one salient conclusion: that Fidel Castro is spurring and supporting the efforts of Communists and other revolutionary elements to overthrow and seize control of the governments in Latin America.

Even before the October missile crisis--and with increasing rancor since then--Cuban leaders have been exhorting revolutionary movements to violence and terrorism, and supporting their activities. Cuban support takes many different forms, but its main thrust is in the supply of the inspiration, the guidance, the training, and the communications and technical assistance that revolutionary groups in Latin America require.

In essence, Castro tells revolutionaries from other Latin American countries: "Come to Cuba; we will pay your way, we will train you in underground organization techniques, in guerrilla warfare, in sabotage and in terrorism. We will see to it that you get back to your homeland. Once you are there, we will keep in touch with you, give you propaganda support, send you propaganda materials for your movement, training aids to expand your guerrilla forces, secret communications methods, and perhaps funds and specialized demolition equipment." Castro is not, as far as we know, promising these other Latin Americans any Cuban weapons or Cuban personnel--either leaders, advisers, or cadres. But he probably does tell them: "If you succeed in establishing something effective by way of a revolutionary movement in your homeland, if your guerrillas come down out of the hills and confront regular armed forces, then we may consider more concrete forms of assistance."

So far, it should be noted, none of the movements in South America has reached this final stage--and in fact even Castro's Sierra Maestra guerrillas never had

to fight a pitched battle with regular military formations which might have required more advanced weapons than small arms, grenades, mines, and machineguns. In many ways, Cuba under Castro is the Latin version of the old Comintern, inciting, abetting, and sustaining revolution wherever it flourishes.

We have occasional evidence of more concrete Cuban support. Cuban nationals, for example, took part in the La Oroya disorders in Peru in December. We know that some funds move, generally in cash by courier, from Cuba to the revolutionaries in other countries. We know that Cuba furnishes money to buy weapons, and that some guerrilla forces in Peru, for instance, are equipped with Czech weapons which most probably came from Cuba.

Venezuela is apparently number one on Cuba's priority list for revolution. Fidel Castro said so to the recent meeting of Communist front organizations for Latin American women. Che Guevara and Blas Roca both emphasized the outlook for revolution in Venezuela in speeches in January. One of our established sources of proven reliability, high in the ranks of the Venezuelan Communist Party says the Central Committee agreed in January that a "peaceful solution to the present situation in Venezuela is out of the question."

This same source reported that Communist guerrilla and terrorist operations in Venezuela were placed under a unified command in late 1962, which coordinates activities with the other militant extremist groups in Venezuela. The result has been the creation of the Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN). This organization is currently trying to publicize its existence by such acts as the hijacking of the freighter ANZOATEGUI, and by acts of sabotage and indiscriminate shootings. These were also designed to dissuade President Betancourt from his trip to Washington. In this, of course, they failed.

The violence in Venezuela should not be minimized. The sabotage is the work of experts, and is being done with advanced types of explosives. The shooting has reached the point in Caracas where it is not safe to go out at night in some sections of the capital. But it is the opinion both of our people and the embassy that

this level of activity is not the sort of thing that will bring down the government unless the president or other high officials are assassinated. The FALN has not reached a point where it stands up to the armed forces, or seizes and holds government buildings.

We believe that Cuba has given guerrilla training to more nationals from Venezuela than from any other country. Our estimate is that more than 200 Venezuelans received such training in 1962. Many of these are engaged in terrorism in the cities, and others were rounded up and given long prison sentences when they committed themselves prematurely last spring in a countryside where the rural population strongly supports the Betancourt administration. One of our best penetrations of the Communist Party in Venezuela tells us that at present the unified command has less than 150 guerrillas in the field, in widely separated groups of 15 to 25 men each.

II. The Cuban Plan

For the past year Cuban spokesmen have been pushing the line that Cuba provides the example for Latin American revolution, with the implication that nothing more than guidance needs to be exported. Castro actually sounded the keynotes for Cuban subversion on July 26, 1960, when he said, "We promise to continue making Cuba the example that can convert the Cordillera of the Andes into the Sierra Maestra of the American continent." In his speech on 15 January 1963 Castro said that if "Socialism" in Cuba had waited to overturn Batista by peaceful means, Castro would still be in the Sierra Maestra. For the past three months, Che Guevara and Education Minister Armando Hart, both in public speeches and in remarks to visiting Communists which have been repeated to us, have been insisting that what they call "Socialism" can achieve power in Latin America only by force.

The Cuban effort at present is far more serious than the hastily organized and ill-conceived raids that the bearded veterans of the Sierra Maestra led into such Central American countries as Panama, Haiti, Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic during the first

eight or nine months Castro was in power. Today the Cuban effort is far more sophisticated, more covert, and more deadly. In its professional tradecraft, it shows guidance and training by experienced Communist advisers from the Soviet bloc, including veteran Spanish Communists.

The ideas move fairly openly in a massive propaganda effort. The inflammatory broadcasts from Havana and the work of Prensa Latina are matters of public record. It may be worth noting that the postal and customs authorities in Panama are destroying on the average of 12 tons a month of Cuban propaganda coming into their land. Another 10 tons a month comes into Costa Rica; most of it is spotted either at the airport or in the post office and destroyed.

The know-how is not only imparted to the guerrilla trainees who come to Cuba, but is exported in the form of booklets. There are thousands of copies of the texts on guerrilla warfare by Mao Tse-tung and by Che Guevara scattered over all of Latin America. Our agents have brought us, for example, a little pocket booklet, about two and a half by four inches, called "150 questions on guerrilla warfare," written by a Spanish Civil War veteran, Alberto Bayo. This was printed in Cuba, and turned up first in Peru. Another version, with 100 questions and answers, based on Guevara's and Bayo's books, has been written especially for Peruvian use and mimeographed in Peru. This is about 5 x 8, and includes drawings on how to place demolition charges as well as charts for calculating the force of various explosives. There is a Portuguese text of Guevara's book in Brazil, and a mimeographed abridgement of Bayo's 150 questions has been prepared by a terrorist-guerrilla organization in Colombia.

All of these textbooks stress that the guerrilla must be self-sustaining. They not only tell him how to make Molotov cocktails, explosives, and incendiary preparations from materials that he can obtain easily and sometimes even openly at home. They stress that his weapons, his equipment, and supplies should come from "the enemy"--that is, from the security forces in his homeland.

III. Training

We estimate that at least 1,000, and perhaps as many as 1,500 persons came to Cuba during 1962, from all the other Latin American countries with the possible exception of Uruguay, to receive ideological indoctrination or guerrilla warfare training or both. More have gone in 1963 despite the limited facilities for reaching Cuba at present.

The largest contingents have come from Venezuela, Peru, Ecuador, Argentina, and Bolivia. Some of the courses are as short as four weeks, designed to let it appear that the trainees had merely attended some conference or celebration and done a little sightseeing. Other courses last as long as a year, and may include intensive training in such things as sabotage, espionage, and psychological warfare.

We have devoted a great deal of effort to monitoring Latin American travel to Cuba at the main jump-off points such as Mexico and Curacao. (Curacao has not been used since October, but KLM may soon resume flights.) The Cubans go to great lengths to conceal the fact that some of these trainees have ever been to Cuba, and how long they stayed. However, we know a great deal about this travel from our penetrations of the Communist parties, from controlled agents we have been able to maneuver into the training courses in Cuba, and from cooperative travel control authorities in Latin American countries. The Cuban Embassy in Mexico City gives the trainee a visa on a separate piece of paper, so that his passport, when he goes home, will only show that he has been in Mexico. We have a record, however, of those who fly on to Cuba. In other cases, particularly in the case of travel through Montevideo before the quarantine, the Cubans furnished passports under other names for travel by way of Curacao.

We derive some of our figures from travel control points, and another set from the information we receive from penetration agents of established reliability in the Communist parties. Some of the

Latin American governments are also able to maintain fairly accurate lists of their nationals known to have been in Cuba. We get a certain amount of cross-checking from lists of names furnished us by several of our agents who have undergone training, and in confessions of captured guerrillas who had been in Cuba. Thus in the case of Peru, for instance, we come up with a list of 235 names of individuals known to have made extended stays in Cuba in 1961 and 1962. We have to make allowance for some who did not receive guerrilla training, and allowance in the opposite direction for those whose names have escaped our surveillance. But we are guided in these adjustments by the cross-checking information mentioned above.

Some of the trainees arrive, and many go home, by way of the Iron Curtain and Western Europe, using Soviet, Czech, or Cuban aircraft--and probably ships as well--for the trip between Cuba and the Bloc. This is another attempt to conceal their movements, and in some cases permits further indoctrination and training in Bloc countries.

Under the circumstances we consider that our estimate of 1,000 to 1,500 guerrilla warfare trainees in 1962 is reasonably accurate. We also believe that the scope and volume of this training is being stepped up, just as we know that it incresed in 1962 over 1961.

The basic training covers cross-country movement of guerrillas, firing, care of weapons, and general guerrilla tactics. One of our Brazilian agents took such a four-week course more than a year ago, under cover of going to Cuba for a convention. He returned to his Havana hotel every few days during the course to spread the word that he had been sightseeing. An Argentine trainee who took a longer course and then was sent home by way of Europe has given us a great deal of detail on the type of training. He reports that some of the trainees remain indefinitely. The Cubans sometimes refer to these men as their International Brigade. Sometimes they are formed into national units from a particular country, in effect forming a packaged cadre which can be returned to the homeland to lead a "Liberation Army."

A trainee who recently returned to Peru after several months of training in Cuba, said that all his fellow trainees were asked to mark bridges and other similar demolition targets on detailed maps of Peru. They were also required to fill out lengthy questionnaires on sabotage targets, possibilities for subversion of police, methods for illegal entry and travel, suitable drop zones for air supply, possible points of attack against police and military posts, and similar information necessary for directing subversion and insurrection.

Numerous reports come to us indicating that in such countries as Colombia, Venezuela, and Peru, where there are indigenous guerrilla forces either in action or in being in the hills, there are Cubans among the bands acting as leaders, instructors or advisors for these forces. These reports are invariably second-hand, and we have not been able to confirm any of them. In some cases, it has turned out that a reference to "a Cuban" with the guerrillas referred to someone who has been trained in Cuba and was training others, rather than a Cuban national. However, we know positively that three Cuban nationals were involved in the strike violence at La Oroya, Peru, last December, which culminated in several million dollars worth of damage to the smelter of the American-owned Cerro de Pasco mining company. One of these Cubans has also been directing the armed invasions of big ranches in the Andean highlands by land-hungry Indians. Information of this nature contributed to the decision of the Peruvian junta to crack down on Communists in January. In Brazil, the complaint of guerrillas in training camps was that they had been recruited by a promise of Cuban instructors, but found there were none. This came to light when the report of a Cuban intelligence agent, relaying their complaints to Havana, turned up in the wreckage of the Varig airliner which crashed in Peru in November.

IV. Weapons

In general, the Cubans appear to be following the textbook for guerrillas in regard to provision of arms. We have strong evidence, from numerous

sources, that they are telling the guerrilla warfare students and their leaders to obtain their own weapons at home.

One of our agents who was in the original group of Brazilian trainees said he was trained exclusively in the use and maintenance of the Garand M-1 rifle and M-3, Browning and Hotchkiss machineguns. His group was told that these were the weapons Brazilian guerrillas would be able to buy, steal, or capture from the security forces at home. Similarly, an Argentine trainee, an agent, said their instructors told them Cuba would not be sending weapons because there was a plentiful source of supply for any determined guerrilla movement in its own homeland. Leaders of militant groups in Venezuela, Brazil, and Peru who have gone to Cuba seeking assistance have been told by the Cuban leaders that Cuba is willing to furnish funds, training, and technical assistance. Reference to weapons is pointedly omitted. This is reported to us by our agents in these same groups.

We have recently again checked with all of our stations in Latin America to review what evidence we have of military shipments from Cuba. In Peru, radio transmitters were admittedly brought in from Cuba. (In Venezuela so much radio equipment was stolen last fall that this was unnecessary.) In 1962, Cuba furnished cash to buy weapons in Mexico to be smuggled into Guatemala. In Peru, the guerrilla trainees who were rounded up in the Huampani-Satipo incident last March had been issued kits containing a Czech rifle with a pistol grip, apparently of bloc origin. Otherwise, however, in case after case guerrilla hardware turned out to have been bought or stolen locally, or smuggled in from the adjoining country. We do not have a single case where we are certain of the Cuban origin of captured arms.

This is <u>not</u> to say that we are positive weapons have <u>not</u> been sent from Cuba. Latin America has a long tradition of smuggling, a long coastline, innumerable isolated landing fields and drop zones, and inadequate security forces to control all such channels. A Venezuelan Communist leader has been telling guerrilla leaders that Cuba will soon send

them mortars. It is always possible, of course, that he is fabricating to build up the morale of his units, but we must also conclude that if he is indeed making this up, he risks inevitable disillusionment.

In summary, we have evidence that in principle Cuba is not sending identifiable quantities of weapons to Latin American insurgents at present. But we have no reason to believe that they will not or cannot do so, when so doing serves their stated purpose of creating uprisings in Latin American Countries. Needless to say, this is a matter that we consider of most serious concern and we intensively trace every rumor that comes to us of the importation of arms from Cuba to Latin American countries.

V. Funding

Cuban financing of subversive operations in Latin America is easy to ascertain and hard to document. Our evidence shows that it is generally effected by couriers carrying cash. The following are a few examples of these operations.

A Venezuelan politician, Fabricio Ojeda, returned from Cuba in March of 1962, and was seen by several witnesses to have large quantities of US currency stuffed in a false-bottomed compartment of his suitcase. There is no law against bringing currency into Venezuela, so that authorities could not even determine how much he had brought in. Ojeda later was captured, tried, and sentenced for guerrilla activity.

A Nicaraguan exile, Julio Cesar Mayorga Portocarrera, was flying from Mexico to Honduras in September, 1961, when weather forced the plane to overfly Honduras and land in Nicaragua. He was found to be carrying $3,600 in cash, which he admitted he was bringing from Cuba for Nicaraguan rebels in Honduras.

Last March Ecuadorean troops raided a guerrilla training camp in the mountains west of Quito and arrested some 48 members of the Union of Revolutionary Ecuadorean Youth. The leaders of the group admitted

having received guerrilla training in Cuba, together with funds to support their activities. One item of $44,000 was publicized in the press.

A highly placed Guatemalan Communist who defected last November has given us a specific account of procedures by which Cuba sent cash to Mexico to buy weapons which were then smuggled into Guatemala. We also have considerable evidence of involved bank transfers by which Cuban money eventually reached Latin American front groups to pay for political and propaganda activity. In some countries where the Cubans still have diplomatic missions, we have obtained photostats showing that Cuban diplomats paid for printing of front-group propaganda.

In January 1963 one of the first Brazilians to receive guerrilla warfare training in 1961 was picked up with a suitcase full of ammunition he was carrying to some of those same guerrilla training camps exposed when the Varig plane crashed in Peru. The man admitted that a woman attorney in Rio had given him the money to buy a large hacienda as a new guerrilla camp. We know that this woman is a cut-out in the communications between the pro-Communist Peasant Leagues, which have run the camps, and the Cuban embassy.

The principle that guerrillas must be self-sustaining has obviously been applied to finances as well. Communist guerrillas have staged numerous bank robberies in Peru, Venezuela, and Argentina. The most spectacular hold-up was that of a bank in a Lima suburb last year which netted almost $100,000. From the participants, who have been caught, we know that the hold-up was carried out by a combination of guerrillas and ordinary criminals, who divided the loot fifty-fifty. Some of the share of the common criminals has been recovered, but the Communist half is believed to have reached the sizeable guerrilla forces of Hugo Blanco in the Cuzco Valley. In February 1963 a bank in an outlying Venezuelan town was robbed of $25,000 by men wearing FALN armbands.

VI. Cuban Propaganda Broadcasts

International broadcasts by Cuban radio stations maintain a relatively constant propaganda level at all

times, with regularly scheduled and special broadcasts to specific countries as well as general transmissions to all Latin America. The general theme of these broadcasts is that the "Cuban example" is awakening the "people" of Latin America to the opportunity for revolutionary action against the "corrupt" regimes in power and against "Yankee imperialism" which allegedly supports them. Within the last two months there has been an increase in the aggressiveness with which the broadcasts incite revolt.

The official Cuban international service called Radio Havana Cuba is the chief radio propaganda outlet. More commonly known as Radio Havana, this station broadcasts weekly a total of 187 hours and 50 minutes of propaganda in languages which include Spanish, English, French, Arabic, Portuguese, and Haitian Creole, to listeners in Europe, the Mediterranean area, and the Western Hemisphere.

Radio Havana's international service was inaugurated on May Day in 1961. It has grown rapidly since that time and is now Latin America's first international broadcaster in terms of program hours. Its time on the air is as follows, in hours per week:

Haitian Creole to Haiti	- 7 hr
Arabic to the Mediterranean area	- 5 hr 15 min
English to Europe	- 9 hr 20 min
English to the Western Hemisphere	- 17 hr 30 min
French to Europe	- 9 hr 20 min
French to Canada	- 3 hr 20 min
French to Mediterranean	- 3 hr 30 min
Portuguese to Brazil	- 7 hr
Spanish to Europe	- 16 hr 55 min
Spanish to the Americas	- 108 hr 30 min

In addition to the regularly scheduled international service, Radio Havana has been known to broadcast special programs in order to take advantage of unique political situations. When serious disorders broke out in the Dominican Republic in late 1961, for example, broadcasts emanating from a self-styled "clandestine" station which said it was located inside the Dominican Republic demanded the overthrow of the Dominican government. The station went off after about a week, but not before direction finder bearings and other technical clues indicated that it had been transmitting from Radio Havana's transmitting facilities in Cuba.

Radio Havana states that it makes its facilities available to political groups from other Latin American countries so they can beam programs to their homelands. These programs, which have the evident intent of encouraging subversion and inciting revolt, are presently beamed on regular weekly or twice a week schedule to Guatemala, Peru, and the Dominican Republic. Similar programs were beamed to Nicaragua and Honduras until last September when they were replaced by a single program with wider targets now programmed nightly. These special programs are exemplified by the programs transmitted to the Dominican Republic on 28 January. One was a "manifesto" by Dominican Communists (who are based in Cuba) on the recent election of the "demagogic imperialist agent" Juan Bosch as President of the Dominican Republic. Another was allegedly by a pro-Communist group of Dominicans in Cuba called the "National Liberation Movement." It appealed to Dominican university students to demonstrate against the Constituent Assembly meeting in Santo Domingo.

There are also two special programs beamed to the United States. "Radio Free Dixie" is a one hour a week transmission in English aimed at US Negroes. The other program, "The Friendly Voice of Cuba," is somewhat more subtle and aimed at a wider audience. Both programs can be heard well in Florida and also in many parts of southern United States.

The technical facilities of Radio Havana are at a transmitter site at Bauta, some 23 miles

southwest of Havana. At present, no more than four shortwave transmitters are being used, but in the past as many as five have been observed on the air at the same time. These transmitters range in power from 10 to 100 kilowatts, enabling Radio Havana to be heard all over the world. Programs are being sent from studios to the transmitter site by means of microwave relays.

VII. Rival Forces in Latin American Subversion

Since the October crisis, Fidel Castro has obviously been trying to straddle the rift between Moscow and Peiping over global Communist strategy. It has been aptly put that Castro's heart is in Peiping but his stomach is in Moscow. This same split between all-out militancy and a more cautious policy--call it coexistence or "two steps forward, one step back"--is reflected on the extreme left in many Latin American countries. Thus Cuba at present not only seeks to serve two masters, but to choose among rival servants in its Latin American subversion.

Castro's views on what is good for socialism and revolution in Latin America are more in line with those of the Chinese Communists than the Soviets. Only the Cuban and Venezuelan Communist parties are totally committed to terror and revolution. In spite of differences over tactics and timing between various Communist groups, all intend eventually to deliver the Latin American countries into the Communists-socialist bloc. The so-called Soviet "conservative" view, as it is now espoused, is more intent on trying to achieve power by legal means if possible and by subversion rather than by force.

Direct Soviet interest in Latin America is clearly increasing. An excellent example of this was the setting up early in 1962 of a Latin American Institute in the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. The avowed purpose of this institute is to raise the study of the problems of Latin America, which in their own statements the Soviets claim they have neglected, to the highest possible level. Teaching of Spanish and Portuguese

languages is to be stressed in the institute and throughout the school system. A list of subjects on which this institute intends to publish shows that it is to be used to attack the Alliance for Progress; it has already attacked the Alliance program in Colombia--a showpiece of the Alliance. We have been reliably informed that posters have been placed in some Colombian universities referring to the problems of the "national liberation and workers' movements in Latin American countries" as topics which will be studied by the institute. Results of these studies will be published in the near future in a magazine called America Latina, intended especially for distribution in Latin America. A pamphlet, apparently to be distributed by the institute, and entitled Alianza para el Progreso, will in the words of its heralds, "unmask the economic expansion of the USA" in Latin America. The institute also expects to enter into close contact with leading Latin American scientists and academicians during 1963.

One of the most important Communist assets in Latin America is a large number of Bloc diplomatic and Cuban missions. These missions are used to further Communist subversive activities even in countries where there are no Bloc diplomatic missions. The USSR, and in some cases some Satellites as well, have diplomatic missions in Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay. The USSR maintains relations with Bolivia, but has no resident mission there. Cuba maintains embassies in Mexico, Brazil, Bolivia, Uruguay, and Chile. The Chinese Communists have no diplomatic ties in Latin America except with Cuba. That fact alone would make Cuban missions important to the Chinese. Only seven Latin American countries--Chile, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Paraguay, and Peru--have no official ties whatever with any bloc country.

Uruguay offers a good example of how the Communists misuse diplomatic missions and the importance the Communists attach to them. We have found that Communist subversive activities in Uruguay are not now aimed at promoting revolutionary activity against the government. In this case even the Cubans appear to be much more interested in retaining the good will of the government so that they can continue to use the country as a base of operations

against Argentina, Paraguay, etc. Communist diplomatic missions, however, are active in supporting local Communists and other pro-Castro groups to retain enough leverage within the country so as to prevent the anti-Castro groups from forcing a break in relations. The badly split Uruguayan government itself is anti-Communist, but is highly tolerant of the activities of these missions and of the Uruguayan party itself. The USSR, most of the Satellites, and Cuba all have diplomatic missions in Montevideo--some 70 or so bloc personnel. In addition, couriers and travellers can go back and forth between this city and the bloc countries and Cuba at any time.

ANNEX A - ARGENTINA

A participant has given us a detailed account of a six-month guerrilla warfare training course given to 50 Argentine extremists in Cuba from July to December 1962. Instruction included such subjects as weapons and explosives, ballistics, communications, construction of defenses, guerrilla strategy and tactics, map reading, and closed and open order drill. The trainees practiced with Mauser and Garand rifles, Thompson submachineguns, Brownings, bazookas, 81-millimeter mortars, and a 57-millimeter recoilless cannon. Part of the group reached Cuba by way of Chile. Some of the men were given two passports, one Cuban and one Ecuadorean, and returned to Argentina by way of Prague.

Buenos Aires police in July 1962 announced that they had raided a warehouse which had served as headquarters for terrorists working with both the Peronists and Communists. According to the police, the gang was engaged in smuggling Cuban propaganda into Argentina and distributing it; facilitating travel of Argentines to Cuba for guerrilla training; and had carried out about 30 robberies to obtain funds, weapons, and explosives.

A special Cuban office in Montevideo, Uruguay, provides false documentation for Argentines and Paraguayans traveling to Cuba for guerrilla training.

Morais, had a flat tire on 14 December. When a police patrol stopped to investigate, they found he was carrying a number of rifles in his car.

In the last week of January, another of the original batch of trainees in Cuba, Jeronimo Rodrigues Lima, was arrested by national security police at an airport. He was carrying a suitcase full of ammunition for some of the camps which apparently are still operating. Jeronimo Rodrigues at first refused to talk, but in less than 24 hours, disgusted, announced he would tell his whole story. So far, according to the press, he has revealed that a woman attorney in Rio de Janeiro had furnished money with which he had bought another farm to continue the Peasant League guerrilla operation. We know this woman works for the Cuban Embassy. Rodrigues says the farm is in his name, and that if he gets out of jail, he intends to forget the Peasant League, move his family to the farm, and work it.

ANNEX B - BRAZIL

Documents found in a wrecked airliner in Peru now have made public an obvious case of Cuban involvement in subversion directed against Brazil. These are the so-called VARIG documents recovered by Peruvian authorities when an airliner carrying a Cuban commercial delegation crashed near Lima en route from Rio de Janeiro on 27 November.

The documents, a letter and attachments from "Gerardo" to "Petronio," comprised a report from a Cuban diplomat in Rio de Janeiro, writing under a cover name, to his superior in Havana. The letter made it plain that Cuba had financed and supervised efforts by Francisco Juliao, Brazilian Peasant League leader, to set up guerrilla warfare training camps within the framework of his pro-Communist peasant organization. The report, which relays complaints of some of the guerrillas recruited for these camps, makes it clear that the Peasant League guerrilla operation was plagued by confusion and corruption, but leaves no doubt of Cuban involvement, and names many Brazilians involved.

Purely fortuitously, a Brazilian customs police official checking on possible clandestine landing fields in the interior, ran across evidence of the training camps and arranged to have some of them raided even before the Varig aircraft crashed. The raids turned up no evidence pointing directly to Cuba, but the camps happened to be precisely those described in the Gerardo-Petronio correspondence. The Varig document provided the evidence against Cuba, the two independent sources matched their details perfectly, and it has become impossible for the Communists and the Peasant League to obtain serious consideration for any claim that the documents might be forgeries. We in turn are sure of their authenticity.

The Peasant League operation, which was staffed by some of the first Brazilian Communists to take guerrilla training in Cuba in June of 1961, continues to provide evidence against Cuba. Although the Cubans apparently have done their best to avoid all contact with the guerrilla organization since the exposê, Brazilian police continue to turn up further ramifications of the operation. The second-in-command of the Peasant League and head of the guerrilla organization, Clodomir

ANNEX C - CHILE

On 28 October 1962, at the height of the missile crisis, a homemade bomb exploded during assembly in a downtown Santiago apartment house. The Chilean police who searched the apartment found four members of the extremist Social Progressive Group (SPG), 6 cases of Cuban propaganda, 30 sticks of dynamite, 38 fuses, and one small bomb already assembled.

One of those arrested, an SPG leader, who had his hand blown off, had earlier been photographed with three Cuban diplomats. At least two of these, Orlando Prendes Gutierrez and Raul Zayas Linares, have been reliably reported as Cuban intelligence officers. The Chilean police told the press that the group had planned bomb attacks on the US Embassy and residence, US firms, and local public utilities. This incident occurred two days after a clandestine Havana broadcast urging Latin American Communists to attack US property and installations wherever possible in Latin America.

ANNEX D - ECUADOR

Well-placed and reliable agents have reported that the last Cuban chargé in Quito, Ecuador, had given more than $40,000 to the Union of Revolutionary Ecuadorean Youth (URJE) for guerrilla warfare training.

More than 45 young Ecuadoreans, including three girls, were rounded up by Ecuadorean paratroopers last spring at a guerrilla training camp at Santo Domingo de los Colorados, about 50 miles west of Quito. Many of the trainees had been to Cuba. The leaders of the group, Santiago Perez Romoleroux, Jorge Rivadeneyra Altamirono, and Efrain Alvarez Fiallos, had recently returned from extensive guerrilla warfare training in Cuba.

When the Ecuadorean Communist Party last January arranged for the expulsion of several URJE leaders involved with the guerrilla operation in order to restore full Communist control, newspapers reported that the expelled leaders had been accused by the Communists of wasting Cuban funds.

Guillermo Layedra, Communist leader from Rio Bamba, arrested on his return from Cuba in March 1962, was reported to have photographs showing him undergoing guerrilla training in Cuba. Communist Miguel Lechon, the only Indian on the party Central Committee and president of the Ecuadorean Federation of Indians, was arrested in 1962 for shooting a peasant. He showed a Soviet pistol which he said had been given him by Fidel Castro during a visit to Cuba, and has also shown a key which he boasts is the ignition key for a Cadillac Castro has promised to send him as soon as he recruits 300 Indians for the Communist Party.

Reliable sources in Ecuador report that at least 80 Ecuadoreans were in Cuba as of January for guerrilla training. We have 30 of these trainees listed by name.

ANNEX E - PERU

The ruling military junta in Peru started in February 1963 mass trials of more than 200 extremists, including 63 Communist leaders. In a 68-page indictment, the government charges that the extremists have attacked police stations and banks, raised guerrilla forces, incited peasant violence, and caused riots in San Marcos University. The evidence to be submitted in the Lima trial alone runs to almost 700 single-spaced pages. The security forces have given us no evidence of a Moscow-Havana master plan, but there is ample evidence of Cuban involvement.

The trials center on the activities of the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), a roof-organization for extremist militants founded by De La Puente Uceda in 1961. De La Puente had just returned from Cuba and said he brought instructions to "organize the revolution in Peru with economic and technical help from Fidel Castro." This phrase from the indictment conforms with reports our agents received at the time from close associates of De La Puente. He is one of the top extremists who escaped the roundup launched by the junta early in January. We believe he is in Cuba. We have a photograph, taken some time ago, which shows De La Puente and two of his top Peruvian associates with Fidel Castro in Havana.

Although the government did not move against the Communists and other extremist groups with any great vigor, proof of Cuban involvement in subversion goes back at least as far as March 1962. Peruvian police fooled a Cuban-trained agent in the mountains into directing them to a guerrilla camp accessible only by foot, near Satipo, and almost simultaneously raided a house in the Lima suburb of Huampani from which trainees were being sent to the camp. As a result, they found complete guerrilla kits including Czech-made rifles with a pistol grip, instructions for dispatching and equipping the guerrilla candidates, and two radio transmitters brought in from Cuba. The custodian admitted he had used the radios to contact a sister in Havana. Most of the men arrested in this incident were released, but have been picked up again in the January roundup and are to be included in the mass trials.

An agent who took guerrilla training in Cuba last fall has provided a detailed account of his training, lists of other trainees he could identify, and in particular, a list of questions the Cubans apparently gave to all the Peruvians. Possibly it is a standard questionnaire for all guerrilla warfare trainees. The Peruvians were asked to pinpoint possible sabotage targets such as bridges on a large map. The Cuban instructors also wanted information on all kinds of targets for sabotage, chances to subvert the police, possibilities for illegal entry into and travel in Peru, the problems of setting up business firms to cover espionage and agent operations, and information on location of and access to police and military installations.

Three major guerrilla groups, according to good reports from our agents and from Peruvian police, appear to have reached agreement on a plan for coordinated action. This may be one factor that persuaded the junta to move against the extremists.

The main guerrilla strength at present is a force which local police in the Cuzco area estimate to be as large as 2,000 men. This is the guerrilla force led by Hugo Blanco, who is reported by Peruvian authorities to have received his guerrilla training in Argentina. If in fact he has 2,000 men, this figure includes landless peasants and Indians, largely untrained and unarmed; we have no reason to believe that more than a small proportion are trained and equipped guerrillas. The Indians, however, are almost as deadly with rock slings as guerrillas are with rifles. The junta has moved in some troops because the local police detachments have been unable to withstand Blanco's raids. Interrogations and agent reports have established that the guerrillas are buying weapons stolen from or sold by the Bolivian military and smuggled across the frontier into Peru. Some of the money is apparently the Communist share of the $100,000 Miraflores bank robbery.

As one example of the activities of the coordinated extremist forces, a lieutenant of the Guardia Republicana, assisted by half a dozen guerrillas dressed in Guardia uniforms, attacked the village Guardia post in Jauja, 110 miles east of Lima, and overwhelmed it. Arming another score of guerrillas with the captured weapons, the gang then robbed three local banks and retreated to the hills.

ANNEX F - VENEZUELA

Venezuela is the top priority target for Cuban subversion. A campaign of terror is in full swing. Castro, Che Guevarra, Blas Roca and other high-ranking Cuban officials have, as recently as January 1963, told various visiting Latin American Communists that Venezuela is the first goal of Castroism in Latin America. Venezuela is receiving priority attention from Castro, who has claimed that the Betancourt regime will be toppled by guerrilla warfare methods.

It would appear from the meager evidence available in Venezuela, that the Venezuelan Communists have been thoroughly briefed to hide or deny any Cuban involvement in the present guerrilla-terroristic campaign which is being waged in the country. The wave of terror which has existed for months in Venezuela has physically exhausted the handful of competent men in the Venezuelan police system, which has little or no time left over to track down evidence of Cuban involvement.

Support from Havana can be inferred, however, if only from the expert character of the sabotage carried out. In mid-February, for instance, it was discovered that the Communists have begun to use shaped charges to sabotage vulnerable oil pipe lines. Earlier attempts had involved more conventional explosives.

The paramilitary apparat of the Venezuelan Communist Party, which is directly charged with the mission for continuing terrorism in the urban areas, has been actively engaged in carrying out other major acts of sabotage, such as burning down warehouses with advanced combustibles and dynamiting major bridges, pipelines and pumping stations. All of these acts have been well planned and professionally executed. There is circumstantial evidence that the Communist sabotage of the Maracaibo oil fields last October and November was in reply to an appeal from Radio Havana to attack all American installations in Venezuela as a reprisal for the quarantine of Cuba.

Last November a Venezuelan military court tried 139 guerrillas captured in the course of the Puerto

Cabello revolt, and handed out heavy jail sentences. Some of the defendants had previously been in Cuba. One of them, Fabricio Ojeda, who had at one time been photographed in Cuban uniform during Cuban army maneuvers, was known to have brought back a large sum of US currency from Cuba, and had made several trips there. He was also the recipient of large quantities of Cuban Communist propaganda.

Venezuelan police early in January raided a house registered in the name of a Venezuelan Communist known to have made at least one trip to Cuba, and discovered a radio transmitter capable of reaching Cuba. Two Communists were subsequently arrested attempting to enter the house. The armed forces have also heard a voice radio, which appears to be located on the grounds of the Central University in Caracas, communicating with another station which they believe to be in Cuba.

Late last fall a raid on the home of a leader in Caracas of the pro-Communist Movement of the Revolutionary Left turned up a sheet of instructions for procedures in radio communication with Cuba. When the man himself was arrested, police found a radio transmitter being carried in the trunk of his car.

We have received reports from a reliable source that Rafael Martinez, head of the Communist paramilitary apparat (PCV) in Venezuela, asked Castro last September for assistance. Castro reportedly had promised to give the PCV mortars and other weapons. However, Castro is reported to have given Martinez $50,000 instead, and offered to train some of Martinez' men in Cuba. Castro had explained that he was unable to offer arms at that time because the USSR would not permit him to do so. Last month (January 1963), it was further reported that the wife of Martinez, Argelia Laya de Martinez, received an additional sum of $6,000 to finance sabotage operations against North American business installations in Venezuela. Mrs. Martinez was visiting in Cuba at the time that she received these funds.

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INVESTIGATION OF

THE PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM

INTERIM REPORT BY
PREPAREDNESS INVESTIGATING
SUBCOMMITTEE

Of The

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

Under The Authority Of

S. Res. 75

(88th Cong., 1st Sess.)

On

THE CUBAN MILITARY BUILDUP

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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

U. S. Senate,
Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee,
Committee on Armed Services,
May , 1963.

Honorable Richard B. Russell,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services
U. S. Senate

My Dear Mr. Chairman:

There is transmitted herewith an interim report by the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, appointed under Senate Resolution 75 of the 88th Congress, on the Cuban Military Buildup.

In its inquiry to this time the Subcommittee has received testimony in executive session from the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Chiefs of the Army, Navy and Air Force intelligence sections. The interim report transmitted herewith is addressed primarily to a review of military developments and intelligence activities and operations in connection with Cuba from early 1962 to the present insofar as the facts have been developed and are now known to the Subcommittee.

The Subcommittee intends to pursue further its inquiry into the Cuban situation and it is anticipated that one or more subsequent reports on this subject will be issued in the future.

It is necessary that this interim report to the full Committee on Armed Services be classified "Secret." However, the Subcommittee is submitting the report for review for security purposes and will have the report printed and released to the public when it has been so reviewed and the necessary security matters have been deleted.

Respectfully,

JOHN STENNIS,
Chairman, Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee.

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CONTENTS

INTERIM REPORT ON CUBAN MILITARY BUILDUP

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INTERIM REPORT ON CUBAN MILITARY BUILDUP

I. INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT

The dramatic events which occurred last October with respect to Cuba are now history. Following photographic confirmation of the fact that strategic and offensive weapons had, in fact, been introduced into Cuba and President Kennedy's confrontation with Premier Khrushchev, such strategic and offensive weapons were ostensibly withdrawn.

However, the public concern and debate about the Cuban situation has not subsided. There have been and are insistent reports that the Soviets still maintain strategic missiles in Cuba which are concealed in caves and other underground facilities and that Soviet troops are based in the island in numbers far in excess of those accepted by our intelligence community. Reports also abound with respect to the use of Cuba as a base for subversive, agitational and revolutionary activities directed at other Latin American countries.

The prevalence of these reports and allegations prompted the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee to launch an investigation into the entire subject matter in an effort to determine the facts. Although the investigation still continues, the Subcommittee deems it appropriate to issue an interim report at this time. This report will be limited to a review of military developments and intelligence activities and operations in connection with Cuba from early 1962 to the current time insofar as the facts are now known to us. A discussion of the use of Cuba as a base for subversive activities will be included in a subsequent report.

Broadly speaking, the term "intelligence community" includes the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the intelligence sections of the Army, Navy and Air Force, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department of State, the National Security Agency, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the

Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is used in this report, however, in a somewhat more limited sense. Where the term appears in this report it primarily refers to and includes the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the intelligence sections of the Army, Navy and Air Force. Other agencies are, of course, impliedly included in our use of the term to the extent that they participated in or contributed to any of the activities or operations discussed.

Up to this time, the Subcommittee has received testimony in executive hearings from Mr. John A. McCone, Director of Central Intelligence; Lt. Gen. Joseph F. Carroll, Director of Defense Intelligence Agency; Major General Alva R. Fitch, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U. S. Army; Rear Admiral Vernon L. Lowrance, Director of Naval Intelligence; and Major General Robert A. Breitweiser, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U. S. Air Force.

The Subcommittee has also received and has on file a number of written reports from the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We have also considered reports issued by the Special Consultative Committee on Security of the Council of the Organization of American States and the Cuban Revolutionary Council.

In addition, the Subcommittee staff has made an extensive investigation and has thus far interviewed more than 70 witnesses who do not hold official positions, including many Cuban refugees and exiles. Staff investigators spent approximately 45 man days in the Miami area alone.

Information has also been received from individual Senators and Members of the House of Representatives.

This interim report is based primarily on the testimony received from the intelligence chiefs who appeared before the Subcommittee. It does, however, include some information from other sources.

Since our inquiry is not yet completed, this report does not contain any overall or comprehensive conclusions and recommendations. Major findings, based on the testimony and evidence thus far received, relative to intelligence activities during the military buildup have been incorporated. Our general recommendation at this time is that an alert vigilance be maintained over all activities taking place in Cuba.

II. SUMMARY OF MAJOR FINDINGS

1. While hindsight shows that the performance of the Central Intelligence Agency and the military intelligence agencies can be criticized in some areas, in other areas they performed creditably. Offensive weapons systems were identified before becoming operational and their locations and performance characteristics spelled out in a limited period of time despite adverse weather and an almost completely closed society.

2. Although photographic reconnaissance has limitations, it was this capability which ultimately produced incontrovertible proof of the presence of strategic missiles and offensive weapons in Cuba. Credit is due to those involved in this mission.

3. While a reasonably competent job was done in acquiring and collecting intelligence information and data, in retrospect it appears that several substantial errors were made by the intelligence agencies in the evaluation of the information and data which was accumulated.

4. Faulty evaluation and the predisposition of the intelligence community to the philosophical conviction that it would be incompatible with Soviet policy to introduct strategic missiles into Cuba resulted in intelligence judgments and evaluations which later proved to be erroneous. Among these were:

(a) It was not until after a confirming picture was obtained on October 25th, 1962, that it was established by the intelligence community that organized Soviet ground combat units were present in Cuba. At this time our plans for a possible landing in Cuba were substantially complete and were necessarily based upon the information that our forces would face only indigenous Cuban defense forces.

(b) The number of Soviet troops in Cuba was substantially underestimated throughout the crisis. On October 22nd, our intelligence people estimated that there were 8000 to 10,000 Soviets in Cuba. They now say that, at the height of the buildup, there were at least 22,000 Soviet personnel on the island.

(c) It was not until the photographic evidence was obtained on October 14th that the intelligence community concluded that strategic missiles had been introduced into Cuba. In reaching their pre-October 14th negative judgment the intelligence analysts were strongly influenced by their judgment as to Soviet policy and indications that strategic missiles were being installed were not given proper weight by the intelligence community. A contributing factor to this was the tendency on the part of the intelligence people to discredit and downgrade the reports of Cuban refugees and exiles.

5. The Subcommittee has uncovered no evidence to substantiate charges and speculation about a photography "gap" having existed from September 5th to

October 14th. The evidence before the Subcommittee leads to the conclusion that such charges are unfounded.

6. The news reports of an alleged conflict between the Central Intelligence Agency and Strategic Air Command with reference to the operation of U-2 high-altitude reconnaissance flights prior to October 14th were also closely inquired into and found to be without merit. No evidence was presented to support the charge that the operation of the U-2 flights were transferred from the Central Intelligence Agency to Strategic Air Command because of a deadlock or friction between the agencies.

7. To a man the intelligence chiefs stated that it is their opinion that all strategic missiles and bombers have been removed from Cuba. However, they readily admit that, in terms of absolutes, it is quite possible that offensive weapons remain on the island concealed in caves or otherwise. They also admitted that absolute assurance on this question can come only from penetrating and continuing on-site inspection by reliable observers and that, based on skepticism, if nothing more, there is reason for grave concern about the matter.

8. There are literally thousands of caves and underground caverns in the Island of Cuba and many of these are suitable for the storage and concealment of strategic missiles and other offensive weapons. Refugee and exile reports continue to insist that they are being so utilized. Military-connected activities have been noted with reference to a number of them but it is the view of the intelligence analysts that the military usage of the caves is for the storage of those weapons which we know are now in Cuba and not for the storage of offensive weapon systems. Admittedly, however, this view is based to a substantial degree on the negative proposition that there is no hard evidence

confirming the presence of strategic missiles in Cuba at this time.

9. Even though the intelligence community believes that all have been withdrawn, it is of the greatest urgency to determine whether or not strategic missiles are now concealed in Cuba. The criticality of this is illustrated by the fact that, assuming maximum readiness at pre-selected sites, with all equipment pre-located, the Soviet mobile medium range (1100 miles) missiles could be made operational in a matter of hours.

10. The intelligence community estimated that approximately 5000 Soviet personnel were withdrawn from Cuba following the October confrontation, leaving, according to intelligence sources, about 17,500 Soviets in Cuba. A net of 4000 to 5000 additional have been withdrawn since the first of the year, our intelligence people say. However, because of what is described by intelligence as "technical reasons," the 17,500 intelligence estimate of those remaining is unchanged at the writing of this report. At the least, this indicates to the Subcommittee that there is a low level of confidence in the original estimate. There is also some doubt in our minds as to the adequacy of the information as to the number of Soviets newly arriving. All of the intelligence people agree that there is no evidence that any of the combat ground troops associated with the four mobile armored groups have been withdrawn.

11. Some other sources --primarily refugee and exile groups-- estimate that as many as 40,000 Soviets are now in Cuba. Bearing in mind the lack of hard evidence on the question and the substantial underestimation of last Fall, we conclude that no one in official United States circles can tell, with any real degree of confidence, how many Russians are now in Cuba and we are of the opinion that the official 17,500 estimate is perhaps a minimum figure.

12. In any event, it is conceded that the combined Soviet and Cuban forces now in the island are quite powerful defensively and could offer severe opposition to any attack. They are admittedly capable of suppressing any

internal rebellion or revolt mounted without external support, and it is clear that an invasion from without, to have a fair chance of success, would require large forces, extensive sea-borne landing efforts, and adequate air cover.

13. Based upon their judgment that all strategic missiles and offensive weapons have been removed, the intelligence chiefs do not believe that the Communist forces in Cuba now present a direct aggressive military threat to the United States or Latin America. Strategic weapons may or may not be now in Cuba. We can reach no conclusion on this because of the lack of conclusive evidence.

14. The evidence is overwhelming that Castro is supporting, spurring, aiding and abetting Communist revolutionary and subversive movements throughout the Western Hemisphere and that such activities present a grave and ominous threat to the peace and security of the Americas.

III. SITUATION PRIOR TO MID-JULY, 1962

A. Cuban Forces

It was estimated by intelligence sources that at the beginning of 1962, the Cuban ground forces consisted of a standing army of 75,000, a ready reserve of 100,000, and a home guard of 100,000. Although the ground combat capability of the Cuban forces had increased since the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion, it was thought that, although the Cuban forces were of varying states of training, they had the capability for effective ground operations at the battalion combat team level. They were not thought to be organized for operations with units larger than reinforced battalions and it was believed that they were maintained primarily for the purpose of internal security operations and to repel any attempted invasion. The intelligence community thought that approximately 500

Soviet bloc advisory personnel were then in Cuba.

By the beginning of 1962, the Cuban Air Force had benefitted by the acquisition of MIG aircraft and the return of a number of people trained in bloc countries. It had some 40 MIG 15's, 17's and 19's as well as about 40 propeller-driven aircraft of training, transport and utility types.

The Cuban Navy was small and of an essentially coastal patrol type. Several of these craft in the sub-chaser and motor torpedo boat types had been received from the Soviets. The crews on a number of these craft were mixed Cuban and Soviet, indicating that the Cubans were still under training.

It was agreed by intelligence sources, however, that even prior to July, 1962, vast amounts of Soviet military equipment had been introduced into Cuba for the use of the Cuban forces. As a result, it was believed that even then the Cuban Army was one of the best equipped in all Latin America. The arms and equipment furnished the Cubans at this time consisted of a mixture of World War II equipment and more modern weapons. There is a question as to whether the amount of heavy and more complicated weapons introduced into Cuba at this time was not more than ample to supply the needs of the Cuban forces as then constituted.

B. Intelligence Activities and Operations

The intelligence activities with respect to Cuba prior to July, 1962, consisted of reconnaissance overflights by U-2 aircraft, peripheral reconnaissance flights over international waters and the collection of reports from refugees, exiles, and other human sources.

For sometime prior to 1962, U-2 aircraft operated by the Central Intelligence Agency flew one mission a month at high altitudes over the Island of Cuba itself for reconnaissance purposes. Commencing in early 1962, two flights

were flown each month, weather permitting, until September, 1962, when the number of flights was increased.

Also, even before 1962, regular electronic reconnaissance and photographic flights were flown by the military on a regular basis over international waters but not over the Island of Cuba itself.

In addition, during the same period, thousands of human source reports were collected and assessed. Included in these reports were many which contained allegations of missile-related activities and of the presence of Soviet ground combat units in Cuba. However, although the reports were checked to the greatest extent possible, the intelligence community obtained no confirmation of such activities.

In recognition of the increasing importance of the Cuban problem, the intelligence community in early 1962 intensified their intelligence activities and stated a greater urgency in their collection requirements with respect to Cuba. The routine one-a-month flight over Cuba was increased to two a month. The intelligence community was alert to the implications of the communization of Cuba. However, on the basis of the information collected and the assessment of this information, the intelligence conclusion at this time was that the activities were primarily defensively oriented. No Soviet combat units or strategic weapons were discovered.

The intelligence community, although agreeing that the activities in Cuba were then primarily directed towards defense, did conclude in early 1962 that it might probably be expected that the IL-28 (Beagle) light bomber would be supplied to Cuba by the Soviets in the future.

IV. SITUATION FROM MID-JULY TO OCTOBER 22, 1962

A. Buildup in Soviet Forces and Equipment

In late July and early August, our intelligence noted a significant change in the situation in Cuba. A sudden rise in military aid from the Soviet Union became clearly evident. Ship arrivals, both dry cargo and passenger, increased drastically. For example, for the first half of 1962, an average of 15 Soviet dry cargo ships per month arrived in Cuba. The number jumped to 37 in August. Only one Soviet passenger ship had arrived in Cuba during the first five months of 1962. Four arrived in July and six in August.

While our intelligence people were aware from this and other information that a major Soviet effort in Cuba was under way, its exact nature and impact was not clear to the intelligence community.

During the July-August period, refugee reports of alleged missile activity in Cuba increased significantly. These reports were checked out as scrupulously as possible, but even though many of them included consistent and similar descriptions of some form of missile activity, there was no confirmation of them.

At the same time, there were human source reports that some of the ships were unloaded at night under rigid security with all non-Soviet personnel being excluded from the dock areas. The practice of unloading at night in small easily guarded ports, remote from large population centers, was known to the intelligence community, although the alleged security conditions ashore could not be confirmed.

Human source reports also alleged that the nature and character of the arriving Soviet personnel had changed significantly. It was reported that some of the arriving personnel during this period were primarily young, trim,

physically fit, sun-tanned and disciplined, and that they formed in ranks of fours on the docks and moved out in truck convoys. Refugee, exile, and other human source reports suggested that, in contrast to the earlier arrivals, the new arrivals were Soviet combat troops. However, the intelligence community adhered to the view that they were military instructors, advisors, and trainers, plus a number of civilian technicians and advisors associated with improving the Cuban economy. The view was that they did not include significant numbers of Soviet military personnel and that they were not organized into combat units. As late as October 29, in an unclassified information brochure published by the Defense Department entitled "Cuba," the Soviet "personnel" in the island were estimated at 5,000.

B. Identification of Specific Weapons and Equipment

1. SA-2 Sites - About August 15, as a result of suspicions generated by human source reports, the Department of Defense focused special attention on suspected areas and requested that they be covered by the "next" high altitude flight. As a result, the next such flight, flown on August 29, established positive identification of SA-2 surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites at two of the suspect locations and at six others in Western Cuba. Flights from August 29 through October 7 discovered additional SA-2 sites. The SA-2 system can engage targets at altitudes from about 3,000 to 80,000 feet and has a slant range of about 25 miles.

2. Cruise Missiles - A coastal defense cruise missile installation was identified shortly after the flight of August 29. Three additional cruise missile sites were discovered by October 7. These are anti-shipping missiles estimated to have a maximum range of about 40 miles. On August 29th KOMAR class patrol boats with 2 missile launchers each were identified in Cuba.

3. MIG-21 Fighters - Although the Soviets had supplied the Cuban Air Force with MIG-15, 17, and 19 aircraft prior to the Spring of 1962, the presence of the modern supersonic MIG-21 fighter was first confirmed by a picture obtained on September 5, 1962.

4. IL-28 (Beagle) Bombers - As early as the Spring of 1962, the intelligence community was of the view that the Soviets might send the IL-28 (Beagle) light bomber into Cuba. This apprehension was confirmed by a picture taken on September 28 which was later evaluated as showing crates containing IL-28's aboard a Cuba-bound ship. This evaluation was not made until October 9 and was disseminated to the intelligence community on October 10.

5. Medium Range and Intermediate Range Missiles - As has already been indicated, during all of this period there was a great volume of unconfirmed reports and rumors from human sources about strategic missile-related activity in Cuba. None of these reports were confirmed prior to October 14, 1962. It is evident that many of these reports in fact referred to the SA-2 missile, which, although nowhere near the size of the strategic missiles later identified, still appears large to the untrained observer.

However, after mid-September some reports of missiles being introduced into Cuba were suggestive enough of strategic or offensive weapons to arouse the suspicions of intelligence analysts. This resulted in the conclusion--apparently reached near the end of September, 1962--that there was a suspect medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) site in Pinar del Rio Province. As a result, photographic coverage of the suspect area was proposed and on October 14 a Strategic Air Command U-2 reconnaissance aircraft overflew the area and emerged with hard photographic evidence of the San Cristobal medium-range ballistic missile complex.

Photographic reconnaissance was unable to detect precisely how many ballistic missiles were introduced into Cuba. Prior to the Soviet announcement that 42 missiles would be withdrawn, our photographs had revealed evidence of only 33. It could not be established, therefore, how many ballistic missiles were, in fact, introduced into Cuba or how many the Soviets planned to introduce.

Additional medium-range ballistic missile sites and intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) sites were located by high altitude reconniassance missions flown after October 14. Six MRBM sites were located, all of which had achieved a full operational capacity on October 28 when the dismantling of the sites commenced. Three IRBM sites were located and it was anticipated that a fourth would be established. None of the IRBM sites became operational before being dismantled, it being the estimate that they would have become operational by December 15.

The medium-range missile is estimated to have a range of about 1100 miles and the intermediate range missile is credited with a range of 2200 miles

C. Failure to Identify Soviet Organized Ground Combat Units

As has already been noted, notwithstanding some reports that many of the Soviets arriving in Cuba after mid-July were military units, and notwithstanding the evidence of a drastically increased buildup in modern and sophisticated ground weapons, the intelligence community did not identify the presence of Russian organized ground combat forces in Cuba until October 25 when new pictures obtained by low-level photography, coupled with a reanalysis of previous photography, led to the conclusion that there were, in fact, four organized, mobile, and powerful armored Soviet units in Cuba.

The aggregate strength of these units is now estimated by intelligence people to be about 5,000 men.

In addition, it is agreed that the number of Soviet personnel in Cuba was substantially underestimated by our intelligence. For example, on October 22, 1962, the date that the President addressed the nation, the intelligence community estimated the Soviet personnel in Cuba to be 8 to 10 thousand. The current intelligence evaluation is that at the height of the Soviet build-up, there were in Cuba an aggregate of at least 22,000 Soviet troops. This is, of course, a retroactive or reconstructed intelligence estimate. One factor in the underestimation of the number of Soviet personnel in Cuba in October was the assumption that the arriving passenger ships were normally loaded. It is obvious now that these ships were, in fact, troop loaded and that the actual aggregate troop-carrying capacity of the arriving passenger ships was in excess of 20,000. In addition, it is believed that additional Soviet military personnel arrived in cargo ships. There is some reason to doubt that even the 22,000 figure would account fully for all of the great quantities of weapons and equipment introduced into Cuba since June, 1962.

The failure to identify the presence of organized Russian combat units in Cuba and the underestimation of the number of Soviet personnel present there merits special comment. At that time, that is, on October 22, our plans for a possible landing of forces in Cuba, which were already substantially complete, were necessarily based upon the information that our invading forces would be opposed only by indigenous Cuban troops. The fact of the matter is that the native Cuban forces would have been reinforced by highly trained, powerful, and mobile Soviet armored units possessed of tremendous striking power. These facts were not transmitted to the responsible United States commanders until several days subsequent to October 25.

In other words, the true order of battle of the enemy had not been ascertained at the time of the completion of plans for possible landings of our forces in Cuba. This omission could have resulted in our paying a much higher price in casualties in the occupation of Cuba than had been anticipated.

Equally important, since on October 22nd the President did not know of the presence in Cuba of a substantial number of Soviet soldiers in heavily armed organized ground combat units, he could not include this factor in his actions vis-a-vis the Soviets and demand at that time their withdrawal from the Western Hemisphere along with the strategic missiles.

D. Alleged Photographic Gap

There has been considerable public discussion about an alleged gap in our photographic reconnaissance over Cuba during the period from September 5 to ~~September~~ October 14. We have examined this question as thoroughly as possible and have found the allegations with respect to it to be unfounded. The record of the flights which were scheduled between August 29 and October 14 should be sufficient to clear up the situation and these will be summarized here.

The flight of August 29, which has already been discussed, resulted in the discovery of surface-to-air missile and cruise missile sites.

On September 5, a mission was flown which covered the central and eastern portion of the island. Good coverage was obtained of the central portion but weather conditions prevented any photographic returns with reference to the eastern end of the island.

A flight was planned for September 10th but this was not flown.

On September 17, a mission was flown but, because of weather conditions, it was not wholly successful.

Adverse weather precluded further flights until September 26th. Flights were flown on September 26, September 29, October 5 and October 7. These flights completed the coverage of those areas of Cuba which had been spotlighted as requiring early attention.

Weather prevented any additional flights until October 14. On October 12, the Strategic Air Command was given responsibility for operating the U-2 high altitude reconnaissance missions over Cuba, and on October 14, it flew the flight which gave the first hard evidence of the existence of strategic missiles in Cuba.

E. Transfer of U-2 Flights from CIA to SAC

There have been numerous news reports alleging the existence of a conflict between the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Strategic Air Command (SAC) with reference to the operation of the U-2 high altitude flights. These reports have contained allegations that a deadlock existed between CIA and SAC and that this was resolved at the policy level by transferring the function of flying the U-2 missions from CIA to SAC. It has also been alleged that this is one of the reasons for the delay in locating the MRBM sites in Cuba.

These allegations have also been closely inquired into and have been found to be without merit. There is no evidence whatsoever to suggest that any conflict between CIA and SAC existed or that there was any delay in photographic coverage of the island because of the fact that the U-2 program was being operated by CIA prior to October 14.

Likewise, there is no evidence whatsoever of any deadlock between the two agencies or any conflict or dispute with respect to the question of by whom the flights should be flown.

The Subcommittee inquired thoroughly into the reason for the transfer of the U-2 operation from CIA to SAC. It is to be remembered that the SA-2 sites in the San Cristobal area had been located on August 29th. The U-2 flight which was flown on October 14th was programed to over-fly this area. In view of the possibility that the flight might provoke hostile reactions from the SA-2's, it was concluded that it would be more appropriate for the operation to be conducted by the military rather than by civilians. This decision was entirely reasonable and proper.

It is a fact, of course, that the first U-2 flight flown by SAC was the one which resulted in obtaining a photograph of the MRBM site. This, without explanation, originally gave the Subcommittee some concern. However, after inquiring closely into the situation we are convinced that there is no significance to it and that it was just a matter of timing and coincidence.

F. Intelligence Activities and Operations Generally

As has been indicated, the U-2 high altitude reconnaissance flights over Cuba continued at the rate of two a month, weather permitting, until September. The stepped-up schedule for September and early October has already been outlined. All of the U-2 flights prior to October 14th were flown by the CIA.

After the mission which verified the existence of MRBMs in Cuba, there was a concentrated effort to determine the precise nature of the missile buildup and the exact location, number, configuration and state of readiness of the missile systems. Between October 14 and October 22, the Strategic Air Command flew a total of 17 high altitude sorties. Low altitude overflights were not initiated until October 23, the day following the President's message.

During the same period, the peripheral reconnaissance flights over international waters continued, as did the intensified collection efforts using refugees, exiles, and other human sources.

In reviewing the intelligence activities with respect to Cuba, the Subcommittee found areas in which criticism is justly due. In other areas, however, our intelligence did quite well. The MRBMs were discovered while they were in the process of being deployed. The IRBM sites were discovered in a very early stage of construction. The IL-28 bombers were discovered while they were still in their crates. The MIG-21's were discovered when only one had been removed from the shipping container. All these weapon systems were identified, and their locations and performance characteristics spelled out before they became operational in a very compressed and limited period of time despite adverse weather conditions and the fact that we were penetrating an almost completely closed society.

The SA-2 sites were discovered commencing August 29th, and were credited by the intelligence community with becoming operational on a site-by-site basis commencing in mid-September. It is certain that these air defense missiles had attained an operational capability by October 27th. On that date a U-2 plane piloted by Major Rudolph Anderson, USAF, was shot down by an SA-2 and Major Anderson was killed.

CIA and military intelligence, by use of their highly developed photographic capability, were able to give a unique performance in intelligence operations. They ultimately placed in the hands of the President, his advisors and United States diplomatic representatives incontrovertible proof of the presence of Soviet strategic missiles in Cuba in direct contravention of Soviet government assurances. This visual proof unquestionably played a major part in the united action of the Organization of American States and world acceptance of the correctness of our position.

Photographic reconnaissance, however, does have limitations. It is only a part of the total intelligence collection means, although a most important one. It did not reveal the presence of ballistic missiles in Cuba during the period of at least a month between their introduction into the Island and their deployment on sites. The absence of photographic confirmation of human source and other reports, therefore, does not of itself disprove the accuracy of the other sources.

The responsible agencies of the intelligence community appear to have done a creditable job in gathering and collecting quantities of data and information. The deficiency in the performance of the intelligence community appears to have been in the evaluation and assessment of the accumulated data. Moreover there seems to have been a disinclination on the part of the intelligence community to accept and believe the ominous portent of the information which had been gathered.

In addition, the intelligence people apparently invariably adopted the most optimistic estimate possible with respect to the information available. This is in sharp contrast to the customary military practice of emphasizing the worst situation which might be established by the accumulation of evidence.

There also appeared to be a tendency on the part of the intelligence people to discredit and downgrade refugee and exile reports. This was based on the general lack of experience and training of the refugees and exiles as military observers, their frequent inclusion of items not reasonably credible among those things which were within their power of observation as to time, place and comprehension, and on the consideration of the obvious self-interest of the Cuban sources.

Finally, the intelligence community was of the opinion that the Soviets would not introduce strategic missiles into Cuba because they believed that such a development would be incompatible with Soviet policy as interpreted by them. The error inherent in this estimate was clearly demonstrated by subsequent events. The danger that such pre-conceptions will control the weighing of the facts as events unfold is evident.

The influence of these and other factors resulted in several intelligence judgments and estimates which, in the retrospect, proved to be erroneous. A few of these will be mentioned.

The fact that the intelligence community did not accept the fact that organized Soviet ground combat units were being introduced into Cuba until photographic confirmation of this fact was obtained on October 25, and the related fact that the number of Soviets in Cuba was substantially underestimated throughout the entire crisis have already been discussed.

It has also been noted that the intelligence community did not estimate that strategic missiles would be introduced into Cuba until photographic confirmation was obtained on October 14th. It appears that, on this point, the analysts were strongly influenced by their philosophical judgment that it would be contrary to Soviet policy to introduce strategic missiles into Cuba. In retrospect, it appears that the indicators to the contrary were not given proper weight. Among other things the discovery of the surface-to-air missile complex in the San Cristobal area on August 29th could logically have led to the assumption that they were being constructed to protect a strategic missile installation since it was clear that these SA-2's were not being emplaced for the purpose of protecting any existing or known military installation.

V. SITUATION FROM OCTOBER 22, 1962, TO TIME OF REMOVAL OF IL-28 BOMBERS

A. Intelligence Activities and Operations Generally

On the day following the President's statement, that is, on October 23, 1962, low altitude flights over Cuba were commenced and there was a concerted effort to obtain detailed information both about the entire island and selected targets.

During the period from October 22 to December 6 the Strategic Air Command flew a total of 82 high altitude sorties, and from October 23 through November 15, when the low level flights over the island were discontinued, the Air Force and Navy flew a total of 162 low altitude sorties.

B. Identification of Organized Soviet Ground Combat Units

As has already been mentioned, photographs obtained on October 25th provided the first confirmation of the presence of Soviet highly mobile armored task groups in Cuba. The information obtained as a result was first distributed to the operational military commands on October 30th. Up to that time, it was thought that the Soviet ground equipment arriving in Cuba was to be utilized by the Cuban forces.

C. Removal of Missiles and IL-28 Bombers

To a man the intelligence chiefs believe that, following the October crisis and quarantine, the Soviets removed from Cuba 42 medium range ballistic missiles and related equipment, intermediate range ballistic missile equipment, and 42 IL-28 jet light bombers.

A comprehensive and concentrated aerial reconnaissance and fleet observation program endeavored to cover every aspect of the exodus of this equipment. This program involved high and low altitude flights over Cuba, accompanied by intensive sea and aerial surveillance of the departing ships over Cuba and Caribbean waters and continued surveillance across the Atlantic.

The effort was directed at covering the dismantling and abandonment of the missile sites, at covering the roads and highways leading from the sites to the ports, and at covering the port areas to observe the material as it arrived, was assembled on the docks and loaded aboard ships.

As stated, the intelligence community believes that all strategic missiles and bombers which were in Cuba at the time of the quarantine were removed by the USSR. However, they acknowledge the existence of continuing reports to the contrary and freely concede that, in terms of absolutes, it is possible tha despite our surveillance program, we were misled and deceived.

VI. CURRENT MILITARY SITUATION IN CUBA

A. Intelligence Activities and Operations Generally

Since the withdrawal of the strategic missiles and the IL-28 bombers the intelligence community has turned its primary attention to surveillance of the situation as it now exists. High level U-2 photographic flights continue on a regular basis. Since the U-2 was shot down on October 27 there has been no further attempt to interfere with our aerial reconnaissance. The reason for this one incident amidst a pattern of acquiescence in the overflights remains a matter for speculation.

The collection efforts using the technical and the various human sources available, such as refugees, exiles, and returned prisoners of the ill-fated Bay of Pigs operations, and others is a continuing process. The close surveillance of merchant shipping arriving and departing Cuba, by naval air and surface ships continues, as does the peripheral surveillance by electronic reconnaissance and photographic aircraft. There is additional surveillance of the aircraft activity over and near Cuba, from bases and ships to the extent that radar range permits.

A particular focus of attention has been the prospect that Cuba might become a base for Soviet submarine operations. There have been repeated rumors and speculations that such is already the case. Much of this is related to the Soviet assistance to Cuba in improving and expanding certain commercial fishing facilities. The intelligence community, however, does not believe that in fact Cuba is now, or has been, a base for Soviet submarines.

Admittedly, however, no spectacular operation is necessary to provide temporary advance base type support to submarines, sufficient to greatly extend their time on station away from bloc nation ports, and to facilitate their operations generally. Reasonably sheltered anchorages or ports with sufficient depth, ready supplies of diesel fuel, fresh water, food supplies, and relaxation facilities ashore for the crews greatly extend the time away from home for any submarine. The presence of a few skilled technicians and a supply of the high usage repair parts would additionally extend operational periods considerably. The use of shore-based long range communication systems and information from surface and shore-based radio and radar nets would greatly facilitate Soviet submarine operations in the Caribbean as well as assist in attempts to evade detection.

B. <u>Nature and Capabilities of Forces and Equipment Now in Cuba</u>

1. <u>Types and Numbers of Weapons</u> - As previously mentioned, it was testified that the native Cuban forces are organized only at reinforced battalion level with the effective modern weapons for such units, including rifles, machine guns, light and heavy mortars and considerable field artillery. For an organization of that type they have a rather large amount of mechanized equipment, tanks, self-propelled artillery and armored personnel carriers.

They also have available a considerable amount of anti-tank guns and light antiaircraft guns suitable for use against low flying aircraft. How much of the large numbers of additional crew-operated weapons of the types mentioned above are now in Cuban hands is apparently not known or estimated.

The Soviet organization has a powerful modern array of weapons in plentiful numbers. There are 24 SA-2 sites of 6 launchers each, in a tight knit perimeter air defense of the entire Island of Cuba. These weapons are similar to our NIKE-HERCULES and are very good indeed. Their fire control system is also estimated as of a high order of effectiveness. They have brought in a large amount of ammunition for these units. The SA-2 system which is quite complex is manned by Soviet troops. It would take over a year of intensive training, including quite technical schooling, for the native Cuban troops to replace the Soviets in the SA-2 system. Probably associated with the SA-2 sites for low level air defense, as well as in local defense of other important sites, are some of the large additional numbers of light antiaircraft guns brought in by the Soviet Expeditionary Force. Whether any or all of these weapons are manned by Soviets is apparently not known.

There are four cruise missile sites, with missiles of a range of about 30 to 40 miles from their ground launchers. The missiles are placed as part of the coastal defense system of Cuba, which is the normal Soviet employment of these weapons. They are manned by Soviet naval crews. As an added feature of these missiles, there are at least one hundred fifty (150) of them in Cuba, far more than could be logically associated with the known missile launching sites. It may be speculated that the launchers for these missiles may have been in some of the bloc shipping turned back by the October Quarantine and thus failed to reach Cuba.

The Soviet naval contingent in Cuba also operates 12 KOMAR-type high-speed patrol craft as part of the Cuban coastal defenses. These boats are each equipped with a pair of cruise-type missiles. The missiles are estimated to have a range of 10 to 15 miles. These boats are under Soviet control, but Cubans are believed to have been observed aboard them. The KOMARS are apparently the only Soviet naval craft introduced into Cuba as part of their expedition.

The Soviet Army element of the Soviet expedition in Cuba is armed with almost all of the weapons found in large Soviet troop formations. Many of these weapons, of the type characteristic of elements of mechanized and motorized divisions, reinforced by artillery and other units, are known to be in surprisingly large numbers. As mentioned before, the amounts, if any, handed to the Cubans from the many hundreds of heavy weapons brought in by the ships of the Soviet expedition, are not fully known. These weapons include heavy tanks and medium tanks, to a total in Cuba, both in Soviet and Cuban hands, of almost 400. There are several score self-propelled assault guns; over 200 57mm anti-tank guns; over 500 light, medium and heavy mortars; over 600 field artillery pieces; around 400 antiaircraft guns, both 300 mm and 57 mm; almost 100 armored personnel carriers, a number of the truck-mounted multiple launchers for the 130 mm rocket, all brought in over and above the numbers already in Cuban hands. In addition, of course, quantities of various types of motor vehicles, radio equipment and engineer equipment were also brought in.

To the above must be added two very modern Soviet Army tactical missiles The first is the SNAPPER, a wire guided anti-tank missile similar to our SS-10 and SS-11. The second is the FROG, a rocket with a range of about 25 miles,

which can be equipped with a nuclear warhead. It is similar to our HONEST JOHN.

According to our intelligence, the Soviet Air Force in Cuba has approximately 42 MIG-21's, one of their most modern high performance supersonic jet fighters. They are equipped with infra-red seeking, homing missiles similar to our SIDEWINDER. Associated with them is a net of radars and radios necessary for their control and the integration of the entire air defense system, SA-2 and fighter.

2. Strength and Capabilities of Forces

The estimate of the strength of the Cuban army remains at the same level as before the crisis, that is, 75,000 in the regular Army, 100,00 in the Militia and 100,000 in the form of a home guard.

The native Cuban Army capabilities are believed generally limited by their organization. They are probably able, as before the crisis, to suppress an insurrection, depending upon the degree of support the insurgents obtain from the people of Cuba, and the amount of effective outside help given. It also has a limited degree of static defense ability against modern highly organized and heavily supported forces such as those employed in United States amphibious and air-borne landing operations. The lack of an organization which would permit coordinated operations by units larger than reinforced battalions indicates a low probability that any such combat would be of long duration.

The Cuban Navy is estimated to number some 4000 to 5000 men and to consist of 6 KRONSTADT patrol craft and a relatively small number of other coastal patrol craft. Although its previously slight capabilities have been

somewhat enhanced by the provision of Soviet equipment and by training, it is not believed to be very effective and is generally limited to coastal patrol activities.

The Cuban Air Force consists of a Cuban manned jet fighter force of about 70 MIG-15's, 17's, and 19's, about 14 World War II propeller fighters, about 18 propeller-driven tactical bombers, a considerable quantity of antiaircraft equipment, plus a limited number of trainers, transports, and helicopters. The modern MIG-21 jet fighters which are in Cuba are not believed to have been turned over to the Cubans.

The effectiveness of the Cuban Air Force is not readily apparent. The assortment of fighters for air defense have varying performance characteristics. The effectiveness of its bomber force would probably be limited to action against insurgents in or invaders of Cuba who were not possessed of any real air cover or air defense capability.

The Soviet Expeditionary Force is still currently credited by the intelligence community with a total strength of about 17,500. Of these, about 2000 are believed to be Soviet Navy, with about 1000 manning the cruise missile sites, and the remainder in the KOMAR missile-bearing patrol boats, supporting Cuban ships and headquarters, security and other miscellaneous assignments. About 7800 Soviets are believed in the Air Force and Air Defense system, which includes the personnel manning the SA-2 system. This leaves an estimated 7700 soldiers to man all the weapons and equipment of the Soviet Army contingent in Cuba.

At this point it must be said that there is no really hard evidence of the number of Soviets who are now in Cuba. While 17,500 is still the official estimate of our intelligence people, despite the reported withdrawal of some

4000 to 5000 since the first of the year, the level of confidence in its accuracy varies even within the intelligence community. Other sources present considerably higher estimates --some ranging up to 40,000 and more. Bearing in mind the substantial underestimation of last October, we can only conclude that no one-- outside of Soviet and Cuban official circles --knows how many Russian troops are now there. The 17,500 estimate is perhaps a minimum figure.

In any event, it is believed that the Soviet expedition, combined with the Cuban forces, as an entity, is quite powerful in a defensive sense. The air defense system is believed to be of a high order of effectiveness. The coastal defense cruise missiles do not form a tight perimeter defense of the Cuban shoreline, evidently because the quarantine turned back the necessary launchers to complete an interlocking net similar to the SA-2 system. This gap in the island defense may be partially covered by the KOMAR missile craft. The Soviet Army units, trained in mobile aggressive armored warfare, if well coordinated with the static defense ability of the Cuban native forces, could offer severe opposition to any attack. This opposition would be sufficient to make it necessary to mount a large sea-borne landing effort along with any desired air-borne effort in order to be sure of success. The public evidence of the forces assembled during the October crisis indicate that the combination of Soviet and Cuban forces would require the bulk of the ready forces in the United States and the Atlantic Ocean.

Based upon their judgment that all strategic missiles and offensive weapon systems have been removed, the intelligence community does not believe that Cuba now presents any major direct military threat to the United States or Latin America in an offensive or aggressive sense. Strategic weapons may

or may not be now in Cuba. We can reach no conclusion on this because of lack of conclusive evidence.

It is clear, however, that as a source of weapons and small bands of provocateurs, saboteurs, agents of revolution and chaos it is a distinct and present threat to all of the Latin American nations with shores on the Atlantic Ocean and Caribbean Sea. It might be relatively difficult to engage in the smuggling of tanks, self-propelled guns, and heavy truck-towed artillery. Light mortars, machine guns, rifles, and the ammunition for these weapons, grenades, explosives, radios and bribe money are an entirely different matter. Gun running is an ancient art in Central and South America, well-practiced and well-understood in many quarters. Modern facilities make Cuba, as a centrally located base for such Communist operations, a present and grave menace to the peace and security of the Western Hemisphere. The use of Cuba as a base for subversion will be discussed in more detail in a later report.

3. Reports of Concealed Strategic Weapons in Cuba

Reports from refugee, exile and other human sources insist that the strategic missiles and bombers were not removed from Cuba but are concealed in caves and otherwise. The intelligence community, although aware of these reports, have been unable to confirm them and adhere to the position that all strategic weapons are withdrawn.

It is fair to say, however, that this is a matter of great concern to the intelligence community. Based on skepticism, if nothing else, there is grave apprehension on this score. It is agreed that iron-clad assurance of the complete absence of Soviet strategic missiles in Cuba can come only as a result of thorough, penetrating on-site inspection by reliable observers. The

current intelligence estimate that they are not present is based largely on the negative evidence that there is no affirmative proof to the contrary. This of course, was precisely the status of the matter prior to last October 14.

There is no doubt that there are literally thousands of caves and caverns in Cuba and that it is feasible to use many of these for the storage and concealment of strategic missiles and other offensive weapons. It is also true that military activity has been observed in connection with these caves. Our intelligence people are of the opinion that some of the caves are in fact utilized for the storage of military items and equipment other than strategic missiles, such as ammunition, explosives, etc.

The importance of making every effort to ascertain the truth with respect to this matter cannot be over-emphasized. The criticality of it can best be illustrated by the fact that the testimony established that, upon the assumption that all missiles and associated equipment and the necessary personnel were readily available near pre-selected sites in a state of complete readiness, mobile medium range missiles could be made operational in a matter of hours. Thus, if these missiles and their associated equipment remain in Cuba, the danger is clear and obvious.

The possible installation of advance submarine bases in Cuba has already been discussed.

4. <u>Withdrawal of Soviet Personnel</u>

Even though the intelligence community believes that a net 4000 to 5000 Soviet military personnel have been withdrawn from Cuba since the first of the year, because of what intelligence describes as "technical reasons" the previous intelligence estimate of approximately 17,500 Soviets in Cuba remains unchanged. At the very least this suggests to the Subcommittee that

there is a low level of confidence in the original estimate. There is also some question in our minds as to the adequacy of the information as to the number of Soviets newly arriving. Admittedly, there could have been undetected arrivals at smaller ports, where it is known that cargo ships have repeated their prior practice of unloading at night under conditions of strict Soviet-imposed security. Since night photographic methods were not employed, we have little knowledge of what happened in these cases. In any event, as the matter stands at the writing of this report, the intelligence community does not believe it yet has sufficient concrete evidence to estimate any reduction in overall Soviet military capability on the Island. There is no evidence that any of the combat troops associated with the four armored groups have been withdrawn.

C. Summary of Threat Arising from Soviet Presence in Cuba

Our summary of the threat and potential threat which the Soviet presence in Cuba [illegible] presents to the Americas is as follows:

1. Cuba is an advanced Soviet base for subversive, revolutionary and agitational activities in the Western Hemisphere and affords the opportunity to export agents, funds, arms, ammunition and propaganda throughout Latin America.

2. Assuming without deciding that all strategic weapons have been withdrawn, there is the ever-present possibility of the stealthy re-introduction of strategic missiles and other offensive weapons, using the Soviet forces still in Cuba as camouflage and security for the activity.

3. Cuba serves as an advance intelligence base for the USSR.

4. The potential exists to establish electronic warfare capabilities based on Cuba.

5. The vital Panama Canal could be the target for sneak raids originating from Cuba.

6. Potentially, Cuba is a base from which the Soviets could interdict our vital air and sea lanes. It can now be used for the air, sea, and electronic surveillance of our military activities in the Southeast United States and the Caribbean.

7. Cuba's airfields could serve as recovery air bases for planes launched against the United States from the Soviet Union.

8. Advanced Soviet submarine bases could be established in Cuban ports with very little effort.

9. The continued presence of the Soviets in Cuba could require a further reorientation of the U.S. air defenses.

10. Cuba provides a base for the training of agents from other Latin American countries in subversive, revolutionary, agitational and sabotage techniques.

11. The very presence of the Soviets in Cuba affects adversely our nation's image and prestige. Our friends abroad will understandably doubt our ability to meet and defeat the forces of communism thousands of miles across the ocean if we prove unable to cope with the communist threat at our very doorstep.

A consideration of all these matters serves to emphasize the gravity of the threat to our national security which Cuba now represents.

D. <u>Prospect of Internal Revolt or Invasion</u>

The continued presence of the Soviet expedition in Cuba can now be seen to be a most effective shield against either internal revolt by native insurgents, or invasion by external forces from any source. The ringing of the

Island by the Soviet air defense and missile system, and the island-wide evidence of impressive, powerful, armored Russian troop units, all apparently immune from attack, has been and will be an increasing psychological damper to the fires of revolt. We can only expect, under present circumstances, that whatever capacity and will to resist communism may exist among the people in Cuba, will wither and shrink. The communization of the younger element creates simultaneously an increasingly militant communist nation.

The withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Cuba would remove a primary psychological prop of Castroism, and remove what is presently being used as a physical shield against any overt effort to keep alive the fires of freedom in Cuba. As mentioned before, the ability of Castro's native Cuban forces standing alone, to withstand any insurrection, depends upon the support the Cuban people give to the insurgents, and the effective outside help given to insurgent forces.

VII. CONCLUDING STATEMENT

Barring some development which is unforeseen at this time, the public debate will probably continue as to whether missiles and other strategic weapons are now based in Cuba and as to the number of Soviet troops being maintained there. These things are certainly of undeniable importance. The matter of basic and fundamental importance, however, and the source of the real threat, is that international communism now has a firm foothold in this hemisphere and that, if we permit it to do so, it is here to stay.

The Soviets are in Cuba primarily for the purpose of increasing and spreading communism's influence and power in Latin America and we can be sure that they will exploit their foothold to the greatest extent possible. The paramount danger at this time is that the nations of this hemisphere may be subverted one by one and be exploited, in turn, for subversive and revolutionary activities. By this process of erosion our neighbors to the South may fall nation by nation until the entire hemisphere is lost and the Communist goal of isolating the United States has been attained.

Communism, of course, operates on a world-wide scale and its methods and techniques are always adapted to the environment in which it operates. With this in mind, the value to the USSR of the occupation of Cuba is apparent. The techniques of communist subversion may vary from simple infiltration to violent intervention. Whatever its form, however, in Cuba as elsewhere it is conceived, developed and perfected by the leaders of world communism for the purpose of furthering their concept of world domination. Its aim and goal is to destroy existing political, economic and social orders and to replace them with new and dictatorial regimes which presuppose the complete physical and moral control of subjugated peoples.

This aim and goal has already been ahcieved in Cuba. It will be abhieved elsewhere in Latin America unless positive steps are taken to prevent it. We must be prepared to take appropriate and positive action in our own national self-interest and in the interest of the collective security of the Western Hemisphere.

The Communist domination and occupation of Cuba, and the resulting menace to our security, requires and demands that the United States be ever alert and vigilant to all of its sinister implications. We must exercise the greatest surveillance and watchfulness possible, and use all available resources, for the purpose of ascertaining the true military situation in that unhappy island and to insure that we will not again be deceived and surprised. The entire Cuban problem, both military and political, should be accorded the highest possible priority by our governmental officials to the end that the evil threat which the Soviet occupation of Cuba represents will be eliminated at an early date.

Mr. Califano
Col Patchell ?

March 29, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT A. HURWITCH, Department of State

SUBJECT: Missile Crisis Section of the President's Draft Report to Congress on US Participation in the UN During 1962

Pursuant to our telephone conversation, the attached draft has been reviewed and the Department of Defense has no objection to it, subject to the following changes:

1. Page 3, Line 8: Change number "25" to "24." Reason: Accuracy, based on official Department of the Navy records.

2. Page 3, Line 10: Change "12" to "16" and "25" to "24." Reason: Accuracy.

3. Page 34, Lines 14 and 15: Insert "10" before word "November," "and observed" before "42," and "ballistic" before "missiles." Reason: Clarity and more accurate detail.

4. Page 37, Lines 13-15: Insert "by December 6" before "its promise" and "42" before "IL-28." Eliminate the sentence "and, by December 6, the US was informed that all bombers (42 in number) had left," and substitute "their removal being confirmed by aerial reconnaissance and by along-side observation at sea on the decks of the Soviet ships carrying them back to the USSR." Reason: Provide additional positive detail, particularly with reference to the IL-28 removal being based upon confirmed observation and not merely upon information provided by the USSR.

Page 42, Line 9: Insert "more vigilant and" before "stronger." Reason: Strengthen prime point that increased awareness of Communist duplicity and potential threats resulted from crisis, particularly in the OAS.

Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
Special Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

28 March 1963

U17,171/P-2

SUBJECT: Missile Crisis Section of the President's Draft Report to Congress on US Participation in the UN During 1962

TO: General Counsel
Department of Defense

Intelligence content of subject draft has been reviewed and the following comments are submitted:

1. Page 3, Line 8: Change number "25" to "24." Reason: Accuracy, based on official Department of the Navy records.

2. Page 3, Line 10: Change "12" to "16" and "25" to "24." Reason: Accuracy.

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5. Page 42, Line 9: Insert "more vigilant and" before "stronger." Reason: Strengthen prime point that increased awareness of Communist duplicity and potential threats resulted from crisis, particularly in the OAS.

Joseph F. Carroll

JOSEPH F. CARROLL
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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JOSEPH F. CARROLL
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

March 27, 1963

10:40 am
3/28/63
phoned Col. "Tiny" Moore & he'll have DIA look at it & report to me

MEMORANDUM FOR THE GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Attached is a draft of the missile crisis section of the President's Report to Congress on United States Participation in the United Nations during 1962.

The Department of State has drafted this report and sent it to me for Department of Defense clearance. I should appreciate it if you would read the report and return it to me with any comments by 1200 hours on March 29, 1963.

Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
Special Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army

Attachment
As Stated

cc:
Mr. Yarmolinsky
Mr. McGiffert
General Carroll (DIA)

GC 2490

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Mr Califano

TO : CCA - Mr. Hurwitch

DATE: March 27, 1963

FROM : RPA - William G. Bowdler WGB

SUBJECT: Defense Clearance of Missile Crisis Section of President's Report To Congress on US Participation in UN During 1962.

UNP, with RPA's cooperation, has prepared the attached draft chapter on the missile crisis for the President's annual report to Congress on US participation in the UN.

Mr. Monsma is handling clearance of the chapter within ARA. I have been asked to obtain Defense clearance. When I spoke to Mr. Knaur about this last week, he touched base with Mr. Yarmolinsky and came back with the reply that the most expeditious way to get DOD clearance is through CCA channels. Could you please arrange for this to be done as quickly as possible as the report is now overdue?

ARA/RPA:WGBowdler:jjv

Mr. Califano

March 27, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

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Signed
Joseph A. Califano, Jr.

Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
Special Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army

Attachment
As Stated

cc:
Mr. Yarmolinsky
Mr. McGiffert
General Carroll (DIA)

DRAFT PRESIDENT'S REPORT 1962

SOVIET OFFENSIVE WEAPONS IN CUBA

Soviet Buildup

On October 22, President Kennedy announced to the nation and to the world the "secret, swift and extraordinary buildup" by the Soviet Union of offensive missiles in Cuba and the initial steps that the United States was taking to cope with this threat. Information on the buildup had been given to the President the previous Tuesday morning (October 16) and, during the week that followed, surveillance was stepped up, confirming evidence evaluated, a course of action decided upon, friendly governments notified and consulted, the members and machinery of the Organization of American States (O.A.S.) brought into the picture, and American defenses in the Caribbean strengthened and put on the alert.

The President revealed that a serious threat against the peace and security of the Americas was being secretly mounted by the Soviet Union on the "imprisoned island" of Cuba. Sites for medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) capable of carrying a nuclear warhead 1,000 nautical miles had been rapidly and secretly installed and additional sites not yet completed were designed for intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) capable of travelling twice as far and thus posing a nuclear threat to most of the major cities of the Western Hemisphere. This urgent transformation of Cuba into a strategic base with nuclear striking capacity constituted an explicit threat to the peace and security of the Americas in defiance of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) of 1947, "the traditions of this nation and hemisphere," and the Charter of the United Nations. This Soviet action contradicted the repeated assurances of Soviet spokesmen, both

/publicly and

publicly and privately delivered, that the arms buildup in Cuba would retain its original defensive character. Neither the United States nor the world community, the President emphasized, could tolerate the deliberate deception and offensive threat represented by the clandestine deployment of strategic nuclear weapons.

To meet this threat the United States was taking immediately the following steps: 1) to halt the buildup, a strict quarantine of all offensive military equipment under shipment to Cuba was being initiated and, should offensive military preparations continue, "further action will be justified;" 2) the United States declared that it would regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union, requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union; 3) Guantanamo was being reinforced; 4) the Council of the Organization of American States was being convened to apply the Rio Treaty in support of hemispheric security; and 5) under the Charter of the United Nations, the United States was requesting an emergency meeting of the Security Council. Finally, the President called on Chairman Khrushchev "to halt and eliminate this clandestine, reckless, and provocative threat to world peace and to stable relations between our two nations."

U.S. Objective

This was a difficult and dangerous effort on which the United States had set out, the President concluded, "but the greatest danger of all would be to do nothing." On the military side, steps were taken to strengthen defenses in the Caribbean and to put United States forces in a posture to apply the quarantine. The Department of Defense had ordered all tours of duty of Navy and Marine personnel extended until further notice; the

/Guantanamo naval

Guantanamo naval base defenses were strengthened; air power was built up in the Southeastern portion of the United States; and military deployment put 5,000 marines and 40 naval vessels in the Caribbean, initially as part of a training exercise. Following the resolution adopted by the Organ of Consultation of the Council of the Organization of American States (described below) the President issued a proclamation establishing the quarantine of Cuba as of 10 A.M. on October 24. The Department of Defense ordered the interdiction of 25 Soviet merchant vessels known to be headed for Cuba. At 8 A.M. on October 25 the first interception of a Soviet ship, the oil tanker Bucharest, took place, and the ship was allowed to proceed. 12 of the 25 Soviet vessels heading for Cuba turned around and no encounter with a contraband-carrying vessel occurred during the Cuba affair.

From the beginning it was clear that in the political and diplomatic realm U.S. policy had two immediate tasks. The first and most proximate task of U.S. diplomacy was to show that the Soviets had in fact used guile and deception to emplace in Cuba offensive nuclear weapons, and that our evidence was conclusive. The second was to halt further shipments and bring about rapidly and effectively the removal of the offensive weapons, under U.N. supervision, before the quarantine could be lifted. The United States was prepared to negotiate on modalities and to consider various formulae but not to abandon this goal.

From the start, both the Organization of American States and the United Nations were involved. Resources and institutions of this hemisphere were used to underline its solidarity and determination, and to convince the Soviet Union that elimination of the offensive weapons was a purpose to which the hemisphere was solidly committed. From the start, too, it was clear that

/the United Nations

the United Nations would have a crucial role. It was the forum in which the evidence of Soviet guilt could be most convincingly exposed to a world-wide audience, world opinion mobilized, and the world verdict pronounced. It was, also, a ready and efficient mechanism for diplomatic communications. The United Nations served as a site where U.S. and Soviet negotiators could easily meet. The Secretary-General himself supplied an important link between the parties particularly during the first days when tension was highest. Thirdly, although Cuba prevented their employment, the United Nations proved itself willing and able to devise acceptable mechanisms for inspection and verification of dismantling and removal of the offensive weapons and for safeguards against their reintroduction. The United Nations was also prepared to carry out the necessary operational responsibilities. Simultaneously with the President's speech, therefore, the United States took diplomatic steps to set in motion the political machinery of the O.A.S. and the U.N.

O.A.S. Action

In Washington the U.S. Representative on the Council of the Organization of American States (C.O.A.S.) sent a note to the Acting Chairman requesting the immediate convocation of the Council as a Provisional Organ of Consultation under Article 6 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty). This article provides for immediate consultation on measures to be taken for the common defense and for the maintenance of peace and security of the Continent when "the inviolability of the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any American States should be affected by an aggression which is not an armed attack or by an extra-continental conflict, or by any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America."

/The O.A.S.

The O.A.S. Council met on the morning of October 23. Secretary of State Dean Rusk sitting as the U.S. Representative described the nature of the threat to this hemisphere and the count measures which the United States considered it essential for the inter-American system to take. He stated that "the Soviet intervention in this hemisphere with major offensive weapons challenges as never before the determination of the American Governments to carry out hemispheric commitments solemnly assumed in inter-American treaties and resolutions for the defense of the peace and security of the nations of the hemisphere against extra-continental aggression or intervention." He proposed that under the Rio Treaty the Council, serving as Organ of Consultation, without delay "call for the immediate dismantling and withdrawal from Cuba of all missiles and other weapons of offensive capability and ... recommend ... that the member states of the Organization of American States take the necessary measures to ensure that Cuba does not continue to receive additional offensive weapons ... and if necessary to prevent the offensive capacity already acquired by the Castro regime from being used to destroy the peace and security of the hemisphere."

The Secretary noted that the United States was simultaneously asking the U.N. Security Council to act in the matter. He observed: "The threat is to our hemisphere and we have primary responsibility and duty to act as we are now doing, as a hemisphere. But the threat originates from outside the hemisphere and it is appropriate that the extra-continental power which challenges our inter-American commitments ... be dealt with in the forum in which that power participates. It is therefore fitting in this case that the Security Council of the United Nations be requested to call upon this member

/to refrain

to refrain from his aggressive actions against us and seek to enforce upon him its decisions. Meanwhile, without awaiting the outcome of the United Nations approach, we must ensure that our hemisphere is effectively quarantined against any further addition to Soviet offensive nuclear military power in our midst."

Following a general discussion of the danger confronting the hemisphere the Council voted 19 to 0 (Bolivia abstained for lack of instructions) to constitute itself provisionally as the Organ of Consultation (C.O.A.S./O.C.). Then, at the suggestion of the U.S. Representative, the Organ of Consultation adjourned for several hours to permit a number of delegations to consult their governments and receive instructions on the draft resolution presented by the United States to deal with the threat confronting the hemisphere.

The Organ of Consultation reconvened that same afternoon. Debate centered on the draft resolution. As each representative spoke, it became evident that the American republics were solidly united in their determination to resist this most dangerous threat tothe peace and security of the hemisphere. A few delegations were not in a position to vote affirmatively on certain provisions of the resolution, attributable for the most part to domestic constitutional considerations, but when the resolution as a whole was put to a vote, the support was unanimous. In one of the historic decisions of the inter-American system the Organ of Consultation: (1) called for "the immediate dismantling and withdrawal from Cuba of all missiles and other weapons with any offensive capability," and (2) recommended that "the member states, in accordance with Articles 6 and 8 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, take all measures, individually and collectively including the use of armed force,

/which they

which they may deem necessary to ensure that the Government of Cuba cannot continue to receive from the Sino-Soviet powers military material and related supplies which may threaten the peace and security of the Continent and to prevent the missiles in Cuba with offensive capability from ever becoming an active threat to the peace and security of the Continent." The resolution also expressed "the hope that the Security Council will, in accordance with the Resolution introduced by the United States, dispatch United Nations observers to Cuba at the earliest moment."

Following the meeting of the Council of the Organization of American States/Organ of Consultation and pursuant to the recommendations contained in the second paragraph of the resolution adopted, President Kennedy issued the Presidential Proclamation interdicting the delivery of offensive weapons and associated material to Cuba, to commence at 10:00 A.M. Eastern Standard Time on October 24. The proclamation stated that the Secretary of Defense "shall take appropriate measures to prevent the delivery of prohibited material to Cuba, employing the land, sea and air forces of the United States in cooperation with any forces that may be made available by other American states." The Secretary of Defense was authorized to designate prohibited or restricted zones and prescribed routes and declared that "any vessel or craft which may be proceeding toward Cuba may be intercepted and may be directed to identify itself, its cargo, equipment and stores and its ports of call, to stop, to lie to, to submit to visit and search, or to proceed as directed." Any vessel that refused to comply with directions might be taken into custody. In carrying out the order force was not to be used except in case of failure or refusal to comply with directions or

/regulations

regulations after reasonable efforts had been made to communicate with the vessel or craft, or in self-defense.

In the days immediately following, twelve other American republics offered assistance in support of the quarantine operation: Argentina, Dominican Republic, Venezuela, Costa Rica, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Panama, and Nicaragua. Several of these offers included naval units, posing the problem of coordination of forces. Consequently, on November 5, the C.O.A.S./O.C. recommended that the contributing member states take among themselves the technical measures necessary to establish an efficient and coordinated action. Pursuant to this recommendation, the governments of Argentina, the Dominican Republic and the United States on November 9 notified the C.O.A.S./O.C. of the establishment of an Inter-American Combined Quarantine Force into which they were integrating their respective naval units and placing officers of the participating navies on the staff of the Commander of the Combined Quarantine Force.

Security Council Consideration

Simultaneously with the call for a meeting of the O.A.S. Council, Ambassador Adlai Stevenson in New York requested the President of the Security Council -- that month the Soviet Representative -- to call an urgent meeting of the Council "to deal with the dangerous threat to the peace and security of the world caused by the secret establishment in Cuba by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of launching bases and the installation of long-range ballistic missiles capable of carrying thermonuclear warheads to most of North and South America." "The United States," he wrote, "now has incontrovertible evidence that the U.S.S.R. has been installing in Cuba a whole series of facilities for launching offensive nuclear missiles and other offensive weapons and installing the weapons themselves."

/The establishment

The establishment of these bases, Ambassador Stevenson declared, "constitutes a grave threat to the peace and security of this hemisphere and of the whole world." It should be the purpose of Security Council action, he concluded, "to bring about the immediate dismantling and withdrawal of the Soviet missiles and other offensive weapons in Cuba, under the supervision of United Nations observers, to make it possible to lift the quarantine which is being put into effect." He also expressed the willingness of the United States to confer with the Soviet Union "on measures to remove the existing threat to the security of the Western Hemisphere and the peace of the world."

Ambassador Stevenson transmitted a draft resolution which called for the immediate dismantling and withdrawal from Cuba of all missiles and other offensive weapons, and which authorized the sending to Cuba of a U.N. observer corps to assure and report on compliance with the resolution. The resolution called for an end to the U.S. quarantine of military shipments to Cuba when the above terms were complied with and recommended that the United States and the U.S.S.R. "confer promptly on measures to remove the existing threat."

The Security Council held four meetings on October 23, 24, and 25. By the time the first meeting opened on the afternoon of October 23, the Soviet Union and Cuba had introduced two parallel letters to the President of the Security Council making similar requests for an urgent meeting of the Council in an attempt to change the focus of the question. They contended that U.S. countermeasures and "aggressive action" against Cuba constituted the real threat to peace in the Caribbean. Under Rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, the Cuban Representative was invited to participate in the discussion of the matter before the Security Council.

/Ambassador

Ambassador Stevenson's opening speech put the issue in the perspective of Soviet post-war aggressive expansionism. He traced the "vast plan of piecemeal aggression" and "the basic drive to abolish the world of the Charter" which had characterized Soviet policy in the post-war years and which had not been altered by the present Soviet Government. Contrasting the history of Soviet expansionism and rejection of the principles of the Charter with the United States record of loyal support for the Organization and "the world of the Charter," Ambassador Stevenson regretted that some members "seemed to believe that the cold war is a private war between two great super powers." "It is not a private struggle," he insisted, "it is a world civil war -- a contest between the pluralistic world and the monolithic world -- a contest between the world of the Charter and the world of Communist conformity." "The Castro regime," he pointed out, "has aided and abetted an invasion of this hemisphere" and "has given the Soviet Union a staging area in this hemisphere" by inviting "an extra-continental, anti-democratic and expansionist power into the bosom of the American family" and by making itself "an accomplice in the communist enterprise of world domination." The Soviet Union, he continued, had secretly transformed Cuba into a formidable missile and strategic airbase, armed with the deadliest, most far-reaching modern nuclear weapons, in an attempt to put all the Americas under a "nuclear gun" and to intensify the "Soviet diplomacy of blackmail." The day of forbearance is past, he concluded. "If the United States and the other nations of the Western Hemisphere should accept this new phase of aggression, we would be delinquent in our obligations to world peace." He could not believe that the Soviet leadership had deluded itself into supposing the United States lacked the nerve and will to use its power, and he voiced the hope that the Soviets would call an end "to this new

/phase of

phase of aggression." He urged the Council to call for the immediate withdrawal of Soviet missiles and other offensive weapons from Cuba.

Ambassador Stevenson then informed the Security Council, in accordance with Article 54 of the Charter, that the Council of the O.A.S. had adopted a resolution by 19 affirmative votes (as noted above) calling for the dismantling and withdrawal of the offensive weapons, recommending that member states of the O.A.S. take all measures to ensure that the threat was removed from the continent, and expressing the hope that the Security Council will "dispatch U.N. observers to Cuba at the earliest moment."

Ambassador Stevenson thus made three points before the Security Council which defined the themes for the debate during the rest of the week:

(1) The Soviet action in sending thousands of military technicians to its puppet in the Western Hemisphere, supplying jet bombers capable of delivering nuclear weapons, installing missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads and preparing sites for additional missiles with a range of 2,200 miles, and doing these things through deceit and under the cloak of secrecy, were in defiance of the security commitments of the Organization of American States and in violation of the Charter of the United Nations, and contained a manifest threat to this hemisphere and to the whole world.

(2) The action and policy of the United States in this matter were in consonance with the U.N. Charter and had the unanimous backing of the Organization of American States.

(3) The Security Council should remove the threat by calling, as the resolution proposed, for the immediate dismantling and withdrawal from Cuba of all missiles and all offensive weapons; authorizing and requesting the Secretary-General to dispatch to Cuba a U.N. observer corps to assure and

/report in

report in compliance with this resolution; calling for termination of the quarantine upon U.N. certification of such compliance; and urgently recommending that the United States and the Soviet Union confer promptly on measures to remove the existing threat to the security and the peace of the world and report thereon to the Security Council.

Following Ambassador Stevenson's presentation, the Cuban and Soviet Representatives made their initial statements. The Cuban Representative, Mr. Garcia-Inchaustegui, denounced the naval "blockade" as an "act of war" and declared that the Cuban people had answered the "armed attack" with general mobilization. He asked the Council to call for the immediate withdrawal of all troops, ships and planes deployed on the approaches to Cuban shores, and for the cessation of all "interventionist" measures. The Cuban Representative also contended that the United States had no right to ask for dismantling and disarmament and that "logically, U.N. observers should be sent to the U.S. bases from which invaders and pirates emerge to punish and harass a small state." He insisted that Cuba "will not accept any kind of observers in matters which fall within our domestic jurisdiction."

The Soviet Representative, Ambassador Zorin, declared that the United States charges were "a clumsy attempt to cover up aggressive actions" in Cuba. He described the U.S. quarantine as a "new and extremely dangerous act of aggression" and as "undisguised piracy." During this first encounter, while avoiding direct reference to the presence of Soviet missiles or bombers in Cuba, Ambassador Zorin declared that accusations that the Soviet Union had "set up offensive armaments in Cuba" were false, and officially confirmed the statement already made by the Soviet Union in this connection, "that the Soviet Government has not directed and is not directing to Cuba any offensive armaments." He also recalled the statement of Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs

/Andrei Gromyko

Andrei Gromyko in the General Assembly just a month previously (September 21, 1962) that "any sober-minded man knows that Cuba is not ... building up her forces to such a degree that she can pose a threat to the United States ... or else a threat to any state of the Western Hemisphere."

Ambassador Zorin submitted to the Security Council a statement published by the Soviet Government that day which addressed a "serious warning to the United States Government, to advise it that, in carrying out the measures announced by President Kennedy, it is taking on itself a heavy responsibility for the fate of the world;" declared that the Soviet Government will do "everything in its power to frustrate the aggressive designs of U.S. imperialistic circles;" and appealed to all governments and peoples to raise their voices in protest against the "aggressive acts" of the United States and strongly to condemn such acts. He introduced a draft resolution condemning the "actions of the Government of the United States designed to violate the Charter of the United Nations and to intensify the threat of war." The Soviet resolution insisted that the United States "repeal its decision on the control of ships of other states going towards the shores of Cuba," and called upon the United States, Cuba, and U.S.S.R. "to establish contacts and enter into negotiations for the purpose of normalizing the situation and thereby removing the threat of war."

At the request of the Representative of Ghana the meeting was adjourned to the following morning so that representatives might consult with other delegations outside the Council.

The Next Morning: October 24

The next morning, the Security Council heard the Representative of Venezuela, Mr. Sosa-Rodriguez, associate the Latin American nations with the action taken by the United States pursuant to the O.A.S. resolution. He noted

/that "it has

that "it has been proved that the Soviet Union has set up in Cuba rocket bases that might deliver nuclear missiles to about 1,000 miles distance, and that, apparently, it is at present setting up others for rockets with a range of up to 2,200 miles." This had created an atmosphere of insecurity and concern in the countries of the American hemisphere which felt themselves directly threatened by such weapons. The weapons in Cuba, the Venezuelan Representative emphasized, were no longer defensive but offensive, and "they are of a magnitude that might be sufficient to wipe out any of the American republics and drag the world into the holocaust of nuclear war." He described the apprehension felt throughout the continent at Cuban subversive activities, including the introduction of agents, propaganda, and weapons to equip guerrilla forces in American republics. Ambassador Sosa-Rodriguez recalled the resolution adopted by the Organization of American States and declared that he was speaking for the entire continent in asking the Security Council to take measures to stop nuclear weapons from arriving in Cuba and to have the presently existing bases of nuclear rockets in Cuba dismantled.

Sir Patrick Dean, Representative of the United Kingdom, noted that by no stretch even of the Soviet imagination could a nuclear missile with a range of 2,200 miles in Cuba be called defensive, and recalled assurances on this point by Foreign Minister Gromyko and President Dorticos of Cuba at the General Assembly the previous month. "While the Soviet Government were acting their lie," he stated, "the orders were being given, plans laid and preparations being made for the supply of missiles to Cuba. Who can possibly believe in the honesty of the Soviet Government's intentions in these circumstances?" The United Kingdom, he concluded, considered that the United States acted properly by coming to the Security Council at the first possible moment. Now the Security Council must take immediate and urgent steps to restore confidence

/in the Western

in the Western Hemisphere by having these offensive missiles dismantled and withdrawn. The United Kingdom fully supported the U.S. resolution before the Council.

The Representative of Rumania, Mr. Malitza, supported the Soviet position. The Irish Foreign Minister, Mr. Aiken, underlined world concern with the growth of Soviet intervention in Cuba. He appreciated Cuban concern with its national security, "but it is a far cry from that to a military buildup of the kind which the Cuban Government now appears to have embarked upon with the massive assistance of the Soviet Union." He could not understand "why the Soviet Union should have chosen this moment to establish new missile and bomber bases on the island of Cuba?" The Foreign Minister believed he perceived some common ground in the U.S. statement to the Security Council of October 22 which declared U.S. willingness "to confer with the Soviet Union on measures to remove the existing threat to security of the Western Hemisphere," and in the Soviet draft resolution which proposed that the United States, U.S.S.R. and Cuba establish contacts and enter into negotiations.

The Security Council reconvened that evening, some forty-eight hours after President Kennedy's historic speech. The naval quarantine had gone into effect at 10:00 A.M. that morning. Members knew that if a Soviet ship attempted to run the quarantine the result would be serious. They also knew that the President had indicated that the quarantine was an "immediate step" which would be followed by "further action" if the Soviet missiles were not removed.

At this meeting the Council heard statements by those members who had not yet spoken: France, China, Chile, United Arab Republic, and Ghana. In addition to expressions of support for the U.S. resolution by France and China, the highlights of the meeting were the statement of Chile, the United Arab

/Republic-Ghana

Republic-Ghana "restraint resolution," and the first formal intervention of the Secretary-General. Ambassador Seydoux, the Representative of France, noted that "the appearance of foreign nuclear missiles on Cuban soil...cannot be considered as other than a serious initiative aimed at creating a new war front in a region which up to now has been free from such threats." He stated that the U.S. had demonstrated clearly that it is seeking a peaceful solution in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and that the solution proposed by the U.S. was desirable in the interest of the countries concerned and "in order to banish once and for all the dangers with which world peace is threatened by the recent developments in Cuba." Ambassador Liu, for the Republic of China, noted that it was particularly disturbing to see Cuba transformed, as a result of Sino-Soviet intervention, into an armed base for communist penetration of the Americas. He declared that the measures initiated by the United States designed to call an immediate halt to the shipment of military material to Cuba were justified and supported the U.S. draft resolution as a reasonable and peaceful solution.

Speaking for Chile, Ambassador Schweitzer endorsed the security measures of the regional system and expressed support for the U.S. draft resolution. He welcomed the authorization that the U.S. draft resolution gave to the Secretary-General to dispatch an observer corps to Cuba. "Unfortunately," he said, "the Representative of Cuba yesterday rejected this idea. At such a decisive moment as this, we believe Cuba should trust the methods of the United Nations for putting out the flames of conflict and for ensuring peace. One such method could be to ensure the United Nations presence in a zone of conflict .... We make a fervent and heartfelt appeal to Cuba to accept such a procedure."

/The United Arab

The United Arab Republic Representative, Mr. Mahmoud Riad, declared that his country "cannot condone the unilateral decision of the United States of America to exercise the quarantine" which he characterized as contrary to international law and likely to increase world tension. He recalled that Dr. Dorticos had told the General Assembly that the weapons Cuba had acquired were "defensive in nature" and called for "normalization" of relations between Cuba and the United States. At the same time he reaffirmed U.A.R. policies against the spread of nuclear weapons. He urged all parties to refrain from tension-aggravating action and called for negotiations. The Ghanian Representative, Mr. Quaison-Sackey, took a similar position, stating that he had no "incontrovertible proof...as to the offensive character of military developments in Cuba" and therefore could not condone the quarantine. He also called for negotiations to resolve the crisis on the basis of "mutual respect for sovereign rights." The U.A.R.-Ghana joint draft resolution requested the Secretary-General "to promptly confer with the parties directly concerned on immediate steps to be taken to remove the existing threat to world peace, and to normalize the situation in the Caribbean;" and called on the parties concerned to comply forthwith with the resolution, to provide every assistance to the Secretary-General, and "to refrain meanwhile from any action which may directly or indirectly further aggravate the situation." The formula proposed was thus limited to a general appeal for mediation by the Secretary-General, but provided neither for the suspension of the Soviet offensive buildup nor for U.N. involvement in inspection and verification.

U Thant Proposal of October 24

At the close of the meeting, the Secretary-General revealed that he had

/just addressed

just addressed an urgent appeal to President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev which proposed "the voluntary suspension of all arms shipments to Cuba, and also the voluntary suspension of the quarantine measures involving the searching of ships bound for Cuba." Thant believed that such voluntary suspension for a period of two to three weeks would greatly ease the situation and give time to the parties to "meet and discuss." He offered to "make myself available to all parties for whatever services I may be able to perform."

In addition to this appeal to President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev, the Secretary-General took the occasion of the Security Council meeting to address an urgent appeal to the President and Premier of Cuba, declaring that "it would also contribute greatly to the same end if the construction and development of major military facilities and installations in Cuba would be suspended during the period of negotiations." He then appealed to "the parties concerned" to enter into negotiations immediately, "even this night," irrespective of other procedures, with the first subject to be discussed being the "modalities" to achieve his suggestions. Significant in U Thant's intervention were his offer to make himself available to U.S. and Soviet negotiators "for whatever services" he might perform and the concrete suggestion for "suspension" of Soviet arms shipments and of the construction and development of major military installations in exchange for the suspension of the quarantine.

The next day, President Kennedy's reply reminded the Secretary-General that the threat "was created by the secret introduction of offensive weapons into Cuba, and the answer lies in the removal of such weapons." The President noted that the Secretary-General had "made certain suggestions and...invited preliminary talks to determine whether satisfactory arrangements can be assured" and indicated that "Ambassador Stevenson is ready to discuss promptly

/these

these arrangements with you." Premier Khrushchev's reply welcomed U Thant's initiative and characterized the situation "as highly dangerous and calling for the immediate intervention by the United Nations."

When the Security Council reconvened Thursday afternoon for what proved to be the last formal meeting on the Cuban crisis, Ambassador Stevenson welcomed both the course adopted by the Soviet Union the previous day to avoid direct confrontations in the zone of quarantine and the report that Mr. Khrushchev had agreed to the proposals advanced by the Secretary-General. Nevertheless, the situation remained serious and Ambassador Stevenson set the theme in his opening remark by inviting the Council to address itself to "the realities of the situation posed by the buildup of nuclear striking power in Cuba."

Ambassador Stevenson cautioned the Council not to forget that "we are here today...for one single reason: because the Soviet Union secretly introduced this menacing offensive military buildup into the island of Cuba while assuring the world that nothing was further from its thoughts." Already the Communists had attempted to distort the record by arguing that it was not the Soviet Union which created this threat to peace by secretly installing these weapons in Cuba, "but that it was the United States which created this crisis by discovering and reporting these installations. This is the first time, I confess," the U.S. Representative continued, "that I have ever heard it said that the crime is not the burglary but the discovery of the burglary." He noted that some representatives in the Council say that they do not know whether the Soviet Union has in fact built in Cuba installations capable of firing nuclear missiles over ranges from 1,000 - 2,000 miles. If further doubt remained on this score the United States would

/gladly

gladly exhibit photographic evidence to prove the truth of the charges.

One by one Ambassador Stevenson demolished the arguments that Ambassador Zorin had presented at the first Security Council meeting. As for the "thirty-five bases in foreign countries" which the Soviet Representative had mentioned, the fact was that there were such missiles with the forces of only three of our allies -- the United Kingdom, Italy, and Turkey -- and that these were established by the decision of Heads of Government in December 1957 "which was compelled to authorize such arrangements by virtue of a prior Soviet decision to introduce its own missiles capable of destroying the countries of Western Europe." Why was it necessary for the Western Hemisphere nations to act with such speed? The "speed and stealth" of the Soviet offensive buildup in Cuba demonstrated the premeditated attempt by the Soviet Union "to confront this hemisphere with a <u>fait accompli</u>." If the United States had not acted promptly and had delayed its counteraction, "the nuclearization of Cuba would have been quickly completed." He stressed that the United States had acted promptly to put into process "the political machinery which we pray will achieve a solution to this grave crisis." The one action in the last few days which had strengthened the peace was the determination to stop this further spread of weapons in this hemisphere. The United States was now in the Security Council, Ambassador Stevenson noted, because it wished the machinery of the United Nations "to take over to reduce these tensions and to interpose itself to eliminate this aggressive threat to peace and to ensure the removal from this hemisphere of offensive nuclear weapons and the corresponding lifting of the quarantine."

When Zorin again attempted to delude the Council about the facts of the Soviet offensive buildup, a dramatic encounter occurred between

/Stevenson and

Stevenson and Zorin, which exposed the truth beyond doubt.

STEVENSON: Well, let me say something to you, Mr. Ambassador: We do have the evidence. We have it, and it is clear and incontrovertible. And let me say something else: Those weapons must be taken out of Cuba.

Next, let me say to you that, if I understood you, you said -- with a trespass on credulity that excels your best -- that our position had changed since I spoke here the other day because of the pressures of world opinion and a majority of the United Nations. Well, let me say to you, sir: You are wrong again. We have had no pressure from anyone whatsoever. We came here today to indicate our willingness to discuss U Thant's proposals -- and that is the only change that has taken place.

But let me also say to you, sir, that there has been a change. You, the Soviet Union, have sent these weapons to Cuba. You, the Soviet Union, have upset the balance of power in the world. You, the Soviet Union, have created this new danger -- not the United States....

Finally, Mr. Zorin, I remind you that the other day you did not deny the existence of these weapons. Instead, we heard that they had suddenly become defensive weapons. But today -- again, if I heard you correctly -- you say that they do not exist, or that we have not proved they exist -- and you say this with another fine flood of rhetorical scorn. All right, sir, let me ask you one simple question: Do you, Ambassador Zorin, deny that the U.S.S.R. has placed and is placing medium and intermediate-range missiles and sites in Cuba? Yes or no? Do not wait for the interpretation. Yes or no?

ZORIN: I am not in an American courtroom, sir, and therefore I do not wish to answer a question that is put to me in the fashion in which a prosecutor puts questions. In due course, sir, you will have your reply.

/STEVENSON:

STEVENSON: You are in the courtroom of world opinion right now, and you can answer "yes" or "no". You have denied that they exist -- and I want to know whether I have understood you correctly.

ZORIN: Will you please continue your statement, sir? You will have your answer in due course.

Inasmuch as Zorin delayed his response, Stevenson proceeded to present conclusive evidence of the existence of Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba. This consisted of a display of enlarged aerial photographs and maps pinpointing the details and location in Cuba of Soviet bomber aircraft and of Soviet missile bases, complete with launching sites and supporting equipment, "in short, all of the requirements to maintain, load, and fire these terrible weapons." When Zorin's reply again evaded the question of whether the Soviet Union had installed offensive missiles in Cuba, Stevenson challenged the Soviet Union to ask the Cubans to permit a UN team to visit the sites he had identified in order to authenticate the evidence.

The proposal made by the United Arab Republic, and supported by Ghana, to postpone further work of the Council and to adjourn the meeting was adopted without objection, in the light of the willingness of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to consult with the Secretary-General on his suggestions of the previous day. The Security Council thus adjourned but remained "seized" of the problem while the parties negotiated. The scene then shifted from the formal chamber of the Security Council to the informal chambers of the Secretary-General.

/Weekend Negotiations:

Weekend Negotiations: The Kennedy-Khrushchev Letters

That weekend (October 26-28) there was an exchange of letters between Moscow and Washington which transformed the nature of the Cuba crisis. On October 26, Khrushchev sent a letter to President Kennedy making certain proposals on the removal of offensive weapons from Cuba. On October 27, another letter from Khrushchev, which was broadcast before delivery, also expressed willingness to withdraw the weapons but proposed to link the question of Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba to the unrelated issue of strategic weapons in Turkey. The USSR would "agree to remove from Cuba those means which you regard as offensive means; we agree to carry this out and made a pledge in the United Nations. Your representative will made a declaration to the effect that the United States of America, on its part, considering the uneasiness and anxiety of the Soviet State, will remove its similar means from Turkey...After that persons entrusted by the United Nations Security Council may check on the spot the fulfillment of the pledge made by either side." Of course. he added, "the authorisation of the Governments of Cuba and of Turkey would be necessary for the entry into those countries of these agents." In addition, Khrushchev proposed that the United States and the USSR give pledges against invasion of Cuba and Turkey respectively and solemn promises to respect the sovereignty and the inviolability of the frontiers of these countries.

This tie-in of Turkey with Cuba was immediately rejected by the United States. A statement issued by the White House that day noted that several inconsistent and conflicting proposals had been made by the USSR in the past twenty-four hours, including the one just broadcast.

/The proposal

The proposal involved the security of nations outside the Western Hemisphere and it was the Western Hemisphere nations alone that were the subject of the threat which produced the crisis. The position of the United States, the statement read, was that "as an urgent preliminary to consideration of any proposals work on the Cuban bases must stop; offensive weapons must be rendered inoperable; and further shipment of offensive weapons to Cuba must cease -- all under effective international verification." As to proposals concerning the security of nations outside this hemisphere, the statement concluded, the United States and its allies had long taken the lead in seeking properly inspected arms limitation, on both sides. These efforts could continue as soon as the present Soviet-created threat was ended.

President Kennedy's letter to Chairman Khrushchev of the same day (October 27) replied to Khrushchev's letter of October 26.

"As I read your letter," the President wrote, "the key elements of your proposals which seem generally acceptable as I understand them are as follows:

"1. You would agree to remove these weapons systems from Cuba under appropriate U. N. observation and supervision; and undertake, with suitable safeguards, to halt the further introduction of such weapons systems into Cuba.

"2. We, on our part, would agree -- upon establishment of adequate arrangements through the United Nations to ensure the carrying out and continuation of these commitments -- (a) to remove promptly the quarantine measures now in effect, and (b) to give assurance against an invasion of Cuba, and I am confident that other nations of the Western Hemisphere would be prepared to do likewise."

Assuming work ceased on offensive missile bases in Cuba and all weapons systems in Cuba capable of offensive use were rendered inoperable, under effective UN arrangements, the President was prepared to have representatives in New York work out an arrangement in cooperation with the Secretary-General for a permanent solution along the lines suggested in Chairman Khrushchev's letter of October 26.

On Sunday, October 28 -- Chairman Khrushchev broadcast the text of his reply. In addition to earlier instructions to discontinue further work on weapons construction sites, he said, the Soviet Government "has given a new order to dismantle the arms which you described as offensive, and to crate and return them to the Soviet Union." The letter stated:

"I regard with respect and trust the statement you made in your message of October 27, 1962, that there would be no attack, no invasion of Cuba, and not only on the part of the United States, but also on the part of other nations of the Western Hemisphere, as you said in your same message. Then the motives which induced us to render assistance of such a kind to Cuba disappear.

"It is for this reason that we instructed our officers -- these means as I had already informed you earlier are in the hands of the Soviet officers -- to take appropriate measures to discontinue construction of the aforementioned facilities, to dismantle them, and to return them to the Soviet Union. As I had informed you in the letter of October 27, we are prepared to reach agreement to enable United Nations Representatives to verify the dismantling of these means.

"Thus in view of the assurances you have given and our instructions on dismantling, there is every condition for eliminating the present conflict."

/Chairman

Chairman Khrushchev sent a copy of this message to U Thant "to enable you to familiarize yourself with our position, which we regard as exhaustive and which will help you to discharge your noble functions." At the same time, he informed the United States and the United Nations, that in connection with the negotiations U Thant was conducting with representatives of the USSR, the United States, and Cuba, the Soviet Government was sending First Deputy Foreign Minister V. V. Kuznetsov to New York to help U Thant in his "noble efforts aimed at eliminating the present dangerous situation."

President Kennedy replied at once to the broadcast message of October 28 even before the official text reached him, and welcomed it as "an important contribution to peace." The operative paragraph read:

> "The distinguished efforts of Acting Secretary-General U Thant have greatly facilitated both our tasks. I consider my letter to you of October 27 and your reply of today as firm undertakings on the part of both our governments which should be promptly carried out. I hope that the necessary measures can at once be taken through the United Nations as your message says, so that the United States in turn can remove the quarantine measures now in effect. I have already made arrangements to report all these matters to the Organization of American States, whose members share a deep interest in a genuine peace in the Caribbean area."
>
> "I agree with you," the President concluded, "that we must devote urgent attention to the problem of disarmament...I think we should give priority to questions relating to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, on earth and in outer space, and to the great effort for a

/nuclear test ban.

nuclear test ban. But we should also work hard to see if wider measures of disarmament can be agreed and put into operation at an early date. The United States Government will be prepared to discuss these questions urgently, and in a constructive spirit, at Geneva or elsewhere."

A. U.S. statement issued the same day welcomed the Khrushchev response and stated: "We shall be in touch with the Secretary-General of the United Nations with respect to reciprocal measures to assure the peace in the Caribbean area."

Weekend Negotiations in New York

Meanwhile steps continued in New York to reach agreement on practical means of avoiding conflict at sea and on arrangements to carry out the Secretary-General's suggestion for stopping work on the offensive bases and screening further shipments as conditions of suspending the quarantine.

The initial aim of the Secretary-General was to avoid an incident at sea. What concerned him most, he had written on October 25 to Chairman Khrushchev, was that a confrontation at sea between Soviet ships and United States vessels "would destroy any possibility of the discussions I have suggested as a prelude to negotiations on a peaceful settlement." He therefore asked that Soviet ships already on their way to Cuba be instructed to stay away from the interception area for a limited time in order "to permit discussions of the modalities of a possible agreement." The next day (October 26), the Secretary-General addressed a parallel letter to President Kennedy, informing him of his approach to Chairman Khrushchev and requesting that "instructions may be issued the United States vessels in the Caribbean to do everything possible to avoid direct confrontation with

/Soviet ships

Soviet ships in the next few days in order to minimize the risk of an outward incident." He expressed the further hope that such cooperation could be the prelude to a quick agreement in principle on the basis of which the quarantine measures could be called off as soon as possible.

Premier Khrushchev accepted the proposal and "ordered the masters of Soviet vessels bound for Cuba...to stay out of the interception area, as you recommend." President Kennedy welcomed U Thant's efforts for a satisfactory solution and stated that if the Soviet Government accepts and abides by his request that Soviet ships already on their way to Cuba stay out of the interception area during the period of preliminary discussions "you may be assured that this Government will accept and abide by your request that our vessels in the Caribbean do everything possible to avoid direct confrontation with Soviet ships in the next few days in order to minimize the risk of any untoward incident!" At the same time the President underlined that this was a matter of great urgency in view of the fact that certain Soviet ships were still proceeding toward Cuba and the interception area.

Screening Shipments

As the White House statement on October 27 made clear, the urgent preliminary to the consideration of any proposals for a solution was that work on the Cuban bases stop, the offensive weapons be rendered inoperable, and further shipment of weapons to Cuba must cease--all under effective international verification. After that means must be found to get the missiles and other offensive weapons removed and their removal verified and to institute adequate safeguards against their reintroduction.

/The immediate

The immediate concern of the negotiators in New York, during the initial phase, was to work out a system for incoming shipments to ensure that no further offensive weapons were being introduced. The UN asked the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to serve as its agent in inspecting incoming vessels to make sure that no more Soviet weapons were coming in to Cuba. The operation would be expected to continue for about one month and would be entrusted to some thirty inspectors which the ICRC would undertake to recruit. Mr. Paul Ruegger, former president of the ICRC, arrived in New York early in November to discuss with the UN whether and under what circumstances the ICRC could undertake this task. In releases issued in Geneva on November 5 and November 13, the ICRC pointed out that the organization could participate in the plan only with the formal agreement of "the three parties concerned." The statement issued by the ICRC on November 13 explained that "eventual action by the ICRC would be based on previous consent being given by the three states concerned" and the methods of control would have to be clarified in future discussions. Premier Castro refused to give his consent to the proposed scheme. Before final arrangements could be made it was, in any event, realized that the system envisaged would no longer be required and that the United States and other countries of the Western Hemisphere could rely on other means, including air surveillance, to guard against new shipments of offensive weapons.

Havana Talks

The main obstacle to progress on establishing the conditions for a settlement was the attitude of the Cuban government. On October 26 U Thant

/wrote Prime Minister

wrote Prime Minister Castro renewing his appeal that he (Castro) direct that "the construction and development of major military facilities and installations in Cuba, and especially installations designed to launch medium-range and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, be suspended during the period of negotiations which are now underway."

Dr. Castro's reply came the next day and proved to be a hedged acceptance. He rejected "the presumption of the United States to determine what action we are entitled to take within our country, what kind of arms we consider appropriate for our defense." Cuba was prepared to accept "the compromises that you request as efforts in favor of peace, provided that at the same time, while negotiations are in progress, the United States Government desists from threats and aggressive actions against Cuba, including naval blockade of the country." Read literally, Dr. Castro was saying that he would consider the suspension only at the price of ending the quarantine. At the same time, his letter contained another note: "...Should you consider it useful to the cause of peace, our government would be glad to receive you in our country as Secretary-General of the United Nations, with a view to direct discussions on the present crisis."

U Thant replied the next day noting that Castro was prepared to accept the suggestion he had made provided the United States Government "desists from threats...against Cuba including the naval blockade" while negotiations were in progress. He accepted the invitation to visit Cuba early in the coming week -- and to "bring a few aides with me to leave some of them behind to continue our common effort towards a peaceful solution of the problem." To facilitate his task the United States had agreed to suspend its naval quarantine and aerial surveillance during the Secretary-General's visit to

/Havana.

Havana. At this point, the United Nations was working on the assumption that the visit to Cuba would be concerned with working out modalities of U.N. observation and inspection and "reciprocal measures to assure the peace in the Caribbean."

The issue was further clouded by Castro's "statement of conditions" issued in Havana on October 28. "The guarantees of which President Kennedy speaks against the invasion of Cuba will not exist without the elimination also of the naval blockade," he declared, "and adoption, among others, of the following measures:"

1. End of the economic blockade and "all measures of commercial and economic pressure" exercised by the United States against Cuba;
2. End of "all subversive activities" and the organization or support of invasions;
3. End of "pirate attacks" from bases in the United States and Puerto Rico;
4. End of "violations of air and naval space" by the United States;
5. United States withdrawal from the naval base at Guantanamo and its "return to Cuba."

This statement of conditions was clearly unacceptable and adumbrated its intransigent position that the Cuban authorities would take during the Havana talks. U Thant and a party of nineteen, including Brigadier General Rikhye and a small military staff, flew to Havana on October 30 and held talks with Cuban leaders that day and the next to arrange for U.N. supervision of removal of the offensive weapons and to discuss the other modalities for carrying out the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement of October 27-28.

/Although general

Although general agreement was reached that the United Nations should participate in settlement of the Cuban crisis and the talks were characterized as "fruitful," the Cuban authorities balked at all proposals for U.N. inspection of weapons removal and safeguards against their reintroduction. Premier Castro reiterated the five demands he had made in his October 28 statement. These demands were obviously beyond the scope of the Secretary-General's purpose in negotiating with the Cubans, and no agreement was reached.

The Secretary-General and his party returned to New York the next day, where, it was understood, talks between the Secretary-General and Cuban representatives would continue. Premier Castro, however, did state that he would not interfere with the Soviet removal of the missiles. The missiles are "not ours", he said in a radio speech on November 1 in which he reported on his talks with U Thant, but he rejected any form of international inspection on the withdrawal of Soviet weapons. He specifically turned down a proposal that the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) carry out the inspection task. He also rejected other forms of UN inspection. On Friday, November 2, Soviet First Deputy Premier Anastal I. Mikoyan arrived in New York on his way to Havana and issued a statement supporting Premier Castro's demands and warmly endorsing the Cuban regime.

Surveillance and Dismantling Continued

When U Thant left Havana without a mutually satisfactory formula, President Kennedy ordered resumption of the quarantine on shipping to Cuba and authorized resumption of close aerial surveillance of the island to determine whether dismantling of Soviet missile bases was proceeding as reported by Soviet officials. On the evening of November 2, the

/President reported

President reported in a short television and radio broadcast that the "Soviet missile bases are being dismantled, the missiles are being crated and the fixed installations at the sites are being destroyed." The President said the information was based on aerial photographs and added that the United States intended to follow closely the completion of this work through various means, including aerial surveillance, until "an equally satisfactory international means of verification is effected." He also said that while the quarantine remained in effect, he was hopeful that adequate procedures could be developed for international inspection of Cuba-bound cargoes. The International Committee of the Red Cross could be "an appropriate agent" for carrying out this inspection.

New York Negotiations: Verification and IL-28s

Meanwhile, talks proceeded in New York between Ambassador Stevenson and Mr. John J. McCloy for the United States and Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov, for the Soviet Union. Apart from working out the details of the scheme for ICRC inspection of incoming shipments (described above), the negotiators spent the next three weeks in considering two main issues. Until November 12 the central concern of the negotiators was to make sure that the offensive missile system had left Cuba and to work out a satisfactory system for verification that dismantling and removal had in fact taken place. Associated with this was the problem of longer-term safeguards against the reintroduction of offensive weapons. From November 12 to November 20 the focus of negotiation shifted to the problem of removal of the Soviet IL-28 bombers from Cuba.

On verification, it was clear that what the President had termed "an equally satisfactory international means of verification" required an adequate UN system of inspection to make sure that the offensive weapons

/had in fact

had in fact been removed, to guard against hiding, and to prevent reintroduction of such weapons. Various schemes were considered and the USSR made clear its willingness to have UN verification take place. Castro adamantly refused to accept any form of verification in Cuba by the UN or under its auspices for removal of the weapons. US negotiators continued to make it clear to the Soviet negotiators that US aerial surveillance would continue so long as there was no adequate UN system of inspection. When it became clear that Castro would not give his consent to UN inspection or verification of shipments from his ports, the negotiators turned to devising a system for US inspection at sea of outgoing ships carrying the dismantled missiles. The US naval vessels would come "alongside" departing Soviet vessels which would be loaded in such a way as to enable the US vessels to see and count the missiles and associated equipment. Rapid progress was made in dismantling and loading the missiles and by November the US had counted 42 departing missiles by this procedure. Failing UN verification and safeguards, the US continued its own system of surveillance under the existing OAS resolution to make sure that offensive weapons were not reintroduced.

On November 12, with the missiles removed, the US negotiators took up again the question of the removal of IL-28s and made it clear that the United States could not consider lifting the quarantine until the bombers were withdrawn. The Soviets claimed they had fulfilled their part of the bargain by dismantling and removing the missiles and were pressing for lifting of the quarantine and a U.S. non-invasion pledge.

The US position was that the bombers were defined as offensive weapons in the Presidential Proclamation of October 23 and that they

/were included as

were included as such in the Kennedy-Khrushchev exchange of October 27-28. The United States made it clear that it could not consider lifting the quarantine until the Soviets agreed to remove the IL-28s within a short time.

Partial Settlement: November 20

On November 20, Dr. Castro informed U Thant that if the Soviets wished to remove the bombers he would not object. That day an agreement was reached between Kennedy and Khrushchev under which the IL-28s would be withdrawn. U Thant was notified the same day by Ambassador Stevenson and Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov. Soviet agreement to remove the bombers paved the way for the lifting of the quarantine. The partial settlement had taken just four weeks to accomplish.

At his press conference that evening, President Kennedy announced that he had that day been informed by Chairman Khrushchev that all of the IL-28 bombers in Cuba would be withdrawn in thirty days, and that these planes could be observed and counted as they departed. "Inasmuch as this goes a long way towards reducing the danger which faced this hemisphere four weeks ago," the President announced, "I have this afternoon instructed the Secretary of Defense to lift our naval quarantine." The President then recalled the agreement he had reached with Chairman Khrushchev October 27-28, including the stipulation that once the Soviet leader had complied with all his pledges, "we would remove our naval quarantine and give assurance against invasion of Cuba." Evidence to date indicated that all known offensive missile sites had been dismantled, he stated, and sea inspection by the navy had confirmed that the missiles had been withdrawn. But, he warned, "important parts" of the agreement "remain to be carried out. The Cuban Government has not yet permitted the United Nations to

/verify whether all

verify whether all offensive weapons have been removed, and no lasting safeguards have yet been established against the future introduction of offensive weapons back into Cuba." The United States, therefore, had no choice but to pursue its own means of checking on military activities in Cuba. The United States, he said, will continue its efforts to achieve "adequate international arrangements for the task of inspection and verification of Cuba." Later, in reply to a question, he defined adequate safeguards as "an inspection which would provide us with assurances that there are not in the island weapons capable of offensive action against United States or neighboring countries and that they will not be reintroduced."

Regarding guarantees against invasion, the President stated that these were contingent on adequate verification and safeguards for the future.

> "As for our part, if all offensive weapons are removed from Cuba and kept out of the Hemisphere in the future, under adequate verification and safeguards, and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive Communist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean. And, as I said in September, "We shall neither initiate nor permit aggression in this hemisphere."

The United States, he stressed, would not abandon the political, economic, and other efforts to hald subversion from Cuba nor its purpose and hope that the Cuban people shall some day be fully free. "But these policies are very different from any intent to launch a military invasion of the island."

<u>Inter-American Quarantine Force Terminates Operations</u>

Following the lifting of the quarantine, the three governments whose

/naval units had

naval units had participated in the inter-American combined quarantine force -- i.e., Argentina, Dominican Republic, and the United States -- notified the C.O.A.S./O.C. on November 30 that the operations of the quarantine force had been terminated. During this period, it had not been necessary to take up the offers of airport and seaport facilities and other types of assistance made by other hemispheric determination and solidarity.

As the negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union in New York progressed, the United States kept the C.O.A.S./O.C. fully informed of developments. The C.O.A.S./O.C. in the meantime withheld taking any further action with regard to the crisis until these talks were completed.

Continued Negotiations

The Soviet Government carried out its promise to withdraw the IL-28 bombers, and, by December 6, the United States was informed that all bombers (42 in number) had left. No progress, however, was made during the rest of the month in achieving the "adequate international arrangements for the task of inspection and verification in Cuba" that the President had mentioned on November 20, and which were part of the original understanding. Deputy Premier Mikoyan's three-hour conversations with the President on November 29 and with the Secretary of State on November 30, did not advance the final solution. The question was turned over again to the delegations in New York.

By mid-December several important loose ends still remained. No

/adequate,

adequate, U.N.-supervised arrangements for verification of removal of offensive weapons and safeguards against their reintroduction had been achieved. The U. S. assurance against invasion or supporting an invasion of Cuba was dependent on adequate safeguards that offensive weapons were not present or reintroduced into Cuba and that Cuba refrained from aggressive acts against the Western Hemisphere.

Soviet Troops

The withdrawal of Soviet personnel from Cuba was also a matter of deep concern to the United States. As the President stated at his press conference of November 20, the U.S. had been informed that Soviet combat units and other Soviet units were associated with the protection of offensive weapons systems and would also be withdrawn in due course. The U.S. position was that removal of the offensive weapons systems made the presence of Soviet troops to defend such weapons no longer necessary. Efforts to secure their removal continued into 1963.

Security Council Consideration Concluded

The formula for terminating Security Council consideration of the Cuban crisis was finally agreed between the governments of the United States and the Soviet Union on January 7, 1963. It represented a standstill rather than a final settlement. The two governments agreed to send a joint letter to the Secretary-General which he, in turn, transmitted to the Security Council for information of its members. The text of the letter read:

> "On behalf of the Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union, we desire to express to you our appreciation for your efforts in assisting our governments to avert the serious threat to the peace which recently arose in the Caribbean area.
>
> "While it has not been possible for our governments to

/resolve all the

resolve all the problems that have arisen in connection with this affair, they believe that, in view of the degree of understanding reached between them on the settlement of the crisis and the extent of progress in the implementation of this understanding, it is not necessary for this item to occupy further the attention of the Security Council at this time.

"The Governments of the United States of America and of the Soviet Union express the hope that the actions taken to avert the threat of war in connection with this crisis will lead toward the adjustment of other differences between them and the general easing of tensions that could cause a further threat of war."

The same day (January 7, 1963), the Permanent Representative of Cuba, Carlos M. Lechuga, addressed a letter to the Secretary-General, which he requested be transmitted to United Nations members, expressing a dissenting view on the conclusion of the affair. Cuba, the letter declared, "does not consider as effective any agreement other than one which would include consideration of five points or measures, which as minimum guarantees to peace in the Caribbean, our Prime Minister Fidel Castro stresses in his declaration of 28 October, 1962...."

As the Security Council concluded its consideration of the Cuban item, the situation remained as follows:

1. The Soviet Union had withdrawn its offensive missiles, its bombers, and some of its military personnel. The United States and participating American Republics had lifted the quarantine.

2. The Cubans had refused to accept on site inspection and post-removal verification or to agree on a system of continuing safeguards against reintroduction of offensive weapons under United Nations auspices.

3. In the absence of adequate inspection and safeguards, the United States continued other methods of surveillance of military

/activities in

activities in Cuba in the interests of hemispheric security.

4. The continued presence of Soviet military personnel in Cuba constituted an unacceptable intervention of foreign military power in the Western Hemisphere. Efforts continued with the USSR to obtain their removal as agreed.

5. The United States continued to be seriously concerned about Cuban subversive efforts directed against other American Republics.

6. The United States position with regard to assurance against invasion remained that stated by the President on November 20, as outlined above.

7. With the conclusion of the New York talks and the joint US-USSR letter terminating Security Council consideration of the matter, responsibility of further action remained with the OAS Organ of Consultation in its hemispheric context.

Conclusion: Complementary Roles of Bilateral, Regionals, and UN Diplomacy

The Cuban affair demonstrated the utility and possibilities for interaction of the various diplomatic and military instruments available to the United States in a crisis. Orchestration of bilaterial diplomacy, regional arrangements, and the United Nations system marked the handling of the crisis throughout. In particular, the Cuba affair represented a unique demonstration of coordination between a regional system and the world organization, with diplomatic action being taken in the O.A.S. and the United Nations, depending on the task to be performed and the governments directly involved. The O.A.S. system successfully met the test of

/workability by

workability by demonstrating conclusively the solidarity and determination of the American Republics when their security is endangered. The rapid, decisive action taken by the American Republics under the Rio Treaty strengthened the hand of the United States in making its case before world opinion, in dealing in the Security Council with the crisis, and in negotiating with the Soviets.

The United Nations played a three-fold role: as a forum for exposing Soviet duplicity and for enlisting diplomatic support of the United States position; as an instrument for international consultation and as a site for negotiation; and, as an institution willing and able, on short notice, to provide inspection and verification services.

(1) The United States provided an unparalleled forum for presenting the facts of the Soviet offensive buildup directly to representatives of 109 nations and through communications media directly to world public opinion. Ambassador Stevenson's speeches of October 23 and 25 in the Security Council, together with the photographs and explanations to delegations both inside and outside the chamber, presented incontrovertible evidence in a dramatic and effective manner and thus helped in convincing the world of the facts. In addition, the United Nations provided a forum in which the American Republics could impress on the world and on the Secretary-General their solidarity on this issue.

(2) The Secretary-General provided an effective point of contact, notably in the tense days at the outset of the crisis and valuable suggestions for avoiding direct confrontation. The Secretary-General's intervention on the second day of Security Council debate, in which he called for suspension of arms shipments and of construction and development of military installations in exchange for suspension of

/the quarantine

the quarantine led to the formula under which Soviet ships stayed away from the interception area and on that condition the United States agreed to do everything possible to avoid direct confrontation. Khrushchev gave unprecedented agreement to the idea of U.N. inspection and verification of arms removal on the spot. And, the United Nations proved that it was ready and capable of organizing a corps of observers and a system of inspection in rapid order.

Both the United Nations and the Organization of American States proved their utility and vigor -- and emerged stronger from the ordeal.

SECRET WHEN WITH ATTACHMENTS

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

March 8, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BROMLEY SMITH

SUBJECT: Cuba

As a follow-up to my memorandum to you on February 15, 1963, I am attaching excerpts containing references to Cuba in testimony given by the Department of Defense to congressional committees. They continue from the latest date of each committee excerpt you now have, and include excerpts from the Senate Armed Services Committee transcripts.

Not all testimony has been screened for Cuba references inasmuch as all transcripts are not available. Thus the House Armed Services Committee has been covered up to February 21, the DOD Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee to February 13, and the Senate Armed Services Committee to February 22. The DOD Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee has not yet begun its hearings.

As transcripts become available, I will send the requested items to you.

SIGNED

David E. McGiffert
Assistant to the Secretary
(Legislative Affairs)

11 Attachments
- 4 HASC Transcript excerpts
- 3 DoD SC, HAppns Transcripts excerpts
- 4 SASC Transcript excerpts

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SECRET WHEN WITH ATTACHMENTS

cc:(S/Attachments included) -
Mr. McNaughton, GC
Mr. Yarmolinsky, Spec Asst.
Mr. McGiffert, ATSD(LA)
Mr. Lennartson, PA
Mr. Califano, OSA

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
ROBERT S. McNAMARA TO THE PERMANENT
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS   13 March 1963
U. S. SENATE

Mr. Chairman, I am grateful to this Committee for having granted my request of 9 March that I be afforded the opportunity to present my views on the development of the TFX concept and on the selection of General Dynamics Corporation as prime contractor for this versatile new addition to our Defense arsenal.

My decision in November 1962 to select General Dynamics over the Boeing Company, as the better of two qualified competitors, was based on the judgment that the General Dynamics design would result in an airplane less expensive to produce, maintain, and operate, and more dependable both in training missions and in actual combat.

The General Dynamics-Grumman team was successful because, in my judgment, and in the judgment of the Secretaries of the Navy and the Air Force, their proposal gave the most valid promise of obtaining a single airplane that can meet Navy and Air Force requirements with:

- The least expensive, time-consuming research and development effort before production.
- The least reliance upon unknown process and materials.
- The earliest delivery to our fighting forces.
- The highest level of experience in building fighter-type aircraft.

- The greatest use of proven design techniques and methods.
- The most understanding of the requirements and difficulties in developing, testing, tooling, and producing a fighter-type aircraft.

When the General Dynamics and Boeing proposals were first identified in the early stages of the competition in December-January 1961 -- 1962 as the two significantly better proposals among those submitted by six competing companies, neither proposal was found to be acceptable without substantial changes. Differing opinions were expressed as to whether a single contractor, Boeing, should be selected at the outset, or whether the competition between General Dynamics and Boeing should be continued in order to meet the military requirements.

Competition was continued over the period from January to the Fall of 1962. In November 1962, the Fourth Evaluation Report, prepared by the evaluation officers of the Navy and the Air Force, concluded:

"(1) Both contractors have the capability to successfully design and produce this weapon system.

"(2) Both designs are acceptable as initial development design configurations to the using Agencies involved -- TAC and the Navy.

"(3) Both designs will require further design refinement, and changes can be expected during the development period.

"(4) When fully developed, the operational tactical aircraft will markedly improve the capability of the Tactical Air Command in carrying out its assigned missions, especially in limited war.

"(5) Similarly, the Navy version, when fully developed, and when configured with the new long range air-to-air missile, will markedly improve existing fleet air defense capability."

The Report itself did not express a preference for either proposal, and indicated there was little to choose between the proposals. Both proposals were certified by General LeMay and Admiral Anderson to meet military requirements. My examination of the facts, in consultation with my advisers, convinced me that, as compared with the Boeing proposal, the General Dynamics proposal was substantially closer to a single design, requiring only relatively minor modifications to adapt it to the differing requirements of the Navy and the Air Force, and that it embodied a more realistic approach to the cost problem. Accordingly, I decided to select General Dynamics as the development contractor, since I concluded that it was best qualified to design the most effective airplane that could be produced at the least cost, in the least time, to meet our military requirements. It should be unnecessary to add that no other considerations entered into my judgment, but I wish to make that statement a part of the record.

When I took office in January 1961, President Kennedy instructed me to:

1. Develop the force structure necessary to our military requirements without regard to arbitrary budget ceilings.

2. Procure and operate this force at the lowest possible cost.

Following this guidance, we have made substantial increases in both our nuclear and non-nuclear forces. The additions to our nuclear forces have been designed both to strengthen our strategic retaliatory forces and to increase their flexibility by shifting the emphasis to those weapon systems which have the best chance of riding out any kind of nuclear surprise attack.

At the same time, we have substantially expanded our non-nuclear forces -- ground, sea, and air -- so that we can cope with the many and varied threats confronting us around the world. To insure that our non-nuclear forces are properly equipped and supplied, procurement of weapons, equipment, and ammunition has been vastly increased.

Concurrently with these increases in our fighting strength we have attacked the problem of costs on a wide variety of fronts. Because of the great technical complexity of modern-day weapons, their lengthy period of development, their tremendous combat power and their enormous cost, sound choices of a limited number of major weapon systems in relation to military tasks and missions have become the key decisions around which much else of the Defense program revolves.

In the past, the actual costs of major weapon systems have commonly increased from 300 to 500 percent over the costs estimated when the program started, and in some instances more. Some of the reasons for such overruns have been:

1. We have insisted that weapon systems meet performance standards that go far beyond essential military requirements.

2. We have accepted unrealistically optimistic cost estimates at the beginning of a program, only to find costs multiplied many times during the program.

3. We have not sufficiently defined at the outset what it is we are asking our contractors to develop. Here we have discovered that it is frequently helpful to work with more than one contractor in what we call a "program definition phase" before a development contract is awarded.

4. We have too often employed inadequate and unsatisfactory procedures to select major contractors, putting insufficient weight on seasoned experience in the design and production of similar weapons.

5. We have relied too much on cost-plus-contracts and other contracting procedures which do not provide incentives to reduce cost.

Within the Department of Defense, we have taken a number of steps to attack these problems. A formal five-year cost reduction program has been launched, which should produce savings of at least $3 billion per year by the end of fiscal year 1965. It has already produced savings that should amount to $1.4 billion per year. We are shifting from cost-plus-fixed-fee to fixed price and incentive contracts. We are studying ways to improve program definition and cost estimates, using the resources of such non-profit organizations as the Logistics Management Institute as well as in-house resources.

At my request the problem of how we select contractors has been under study for several months by a subcommittee of the recently established Defense Industry Advisory Council, which represents a cross-section of America's business and industrial leaders. Both the Council and we are convinced that our current source selection procedures can be improved.

One way to reduce costs (and to increase reliability) is to insist that weapon systems be developed that can be used by more than one Service, where this can be accomplished without degradation of essential military requirements. The advantages of one weapon system over two are obvious. They result in substantial savings not only in the development, test and production stages, but throughout the life of the system in terms of logistic support, maintenance, training programs, and operations.

The disadvantages of operating many different weapons systems can be observed in the Navy and in the Air Force today. The Navy currently has a

rate of aircraft out of operation for lack of parts which is altogether too high. The Air Force is maintaining a better operational rate but at a cost of excessive spare parts inventories. With the present rapid rate of technological change, the Air Force has acquired a $2.2 billion inventory of spare parts that are already obsolete and practically worthless.

When I became Secretary of Defense, I learned that the Air Force was developing plans for a tactical fighter that would ultimately replace the F-105. At the time, the Navy was designing a second tactical fighter to replace the F4H in its fleet air defense role. These two planes would have many common missions and require many similar operational capabilities. After consultation with my military and civilian advisors, and independent study, I became convinced that one tactical fighter could be developed that would meet both the Navy and Air Force requirements. Accordingly, I directed that the Air Force reorient its program, with Navy participation, to achieve the goal of a common tactical fighter.

The concept of a major multi-Service weapon system is new. I would be less than candid with you if I did not admit that the majority of experts in the Navy and Air Force said it couldn't be done. As late

as the 22nd of August 1961, after the Navy and the Air Force had been working together for almost 8 months, it was reported to me by both Services that development of a single TFX aircraft to fulfill stated requirements of both Services was not technically feasible.

While this attitude, based on years of going separate ways, was understandable, I did not consider it was a realistic approach, considering the versatility and capabilities that could be built into a modern aircraft because of advances in technology. I was also convinced that, if we could achieve a single tactical fighter, we would save at least one billion dollars, in development, production, maintenance and operating costs. In short, after study and review, I believed that the development of a single aircraft of genuine tactical utility to both Services in the projected time frame was technically feasible and economically desirable. I directed that we continue to work toward this objective. Because this decision was peculiarly my own, I kept myself fully advised of the development of the TFX as it progressed over the succeeding 14 months.

Since I consider it essential to a thorough understanding of the matter before you, I would like at this point to recount for you in some detail the sequence of events which led up to the decision. On 1 September 1961, I directed the Air Force to seek to develop a single aircraft for both the Air Force tactical mission and the Navy fleet air defense mission. From the outset, the emphasis was on development of a weapons system that provided minimum divergence between the Navy and Air Force versions. My specific guideline in this regard was: "Changes to the Air Force tactical version of the basic aircraft to achieve the Navy mission shall be held to a minimum." This is a recurring theme throughout the procurement actions which followed.

Requests for proposals from aircraft manufacturers were issued in October, 1961, and proposals were submitted by six firms two months thereafter.

A Source Selection Board was organized with members appointed by the Navy and the Air Force, and they were instructed to work jointly in evaluating the proposals, under the non-voting chairmanship of the Commander of the Air Force Aeronautical Systems Division.

To assist the Source Selection Board, an Evaluation Group was established, consisting of approximately 235 Navy and Air Force officers, advisors and consultants, divided into teams to make the detailed analyses and to evaluate each of the proposals in the areas of technical design, operational effectiveness, logistics, management strength, production efficiency, and suitability for use on aircraft carriers.

The findings of the Evaluation Group were submitted to the Source Selection Board. The Board's recommendations were reviewed by appropriate commands within the Navy and the Air Force, as well as by the Air Council, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and the Chief of Naval Operations, and finally, by the Secretaries of the Navy and Air Force who made their recommendations to me.

Of the six proposals considered in December and January, those of Boeing Company and General Dynamics Corporation were determined by the Evaluation Group to be significantly better. But it was recognized that each of these designs would require substantial changes before it would be acceptable. Although the Boeing design was given the higher rating in operational capability, and General Dynamics was given the higher rating in the technical area, the Evaluation Group recommended that study contracts be awarded to both Boeing and General Dynamics, in order to modify their designs to meet the military requirements. For example, Boeing's proposal had offered the General

Electric engine which was found to be unacceptable. The senior Navy member of the Evaluation Group stated that none of the designs was acceptable without very substantial change.

A different view was expressed by the Source Selection Board which recommended that further work to achieve a satisfactory design be conducted exclusively with Boeing. It recognized that substantial changes had to be made to the Boeing design: a different engine was required, the means of stowing missiles was unsatisfactory, the radar equipment required revision, and feasibility of substituting capsules for ejection seats had to be explored. The Source Selection Board proposed that a letter contract be issued to Boeing for the limited purpose of refining a design specification which would be acceptable to the Navy and the Air Force. The Board's recommendation was concurred in by the Tactical Air Command, the Air Force Logistics Command and the Navy Bureau of Weapons. The Air Force Systems Command, however, which would have the over-all responsibility for development of the aircraft, recommended against the selection of Boeing, and proposed the award of study contracts to both Boeing and General Dynamics, as suggested by the Evaluation Group.

The Air Force Council, chaired by the Deputy Chief of Air Staff for Operations, in the absence of the Vice Chief of Staff, with the concurrence of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Air, also supported the Evaluation Group, and recommended that study contracts be issued to both companies for continued competition for another 60 to 90 days. The Council recognized that neither the Boeing nor the General Dynamics proposal, as submitted, would meet the established military requirements. The Council felt that by extending the competition for an additional period "time and dollars are thereby more apt to be saved than lost in the long run." It considered that competition should produce realistic cost estimates, further assurance of the validity of the eventual choice, and, in all probability, an earlier final design.

Agreeing with the Air Council's proposal, the Secretaries of the Navy and Air Force recommended to me that study contracts be awarded to both Boeing and General Dynamics. They pointed out that:

a. The proposals of these two companies were markedly superior to the others and offered the best chance of being brought up to stated Service requirements.

b. The Services were unanimous in rejecting the General Electric engine (on which the Boeing design had been based) because of the low probability of its development in the time required, since not even a prototype existed at the time.

c. The extension would permit the fuller use of the two designs and provide the incentive for sharper competition from business and design standpoints.

I approved the recommendations of the Secretaries of the Navy and Air Force, raising particular questions about the realism of the Boeing cost estimates.

The two companies submitted new proposals on April 2, 1962, and the second evaluation was conducted in April and May. The Evaluation Group concluded that both contractors had done an excellent job in correcting identified deficiencies, but neither design was acceptable to the Navy from the standpoint of suitability for use on aircraft carriers and ability to remain on station for adequate periods of time.

The difference of opinion between the Navy and the Air Force emerged more fully in the deliberations of the Source Selection Board, and overshadowed consideration of the relative merits of the two companies, since the Navy member of the Board took the position that neither the Boeing nor the General Dynamics design was acceptable to the Navy, and the endorsements transmitted to the Chief of Naval Operations, and by him to the Secretary of the Navy, recommended in effect abandonment of the effort to achieve a joint fighter. It is clear also that the Air Force members of the Source Selection Board preferred the Boeing submission. The qualified

concurrence of the Navy member must be viewed in the light of the over-all Navy recommendation. As a matter of fact, Admiral Anderson stated in writing that he had "no indication that Navy requirements can indeed be met." Therefore, he was of the opinion that "it was premature to state a firm recommendation at that time that Boeing be unequivocally selected."

The Secretaries of the Navy and Air Force advised me that, in view of the joint nature of the program and the continued nonacceptance by the Navy of either design (principally because of high gross weight and wing loadings), the Source Selection Board had been directed to examine courses of action which would correct deficiencies as specified by the Navy. Minimum design changes were to be analyzed and the resulting divergence between the Navy and the Air Force versions of the aircraft, resulting from the elimination of those deficiencies, were to be determined. Three weeks were suggested to accomplish the task. I concurred, emphasizing that acceptable Navy and Air Force versions were not to be created by reducing the degree of commonality so far as to lose the savings inherent in a joint program.

At the end of the three-week period, both companies submitted proposals which contained very substantial changes from previous designs. The Navy member of the Source Selection Board remained unconvinced that either of the new proposals met the Navy's requirements. The Board also noted that

the degree of divergence between the Navy and the Air Force versions that would be necessary to meet Navy specifications had not been determined in the time available. Nevertheless, the Board recommended, and the Air Council, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and the Chief of Naval Operations proposed that a single contractor, Boeing, should be selected at that point to undertake a continuing "design definition" phase. The expressed need for the continuation of the definition process pointed up the fact that the purposes for which the third evaluation were held had not been satisfied.

Following the second and third evaluations of the TFX, it appeared to me not only that neither contractor was meeting Navy requirements, but also that my primary goal was not accepted or not fully understood by the contractors or the Source Selection Board. That goal was to develop, if at all possible, one plane to meet the needs of both the Navy and the Air Force.

Therefore, the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of the Air Force directed that work be continued to establish detailed designs, from which they could better assess the probability of developing the respective versions into an effective weapon system acceptable to both the Navy and the Air Force. They also directed that the obvious disparity between the contractors' cost proposals and the Air Force standards be reconciled. Lastly, they restated my intent to reduce cost by maximizing similarities

in the Navy and Air Force versions, and by use of common equipments and structures.

To avoid any doubt as to the objective, I asked Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric to write to Boeing and General Dynamics explaining fully my position, and asking both of them to rework their proposals in accordance with our requirements. That letter of July 13, 1962, explicitly established three conditions that had to be met before any contract would be awarded. These were:

"1. Satisfaction of both Navy and Air Force that a significant improvement to their tactical air capabilities is represented by the winning design.

"2. Minimum divergence from a common design compatible with the separate missions of the Air Force and Navy to protect the inherent savings of a joint program.

"3. Demonstrably credible understanding of costs both for development and procurement of the complete TFX weapon system, which costs must be acceptable in view of the capability added to our military strength by the weapon system."

These three conditions are vital. They are the yardsticks I used in judging and weighing the two proposals -- Boeing and General Dynamics. They were constantly in my mind as I reviewed the Fourth Evaluation Report. Rather than ignoring its advice, I relied heavily on its comments and conclusions.

The two companies submitted their new proposals in September 1962. These proposals were reviewed by the Evaluation Group and the Source Selection Board, which made its report on November 2.

At the risk of repetition, I want to read to you again the general conclusions of the Evaluation Group which were restated verbatim by the Air Council, with the concurrence of Admiral Anderson, Chief of Naval Operations, and General LeMay, Chief of Staff of the Air Force:

"(1) Both contractors have the capability to successfully design and produce this weapon system.

"(2) Both designs are acceptable as initial development design configurations to the using Agencies involved -- TAC and the Navy.

"(3) Both designs will require further design refinement, and changes can be expected during the development period.

"(4) When fully developed, the operational tactical aircraft will markedly improve the capability of the Tactical Air Command in carrying out its assigned missions, especially in limited war.

"(5) Similarly, the Navy version, when fully developed, and when configured with the new long range air-to-air missile, will markedly improve existing fleet air defense capability."

The Fourth Evaluation Report did not choose as between the contractors. When I reviewed the report, I could see why. The question was a very close one.

In the technical area, the Report evaluated the General Dynamics design as having "a better structural design, a simpler fuel system, a slight edge in the flight control area and better proposed programs in the Personnel

Subsystem and Aerospace Ground Equipment areas. The General Dynamics design had an edge in supersonic dash capability and supersonic maneuverability at altitude. It has a low radar cross section and an integrated penetration aids system. For deceleration, it uses dive brakes in the air and brakes on the ground, providing a conventional but limited deceleration capability. The Boeing design has the edge in ferry capability, conventional weapon carriage, loiter capability, and in landing performance. It has the advantage in low-altitude maneuvering capability. For deceleration it uses a thrust reverser which offers an excellent deceleration capability, but will require additional development effort."

In the operational area, the Boeing proposal received the higher score, but the Report stressed that either design was considered acceptable from the users' viewpoint.

In the "Production, Management and Cost" area, General Dynamics was rated higher than Boeing. In "Scheduling," General Dynamics presented the better program. It was somewhat more detailed and better time phased.

In the "Logistics" area, which includes the functional elements of maintenance, supply, transportation and procurement, the Boeing proposal received a slightly higher rating over-all.

It was clear that both designs met the first condition prescribed in Mr. Gilpatric's letter of July 13, i.e., satisfaction of both Navy and Air Force that the designs represented significant improvement to their tactical air capabilities. With this state of the record, the degree to which the two designs met the other two cardinal conditions became crucial. You will recall that those two conditions were: (1) minimum divergence from a

common design; and (2) demonstrably credible understanding of costs. It should be emphasized that these two conditions would understandably loom less important in the eyes of the Source Selection Board than operational capability. These are conditions more properly the concern of those charged by law with the over-all direction of our defense effort. They are equally a part of my determination of what is in the national interest.

When I reviewed the Fourth Evaluation Report from the standpoint of minimum divergence from a common design, I was immediately struck by the difference in approach adopted by the two contractors. The Report found that General Dynamics proposed an airframe design that has a very high degree of identical structure for the Navy and Air Force versions. On the other hand, the Report estimated that in the two Boeing versions less than half of the structural components of the wing, fuselage and tail were the same. In fact the Evaluation Group concluded that Boeing is, in effect, proposing two different airplanes from a structures point of view. The same differences in approach were apparent in the larger number of identical parts in the General Dynamics design -- a particularly crucial point, since there are strong incentives in the course of the development process to retain identity of parts, while, on the other hand, small divergences in the early stages tend to grow as development proceeds.

In short, Boeing simply did not meet the fundamental requirement of minimum divergence from a common design. No amount of peripheral technical argument should be permitted to obscure this central and crucial fact.

It has been suggested by several of your committee staff in their role as witnesses before the committee that much ado about nothing has been made about the so-called issue of commonality. It has been suggested to you that the only reason for common structures or common parts is so that money could be saved by use of common tooling. Such a conclusion overlooks the basic purpose of attempting to get one airplane instead of two. Two airplanes increase costs at every stage beginning with development itself.

As the Fourth Evaluation Report stated, the design approach adopted by Boeing would "require separate documentation, (drawings; loads, stress, flutter, and fatigue analyses; etc.); separate static, dynamic and fatigue test programs; and more extensive developmental flight testing for the USAF and Navy versions."

Separate production lines or unique production operations would be required earlier in the production process. Supply and logistics problems become complicated. It is evident that the less the divergence, the greater the savings in the logistics area.

These future savings are not susceptible of precise measurement, involving as they do such factors as training, supply processes, future usage rates, common technical manuals, and the like.

If I had approved what was essentially two different airplanes, the prospects of saving one billion dollars would have evaporated. The issue of minimum divergence is fundamental. The effort to attain the highest possible degree of commonality.

lies at the heart of the entire TFX endeavor. My instructions on this point were clear and consistent.

Another aspect of the Fourth Evaluation Report struck me as I reviewed the report and consulted with my technical advisors, including Dr. Charyk, who was then Under Secretary of the Air Force, and Dr. Brown, the Director of Defense Research and Engineering. On the basis of my studies, discussions with my advisers, and my experience over the years in judging development and production programs, it became clear to me that the General Dynamics proposal was generally more straightforward in approach than that of Boeing, although the General Dynamics design was fully acceptable. There were aspects of the Boeing proposal which, on their face, complicated the development of the aircraft. Three problems in particular stood out in my mind.

The first problem was Boeing's proposed use of engine thrust reversers for in-flight deceleration, as well as for reducing ground roll after landing touch down. To date, engine thrust reversers have never been used in flight on operational fighter aircraft, nor have they ever been employed on supersonic aircraft. The only operational experience has been on subsonic commercial jet transports and cargo-type aircraft in which the engines are mounted on outboard pylons underneath the wings. The Air Force does have one fighter aircraft in which a research and development type installation has been made. This is a single engine aircraft with the exhaust on the airplane centerline

and aft of the tail surfaces. The Boeing design uses two engines nestled in the fuselage with their nozzles exhausting hot gases directly alongside the horizontal and vertical control surfaces. The full effect of this hot gas efflux is unknown. Assurance that longitudinal and directional stability was not impaired could not be obtained without extensive flight tests, in addition to considerable developmental wind tunnel testing. Since flight testing cannot occur until late in the development phase, the Boeing design would impose an added degree of risk in terms of meeting an early operational date for the TFX.

In addition, the Boeing thrust reverser feature, as the Fourth Evaluation Report observed, adds considerably to the complexity and to the development task associated with the engine. The full impact of this problem could not be completely assessed because Boeing did not collaborate in detail with the engine contractor, Pratt and Whitney, on its proposed thrust reverser design and development.

Speed brakes, as proposed by General Dynamics, are historically proven and offer a more straight forward approach to meeting the stated military requirement. Since speed brakes will, in themselves, exceed the military requirement, the greater development risk of thrust reversers must be weighed against their possible advantages. I want to point out that in selecting the General Dynamics proposal we retain the option to apply

thrust reversers to the aircraft design, but we have the flexibility to undertake this development on an exploratory basis concurrent with the overall program, and terminable at will if costs should exceed anticipated benefits.

The second area in which Boeing's approach seemed likely to produce more complicated development problems was its proposed power plant installation with top-mounted inlets. The Fourth Evaluation Report commented that Boeing's location of the inlets on top of the fuselage, in combination with the Boeing subsonic diffuser design, results in significant distortion of the air flow at the engine face under most conditions, and prohibitive distortion during high angle of attack operation. The Report noted that the effect of this distortion on engine operation is virtually impossible to predict accurately, and it can only be determined by actual testing of the engine in flight under the distortion conditions delivered by the induction system.

In contrast, General Dynamics chose a conventional "straight through" installation and inlet design which the Evaluation Group considered to be a good selection for the TFX aircraft -- one which should give the best trade-off in terms of performance, complexity and operational problems. The top-mounted inlet does minimize the problem of foreign object damage during ground operations, but there is no reason to believe that the more conventional General Dynamics solution for this problem will not be effective, and it avoids all of the other uncertainties of the Boeing approach.

The third area in which the Boeing approach involved greater development risks was its extensive use of titanium in its wing carry-through structure. We have had some experience in the use of titanium in other Department of Defense weapon systems but mainly in heat-resistant applications and where high stress levels in thick plates are not involved. The Fourth Evaluation Report observed that data concerning the fatigue design properties of titanium, in the thickness Boeing proposed to use in the wing carry-through structure, is very limited, and that this raises the question of the advisability of using such thickness. The Report further commented that the effect of temperature on structural details, especially in the aluminum-to-titanium splice, can be expected to be quite pronounced in producing metal fatigue, and the Report concluded the Boeing fatigue test program showed lack of realism. In fact, Colonel Gayle, the TFX System Project Officer, sent a letter to the competing companies pointing out that, in the judgment of the Aeronautical Systems Division, it was not advisable to use titanium in fittings which are subject to heavy load, nor in heavy section areas because of a lack of data relating to such use. If Boeing's proposed use of titanium did not work out and heavier steel had to be used to replace the lighter metal, I realized that not only would the operational capabilities of the Boeing plane suffer, but additional costs would be incurred.

In contrast, the General Dynamics design solved the problem of wing loading by the ingenious but simple expedient of providing a bolt-on extra wing extension for the Navy version of the aircraft, instead of employing relatively unusual applications of an exotic metal.

These three examples point up for me a basic difference between the overall philosophies underlying the two proposals. I should emphasize that this difference in philosophy was not peculiar to the fourth phase of the competition. Boeing had from the very beginning consistently chosen more technically risky trade-offs in an effort to achieve operational features which exceeded the required performance characteristics. This approach was first exemplified in Boeing's choice of the undeveloped General Electric engine for its initial submission.

Mr. Chairman, I do not mean to say that the Boeing approach posed insuperable obstacles. On the contrary, I assumed that the problems associated with the use of titanium, the use of thrust reversers in supersonic flight, and the high inlet ducts in the propulsion system are all susceptible of solution. But my judgment, reinforced by the Fourth Evaluation Report, clearly indicated that these proposals would, in fact, complicate the development problems, and would require a significantly greater development effort to be expanded by Boeing in their solution.

But, significantly, Boeing proposed a development effort less than that proposed by General Dynamics, and this in spite of the greater complexity of the Boeing aircraft design, the greater divergence between the Navy and the Air Force versions of the Boeing aircraft, and the lesser experience which they possess in building high-density supersonic fighter aircraft. This anomaly caused me to examine other cost aspects of the Boeing proposal.

I discovered additional evidence of unrealistic cost estimates in the Boeing proposal. In the judgment of the Evaluation Group, Boeing was overly optimistic in its estimate of production tooling and was dangerously low in estimating the manufacturing hours for both the development and production phases. It appeared to me that Boeing simply did not appreciate the complexities of developing the TFX. This is understandable because Boeing's past experience in aircraft development and production has been with bombers and transport aircraft -- experience which is largely inapplicable to TFX estimating.

I therefore concluded that as to the third cardinal condition -- demonstrably credible understanding of costs -- Boeing's proposal was deficient.

The Evaluation Team cost estimators recognized this fact. They attempted to correct for it by raising Boeing's costs to a level which in their judgment was more accurate. They also made adjustments for the General Dynamics cost estimates, which were considered deficient, but not nearly so much so as Boeing's.

The Air Force estimators applied experience and other statistical factors to the two proposals in an effort to arrive at ultimate costs. The application of such factors is well suited to correction of an intentionally low proposal. Where, however, the low proposal is the result of a lack

of appreciation of the complexity of a problem, the adjusted figures are subject to substantial errors.

Expressed another way, the cost estimators of the Evaluation Group could only assume an equal understanding of the problem by both Boeing and General Dynamics, and then correct the two cost proposals more or less mechanically. But the predictable result of the lack of appreciation of the scope of a problem is delay and increased costs, the extent of which is essentially unpredictable, and therefore not susceptible to analysis by the application of statistical factors.

The question has been raised as to why costs are important when both contractors were proposing fixed-price incentive contracts. There are several reasons.

In a development contract for a complex new weapon system like the TFX, there inevitably will be engineering change orders. The cost of change orders is borne by the government. Consequently, when two proposals both meet military requirements as did Boeing's and General Dynamics', the proposal which seems likely to involve less change, with consequent delays and increased costs, is to be preferred.

Aside from the matter of cost over-runs induced by multiplicity of change orders, there are other reasons why credibility of costs must be carefully evaluated in a fixed-price incentive contract.

It is true that any costs over the contract ceiling are at the expense of the contractor and not the government. Nonetheless, if after several years of effort it appeared that a contractor's costs were going to be far in excess of the ceiling, say, by several hundred million dollars, the contractor would be in very serious financial difficulty. He would then be motivated to take every possible cost saving alternative. These alternatives could have a serious adverse impact on the continuity and quality of the development.

In short, while incentive contracts are generally important to force efficient management and obtain good estimating, where the dollar expenditure is exceedingly large, as in the case of the TFX, it is imperative that we make our own judgment of cost estimates. This is the only way we can insure that a contractor, through optimism or misunderstanding, has not imposed a ceiling on himself that could lead to serious degradation of the development. This result would hurt the Department of Defense as well as the contractor.

Further, the proposed contract covered only the research and development phase of the TFX program. A multi-billion dollar production

program is to follow. There is no future price commitment for this production program. In the event of very large over-runs on the research and development contracts, the price of the production program, which for all practical purposes would be committed to the development contractor, would probably be affected.

When we talk about the TFX program, we are talking National Defense. This aircraft is to be an important element in our military force; it must be operational in proper quantities in the time span scheduled. The more straightforward design of General Dynamics, an airframe contractor well versed in the design, development, and production of supersonic fighters, and assisted by Grumman, an outstanding designer, developer, and producer of Navy carrier-based aircraft, offered a more dependable answer to our needs.

I have detailed at some length the reasons underlying my judgment that the General Dynamics proposal offered the better possibility of obtaining a satisfactory aircraft on the desired time schedule and within the dollars programmed.

Having studied the TFX question over many months, I met with Deputy Secretary Gilpatric, Secretary Korth, and Secretary Zuckert early in

November 1962, I found that their own views, arrived at independently, coincided with mine. After several discussions we concluded:

First, that all the evidence showed that the TFX concept was a valid concept that would markedly improve existing military capabilities of the Navy and Air Force. We therefore decided to move ahead with the development of the TFX aircraft.

Second, our best judgment of the many factors involved let us to the tentative conclusion that General Dynamics should receive the award. Although I considered our judgment to be soundly supported on the broad bases I have outlined, I agreed that Mr. Zuckert was to review the facts again before we arrived at a final decision.

Having verified to our satisfaction our judgments, we decided to award the TFX development contract to General Dynamics.

There remains one more important aspect of this case which I believe should be thoroughly understood. Fundamentally, we are dealing with a question of judgment. Granted there are specific technical facts and calculations involved; in the final analysis, judgment is what is at issue.

In this case we are faced with a situation in which judgments are pyramided upon judgments. First, we have the judgments of the competing

contractors that an aircraft of particular design can be built at a given cost within a specific time-frame. Next, we have the judgments of the Evaluation Group regarding feasibility, and the degree to which the designs would or would not satisfy the stated requirements. Then the Source Selection Board, using factors weighted by judgment, made a recommendation which appeared to place greater emphasis on potential bonus factors in certain operational areas, rather than on dependability of development and predictability of costs. This recommendation, understandably, was seconded by the Navy and Air Staffs, since these officers are most vitally interested in obtaining the ultimate in performance in individual weapons systems. On occasion, this desire leads to the establishment of characteristics for weapons systems which cannot be met within the time or funds available, and it has frequently resulted in lowering operational effectiveness.

There is only one way I know to minimize the compounding of error that can occur through this pyramiding of judgment, and that way is to apply the judgment of the decision-maker not only to the final recommendation, but also to the underlying recommendations and facts. This I did to the best of my ability. In doing so, I found it necessary to balance the promises held out by competing contractors, against the hopes and aspirations of military officers, and the limiting realities of economics and technology.

That I attach great importance to the principle of free competition is, I believe, demonstrated by my insistence that competition continue

through the program definition phase of the TFX project. That I attach great importance to the fulfillment of established military requirements is, I believe, demonstrated by my refusal to terminate the program definition phase until I was satisfied that the military requirements of both the Navy and Air Force had been met. That I attach great importance to the recognition of economic and technological limiting conditions is, I believe, demonstrated by my selection of General Dynamics as the contractor that most clearly recognized the effects of these limitations on the task to be achieved.

I do not feel that this is a case which presents a civilian--military conflict but rather one of placing emphasis where it must be placed. In the final analysis, judgments differed. In reaching my decision, I considered the recommendations of my various military and civilian advisors as well as other available evidence, but I had the final respon sibility. The basic judgments on my part which determined my decision were:

- Both the General Dynamics and the Boeing designs met stated military requirements and would provide significant improvements in combat capabilities of the Navy and the Air Force.
- The General Dynamics proposal resulted in minimum divergence from a common design compatible with the separate mission of the Navy and Air Force, thus insuring the substantial savings

and increased dependability inherent in a joint program.

- The General Dynamics proposal reflected a more realistic understanding of costs.

As Secretary of Defense my responsibilities were clear; the decision was mine.

Date : 08/04/98
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

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REQUIRES CONCURRENCE OF
CIA
DATE: MAR 2016

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

No object = ✓

S-E-C-R-E-T
EYES ONLY

248

TAB 'A'

SUBJECT: Tasks Assigned to CIA in General Lansdale's Program Review

A. TASKS

Part V, pp. 5-8, of General Lansdale's program review of the Cuba Project, dated 18 January 1962, assigns 32 specific tasks to elements of the U.S. Government. Of these, 16 are assigned to CIA solely or jointly. The tasks have been reviewed by this Agency, and it has been determined that substantially all reporting and planning deadlines can be met. Work on all tasks, with and without assigned dates for completion, is in progress. The following detailed observations are keyed to General Lansdale's paper.

1. Task 1, p.5. The intelligence community is hard at work on NIE 85-62 and is attempting to meet the deadline of 7 February. As was agreed in a conversation of 23 January 1962 with General Lansdale, a short extension may be necessary.

2. Task 2, p.5. The Opa-Locka Interrogation Center in Florida will be in operation on 15 February -- the deadline date.

3. Task 3, p.5 The survey is in progress and will be completed on the stipulated date. On the basis of the information

S-E-C-R-E-T
EYES ONLY

obtained the possibility of establishing additional interrogation points will be determined.

4. Task 4, p.5. An operational assessment of the stay-behind net in Cuba will be completed and reported by the deadline of 15 February. Because communication with singleton agents is by SW, not W/T, it is unlikely that assessment can be completed by the date stipulated; an extension to 28 February may be necessary, although every effort is being made to complete the work before that date. [An intensive program aimed at the acquisition of third country assets through the cooperation of liaison services is also under way, particularly in Spain, Belgium, France, Uruguay, and Costa Rica.] A progress report on the status of this program will be made by 15 February, although this Agency cannot be sure that the cooperation of all intended participants will have been obtained by that date. CIA has also taken the following additional steps in respect to Task 4.

State Excess 6.1(C)

CIA

a. A cable has been sent to field stations to give added impetus to the search for assets and the development of both unilateral and joint operations. Progress reports have been required by 1 March.

b. A survey of the Cuban Chinese community and of

operational access to it is under way. Target date: end of February.

c. An assessment of more than one hundred persons to determine their suitability for return to Cuba as agents in the guise of students is also being conducted. Target date: end of February.

5. Task 5, p.5. The 1 February deadline will be met, and by that date we shall also have begun the search for suitable intermediaries. Analysis to date has not uncovered a top-level official of the Cuban regime whose personal characteristics indicate he would accept recruitment or agree to defection now. Although some targets of opportunity will appear outside Cuba, most planning will necessarily be based upon an appeal made inside the island by intermediaries selected from the ranks of journalists, foreign officials, international businessmen, foreign lawyers, crime syndicates, international detectives and foreign police officials. Additionally, plans for the defection of lower-level Cuban officials abroad have been completed, and the search for targets and access abroad is under way.

6. Task 6, p.5. By the assigned date we shall complete and submit a coordinated plan. We shall also have begun action on

cover and deception operations by that date.

7. Task 7, p. 5. By 1 February CIA will submit an operational schedule for the initiation of an organized resistance movement inside Cuba. The schedule will include the localities selected and the assessment of some candidates. A full assessment will be completed in accordance with the schedule listed in para. 4, above, in conformance with Task 4. It should be noted, however, that this operational schedule (like the schedules called for in Tasks 10, 26, and 30) will necessarily be tentative and subject to later revision as the number of assets inside Cuba increases and as the flow of intelligence is augmented. Moreover, the development of a resistance movement will not remain controllable, so that operational timetables produced during the next four weeks can serve only as guides for a proposed sequence of actions.

8. Task 10, p. 5. CIA has on hand both propaganda and political action assets in the Caribbean area and elsewhere in Latin America. It is planned to use those assets both to support the Project inside Cuba and to generate and mobilize public and official opinion against Castro outside Cuba. The operational schedule will be submitted on the stated date.

9. Task 18, p. 6. Discussions with the appropriate AFL-CIO

officials have been donducted and a report of developments will be submitted by 15 February.

10. Task 21, p. 7. Plans for inducing the failure of crops will be submitted by 15 February. These plans will envisage both the use of controlled assets who can be infiltrated and exfiltrated and the provision of encouragement and guidance to the resistance, so that it will undertake acts of sabotage, some of which are to be directed against crops, particularly rice.

11. Task 24, p. 7. This deadline will also be met. Primary methods of disrupting the supply of Cuban nickel to the USSR could, if approved, include (1) the sinking of Cuban or Bloc ships by open attack; (2) the use of "frogman" or UDT tactics in harbors for the same purpose; (3) the employment of torpedos and mines toward this end; and (4) the sabotaging of primary or secondary sources of Cuban nickel, such as the Nicaro and Moa plants. CIA now has no proven internal assets capable of carrying out any of these actions. The Agency does have external assets capable of undertaking actions (2) and (3). It also has an external group capable of undertaking (4) upon the completion of specialized training. All studies, including a plan for using overt or covert means to prevent re-institution of the Canadian supply to the USSR, will be submitted by 15 February. It is suggested that consideration be given to

CIA

1, 2, 4, 5

State concurs

assigning to the economic action group, chaired by the Department of State, responsibility for overt action designed to deny Canadian nickel to the USSR.

12. Task 26, p. 7. Together with Tasks 27 and 28, Task 26 constitutes an outline of a plan for a psychological warfare operation. These tasks are so closely interrelated that CIA proposes to submit by 15 February a single plan dealing with all three tasks.

13. Task 27, p. 7. See preceding paragraph.

14 Task 28, p. 7. See paragraph 12.

15. Task 30, p. 7. By 15 February CIA will submit an operational schedule dealing with the sabotage of (1) shipping in Cuban waters and harbors, (2) Cuban transport facilities, (3) communications facilities, (4) equipment for the refining of petroleum, (5) facilities for producing and distributing power, (6) industry, (7) food supplies, (8) key military and police installations and materiel. The schedule will also include the disruption of military and police communications and harassment of military and police training and personnel.

16 Task 31, p. 8. This deadline will be met.

B. ADDITIONAL UNDERTAKINGS

The following comments are keyed to Sections D through K, Part IV (pp. 3 and 4) of the program review.

17. Section D, p. 3. Six men, to form the initial nucleus, have been assessed in depth. Further assessment of candidates inside and outside Cuba is in progress, and it is expected that ten of these will be recruited by 15 February.

18. Section E, p. 3. To date fifteen locations have been selected as suitable centers of resistance because of (1) the presence there of groups among which there is patent or incipient unrest, (2) the presence of strategic and tactical targets for use or deactivation, and (3) proximity to potential unconventional warfare areas. In order of priority, the fifteen centers are Havana, Camaguey, Santa Clara, Cienfuegos, Matanzas, Cardenas, Sancti Spiritus, the Escambray Mountains, Holguin, Siantago de Cuba, Ciego de Avila, Baracoa, Pinar del Rio, Manzanillo, and Colon

19 Section F. p. 3. In support of State's efforts CIA has conducted propaganda operations, including a number of mass demonstrations in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

20. Section H, p. 4. One TV intrusion operation has been conducted, on 16 January. Plans for an intrusion during the scheduled parade and demonstration in Havana are being formulated

21. Section K, p. 4[illegible] Groups with which CIA has exploitable access or entree include women, labor, students, teachers, jurists, and other professional classes. International contacts with labor organizations and members of the Catholic Church will also be utilized.

State/Guest
6.1 (B)

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
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PSYCHOLOGICAL PROGRAMS - CUBA

SECOND LATIN AMERICAN YOUTH CONGRESS

POSSIBLE RETALIATORY ACTIONS BY CUBAN GOVERNMENT

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DATE EXEMPTED: MAR 2016
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OKAY TO RELEASE AS REDACTED w/CIA CONCURRENCE

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

31 December 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL HAIG
OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, DA

Subject: Psychological Programs Subcommittee - Cuba

1. An informal meeting of the Interdepartmental Subcommittee (Psychological Programs) on Cuban Affairs was convened in Room 7519, New State at 1430 hours, 30 December 1963. The agenda for the meeting was not pre-announced. Present from State were Chairman Bowdler, Sylvester, and Montenegro; from CIA, Tilton and [Holloway], from USIA, Murphy; and the undersigned.

6(1)(A)
6(1)(C)

2. The following topics were discussed:

a. CUTAL (Unified Labor Federation for Latin America) meeting scheduled for Rio de Janeiro, 24 - 28 January 1964. Mr. Montenegro, State labor advisor for Latin America, described the anticipated meeting as a "founding" assemblage of left-wing labor leaders, socialists, and communists who will attempt to resolve their differences. State believes that there will be a concerted effort by the communists to wrest the leadership of the fledgling federation from Mexican socialist elements. Following actions were discussed:

(1) State to cable US Ambassador to Brazil to ascertain the degree to which local (not national) governmental elements will support disruptive and harassing actions before and during the meeting.

(2) State to circularize Latin American posts with the suggestion that local influences be brought to bear in order to discourage country delegates from attending the meeting.

(3) USIA to consider VOA broadcasts to Latin America in order to exploit exposes of Cuban, East German, and Chinese Communist labor conditions.

(4) CIA to continue black propaganda operations in [Brazil] which suggest postponement of the meeting.

6(1)(C)

September 21, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JOHN H. CRIMMINS
Coordinator of Cuban Affairs
Department of State

SUBJECT: Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs: Possible Retaliatory Actions by the Castro Government (U)

Reference: Memorandum from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs Dept of State, subject as above, 13 Sep 63

In response to reference memorandum, outlined below is the status of existing contingency plans for those priority situations agreed upon at our meeting of September 12, 1963. The numbering of the paragraphs below corresponds to the format utilized in the attachment to reference memorandum and includes those actions for which Department of Defense specific or related military contingency plans exist.

"A. Actions Against U. S. Targets in Cuba

"4. Harassment of Guantanamo

"(a) Cutting off of the water supply"

COMMENT: [A minimum of approximately 20 days supply of water is maintained in reserve storage at the naval base. Provision is made for the emergency resupply of water by tanker, which would require a maximum of eighteen days and which would be implemented on order of CINCLANTFLT.] In addition, evacuation of non-essential personnel in 24 hours or less can be accomplished if directed.

"(b) Closing access to the base by Cuban workers who commute"

purpose of substantially reducing the time required for the U. S. fighter aircraft to reach the scene. Such overflights may be authorized only by specifically designated commanders.

"5. Attack on staging areas employed by exiles in the Caribbean"

COMMENT: With regard to Castro attacks on areas in Latin America, plans exist for the U. S. military to respond to requests for assistance by Latin American governments subject to U. S. Governmental approval. There is also an arrangement for the interchange of information between the U. S. Coast Guard and British naval forces with regard to possible staging areas which may be used by exiles in the Bahamas.

6(1)(C)

"E. Actions Against Targets in the US

"1. Sabotage or terroristic bombings"

COMMENT: The level of intensity of such actions contemplated within the context of the paper is not considered to exceed the capabilities of law enforcement agencies to control. There are military contingency plans to protect against this type of activity at a much higher level of intensity.

"2. Jamming of US radio stations"

COMMENT: There are standing operating procedures to overcome interference and jamming methods employed against military communications.

The summaries of actions set forth above are essentially defensive reactions to Cuban initiatives. There are, of course, existing and related military plans, retaliatory in nature, which range up to and include a full scale military invasion of Cuba.

It was generally agreed at the September 13, 1963 meeting of the Committee that the most likely actions of the Cuban government are those which would not provoke United States retaliation seriously and immediately endangering the Castro regime. It appears more likely that Castro might intensify his support of subversive forces in Latin

REPORT CONCERNING POSSIBLE RETALIATORY
ACTIONS BY THE CASTRO GOVERNMENT

1. The numbering of the subparagraphs below corresponds to the numbering of those actions for which specific or related military contingency plans exist. A brief summary of the action contemplated by those plans is also provided.

"A. Actions Against U.S. Targets in Cuba

"4. Harassment of Guantanamo

"(a) Cutting off of the water supply"

COMMENT A minimum of approximately 20 days supply of water is maintained in reserve storage at the naval base. Provision is made for the emergency resupply of water by tanker, which would require a maximum of eighteen days and which would be implemented on order of CINCLANTFLT. Evacuation of non-essential personnel in 24 hours or less if directed and consistent with national policy.

"(b) Closing access to the base by Cuban workers who commute"

COMMENT Provision is made for the introduction of a tailored Naval Construction Battalion unit containing necessary skills, the requisite labor force, and the possible stationing of a repair ship at Guantanamo Bay aboard which are personnel with appropriate skills. Critical personnel would be transported by air, to arrive within 48 hours, when ordered by CINCLANTFLT.

"(c) Staging demonstration and riots at the gates"

COMMENT Execution of measures appropriate to the degree, kind, and exact location of the disturbance, ranging from no action through such measures as the use of fire hoses and lacnrymating agents may be ordered by the Commander, U.S. Naval Base, Guantanamo.

"(d) Sniping at base sentries resulting in injury or death"

COMMENT Measures may be taken appropriate to the

Enclosure

circumstance and situation ranging from no action, through action taken in self defense by a wounded sentry or those assisting him, through increased defense conditions, placing personnel in positions protected from fire, and return of fire if appropriate and required as determined by the Commander Naval Base, Guantanamo. The precise nature of the U.S. response cannot be determined in advance. A single shot from an unseen sniper resulting in injury or death to a sentry is one thing, a continued sniping fusillade from a number of persons is another.

6(1)(c)

"(e) Sabotaging of base facilities".

COMMENT Extensive security measures are taken to prevent such sabotage by the Commander U.S. Naval Base, Guantanamo. The nature of the action taken would depend upon the nature of the sabotage and be designed to assure the continued functioning of the Base.

"B. Actions Against U.S. Aircraft and Shipping

"1. Harassment of U.S. Shipping using Yucatan Channel, Florida Straits, Windward Passage"

COMMENT The rules of engagement, which have been approved by the highest national authority provide that ships or aircraft ordered to the area may take immediate protective measures including pursuit to, but not into, Cuban air space or territorial waters. Commanders are not authorized to organize deliberately a pursuing force. U.S. pilots are not authorized to attack unless either they or the ship they are defending is endangered by Cuban attack. In the event Cuban aircraft limit their action to harassment, U.S. pilots are limited to making their presence known by flying close aboard the Cuban plane.

MAR 2016
6(1)(c)

"C. Actions Against Cuban Exiles

"1. Shooting down of pirate planes, possibly of US registry.

"2. Hot pursuit of or attack on raiding planes over the high seas or another country's territory.

"3. Hot pursuit of or attack on raiding boats on the high seas or another country's territorial waters

"4. Attack on mother ship or exile raiders on the high seas or in another country's territorial waters

COMMENT It is noted that it is contrary to national policy to permit raids on Cuba originating from U.S. territory, however, at the time a ship or aircraft is discovered to be under Cuban attack it may be difficult to identify it as a "pirate", "raider", "mother ship" or "exile raider", even though this, in fact, may be the case. All the situations, set forth above, are covered, at least in part, by the rules of engagement which have been approved by the highest national authority. However, the action summarized below is authorized only in the case of U.S. ships and aircraft and those not clearly identified as being of foreign registry. Commanders are not authorized to organize deliberately a pursuing force, however ships or aircraft ordered to the area of the attack may take immediate protective measures including pursuit to, but not into, Cuban air space or territorial waters. U.S. pilots are not authorized to attack unless either they or the ship or aircraft they are defending is endangered by Cuban attack. In the event Cuban aircraft limit their action to harassment, U.S. pilots are limited to making their presence known by flying close aboard the Cuban plane. Overflight of Cuba by fighter aircraft is authorized only in those instances where it has been established that Cuban attack is being made on a U.S. ship or aircraft and then only for the purpose of substantially reducing the time required for the U.S. fighter aircraft to reach the scene. Such overflights may be authorized only by specifically designated commanders.

6(1)(c)

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"5. Attack on staging areas employed by exiles in the Caribbean

COMMENT With regard to Castro attacks on areas in Latin America, plans exist for the U.S. military to respond to requests for assistance by Latin American governments subject to US governmental approval. There is also an arrangement for the

6(1)(c)

interchange of information between the U.S. Coast Guard and British naval forces with regard to possible staging areas which may be used by exiles in the Bahamas.

"E. Actions Against Targets in the US

"1. Sabotage or terroristic bombings"

COMMENT The level of intensity of such actions contemplated within the context of the paper is not considered to exceed the capabilities of law enforcement agencies to control. There are military contingency plans to protect against this type of activity at a much higher level of intensity.

"2. Jamming of US radio stations"

COMMENT There are standing operating procedures to overcome interference and jamming methods employed against military communications.

2. "Any additional pertinent information on existing or related plans" and "recommendations, if any, on other likely actions which might be taken by the Castro government in retaliation for Cuban exile raids" was also requested. The furnished list of possible retaliatory actions by the Castro government were of "the level of intensity which the committee agreed to be in the most likely category." It is inferred that what the committee had in mind by the most likely "level of intensity" was that level which would not provoke the United States into taking extensive countermeasures which might seriously endanger the Castro regime. The summaries of actions, set forth above, which might be taken under existing military contingency plans are essentially defensive reactions to Cuban initiatives. There are, however, existing and related military plans, retaliatory in nature, which range up to and include a full scale military invasion of Cuba.

3. If it is assumed that the most likely actions of the Cuban government are those which would not provoke United States retaliation seriously and immediately endangering the Castro regime, it appears more likely that Castro might intensify his support of subversive forces in Latin America

31 December 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL HAIG
OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, DA

Subject: Psychological Programs Subcommittee - Cuba

1. An informal meeting of the Interdepartmental Subcommittee (Psychological Programs) on Cuban Affairs was convened in Room 7519, New State at 1430 hours, 30 December 1963. The agenda for the meeting was not pre-announced. Present from State were Chairman Bowdler, Sylvester, and Montenegro; from CIA, Tilton and [redacted] from USIA, Murphy; and the undersigned. 6(1)(A) 6(1)(C)

2. The following topics were discussed:

a. CUTAL (Unified Labor Federation for Latin America) meeting scheduled for Rio de Janeiro, 24 - 28 January 1964. Mr. Montenegro, State labor advisor for Latin America, described the anticipated meeting as a "founding" assemblage of left-wing labor leaders, socialists, and communists who will attempt to resolve their differences. State believes that there will be a concerted effort by the communists to wrest the leadership of the fledgling federation from Mexican socialist elements. Following actions were discussed:

(1) State to cable US Ambassador to Brazil to ascertain the degree to which local (not national) governmental elements will support disruptive and harassing actions before and during the meeting.

(2) State to circularize Latin American posts with the suggestion that local influences be brought to bear in order to discourage country delegates from attending the meeting.

(3) USIA to consider VOA broadcasts to Latin America in order to exploit exposes of Cuban, East German, and Chinese Communist labor conditions.

(4) CIA to continue black propaganda operations in [redacted] which suggest postponement of the meeting. 6(1)(C)

Jer Wheeler, C/S

September 21, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JOHN H. CRIMMINS
Coordinator of Cuban Affairs
Department of State

SUBJECT: Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs: Possible Retaliatory Actions by the Castro Government (U)

Reference: Memorandum from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs Dept of State, subject as above, 13 Sep 63

In response to reference memorandum, outlined below is the status of existing contingency plans for those priority situations agreed upon at our meeting of September 12, 1963. The numbering of the paragraphs below corresponds to the format utilized in the attachment to reference memorandum and includes those actions for which Department of Defense specific or related military contingency plans exist.

"A. Actions Against U. S. Targets in Cuba

"4. Harassment of Guantanamo

"(a) Cutting off of the water supply"

COMMENT: [redacted] 6(1)(C) [redacted] In addition, evacuation of non-essential personnel in 24 hours or less can be accomplished if directed.

"(b) Closing access to the base by Cuban workers who commute"

9/23/3100 (8 JAN 63) W/JCS 2304/204-1

COMMENT: Provision is made for the introduction of [redacted]

"(c) Staging demonstration and riots at the gates"

COMMENT: Execution of measures appropriate to the degree, kind, and exact location of the disturbance, ranging from no action [redacted]

"(d) Sniping at base sentries resulting in injury or death"

COMMENT: Measures may be taken appropriate to the circumstances and situation ranging from no action, through action taken in self defense by a wounded sentry or those assisting him, [redacted]

6(1)(c)

"(e) Sabotaging of base facilities"

COMMENT: Extensive security measures are taken to prevent such sabotage by the Commander U. S. Naval Base, Guantanamo. The nature of the action taken would depend upon the nature of the sabotage and be designed to assure the continued functioning of the Base.

"B. Actions Against U. S. Aircraft and Shipping

"1. Harassment of U. S. Shipping using Ucatan Channel, Florida Straits, Windward Passage"

COMMENT: The rules of engagement, which have been approved by the highest national authority provide that ships or aircraft ordered to

the area may take immediate protective measures

6(1)(C)

"C. Actions Against Cuban Exiles

"1. Shooting down of pirate planes, possibly of US registry.

"2. Hot pursuit of or attack on raiding planes over the high seas or another country's territory.

"3. Hot pursuit of or attack on raiding boats on the high seas or another country's territorial waters.

"4. Attack on mother ship or exile raiders on the high seas or in another country's territorial waters."

COMMENT: It is noted that it is contrary to national policy to permit raids on Cuba originating from U. S. territory, however, at the time a ship or aircraft is discovered to be under Cuban attack it may be difficult to identify it as a "pirate," "raider," "mother ship" or "exile raider," even though this, in fact, may be the case. All the situations, set forth above, are covered, at least in part, by the rules of engagement which have been approved by the highest national authority. However, the action summarized below is authorized only in the case of U. S. ships and aircraft and those not clearly identified as being of foreign registry.

6(1)(C)

[redacted]

"5. Attack on staging areas employed by exiles in the Caribbean"

COMMENT: [redacted]

6(1)(c)

"E. Actions Against Targets in the US

"1. Sabotage or terroristic bombings"

COMMENT: The level of intensity of such actions contemplated within the context of the paper is not considered to exceed the capabilities of law enforcement agencies to control. There are military contingency plans to protect against this type of activity at a much higher level of intensity.

"2. Jamming of US radio stations"

COMMENT: There are standing operating procedures to overcome interference and jamming methods employed against military communications.

The summaries of actions set forth above are essentially defensive reactions to Cuban initiatives. There are, of course, existing and related military plans, retaliatory in nature, which range up to and include a full scale military invasion of Cuba.

It was generally agreed at the September 13, 1963 meeting of the Committee that the most likely actions of the Cuban government are those which would not provoke United States retaliation seriously and immediately endangering the Castro regime. It appears more likely that Castro might intensify his support of subversive forces in Latin

REPORT CONCERNING POSSIBLE RETALIATORY ACTIONS BY THE CASTRO GOVERNMENT

1. The numbering of the subparagraphs below corresponds to the numbering of those actions for which specific or related military contingency plans exist. A brief summary of the action contemplated by those plans is also provided.

"A. Actions Against U.S. Targets in Cuba

"4. Harassment of Guantanamo

"(a) Cutting off of the water supply"

COMMENT [redacted] Evacuation of non-essential personnel in 24 hours or less if directed and consistent with national policy.

"(b) Closing access to the base by Cuban workers who commute"

COMMENT Provision is made for the introduction of [redacted]

6(1)(C)

"(c) Staging demonstration and riots at the gates"

COMMENT Execution of measures appropriate to the degree, kind, and exact location of the disturbance, ranging from no action [redacted]

"(d) Sniping at base sentries resulting in injury or death"

COMMENT Measures may be taken appropriate to the

Enclosure

circumstance and situation ranging from no action, through action taken in self defense by a wounded sentry or those assisting him, [redacted]

6(1)(c)

"(e) Sabotaging of base facilities"

COMMENT Extensive security measures are taken to prevent such sabotage by the Commander U.S. Naval Base, Guantanamo. The nature of the action taken would depend upon the nature of the sabotage and be designed to assure the continued functioning of the Base.

"B. Actions Against U.S. Aircraft and Shipping

"1. Harassment of U.S. Shipping using Yucatan Channel, Florida Straits, Windward Passage"

COMMENT The rules of engagement, which have been approved by the highest national authority provide that ships or aircraft ordered to the area may take immediate protective measures [redacted]

6(1)(c)

"C. Actions Against Cuban Exiles

"1. Shooting down of pirate planes, possibly of US registry.

"2. Hot pursuit of or attack on raiding planes over the high seas or another country's territory.

"3. Hot pursuit of or attack on raiding boats on the high seas or another country's territorial waters

"4. Attack on mother ship or exile raiders on the high seas or in another country's territorial waters

COMMENT It is noted that it is contrary to national policy to permit raids on Cuba originating from U.S. territory, however, at the time a ship or aircraft is discovered to be under Cuban attack it may be difficult to identify it as a "pirate", "raider", "mother ship" or "exile raider", even though this, in fact, may be the case. All the situations, set forth above, are covered, at least in part, by the rules of engagement which have been approved by the highest national authority. However, the action summarized below is authorized only in the case of U.S. ships and aircraft and those not clearly identified as being of foreign registry.

"5. Attack on staging areas employed by exiles in the Caribbean

COMMENT

"E. Actions Against Targets in the US

"1. Sabotage or terroristic bombings"

COMMENT The level of intensity of such actions contemplated within the context of the paper is not considered to exceed the capabilities of law enforcement agencies to control. There are military contingency plans to protect against this type of activity at a much higher level of intensity.

"2. Jamming of US radio stations"

COMMENT There are standing operating procedures to overcome interference and jamming methods employed against military communications.

2. "Any additional pertinent information on existing or related plans" and "recommendations, if any, on other likely actions which might be taken by the Castro government in retaliation for Cuban exile raids" was also requested. The furnished list of possible retaliatory actions by the Castro government were of "the level of intensity which the committee agreed to be in the most likely category." It is inferred that what the committee had in mind by the most likely "level of intensity" was that level which would not provoke the United States into taking extensive countermeasures which might seriously endanger the Castro regime. The summaries of actions, set forth above, which might be taken under existing military contingency plans are essentially defensive reactions to Cuban initiatives. There are, however, existing and related military plans, retaliatory in nature, which range up to and include a full scale military invasion of Cuba.

3. If it is assumed that the most likely actions of the Cuban government are those which would not provoke United States retaliation seriously and immediately endangering the Castro regime, it appears more likely that Castro might intensify his support of subversive forces in Latin America

than risk direct confrontation with the United States. In the long run, such action is more dangerous and difficult to combat, and in the short run is less likely to provoke immediate and effective United States retaliation. Such actions would be in keeping with Castro's repeated declarations that Cuba is the main source of guidance inspiration for the "inevitable" Latin American revolution. Whereas an inflamed American public opinion over the killing of even a few sentries might require strong countermeasures, the training of a greater number of Latin American guerrillas than the 1500 or more trained in fiscal year 1962, probably would not. Nor is it likely that the return of those trainees to Latin American countries, their establishment of guerrilla training bases, recruitment of additional personnel, and engagement in insurgency actions would be as immediately provocative as interference with the water supply at Guantanamo. Similarly, closing access to the naval base Cuban workers who commute would deprive Castro of a source of foreign exchange. While such items as, "the harassment of air traffic into and out of Guantanamo," or "the harassment of US aircraft operating in the vicinity of or overflying Cuba," might be added to the list, it is considered that specific provocative actions are less likely and less dangerous than the intensification of support to subversive forces in Latin America. Such action not only is in keeping with the declared communist intention to support "national liberation movements of oppressed peoples" but may be done by means which avoid an invitation to overt US military countermeasures which would endanger the Castro regime. Thus, they are considered as of that level of intensity which places them in the most likely category as well as being in the category of most dangerous to the long range interests of the United States.